Critical Undersea Infrastructure: An Introduction
Executive Summary
Submarine infrastructure is essential to maintaining energy supplies and bulk communications across long distances.
There will continue to be an increase in the amount of submarine infrastructure in service, particularly in support of developing economies.
Submarine infrastructure has become firmly enmeshed within geopolitical tensions, primarily between the West and Russia, and China and the US.
Developing resilience in undersea infrastructure is often reliant on redundancy which is expensive, or deterrence which is uncertain, but there are a lack of viable alternatives.
The Importance of Undersea Critical Infrastructure
Of all the infrastructure built to enable modern and globalised societies nothing can be said to be more out of sight (and often mind) than the vast networks of undersea cables and pipelines that crisscross the ocean floor. Constructed firmly on the margins of what can be reached, this infrastructure crosses state jurisdictions and spans everything from shallow littoral environments to the very deep sea. This “critical undersea infrastructure” has been catapulted in political and public consciousnesses due to several high-profile incidents, the most prominent of those being the attack on the Nord Stream Pipelines. This article will introduce the basics of undersea critical infrastructure, its purpose and importance to national security and the major players in its construction, before vulnerable regions will be identified and the methods of building resilience will be discussed.
“Critical Infrastructure” as defined by the UK Government is any infrastructure that if compromised would likewise compromise the provision of essential services, or the national security or integrity of the state. This definition extends to the unseen arrays of cables and pipelines that interlink states and continents in a vast web. The consequences of damaging these cables have been well highlighted by past examples. The case of Nordstream is obvious, in 2021 Nordstream 1 supplied ~15% of European natural gas imports, and its destruction has serious implications for the continent’s energy security. And it's not just pipelines that provide energy security, submarine power cables transport electricity between nations, or from growing offshore renewable projects. Likewise, data cables have an essential role in communications, with ~95% of intercontinental data carried undersea. Damage to these cables is not uncommon, and can have severe effects. In January 2022 damage to one of the two undersea cables that service the Arctic island of Svalbard was damaged, reducing the entire island’s internet connectivity to outside sources to either a 2G network or satellite. The implication of this is a sudden loss of connectivity could have significant economic and security consequences if deliberately orchestrated. It goes without saying that some states are more reliant on undersea infrastructure than others, with coastal and island states utilising this infrastructure more often. There’s also an added vulnerability for remote or isolated regions or dependencies. Such as the previously mentioned Svalbard in the Arctic, or Guam in the Pacific which has become a hub for submarine cables.
Commercial and State Competition Underwater
The industry to install and support undersea infrastructure is only set to grow as connectivity is expanded and increased in the global south. Likewise, the explosion of cloud computing requires high bandwidth connections to large data centres. Digital growth can be seen to precipitate many more undersea cables over the coming years. Renewables and other “green energy” projects too are set to be a large driver of undersea infrastructure, with networks of submarine power cables carrying electricity between regions and countries with large renewable projects or the proposed hydrogen pipeline from Barcelona to Marseille. The rapid growth needed in the infrastructure is likely to shake up the industry, with state-backed Chinese companies muscling their way into a market that was previously split between French, American and Japanese companies. Crucially the growth of infrastructure in the Global South, and the ability for state-backed Chinese companies to offer significantly lower prices than their competitors ensures that they will likely continue to increase market share, even as the US is taking measures to limit Chinese input into digital infrastructure.
European connected submarine cables, image courtesy of European Marine Observation and Data Network, 2023.
The weighting of installed infrastructure towards the global north and developed economies is immediately visible; with Europe showing as a region of especially high density given the relatively shallow waters and short distances of the Baltic, North and Mediterranean Seas. The other obvious feature are the large cable “highways” that cross the Atlantic and the Pacific connecting North America to Europe and Asia respectively. These areas are seeing the most interest in terms of monitoring this subsea infrastructure as a function of the current geopolitical climate. Fears in the West of Russia’s ability to tamper with undersea infrastructure, its relative proximity to all these areas of noticeable density, and its war of aggression in Ukraine have elevated it to the status of an undersea boogeyman. Given the case of Nordstream, and the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine, an area to watch would be the Black Sea, as whoever carried out the former attacks likely has the capabilities to target infrastructure in the latter. Similarly, ongoing narratives as to the rise of China, and broader economic trends indicating a shift eastwards have seen the Pacific and South China gain in relevance. Aside from direct state competition, the diverse array of island nations in Southeast Asia and Oceania require increased connectivity to support economic growth and development. The supply of undersea infrastructure will likely be a key manifestation, albeit one with a tendency to go unseen, of the commercial and strategic competition between the US and China in the region.
The Inherent Vulnerabilities of Undersea Infrastructure:
The vulnerabilities of undersea infrastructure are well known, it is often far from state surveillance apparatus, difficult to access or repair, requires highly specialised equipment, and can be damaged through natural causes, accidental human action, or deliberate human action. Moreso, parsing out whether damage is deliberate or accidental is difficult given the distances involved, where the time to identify and reach the site may be in the regions of days or even weeks. States are looking to proactively deter interference in their undersea infrastructure through a number of initiatives, yet resilience will require more than deterrence. Like other forms of infrastructure, resilience requires both a suitable accounting for environmental factors, such as earthquakes or landslips, when design and construction specifications are developed, as well as an excess of system capacity such that should one element be damaged it can continue to operate. Due to the difficulties in protecting this infrastructure, in the short term redundancy will likely remain the key to resilience, albeit an expensive solution. In the longer term, it can be expected that both an increase in the number of platforms able to surveil and repair undersea infrastructure, as well as the proliferation of technologies such as large Underwater Unmanned Vehicles will provide the capability to assess and repair damage sooner, even if prevention will continue to be the primary challenge.
The seabed is only set to get more crowded as the demand for undersea infrastructure continues in pace with growing bandwidth and energy requirements. Correspondingly the importance that states place on their Critical Undersea Infrastructure will also increase as the visibility and scope of these systems increases. The shifting footprint of this infrastructure with rapid growth predicted in the global south ensures has provided an opportunity for Chinese intrusion into the market which will no doubt form a part of wider rivalries with the US. The undersea is a prominent dimension of geostrategic tensions and, beyond rising market competition, Nordstream has starkly highlighted the vulnerability of subsea infrastructure. The need to be able to protect this infrastructure begins at the design stage with the fostering of resilience. While the ability to proactively protect infrastructure is some way away, resilience in this area can be achieved through deterrence, the ability to quickly identify and repair damage, and redundancy.