How Russia will respond to Finnish and Swedish NATO membership
Executive Summary
Finnish and Swedish NATO membership is one of the most significant shifts within Arctic geopolitics in recent decades
The Nordic nations add sophisticated and well-established Arctic military and defence capabilities to NATO; the organisation should capitalise on this added intelligence and strengthen its Arctic operations
Russian isolation within Arctic forums such as the Arctic Council will cause the country to seek closer cooperation with newer Arctic players such as China and India
Russia is likely to build on pre-existing trends of remilitarising Soviet bases in the far North and will seek to consolidate its power in the Arctic, especially as Baltic Sea routes become more difficult to navigate
Geopolitical tension will grow and non-Arctic players will become more influential in the region
Rapid changes in the High North
The 18th of May 2022 brought with it one of the most significant shifts within Arctic geopolitics in recent decades. By applying to join the defence organisation in light of Russian aggression in Ukraine, Finland and Sweden threw aside 70 years of neutrality in favour of Western cooperation and alliance. Although Swedish accession is still waiting to be ratified, the inclusion of Finland in April 2023 saw NATO double its border with Russia by over 800 km, providing the organisation with an opportunity to increase its range and scope of ventures in the Arctic. The shift Westward increases the likelihood of Russian aggression within the Arctic, serving to significantly alter the geopolitical landscape of the Northern region.
The significance of Finnish and Swedish membership applications
Although Finland and Sweden have observed a close relationship with NATO (becoming Enhanced Operational Partners with the organisation in 2014), the dual application bid is significant. Prior to application, the Nordic nations provided in many ways a ‘third way’ in Arctic dealings, helping to bridge the gap between NATO and Russia (both geographically and within the Arctic Council), and ensuring a relative balance of power in the region. The move away from this neutrality and this ‘third way’ isolates Russia as the only non-NATO member of the Arctic Council, destabilising this power balance and pushing Russia towards closer cooperation with newer Arctic players such as China and India. This shift is troubling- increased Sino-Russian cooperation in particular can serve to destabilise the relative peace of the Arctic as both countries have demonstrated a willingness to act aggressively in political arenas (seen with South China Sea disagreements and Russian aggression in Ukraine respectively). The isolation of Russia within Arctic forums will only serve to increase such divergence.
Finnish and Swedish membership is significant in the implications it has on the scope and capability of NATO operations in the Arctic. The complete membership of all Nordic states brings all states of the NORDEFCO Nordic military defence alliance into NATO spheres, allowing for the smooth transition of NATO operations into the deep pre-existing trends of the Nordic defence alliance. This allows NATO to significantly grow its Arctic defence capabilities, with Finnish and American troops already carrying out defensive drills close to Finland's border with Russia. Mandatory Finnish conscription provides the organisation with an increased and capable military force who is specialised in Arctic defence and strategy. Finland is also touted to host the second largest number of F-35 fighting jets in Lapland (second only to Canada), with NATO operations in Finnish Arctic regions helping to consolidate NATO access to the strategic Arctic region of Finnmark. This expands on prior NATO activity in Finnmark through Norwegian territories, allowing the organisation to consolidate its hold of the geopolitically significant region Southwards through activities in the Finnish Lapland.
Implications on nautical geopolitics
Nordic NATO membership will have a significant impact on the Arctic Sea, even if NATO’s maritime border with the Arctic Sea sees no growth. The accession of Finland and Sweden essentially isolates Russia from the Baltic Sea, leading to the loss of a maritime connection through non-NATO waters between mainland Russia and its Kaliningrad Oblast exclave. This entrapment will push the country to search for alternative naval arenas, and the Arctic, with its receding ice area, is an attractive choice. Whilst ice melt has potentially detrimental impacts on local ecosystems, it also opens up the Sea to increased geopolitical action, with resource extraction and naval trade routes becoming more viable. This causes the Arctic Sea to provide Russia with an opportunity to shore up its geographical weaknesses and access new trade routes as well as resource deposits, with the Arctic already providing the country with over 80% of its natural gas reserves.
Although NATO Nordic accession is likely to accelerate Russian interest in the maritime opportunities that the Arctic Sea presents, Russian Arctic naval presence is not new. The country has for a number of years been rearming and reutilising Arctic Soviet military bases, with Russia using search and rescue operations as well as defence of shipping lanes as a premise for a naval military presence in the region. The inclusion of Finland and Sweden into NATO will allow Russia to claim a necessity of a defensive military presence within the North Sea, and the country will likely increase its maritime ties with China in order to ensure this. Since China’s admission as an Observer Member of the Arctic Council in 2013, Sino-Russian ties have grown in the Arctic, with Chinese Polar Silk Road initiatives passing through naval Russian EEZ zones in the North. Nordic NATO membership will certainly push Russia closer to China and see an acceleration in Arctic militarisation.
Make it stand out
Map showing Russia’s major military and dual-use installations in the Arctic, image courtesy of SWP, 2022
The Kola Peninsula
Finnish NATO membership gives the organisation a much closer reach to Russia’s Kola Peninsula. This poses a significant problem for Russia- the Kola Peninsula serves as the Headquarters of Russian military activities, and as the homebase of its Northern Fleet. Russia has repeatedly touted Finnish NATO membership as an active sign of aggression against its national defence. Thus, Finnish accession will cause Russia to shore up its military capacities in the Kola region, serving to connect Arctic post-Soviet bases together in a Northern defence network. The Kola Peninsula is also home to Russia’s strategically significant Murmansk military base, which Russia will begin to utilise more intensely after Nordic NATO accession. Severomosk serves as one of Russia's key ice-free ports, allowing Russia to materialise on its desire to increase its maritime military presence in the Arctic Sea. The base also hosts nuclear-powered submarines and ICBMS. This is key to note as Russia has long threatened nuclear attack in the face of perceived aggression; if Russia resorts to nuclear capacities, the Murmansk military base is a likely site for this. As Russia will seek to increase its defensive and military capabilities of the Kola peninsula, Murmansk’s arsenal may grow accordingly.
Why Russia will respond aggressively
Russia has shown time and again in its history that when it feels vulnerable, it will seek to securitise, and to aggressively project power (or threaten to). Nordic (especially Finnish) membership is something the country has deemed unacceptable for a long time, with Putin repeatedly threatening countermeasures in light of such action. The doubling of NATO’s border with Russia will be viewed as a sign of encroachment by Russia, pushing the country to rapidly seek to address the altered balance of power politics within the region. Russia can build on recent trends of Soviet base remilitarisation, and will shore up its Arctic defence. Suspension from the Arctic Council in 2022 also frees the country of necessary cooperative measures with other Northern nations, providing Russia with an opportunity to act more belligerently in the region with little extra detriment.
The Arctic region also provides Russia with lucrative multifaceted avenues if it acts assertively. As the war in Ukraine continues to substantially weaken Russian military capabilities, the Arctic is becoming an increasingly attractive option for the country to begin to rebuild and remilitarise, allowing the country a chance to focus its renewed military attention on the North. Close cooperation with China will continue, with Russia likely looking East to shore up its control over Northern trade routes in particular. Mottola writes of the necessity of NATO acknowledging that ‘Russia, and to a lesser extent China, will continue to increase its focus in the securitisation of strategic energy reserves’, connoting the wide-reaching effects of Russian aggression in the Arctic.
What the future holds
Russian militarisation and focus on the Arctic will continue more rapidly after Nordic accession, providing China with an opportunity to firmly establish itself as a key Arctic player through collaborative action with Russia. The reactivation of Soviet bases will cause the Arctic to become an increasingly strategic military area, and can serve to lead to significant tensions over energy and trade activity in the area. As Arctic ice melts, such trends will only grow, with Russia increasingly seeing the Arctic as a region upon which it can assert dominance.
Likely Russian aggression in the Arctic should act as a sign for NATO to act. The organisation will unveil a new security agenda in June in Madrid until 2030, with this expected to contain a greater focus on security and defence. Whilst Russia looks North, NATO, with its increased Arctic capacity and resources should do the same. Although Swedish ratification is still incomplete, the country will soon join, and with it, NATO gains developed Arctic members with longstanding histories of defensive Arctic collaboration upon which it should capitalise. Finland and Sweden enrich NATO’s capacities significantly and are a key new tool in the organisation's arsenal which it will need to learn how to leverage as the Arctic becomes increasingly militarised, and Russian threats to NATO move Northwards.