The Future of the Arctic Council as Russia Hands the Chair to Norway
Executive Summary
The Arctic Council will resume work in June 2023 following a pause after the invasion of Ukraine.
Norway must mediate rising tensions between Russia and Western states as NATO’s presence bolsters in the Arctic and Russia seeks to involve BRICS nations.
Norway is well suited to this role having a longstanding cooperative history with Russia.
As the invasion of Ukraine endures, Russia will be less likely to be reintroduced into the Arctic Council.
The Arctic Council's influence will be challenged because it does not deal with military matters as security issues heighten in the high north.
The Arctic Council on Thin Ice
On 11 May 2023, Russia handed the chairmanship of the Arctic Council, the primary forum for Arctic cooperation, to Norway. This transition bears particular significance for the Arctic following a pause in the council as Russia invaded Ukraine. The extent of Russian participation will be uncertain once the council officially resumes in June, a problem compounded by a freeze in bilateral dialogue between Norway and Russia. Norway is left to navigate rising tensions between Western states and Russia, competitive interest in the high north from non-Arctic states, and the Arctic’s role in mitigating the ever-present threat of climate change. However, Morten Høglund, Chair of the Senior Arctic Officials, suggests the Arctic Council resumption will be limited to the six key working groups in June, while meetings commencing at the “political level” remain uncertain.
Since 2020, the Arctic Council has rarely functioned to its full capacity. The pandemic restricted the scientific work and international diplomacy which characterise the organisation. The Russian invasion of Ukraine prompted the seven other Arctic states – Canada, The United States, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Iceland, and Norway – to release a joint statement of temporary withdrawal from the Arctic Council in March 2022. When the Arctic Council resumes, Høglund asserts that the Arctic states do not want the expulsion of Russia, but “it is not possible for Russia to be included” currently. The Arctic Council’s broad objectives – “to advance sustainable development, environmental protection, and good governance” – will be hindered without involvement from the high north’s largest and most populated state. The council will not have access to valuable social, environmental, and economic data, and the Permanent Participants of the Arctic Council will continue to suffer from the lapse in cooperation. The Saami people, indigenous to Finland, Sweden, and Norway, have lost communication with the Saami in Russia since the invasion and show concern for the treatment of indigenous people in the area.
The development of key Russian Arctic infrastructure, such as the Arctic-2 LNGs Project (partially pictured above), has become reliant on Chinese investment. Image courtesy of NOVATEK
A Russian Opening of the Arctic
The bolstered presence of NATO in the Arctic, coupled with the diplomatic break following the invasion of Ukraine, has led Russia to voice its consideration of alternative formats for cooperation. As Nikolay Korchunov, a Russian Senior Arctic Official, explains, “if the organization becomes useless or our rights are violated, we could consider leaving”. Russia has been vocal about collaborating with BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) states in the high north, reducing its dependence on the Arctic Council through projects such as an international scientific station in Spitsbergen, energy infrastructure partnerships, and cooperation with China as part of the Belt and Road initiative.
BRICS represents a coalition of resistance to the US and NATO. As their presence builds where Russian relations with the West break down, the Arctic is subject to greater geopolitical tension, especially where decision-making is diverted from the Arctic Council. Local scientific activity provides opportunities to increase military presence, as China has demonstrated previously, control of natural resources strengthens global power, and new transportation routes have implications for environmental degradation and climate change. For the Arctic Council to satisfy all eight states, manage the unavoidable involvement of non-Arctic states, and remain the primary forum on Arctic issues, Norway must leverage its long history of maintaining cooperation and managing aggression with Russia.
Securing a Degree of Cooperation
Geography and historical precedent make Norway well suited to leading the Arctic Council through geopolitical instability with Russia. Norway is the only neighbouring country on which Russia has not waged war and, alongside their alliance during the Second World War, this remains socially pertinent for both countries. Norway and Russia also share a border and a broadly constructive diplomatic history cooperating on disaster response, search and rescue, and shipping traffic management. Their bilateral fishing regulation in the Barents Sea exemplifies successful conflict management spanning almost 50 years. Through these issues, Norway and Russia display a “low-level or ‘soft’ dialog in addition to other more formal channels of communication” based on mutual understanding and joint stakes, which can serve as a model for conflict resolution in the Arctic Council. However, Norway’s diplomacy with Russian Arctic officials rests on when the invasion of Ukraine ceases. As Thomas Winkler, Danish Ambassador to the Arctic, states, “When Russia changes its behavior, the first place where we will resume cooperation is the Arctic”.
A door to the Arctic Council left open for Russia will narrow as the conflict in Ukraine endures. Whitney Lackenbauer, Canada Research chair, argues that Arctic exceptionalism has ceased, and we will likely see a regression of the Arctic Council to focus on its core scientific functions rather than producing binding treaties. Data channels can still flow at this level, but at the diplomatic level, the West will become more entrenched in its NATO camp and Russia in its bilateral extra-Arctic relationships. Arctic Council Observer States will most benefit from a divided high north. For example, a Russian Arctic more favourable to resource extraction will be a more attractive site for investment than its counterparts. Equally, should Arctic states not satisfy extraneous stakeholders' interests, eyes may drift along the northern circle. Trending military posturing in the Arctic, such as Russia’s recent live-fire exercises in the Barents Sea, will further increase the geopolitical temperature as a potential arms race echoes that of the Cold War. This would challenge the Arctic Council’s influence as an organisation that does not deal with military matters. Norway’s challenge as chair is to reimagine lines of diplomatic engagement with Russia and its allies to reduce tension in the high north, catalyse scientific endeavours, and continue promoting indigenous people's voices.