The geostrategic significance and opportunities provided by the Svalbard islands
Executive Summary
The Svalbard Islands are party to a unique formation of legislation and sovereign rulings
Russia and Norway are currently the only two nations which uphold an oil and mining presence in the region
Russia is keen to maintain and to begin to, expand its presence in the Svalbard region
China, in its look Northwards, can utilise Russian weakness and its pre-existing research base on Svalbard to propagate its Northern Belt and Road Initiatives
The Svalbard Islands (also known as the Spitsbergen Archipelago) are in many ways an Arctic anomaly. Nominally under Norwegian territory, the islands encompassing 62,700 square km are party to an unusual set of regulations laid out in the Spitsbergen Treaty of 1920. While Norway retains ultimate sovereignty, any citizen from the (now 46) signatory country has access and equal rights to hunting, fishing, industrial activities and mining. The Treaty also discourages military activities within the region, but, crucially, does not prohibit it. The lack of pre-existing indigenous populations on the Islands further blurs these inherently pliable lines of autonomy, with the explicit rights given to any citizen of Spitsbergen Treaty signatory members leading to a permanent presence of a multitude of nationalities present in the region. Seen most significantly through the presence of Russian mining activity in the towns of Pyramiden and Barentsburg, countries are able to leverage the Treaty in order to gain an increasingly permanent foothold in a region of strategic importance.
Svalbard’s geostrategic importance
Being home to the most Northern permanently inhabited settlement in the world (Longyearbyen is host to a population of about 2 and a half thousand), Svalbard provides an opportunity for countries to set up a legitimate base in one of the most Northern territories in the world. The strategic placement (lying between the Barents, Greenland and the Norwegian Sea) provides Svalbard with an active stake in Arctic politics, with the surrounding warm water currents making the region relatively accessible, especially in comparison to other Arctic outposts. This makes Svalbard an increasingly viable option from which countries can establish, and subsequently expand, their Arctic base. Such has been the case with China, with the country's Arctic Yellow River Station established in Ny Alesund in 2003 predating their Polar Belt and Road activities.
The nominal pliability of Svalbard’s sovereignty has caused the region to be predisposed to regional conflict. The notion of not inhibiting the rights of a Treaty signatory country to enjoy the areas’ and surrounding maritime area’s resources has come into conflict with Norwegian territorial claims. Most notably over the establishment of an EEZ, in which Norway wants to protect the fishing resources of Svalbard from non-sovereign actors (specifically Russia), the region has seen consistent resource disputes, with the unique sovereignty agreements of the region helping to inflame such tension.
Russian presence in Pyramiden and Barentsburg
Whilst all Treaty countries are permitted to maintain an economic presence in the region, the only country that does so expressly along with Norway is Russia, with the countries being the only two to still uphold an oil and mining presence in Svalbard. Russian oil ventures are seen primarily through their presence in the towns of Pyramiden and Barentsburg. In both instances, the oil companies are run by the state-owned Trust Arktikugol. What is interesting to note about the Russian oil and gas presence in Svalbard is that it is not a profitable business. Barentsburg, one of Russia’s oil outposts in the region is essentially a ghost town, with Russia not receiving any oil and gas reserves from the region for the past few years. Russia’s economic ties with the Svalbard region date from closer historical connections during the Soviet Era, with Russian activity in the Svalbard region being synonymous with their actions in the High North in general.
However, although the mines do not run a profit anymore, Russian presence through these oil towns is maintained, with a Svalbard Committee even being set up by some of Putin’s closest aides in 2019. Before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russian companies cooperated closely with Norwegian tourism firms, promoting travel and economic flows. Joint Russian and Norwegian efforts on research and scientific legitimacy helped shore up Russia’s presence in the region. However, all such activities with Norway have since been suspended.
The opportunities that a presence in Svalbard provides Russia
In light of the suspension of activities with Norway, Russian presence in Svalbard has not ceded. Longstanding national ties have helped to cement the legitimacy of Russian presence in the Archipelago, with each Russian citizen present in the region providing Moscow an opportunity to play the ‘protecting Russian nationals’ playbook as was seen in South Ossetia and Crimea. The historical presence of the country makes its position in the region hard to lodge, with Longyearbyen and Bareentsburg seeing, if anything, growing Russian activity in the face of low coal reserves.
Svalbard also provides Russian with an opportunity to shore up its defences against a perceived threat posed by NATO and ally members in the High North. A 2017 report by Russian Defense Ministries touted Svalbard and its maritime zone as potential areas of confrontation between Russia and NATO, connoting how disputes such as Norwegian EEZ establishments is ultimately a multifaceted one; economic interests interlay with defensive capabilities in the Arctic region. In this vein, Russia sees Svalbard as a region of geostrategic significance upon which it can build and perpetuate a legitimate Northern presence. Svalbard provides the Russian Northern Fleet and Kola Peninsula access to the North Sea, further incentivising Russia to continue its actions and to shore up its lines of defence.
Russia also holds an unfavourable view of the Spitsbergen Treaty. The 1920 signing coincided with a time of civil war within the nation, with Russians feeling as though they did not have a fair shot at negotiation, and Russia only signing onto the Treaty in 1935. This has in part encouraged Russia’s insistence on ensuring the continuation of its influence on the region- in the face of a perceived geopolitical slighting, it will seek to redress its authority in a region close to home.
Svalbard’s geographic location, pliable sovereignty legislation, and historic connections to the Soviet Union provide Russia with an opportunity to propagate its influence in the Arti from a base of legitimacy. At a time of diminishing European connectivity, Russia’s presence in Svalbard provides the nation with an opportunity to implement, and propagate its power North in the face of defeat in Ukraine. As the world looks more closely at the resources and trade implications of a melting Arctic, Russia’s solid foundation provides it with a springboard from which it will aim to beat other key players to regional dominance.
A rising China in the face of a weakened Russia
It is also important to note the role of China in the Arctic and the implications of a weakened Russia on their bilateral ties. Whilst Russia can turn to its established presence in the Arctic in order to seek power in new global theatres, the growth of Chinese political assertiveness in non-Asian theatres has been rapid. Russia and China have enjoyed a lengthy relationship, and one which has been growing in recent years, allowing China to strengthen its activities in the high North (such as the establishment of a Polar Silk Road in 2018). Similarly to Russia springboarding off the pliability of sovereignty norms in Svalbard, China is looking to do the same. As the power dynamic of the bilateral relationship tilts in favour of China, it is likely that Russia is unable to keep China out of Arctic theatres as it becomes dependent on the nation for economic and trade ties. China, as a signatory of the Spitsbergen Treaty, and as an owner of a Research Station in the region is able to follow a similar trajectory to Russia and turn pliable national laws into opportunity. Unlike Russia however, China has the economic growth, resources and available manpower to exploit this newfound position in the Arctic better, and is going to become a key player in the Arctic for many years to come.