Intelligence Briefing - From Pyongyang to Kursk: North Korea’s Deployment in the War Against Ukraine
By Rebecca Atzori
Summary
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has provided missiles and deployed troops fighting alongside Russian soldiers in the Russian Kursk region, to counter the Ukrainian offensive and likely to make up for Russia’s manpower shortage. This has caused a general escalation of the conflict, leading to the USA and UK authorising Ukraine’s launching of long-range missiles into Russian territory, and Russian president Putin revising Russia’s nuclear doctrine. The situation is now tense but stalling, considering the leadership transitions in the US and EU. Prolonged conflict is expected, with potential shifts in strategy by Russia, the potential involvement of Belarus, fragmented Western unity, and increased roles for China and Türkiye in shaping outcomes.
Current Deelopments
North Korean troops have joined the Russian front of the war in Ukraine. South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) reported the presence of North Korean troops in Russia in late October, noting receipt of training and equipment before deployment. The report has been supported by statements from NATO countries (e.g., USA), and Ukraine, with estimates ranging from 1,500 to 12,000 North Korean soldiers. Moreover, unverified frames on the internet appear to show soldiers of Asian ethnicity fighting on the Russian side.
Additionally, Ukraine is reported to have captured three wounded DPRK soldiers, of whom two have survived and given statements to the Ukrainian Secret Services. The NIS supported the statement of Ukrainian president Zelensky.
North Korea supplied the Russian Federation with ballistic missiles between December 2023 and January 2024. The South Korean government, Ukraine and NATO allies have found evidence of North Korean missiles on Ukrainian soil, following unusually heavy aerial attacks from the Russian Federation.
The Biden Administration approved the usage of US long-range missiles for offensive purposes on Russian soil by Ukrainian forces. The UK and France tacitly followed, albeit without releasing any public statement regarding the matter. This signalled a powerful escalation of the conflict, leading Putin to change Russia’s nuclear doctrine to allow every indirect involvement in the war against the Russian Federation to be countered by a direct nuclear strike. However, this is widely considered to be for purely rhetorical effect.
Ukrainian Air Forces reported the Russian Federation’s first IRBM launch since the conflict started. On 20th November, the Ukrainian Air Force reported an aerial attack from Russia’s Astrakhan region, conducted with several missile types, including an ICBM. This was confirmed the day after by the Russian President.
The Russian Federation has significantly increased the number of drones and missiles used in aerial attacks in December 2024. The Russian Federation used this strategy in the two previous winters, with the aim of hitting critical energy infrastructure and using winter as a weapon against Ukraine, thereby increasing the impact of its attacks.
Vladimir Putin meeting Kim Jong-Un in Pyongyang, North Korea, 18 June 2024. Source: BBC (KCNA)
Analysis
The deployment of DPRK troops signals a shortage in Russian manpower. With an overheating economy and strained population, Russia needs to make up for the losses on the ground while avoiding a second mobilisation of its citizens. This is due to concerns of potential for negative domestic political consequences as well as the lack of command personnel and weaponry for additional units.
No major advances on the ground have occurred on the Russian side after more than two months of reported DPRK troop deployment. DPRK soldiers are deployed in the Kursk region to counter Ukrainian offensive operations. Since the deployment of North Korean soldiers, Ukrainians have slightly backed down in the Kursk region, maintaining offensive operations. On the other side, several North Koreans are said to have fallen given difficulties stemming from the lack of training and language-related communication problems with Russian soldiers.
Ukrainian capacity is being put under pressure following the deployment of DPRK troops. No official figures have been disclosed, but anonymous Ukrainian soldiers have reported details to journalists about North Korean soldiers' tactics and the subsequent strain they are putting on Ukrainian troops in the Kursk region. No significant advances on the Ukrainian side in the Kursk region have been reported since the deployment of DPRK troops.
It is unlikely that any major response will come from NATO countries and their allies, considering several elements of uncertainty among Western countries. In particular, the installment of Donald Trump as new US president on 20 January 2025; Germany’s presidential elections in February; the new EU Parliament and Commission. Western support for Ukraine is unlikely to change for weeks if not months, despite these developments refocusing attention on Ukraine vis-à-vis the war in Gaza and recurrent appeals by Ukrainian president Zelensky.
Belarus might be incentivised to increase its military support for Russia troops if no response nor retaliation is taken by the international community over the deployment of North Korean troops. Considering the increasingly stricter reliance of Belarus’ economy on Russia, which allowed Belarus’ economy to grow and overcome Western sanctions, it is likely that Belarusian president, Alexander Lukashenko, is no longer in the position to deny Russia of further support. This might translate with covert operations, presence of troops on the Belarus-Ukraine border, military infrastructure availability and, despite unlikely, deployment of Belarusian troops along with the Russian military, on the line of the DPRK’s example. Belarus has long supported the Russian Federation in its attack on Ukraine, which started by allowing Russian tanks and troops to move in its territory before invading Ukraine. This caused the international community to impose sanctions on Belarus, which has since continued supporting Putin regardless. However, despite imminent elections already see Lukashenko continuing being Belarus’ president, an actual entry into the Ukraine war would entail a significant risk of a political suicide. In fact, the majority of Belarusian does not support the war, and domestic discontent might result in non-pacific protests led by the opposition.
China is most likely non-supportive of the DPRK’s direct involvement, in line with its long-standing stance of non-interference. China is extremely unlikely to publicly endorse nor condemn the latest development, despite its known sympathy for the Russian president and existing similarities with the situation with Taiwan.
Türkiye will likely remain a decisive actor in potential ceasefire or peace talks. Türkiye has in recent years tried to enhance its role in international fora by taking strong stances to ensure the support of Middle Eastern countries (including, the direct and loud condemnation of Israeli actions in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria) and by showing a more moderate approach when dealing with Western countries in order to ensure their non-hostility, if not their support.
Scholars and practitioners are still debating over the applicability of international law and consequential international humanitarian law to this development. Someargue that the DPRK has entered into an international armed conflict (IAC) with Ukraine, while others have refrained from making such a strong statement. This would have consequences on how DPRK soldiers are treated and whether those captured can be considered prisoners of war (POWs). There appears to be consensus regarding the DPRK’s violation of international law through providing support to a country which has initiated a war of aggression against a sovereign state.
Pictured: A North Korean soldier, captured in Kursk Oblast. Source: X (@ZelenskyyUa)
Forecast: Short & Medium Term
In the short-term (1-3 months), a transition phase is most likely. Russian advancements are likely to stagnate; the integration of DPRK troops does not seem to have strongly benefitted Russia to date, considering the logistical and operational challenges on the ground – namely miscommunication among soldiers because of the language barrier and the non-familiarity of North Korean soldiers with Russian systems. However, this might allow the Russian Federation to sustain pressure against the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk. Western responses might indeed stall, due to the transition of power in the United States and the consequent re-adjustment of US’ foreign policy priorities and commitments to Ukraine. With this impasse, NATO countries are likely to delay their response to the DPRK’s involvement in the conflict, ultimately losing the attention the conflict had regained due to DPRK involvement. Meanwhile, it appears certain that EU support will continue, despite mounting uncertainty concerning NATO contributions. Russia friendly countries – notably China and Türkiye – are likely to subtly continue their support for Russia, awaiting a more clear response from NATO countries. In the long-term, Belarus might start joint military ground exercises with the Russian military in order to prepare for increased support or possible joint action in Ukraine. This is feasible given previous joint military exercises, which would allow Belarus to plausibly deny accusations of direct support to Russia in the conflict.
In the medium-long term (6-9 months), we might observe the prolonging of the conflict with shifting dynamics. Russian forces might reset their strategy once DPRK troops are fully established in the Russian theatre, even if DPRK troop deployment rates are insufficient for replenishing ranks against the current rate of Russian troop losses.
It is unlikely that international institutions will provide a clear response on the legal status of North Korea in the armed conflict within the given period. This might further incentivise Belarus to support the Russian army with trained troops, thereby increasing the burden on Ukraine’s military capabilities and morale, and leaving Western countries with a dilemma. However, Western countries are highly likely to experience increased fragmentation due to the second Trump administration, which is likely to be less interventionary and likely to pressure European and NATO countries to be the same with respect to the Ukrainian conflict. The EU might struggle to have a unified perspective on the matter considering member states’ domestic pressures, such as energy prices and inflation. Lack of a unified stance may cause the EU to fragment further. This general fragmentation might hinder aid and military equipment support to Ukraine, and increase the sway of other powers in the broader dynamic of the conflict, such as China and Türkiye. Pressure from humanitarian organisations to recognise North Korean troops as combatants under the legal framework of international armed conflicts may increase, as the legal status of North Korean prisoners is still unknown. On North Korea’s side, the involvement on the battlefield will translate into a development of its military doctrine through lessons learned through direct combat experience, acquired knowledge on test weapons systems and the gained access to Russian military technologies. More generally, the DPRK will also benefit in terms of securing Russia’s further assistance in circumventing UN sanctions. This might alter the security context in the Korean peninsula.