By Ciaran Murray

Summary

The tensions between Serbia and Kosovo significantly increased in September and October 2023, after a group of around thirty ethnic-Serbian militants attacked Kosovan police officers in Banjska, Northern Kosovo. This led to a siege by Kosovan authorities on a local monastery where the militants had barricaded themselves. Serbia then mobilised approximately 4000 troops and sent them to military bases along the Kosovan border, along with armoured vehicles and artillery. Fears of an imminent Serbian invasion resulted in NATO deploying additional troops to Kosovo and international condemnation of Serbian aggression. Serbian troops were withdrawn days later, and tensions have since decreased, but relations between Serbia and Kosovo remain significantly strained.

Current Developments

Attack in Northern Kosovo:

• At approximately 02:00 local time on 24/09/2023, a group of around thirty ethnic-Serb militants opened fire from multiple positions of Kosovan police officers near a roadblock in the village of Banjska, Zvecan Municipality, Northern Kosovo. 

• Kosovan police patrols were called to reports of trucks blocking a bridge just outside Banksja. Responding police patrols were ambushed, resulting in one dead and one wounded.

• The militants then drove to a Serbian Orthodox monastery in Banjska and barricaded themselves inside.

• Local media reported an increased police presence in Banjska at around 09:00 local time. This was followed by reports of a police operation to clear Banjska Monastery at around 12:30 local time. By 17:00, local media reported that the sweep was complete, with three militants killed and a large number arrested.

• Kosovan authorities alleged the remaining militants escaped across the border to Serbia, with wounded fighters being treated in the city of Novi Pazar.

• Images of equipment seized from the militants released by Kosovan authorities include but are not limited to:

  • Small arms

  • Heavy weapons

  • Explosives

  • Drones

  • Identification cards/documents

  • Approximately 20 SUVs, some of which had ‘KFOR’ stickers attached.

• Weapons analysis carried out by Militant Wire indicates that much of the equipment is Serbian-made, and some weapons shown are rarely found outside of the Serbian armed forces.

• 29/09/2023, Milan Radoicic, the Vice President of the Kosovan Serb List party, admitted to organising and leading the attack in Banjska. Radoicic lives in Serbia and has already been wanted by Kosovan authorities in connection with the 2018 killing of a moderate (he supported a peaceful coexistence of ethnic Albanians and Serbs) Kosovan Serb politician Oliver Ivanovic.

• On 03/10/2023, Radoicic was detained by Serbian authorities in Belgrade. Prosecutors recommended he should remain in custody, but the Serbian High Court instead released Radoicic the next day, prohibiting him from leaving his place of residence or the country without the Court’s permission.

Serbian Troop Buildup:

• On 25/09/2023, Serbian pro-Russian Telegram channels posted images and videos purporting to show Serbian Armed Forces vehicles travelling towards the border with Kosovo.

• On 29/09/2023, a video claiming to show Polish KFOR troops moving into Zvecan Municipality, Northern Kosovo, was published on X.

• On 29/09/2023, White House National Security Spokesperson John Kirby said the US was aware of an ‘unprecedented buildup’ of Serbian troops and armour (tanks, mechanised infantry, artillery) along its border with Kosovo.

• On 29/09/2023, NATO stated it was increasing its presence in Northern Kosovo, and the UK stated it was sending additional troops to boost the KFOR contingent in the region.

• On 30/09/2023, the Kosovan government claimed Serbia had deployed additional troops to 48 military bases along the border.

• Statements from the Serbian government indicate that approximately 4000 troops, vehicles, and equipment were deployed to these bases - around double the average level.

• On 02/10/2023, the Serbian Army claimed it had reduced its presence along the border to normal levels. The Serbian Army also rejected claims that this deployment was unprecedented, pointing to previous instances where higher numbers of troops were mobilised, and the armed forces were put on combat readiness.

International Reactions:
EU and EU Member States’ Reactions

• EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell condemned the "hideous attack", saying those responsible must be brought to justice. He blamed Albin Kurti, prime minister of Kosovo,  for failing to set up the association of Serb-majority municipalities to ensure their autonomy in the country.

• European Commission spokesperson Peter Stano called the Serbian buildup concerning, called for an immediate withdrawal and urged for an investigation with full Serbian cooperation.

• The EU stated that neither Kosovo nor Serbia would be admitted into the Union until both nations normalised relations with each other.

• German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said Germany was monitoring tensions and would react if necessary.

• German Chancellor Olaf Scholz called for both countries to de-escalate.

US Reactions

• The US condemned the attack and urged both sides to defuse the situation. US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken called on both governments to avoid increasing tensions.

• The US called on Serbia to withdraw its troops from the border after detecting the buildup.

Russia Reaction

• Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said Russia was monitoring the situation in Kosovo and suggested Kosovan authorities may have staged the attack.

Analysis

Serbian Involvement

This attack was likely carried out with the knowledge of the Serbian government to stoke nationalist sentiment amongst the Serbian population due to the upcoming snap election. However, it is also likely that the Serbian government maintained sufficient distance from the operation to allow for plausible deniability in the aftermath.

The group’s equipment and training indicate a level of sophistication unlikely achievable by independent groups. The extent of equipment used by militants indicates the group was highly likely well-organised and well-financed. Moreover, the rarity of some of the seized weapons on civilian markets suggests the group probably has links to the Serbian Armed Forces. Additionally, the ambush tactics and successful escape indicate that the group possibly had prior military-style training. 

Furthermore, the strong links between the Serb List and the Serbian government, as well as Radoicic and Vucic, the President of Serbia, means it is unlikely an attack of this scale could have been planned without Vucic’s awareness. While Serbian authorities detained Radoicic, his voluntary admission of guilt and subsequent release pending investigation indicates he will be given a lenient sentence. This suggests cooperation between Radoicic and the Serbian state, as it appears he will not be seriously punished for his involvement in the attack.

As Radoicic organised and carried out the attack, the Serbian government had sufficient plausible deniability to refute allegations of involvement, thus preserving its international reputation. There is a possibility that this attack was carried out entirely independently of the Serbian government; however, the current evidence suggests at least a partial involvement of the Serbian state.

The calling of a snap election by Vucic a month after the initial attack indicates he is trying to boost his domestic support after a recent decrease in public satisfaction. Announcing the election, Vucic said, “we are living in a time in which it is necessary for all of us to be united in the struggle for vital [...] interests of Serbia”. As much of the Serbian population is opposed to the existence of Kosovo as an independent state, increasing tensions with Prishtina will likely prompt a rally-around-the-flag effect amongst the electorate, increasing Vucic’s popularity. Indeed, it is probable that Vucic’s SNS party will win the upcoming election, renewing its legitimacy to govern.

Internationally, while EU membership is desirable for Serbia, it is not contingent on its recognition of Kosovo but on normalisation between the two states. Serbia’s decision to act aggressively, placing troops on its border with Kosovo, indicates a lack of appetite for normalisation. While Serbia is divided on the issue of EU membership, the idea that Kosovo is Serbian has widespread support. This means that Vucic does not face significant domestic pressure to pursue EU membership and will likely gain more support from an antagonistic stance towards Kosovo.

Serbia also benefits from this attack due to its potential to destabilise Kosovo. The infiltration of a militant group into Kosovo will likely evoke feelings of insecurity and frustration amongst the ethnic-Albanian Kosovan population due to the inability of Prishtina to prevent such attacks. The attack will also prompt tightened security in Northern Kosovo, which has the potential to incite unrest within the ethnic-Serb majority native to that region. Therefore, both the ethnic-Albanian and ethnic-Serbian populations in Kosovo will likely be dissatisfied with the government and aggressive towards one another; thus, there is an increased chance of destabilising Kosovo internally.

Serbian Annexation Plans

It is unlikely Serbia planned to annex Northern Kosovo as part of this operation due to the high probability of conventional war between Kosovo and Serbia and significant international reaction. The proximity of the conflict to other European states and the high chance of escalation to a regional conflict in the Balkans means it is probable that Kosovo would receive aid from European countries and that Serbia would face heavy economic sanctions for its aggression.

According to the Military Technical Agreement signed in 1999 between NATO, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the Republic of Serbia, KFOR troops are authorised to use military force to enforce withdrawals of Serbian troops if they enter Kosovan territory. UNSC Resolution 1244 also states that KFOR is permitted to enforce the ceasefire between Serbia and Kosovo and prevent the return of Serbian troops to Kosovo.

Therefore, it is almost certain that in the event of a Serbian annexation attempt, NATO would provide military assistance to Kosovo. It is also likely that European nations and other allies of Kosovo, such as the US, would provide economic and/or military aid to defend its sovereignty. 

The EU would likely impose economic sanctions on Serbia in the event of an attempt to annex Northern Kosovo. The EU is a significant trading partner for Serbia, accounting for over half of its overall trade in 2022. Therefore, it is highly probable that sanctions would have a detrimental effect on the Serbian economy due to its dependence on European trade. A similar scenario occurred during the Yugoslav Wars when comprehensive UN sanctions heavily damaged the Serbian economy, leading to a cessation of hostilities.

Serbia-Kosovo Relations

As Kosovan security services carry out investigations and arrests in Northern Kosovo over the coming weeks, tensions between authorities and ethnic-Serbs in the region will likely increase. Due to the significance of the September attack and subsequent Serbian troops build-up, it is unlikely that the Kosovan government will give majority-Serb municipalities increased autonomy; instead, it is more probable that local government authorities will tighten security measures in these municipalities in case of violent unrest or further attacks.

Relations between Serbia and Kosovo will likely deteriorate in the next six months as inquiries into the September attack are carried out, and both countries continue to disagree over the extent of Serbia’s involvement. 

Overall, further violence between Serbia and Kosovo in the form of public unrest or similar operations to the September attack is likely in the next six months as tensions remain incredibly high; however, the outbreak of a conventional war between the two countries is highly improbable.

International

The EU will almost certainly continue to lead mediation efforts between Kosovo and Serbia, as decreasing tensions will be seen as a priority. Both nations will likely participate in negotiations if a significant escalation does not occur; tangible progress remains unlikely.  Because normalisation between Kosovo and Serbia in the next 12 months is highly unlikely, it is almost certain that neither country will be granted EU member status for the foreseeable future.

The KFOR contingent in Kosovo will likely become more active shortly as tensions remain high and additional NATO troop deployments continue to occur. At the same time, Russian links with Serbia will likely strengthen in the near future. Considering Russia is largely a pariah state in the Western world, Serbia is a more valuable ally, given its geographic and diplomatic position in Europe.