On 13 July, Brazilian congress bypassed election and budget laws to approve a government bill for US$7.5 billion in welfare spending. Although the measure may seem counterintuitive for an economy that struggles to recover in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, it is reflective of President Jair Bolsonaro’s strategic predicament. Unlikely to win this year’s election and at risk of facing punishment once out of office, Bolsonaro will fight tooth and nail to avoid defeat, and the cost will befall Brazil’s institutions unless he is stopped.

With just over two months to go until election day, the outlook is grim for Bolsonaro’s reelection bid. Former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has been leading polls since last year and is on the cusp of reaching the necessary majority to win without the need for a runoff. In the meantime, there is little political capital for government to pursue its policy agenda and only so much that campaigning can theoretically do to make up for it.

If losing an election is bad enough under regular circumstances, it can be even worse for Bolsonaro, who will lose presidential immunity and oversight of investigative bodies once out of office. His government has been marred in scandal since its beginning, from allegations of illicit enrichment, to the mishandling of the pandemic, and threats to the rule of law. It is not unreasonable to conceive that sufficient evidence may arise to implicate him and his family in criminal misconduct under a new government. In this sense, more is at stake for the incumbent than just his political survival.

With little room to manoeuvre and desperate to avoid prosecution, all that remains for Bolsonaro is to play outside the rules, and, with his track record, it should come to no one’s surprise that he is willing to do so. Between increasing government debt, casting doubt on Brazil’s electoral integrity and planning a rally against the Supreme Court, the president shows no regard for public finance, democracy, or the rule of law.

In the current trajectory, one can expect uninterrupted attacks on Brazil’s institutions as Bolsonaro tries to secure a favourable outcome until the end of term in January. This comes at the risk of widespread instability, leaving the next government to pick up the pieces or, even worse, triggering a breakdown before a transfer of power can occur. However, if there is any chance of minimising the damage, it stems from the fact that the latent strongman will need to retain his support to carry out these attacks. 

Two alternative developments can lead the country off its crash course: either Bolsonaro loses his backing or is given an out. In the first case, the current winning coalition decides there is more to gain by siding with a different contender, so they pull the rug from underneath Bolsonaro, putting an end to the crisis before it escalates. In the second, government and opposition work together to build an “off ramp” for Bolsonaro, ensuring he will not face punishment if he hands over power, which gives him an incentive to play by the rules.

Recent developments suggest these are not remote possibilities. Just this week, influential business associations signed an open letter in defence of Brazilian democracy, which indicates Bolsonaro has lost significant elite support. Likewise, news has circulated that congressmembers are considering drawing up a constitutional amendment offering lifetime senate seats for former presidents, which would allow Bolsonaro to retain his immunity if he loses the election.

Brazil’s future may look uncertain in the current conjuncture, yet identifying the actors and interests at play can go a long way for unravelling the country’s political risk outlook. No one rules alone and even the most brazen president still needs allies to pass legislation or launch a coup. If the future of the country is tied to Bolsonaro’s fate, then hope for Brazilian democracy currently lies with his supporters.

Photo: Gerson Fortes | Shutterstock