Moscow’s game in Latin America: how Russia increases its influence in the Western Hemisphere
After tensions between Ukraine and Russia degenerated into violence at the end of February 2022, presidents and foreign ministers across the globe began to condemn Moscow’s aggression. However, not all countries in the Western Hemisphere criticised the attack on Ukraine’s sovereignty. Some leaders in Latin America were even vocal in their support of Putin and explicitly defended actions undertaken by the Russian government. Among them was Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela who denounced the West for imposing sanctions on Russia and Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua who justified the attack, claiming that Ukraine's attempt to join NATO left Russia with no choice. Although its global power has somewhat decreased since the end of the Cold War, Russia clearly continues to find ways to create, maintain and consolidate bilateral bonds with countries on the other side of the Pacific, building influence and gaining political support.
Russian propaganda and vaccine diplomacy
Provision of Sputnik V Covid-19 vaccines is one the most recent and significant examples of how Russia increases its presence in Latin America. Argentina was, in fact, the first country outside of the former Soviet Union to grant approval of the Russian vaccine. As of today, the Sputnik V accounts for 40 million contracted doses in Peru, 20 million in Argentina, 17 million in Venezuela, 8 million in Guatemala, and 5,2 million in Bolivia. Interestingly, the introduction and distribution of Russian vaccines in Latin America was accompanied by intense Russia’s state-sponsored propaganda efforts. Among other tools, Moscow used Twitter to spread messages favouring and backing its vaccines in order to shape public opinion and build a positive image of its product.
Vaccine diplomacy is not the sole domain in which Russia resorts to propaganda. Lately, its operations were also concentrated on legitimising the invasion of Ukraine in the eyes of Latin American audiences. The primary media outlet which enabled the diffusion and reinforcement of narratives aligned with the Kremlin’s position in Latin America is known as Actualidad RT, a Spanish-language TV channel of the Russia Today network. Russia also has a strong presence on Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp, where it uses its bots and trolls to manipulate information. To this day, several experts have voiced their concerns about the implications of Russian disinformation for Latin American societies. Apart from strengthening anti-Western sentiment, the spread of half-truths and fake news has been claimed to contribute to undermining liberal international order and democratic values in the region. In fact, the Kremlin has been linked with 50,000 cyberattacks on the national voter registry that were detected during the run-up to 2018 parliamentary elections in Colombia. For various reasons Russian disinformation campaigns face particularly weak opposition in the trio of Latin American authoritarian regimes, namely, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, which are all engaged in countering the US influence.
Security cooperation
Though Russia does not possess the economic power to match China, it was successful in implementing various other instruments to improve its presence in the region. This includes security cooperation. Russia’s activities in this sphere encompass deployment of military personnel, equipment, tanks, ships and aircrafts to countries such as Nicaragua and Venezuela. Moreover, in 2013 Russia established a regional training facility in the eastern part of Nicaragua. Over the years, members of law enforcement agencies from several Latin American states have participated in courses offered at the facility. Moscow also plays a crucial role in supplying arms to some of the countries in the region. To provide an example, as many as 9 out of 10 arms imported to Ortega's Nicaragua after 2000 came from Russia. Other Latin American leaders that decided to purchase military equipment from Russia in the past include Dilma Rousseff and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil, Ernesto Samper of Colombia as well as Alberto Fujimori of Peru.
Economic influence
Even though the scale of Russia's economic engagement with Latin America remains limited, repercussions of the invasion of Ukraine have demonstrated its importance in certain sectors of the economy. To begin with, Russia exports 15% of global nitrogenous fertilizers which is vital in the context of global food security. Shortly after the start of the invasion there was an initial decline in fertiliser imports from Russia, which alarmed Brazilian decision makers due to the country's reliance on the Russian supply (Moscow provides roughly a quarter of Brazil's fertiliser needs). Fortunately, Putin guaranteed Bolsonaro that Russia will fulfil its duties as a trading partner. Potential interruptions in supply could have dealt a severe blow to the Brazilian agricultural sector, which ”fuels both domestic industries and consumer markets as well as makes up 30% of all exports”. In turn, Ecuador's fruit industry was hit hard owing to the war taking place on the other side of the globe. Normally, almost 20% of bananas produced in Ecuador ended up in Russia. Due to economic sanctions against the Kremlin, exports have dropped significantly, leaving millions of boxes of Ecuadorian bananas to rot.
Energy dependence
Moscow has been known to reap benefits by dealing with countries that have been rejected by states or international organisations. In contrast to Western actors who encourage or sometimes even require their partners to respect basic human rights and democratic values, Russia is not interested in imposing any standards, thusly, presenting itself as a viable alternative. As a matter of fact, despite US sanctions, Russia helped the Venezuelan government with the design and launch of its state-backed cryptocurrency. Over the course of Putin’s time in office, Russia has been heavily invested in increasing its role in Venezuela, focusing on its oil and mining sector. The dealings with Maduro form part of Putin's grand strategy for Latin America. Namely, Moscow strives to grow its presence in Latin America’s energy sector. In recent years, Russia has demonstrated strong interest in Bolivia’s and Chile’s lithium, Brazil’s and Mexico’s oil, as well as in nuclear collaboration with Argentina, Paraguay and Ecuador, among other examples. Although some suggest that the Russian influence in Latin America might be overstated and limited when compared to China, its pursuit of regional influence should be constantly monitored. Understanding Russia’s priorities seems particularly important from the European perspective. If successful, Putin could gain a foothold in Latin America’s mines, plants and refineries, risking further increase of Europe's energy dependence on Russia.
Look into the future
Russia’s targeted approach to foreign policy will most definitely continue with efforts to further increase its influence in Latin America. However, Moscow’s success will largely depend on the activity of Biden’s and Xi Jinping's administrations as they also seek to sustain and consolidate their presence in the region. Here are some predictions on how relations between Russia and Latin American states may develop in the near future:
Russia is committed to challenging the US' relationship with Latin America. However, it will be highly difficult for Russia to increase or even maintain the level of investment and its economic presence in the region due to the costs of the ongoing war in Ukraine. Importantly, the arms sales could be seriously disrupted as domestic manufacturers are focused on addressing the demand of the Russian army. Simultaneously, there is a tough competition from China which is successively developing its economic relations with Latin America. Russia will have to prioritise and focus on the most crucial activities. This involves continuous cooperation with Nicaragua and Venezuela as well as finding ways to enhance its participation in the Latin American energy sectors. Though Chinese company CATL has been lately selected to partner with the state-owned YLB (Yacimientos de Litios Bolivianos) on accelerating lithium industrialisation, Bolivian President, Luis Alberto Arce announced that the government continued to negotiate with other foreign companies. With Russia's Uranium One Group in the race, Putin still has a chance to gain a share of that pie.
Though 2023 in Latin America will not be as electorally intense as 2022, next year presidential races will take place in Argentina, Guatemala, and Paraguay, whereas other notable elections are set to occur in Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Cuba, and Ecuador. Moscow might attempt to influence those electoral processes with the use of its sophisticated propaganda toolkit in order to increase the chances of parties and candidates who align with Russia’s views and preferences win.
There are widespread expectations among international actors for an improvement of the situation in Venezuela. While some progress has been made, experts remain rather sceptic of the prospects for credible and meaningful reforms in the coming months. However, in case of success, Venezuela’s relationship dynamics with the US and other international actors could radically alter. Ease of sanctions and the country’s opening would mean its re-entering into global markets, consequently, reducing and marginalising Moscow’s standing.
The electoral victory of Lula in Brazil sparks hope for BRICS to play a more significant role at the global stage. The grouping of major emerging economies (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) was established as a platform to influence global discussions and enhance dialogue among its members. As for Putin, BRICS gives Russia a chance to show that it is not isolated, which seems particularly crucial at its current position. Recently, Argentina has shown interest in joining the alliance. Expansion of BRICS might strengthen the group itself and its counterweight to the West, which could potentially help improve Russia’s role in the international arena. However, not only is it unclear whether Argentina will be eventually accepted, but also what shape and actions BRICS will take in the near future.