Analysing the 2023 Turkish Elections: Opposition Mistakes and Unfair Playing Field
The 2023 Turkish presidential and parliamentary elections were closely watched by the international community as they shaped the country's political landscape for the next five years. Recep Tayyip Erdogan emerged victorious once again, securing his position as the president for another term. According to the current constitutional setup, this would mean that he would remain president of Türkiye until 2028. As Erdogan was heading into the runoff vote with a 5 point lead on Kemal Kilicdaroglu, he was able to ultimately garner 52.14% of the votes against Kilicdaroglu who obtained 47.86% of votes. As Erdogan now heads into a third decade of power, many questions surround the conditions under which the election were contested and the mistakes made by the opposition coalition.
In the case of the parliamentary elections, Cumhur Ittifak (The People’s Alliance) consisting of the AKP, MHP and smaller Islamist parties, such as YRP led by Fatih Erbakan, obtained 323 seats out of 600 to retain a simple majority in parliament. The AKP fell as low as 35.6% in its vote count, marking the lowest percentage it has achieved since the party first came to power in November 2002 and a 7 percent decrease from the 2018 elections. One of the biggest surprises that came out of the parliamentary elections was the Nationalist Action Party’s (MHP) performance as they retained just over 10% of the vote, outperforming expectations. This was despite the fact that the party was suffering internal friction under party leader Devlet Bahceli amid the assassination of former Grey Wolves president (Ulku Ocaklari) Sinan Ates back in December 2022.
Another smaller party that outdid expectations was the New Welfare Party (YRP), obtaining 2.8% of the vote and 5 seats in parliament. Their party leader Fatih Erbakan made headlines during the COVID-19 pandemic due to his anti-vaccine remarks and anti-LGTBQ comments during the campaign, eventually joining the People’s Alliance with the AKP after Erbakan had failed to obtain 100,000 signatures required to become a presidential campaign. The consolidation of the Turkish ultra-nationalist bloc indicates that the new parliament will be the most far-right since the AKP first came to power in 2002.
The opposition had also fallen short amid high expectations going into the first round. The CHP failed to take 30% of the vote and, similarly to previous electoral performances, was only able to retain 25% of the electorate’s support. The Good Party (IYI) led by Meral Aksener underperformned and only got 9.69% of the vote in comparison to 9.96% in the 2018 parliamentary election. The inclusion of the Good Party in Millet Ittifak (Nation’s Alliance) in a bid to attract more nationalist voters ultimately was not effective as some Good Party voters were disillusioned with the candidacy selection process and the drama that ensued between the weekend of March 3-6 just two months before the election.
The opposition suffered from a number of mistakes during the campaign that ultimately undermined its credibility to voters. The first of which included the late start to its campaign just two months before the election, instead of putting together a more specific agenda months before the election began. The opposition coalition’s inability to decide on a candidate in a timely and effective manner was one indication where the opposition presented itself as unstable when it came to governing the country. Another mistake by the opposition included a sharp shift to anti-migrant rhetoric by Kemal Kilicdaroglu in contrast to a conciliatory and unifying message he had tried to convey in the lead-up to the first round.
Such a drastic transition to a aggressive and polarizing stance undermined the opposition’s promise of trying to unify different segments of Turkish society, as Kilicdaroglu’s memorandum of understanding with Victory Party leader Umit Ozdag, known for his anti-refugee and ultra-nationalist stance, alienated Kurdish voters in the run-off vote. In some predominantly Kurdish provinces in the Southeast, voter turnout decreased as much as 8-10%, which made a difference in the final tally. Ultimately, the opposition’s main struggle was the inability to obtain substantial votes in Central Anatolia, the Black Sea region, and the earthquake affected areas that are known to be AKP strongholds.
Despite the numerous limitations of the opposition alliance’s campaign, it is important to recognize that the election was conducted in highly unfair and unfree conditions. For instance, the Turkish Telecommunications Board (BTK) censored Kilicdaroglu’s text message just days before the run-off vote, the Supreme Election Council (YSK) banned the broadcasting of a video of a town hall he attended, and he was given just 32 minutes of airtime on state TV network TRT in one month while Erdogan was given 32 hours of airtime. This is also not to mention the fact that state institutions are under heavy partisan control and are firmly consolidated in Erdogan’s hands. With such institutional advantages for Erdogan and hurdles for the opposition to overcome, Erdogan was still only able to obtain 52% of the vote in the run-off.
With the elections now over, attention now turns to what Türkiye could look like under five more years of Erdogan. Given that he governs the country in a highly polarized context, he has now been given the mandate to continue a highly assertive foreign policy based on nativist and militaristic rhetoric. Unorthodox economic policies are still likely to continue, even as Mehmet Simsek returns to the fold of managing the economy as the newly appointed finance and treasury minister in a bid to restore global credibility. Simsek had been finance minister before Erdogan appointed his son-in-law Berat Albayrak, yet given Erdogan’s promise of keeping interest rates low throughout the election campaign, Türkiye is on track for a critical balance of payment crisis should such policies continue.
With former co-leader of the HDP Selahttin Demirtas, who has been imprisoned since 2016, now quitting from active politics, IYI party announcing the end of the Nation alliance, and Future and DEVA Party MPs who ran under the CHP ticket now leaving the CHP, the opposition blocs have begun to split amid the aftermath of the election. The next elections will now be the 2024 municipal elections, as the opposition will have to re-group quickly if it wants to stand a chance in what could be tight races in municipalities such as Istanbul and Ankara. This will have to include a campaign that evokes hope, is sophisticated, and involves grassroots on-the-ground campaigning amid rule of law deficiencies and economic mismanagement.