Earthquake Aids and the Normalisation of Syria - Gulf Relations

Since the onset of the Syrian Civil War over a decade ago, the Assad regime’s relations with neighbouring Gulf countries have been severely fractured, with the Arab League suspending Syria’s membership in 2011. As the war has progressed, the GCC has reprioritised its foreign policy and geopolitical development agendas, leading to a slow, but steady, thawing of tensions. The thawing process can be observed in the GCC’s response to the fallout from the Türkiye-Syria earthquake. 

Prior to the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011, Syria maintained relatively normal relations with most Arab states. However, as the protests in Syria devolved into warfare, Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar in particular, cut ties with the Assad regime, opting to support various armed opposition groups in an effort to oust Bashar al-Assad from power. 

Gulf involvement in the Syrian Civil War stemmed from one primary source, fears regarding Iran’s growing influence in the region. From the perspective of the Gulf monarchies, which contain significant minority Shi’ite populations, if Iran could consolidate control over Syria, vis-a-vis the Assad regime, it would be successful in establishing an arc of Iranian-led Shi’ite dominance stretching from Afghanistan through Iran, Iraq and Syria into Southern Lebanon; threatening the conservative Gulf monarchies at their doorsteps. Additionally, Syria, as a result of their historical and religious ties, had been one of Iran’s steadfast allies in the region. 

The low point in Syrian-Gulf relations was during the midst of the Syrian Civil War, when the Gulf monarchies were accused of funding and arming various Islamist militias. For example, between 2011 and 2013, Qatar allegedly provided actors within the Free Syrian Army with up to $3 billion in funding. Similarly, Riyadh allegedly provided funding worth billions to armed rebel groups such as the Jaysh al-Islam and the Army of conquest. The UAE, taking a slightly different approach, limited its proxy-warfare funding to secular factions of the Free Syrian Army coalition, hoping to counter the rise of political Islam. 

As the war in Syria has progressed, with the Assad regime slowly regaining control over the vast majority of Syrian territory, the Gulf monarchies have shifted their geopolitical objectives as a response to the ever-changing global political environment. In 2018, the UAE became the first Gulf country to reopen its embassy in Damascus, legitimising Assad’s rule over the country, with Bahrain following suit shortly after. Since then, the UAE has worked towards the reintegration of Syria into the Arab world, hoping to normalise relations with Syria in an attempt to curb the ever-present Iranian influence in the country. 

Although Doha and Riyadh are yet to replicate the UAE’s normalisation efforts, the Kahramanmaras earthquake has provided a chance for the two Gulf monarchies to begin the re-establishment of relations with the Assad regime. Firstly, the UAE, leading global efforts, has pledged $100 million in aid to be shared equally between Türkiye and Syria, with aid being directed to Assad’s Damascus-based government. Similarly, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have mobilised aid efforts to assist with the humanitarian fallout. On the 7th of February, Saudi Crown-prince Muhammad bin Salman, ordered the mobilisation of an air bridge to Turkey and Syria in an effort to assist with the recovery process. In addition, the KSrelief charity has, as of the 10th of February, raised over $60 million for Turkey and Syria. Similarly, Qatari organisations have taken a leading role in providing support to the victims of the earthquakes, with the Qatar Fund for Development, working alongside charities such as Qatar Red Crescent, has sent 108 tonnes of aid to Turkey and Syria, amongst other on-the-ground initiatives. 

Although Saudi Arabia and Qatar are yet to specify if their aid efforts are directed through the Syrian government, the rapid response from the Gulf monarchies can be seen as the first, albeit small, step towards the normalisation of wider Syrian-GCC relations. The thawing in tensions comes at a time when the Gulf monarchies have reshaped their foreign policy objectives as a result of shifts in the global and regional political environment. As mentioned previously, for the UAE, the normalisation of relations is an attempt to more effectively counterbalance Iranian presence in the country, allowing it to focus on other regional conflicts, such as the war in Yemen. In Saudi Arabia’s case, balancing relations between the United States and Russia, particularly within the context of the war in Ukraine, has been at the forefront of foreign policy objectives. Additionally, focusing on trade relations with energy importers and growing economies such as India and China has been deemed more important, signalling the growing presence of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on the international stage. Finally, from Qatar’s perspective, countering the impacts of strained relations with its GCC counterparts, as a result of supporting groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, have taken the forefront over unsuccessful attempts at supporting opposition forces in the Syrian battleground.