Feasibility of Assad’s call for enhanced Russian military presence in Syria
Following his visit to Moscow on 15th March, Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad stated his willingness to accommodate more Russian troops and military installations in Syria on a permanent basis. Russian facilities in the country have recently undergone expansion works at the Tartus naval base and the restoration of the Al-Jarrah military base. Meanwhile, Russia has already announced plans to make its presence in the Khmeimim base permanent. Considering the central role of the Russian military in safeguarding his regime and essentially defeating the opposition uprising, but also its role in deterring renewed Turkish attacks within the Syrian borders, it is hardly surprising that Assad would find the Russian presence beneficial for his future. Russia’s power projection capabilities, however, are no longer reminiscent of the ones that helped him cement his rule over battered Syria.
After almost 400 days of fighting in Ukraine, the Russian military has sustained inconceivable losses - thousands of vehicles of all kinds and tens of thousands of professional, experienced troops (even according to the most moderate estimates). Moscow’s erratic effort to refit archaic reserve vehicles like the BMP-1 and the T-62 only highlights the incapability of its defence industrial base to replenish losses in the Ukrainian front. Similarly, units from as far as Vladivostok, hundreds of thousands of conscripts and the now infamous Wagner mercenary group have been committed to the fight. The latter, a crucial part of the Russian effort in its Syrian intervention, has faced significant casualties. How has this degradation in Russian military capabilities affected its position in Syria then?
While certain assets were moved out of the country (notably, a squadron of Su-25 attack aircraft and an S-300 battery), there have been no signs of a significant Russian pull-out from Syria. To the contrary, as was mentioned before, Russia has sought to expand its installations there, even after it became obvious that the war in Ukraine had become a protracted, costly conflict. It would be safe to assume that bar a catastrophic, unprecedented collapse due to its invasion’s outcome, Russia will seek to maintain its presence in Syria, its only foothold in the Middle East. At the same time, Assad’s seeming plea for an increased presence might simply be unfeasible and of little benefit to Russia. ISIS and any opposition to the Assad regime have mostly been defeated, while Kurdish militia have repeatedly called for military cooperation with Damascus against the Turkish occupation of the country’s northern provinces and any future invasions. Furthermore, the power vacuum left behind by Russia scaling down operations will likely be filled by Iran and its affiliated militia, a close ally of Russia that has been active in supporting the Russian war effort with military equipment.
Overall, while Russia’s presence in Syria will most likely be permanent, it is highly unlikely that it will be bolstered significantly, as the increased costs for Russia simply outweigh any potential strategic benefits. Assad would undoubtedly feel uneasy relying exclusively on Iran as a security partner – or guarantor – both because of its lesser conventional military capabilities compared to Russia and the fact that in this way, he would lose any leverage he currently possesses. Unfortunately for him, Russia’s capabilities and, consequently, ambitions after the culmination of its invasion may hardly resemble those of the global powerhouse that cemented his position in the first place.