It has been almost six months since former Lebanese President Michel Aoun left office in October 2022 following an untenable presidential term and no replacement has yet been elected. Aoun's presidency coincided with financial and economic crises that drove the majority of the Lebanese into impoverishment, large demonstrations against the government that protested systematic corruption and demanded reform, and a devastating blast at the Beirut Port that has yet to result in a single criminal prosecution. The country is currently in a political stalemate due to major economic and social difficulties, as well as internal disputes that prohibit the country's leaders from agreeing on a presidential candidate. Meanwhile, the recent deal between Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran, mediated by China, is likely to de-escalate several crises in the Middle East, albeit to differing degrees and with varying consequences. The leaders of both countries subsequently extended invitations to trade visits, which immediately boosted the agreement. The two nations have a lot to negotiate, including the Lebanese crisis. Lebanon is indeed at the forefront of the nations that are inextricably linked to and will be substantially influenced by the outcomes of the Beijing agreement. Beirut has long had political, economic, cultural, and religious ties to both Saudi Arabia and Iran, and favourable developments, such as stability, financial support, and civic harmony, could bring significant rewards. The accord, however, is unlikely to resolve Lebanon's presidential election dilemma anytime soon, given the country's political, sectarian, and factional complexities. Other election-related issues will have to wait until Lebanese organisations develop the necessary formulae and compromises.

Undoubtedly, one of the most pressing challenges in Lebanon is the election of a president for the country. While this election is not the only major obstacle to Lebanon's recovery, it would still ease the general political deadlock. The country is now run by a caretaker administration led by Prime Minister Najib Mikati, with no end in sight to the presidential vacuum. Because of the push and pull of opposing ideas and interests among its members, Mikati's cabinet cannot even agree on the simplest of executive actions, as seen by the struggle over a decision to postpone the switch to Daylight Saving Time (DST) by four weeks (until the end of the holy month of Ramadan). The government's decision sparked fierce political and sectarian debates across the country.  A number of churches, catholic schools, Christian affiliated media outlets, and Christian political figures declared their opposition to it. The government's decision to turn back the clock technically binds governmental entities. Nevertheless, the caretaker ministry of education declared on Sunday that all schools will instead advance in accordance with Daylight Savings Time. Quickly, the Lebanese have been divided between what is generally known as the "Muslim time zone" — the time set by the government — and a "Christian time zone."  Justice Minister Henri Khoury blasted the ruling, highlighting Lebanon's political establishment's internal strife. The decision was eventually overturned by the Lebanese government on Monday, March 27, effectively saving Lebanon from another sectarian crisis.  Indeed, the time conflict could have brought Lebanon to a halt if it wasn't already paralyzed by the parliament's inability to elect a president.

Indeed, it is difficult to ignore the possible beneficial effects of the Iranian-Saudi agreement on Lebanon, where a presidential vacuum remains and political deadlock reigns supreme. Lebanese political leaders such as Speaker Nabih Berri described it as ‘’a glimmer of hope that we have never lost and will never lose’’. Hasan Nasrallah, Secretary General of Hezbollah, the country's most powerful military and political movement and an Iranian ally, described the agreement as a "good development". However, Nasrallah later stated that Iran and Saudi Arabia did not address the Lebanese issue in their discussions, emphasising that the presidential issue is primarily a "domestic" one and that the Lebanese "must benefit from the positive atmosphere". This was explicitly stated by Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan when he stated that Lebanon needs “Lebanese rapprochement” and not “Saudi-Iranian rapprochement,” and that “Lebanon must [realise] its own interests, and politicians must put Lebanon’s interest before any other. Once they do this and work on building the Lebanese state, Lebanon will prosper,” he added. Given the unique conditions impacting Lebanon and the network of sectarian entanglements among its different political factions, it is not difficult to understand how the deal may not have any good influence on Lebanon, at least in the short term. While foreign players, particularly Saudi Arabia and Iran, historically wielded significant influence over local parties and may therefore help steer them toward collaboration, their power may be hampered by the parties' sectarian political objectives and opposing agendas. One element of Lebanon's present political deadlock is a struggle between four large parliamentary blocs: two Maronite-led blocs and two (allied) Shiite-led blocs, which add a sectarian aspect to the struggle. What aggravates the situation are Christian calls for a federal system to be imposed if a settlement to the presidential election issue cannot be reached. These calls were rejected by Nasrallah, who recently declared that "in this country, our choice is to live together. This small country cannot stand federalism or division". "People must live together despite political differences," he added.

The two Shi’i blocs of Hezbollah and the Amal Movement, led by Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, have lately promoted the candidacy of former MP and minister Suleiman Frangieh. For Hezbollah, according to Nasrallah, the most important requirement for a president is someone who "would not stab [it] in the back". On a local level, Hezbollah's major concern is probably choosing a president who would retain the group's dominance in the state and government. On the other hand, some Hezbollah opponents have backed MP Michel Moawad, who represents many of the elements opposed to Hezbollah's — and, by implication, Iran's — dominance in Lebanon. However, in 11 rounds of presidential elections in parliament, he has failed to get the backing of more than one-third of the 128-member legislative body. He has the support of Lebanon's largest Christian party, the Lebanese Forces, which has 19 members in parliament to Frangieh's two. So far, the second largest Christian party (with 17 MPs), the Free Patriotic Movement, led by MP Gebran Bassil, has refused both candidates. Bassil is himself an undeclared candidate who has been unable to convince Hezbollah to endorse him due to the latter's long support for Frangieh. These and other factors might restrict the good impact of the Saudi-Iran deal on Lebanon.  What aggravates the situation are Christian calls for a federal system to be imposed if a settlement to the presidential election issue cannot be reached. These calls were rejected by Nasrallah, who recently declared that "in this country, our choice is to live together. This small country cannot stand federalism or division". "People must live together despite political differences," he added. Both sides of Lebanon's political struggle are afflicted with the same problem: If either of the candidates, Frangieh or Moawad, or a third candidate such as army chief Joseph Aoun, could secure the endorsement of at least a simple majority of parliamentarians (65 members), they are highly unlikely to meet the constitutional requirement of a quorum of 86 deputies (two-thirds of parliament) for a legal electoral session. Therefore, if the Saudi-Iran deal is to have an influence on Lebanon's presidential election, it must be aimed at persuading opposing parties to accept a compromise candidate capable of securing a quorum.

 However, such a candidate is likely to be weak since they would have to tread a fine line between not giving Hezbollah the guarantees it seeks and not appeasing its opponents. Without the strong backing of either faction, such a potential president would be unable to rebuild the state and its institutions, adding to the country's current condition of near-collapse. As a result, regardless of the outcome of the Saudi-Iran reunion, Lebanon's presidential election may be forced to be postponed for a lengthy period of time. On the one hand, it's impossible to imagine Iran putting pressure on Hezbollah to drop its demand for a president who will defend it. This would imply giving in to the party's opponents in Beirut, who have long demanded that it disarm. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia is unlikely to tolerate Hezbollah's total and open domination over Lebanon. The group has long burnt bridges with Riyadh, harming Lebanon's relations with the kingdom and other Gulf nations, and no action by Iran is likely to succeed in improving them. Furthermore, Hezbollah's opponents are unlikely to acquiesce to the election of a Hezbollah supporter; Michel Aoun served in that capacity from 2016 to 2022, seeing the final breakdown of the Lebanese state. A detente between Saudi Arabia and Iran is indeed a much-needed and encouraging development that will undoubtedly benefit Gulf security, stability, and cooperation. However, given Lebanon's political, sectarian, and factional complexities, the Saudi-Iran agreement is unlikely to settle the country's presidential election crisis anytime soon. Lebanon's fate is in the hands of its own people and leaders, who have to work together to tackle the country's pressing challenges. Until they do so, the country will remain in free fall.