Saudi Arabia and Qatar, Foes on the Field

Qatar and Saudi Arabia once again find themselves in competition with one another. From 2017 until the signing of the al-Ula pact in 2021, Saudi Arabia led a multi-nation economic and diplomatic boycott of Qatar, due to Qatar’s close ties to Iran and Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Despite agreeing to put their differences to one side in 2021, the rivalry never truly died, and it has reignited on the football field. Just two months after Qatar’s hosting of the first Middle Eastern FIFA World Cup, the neighbouring nations find themselves jockeying for position as the region’s preeminent sports authority.

Football, and in particular the English Premier League (EPL) – the domestic league with the highest annual revenues – is fast becoming the playing field in which nation-states, and Gulf states in particular, can exert their influence, increase their global recognition and engage in nation-branding. Now, with the biggest brand in English football – Manchester United – up for sale, Qatar and Saudi Arabia are once again vying for regional supremacy through sport.

Qatar was the first of the two nations to begin exploiting the popularity of the beautiful game when it engrained sport in its trailblazing Vision 2030 plan. According to the Qatari government, its “ambition is to become a global leader in sports and bring the world together through sustainable sports development, building on our achievements to date.” To achieve its goals, it has opened sports academies, hosted various high-profile sporting events, and encouraged its population to become more active. Most notably, Qatar purchased French football club Paris Saint-Germain (PSG) in 2012, through the Qatar Sports Investment (QSI) company, and successfully won the bid to host the 2022 edition of the FIFA World Cup.

Both PSG and the World Cup have brought Qatar increased attention – for better or for worse - over the past decade. Scholar James Dorsey argues that not only was this a ploy by Qatar to become a global leader in sports, but it was also a way to ensure its relative security on the international stage. After all, despite being gas-rich, and having one of the highest GDPs per capita, Qatar is a minnow sandwiched between Saudi Arabia and Iran, with little to no defence capabilities of its own.

Saudi Arabia saw the success of their neighbour’s soft power sporting strategy and decided to implement something similar. Under Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS), the kingdom also created a Vision 2030 plan which is a national development strategy aimed at modernising the nation quickly under new leadership. At the centre of Saudi Vision 2030 is a diversification of the economy away from oil and towards sport and tourism. Since the strategy’s launch in 2016, Saudi Arabia has hosted high-profile boxing events, it has created the LIV Golf tour, entered the Formula 1 racing circuit, and has become heavily invested in football with the purchase of English Premier League club Newcastle United.

However, Saudi Arabia’s ambitions to overtake Qatar and the UAE as the regional hub for sport, and the dominant Gulf power, have led to even greater recent involvement in football. It was recently announced that they will host the 2023 FIFA Club World Cup and the 2027 AFC Asian Cup. Moreover, the nation celebrated the arrival of Portuguese star Cristiano Ronaldo, who signed for club Al-Nasr in early 2023. They are even planning a joint bid with Egypt and Greece to host the 2030 FIFA World Cup. According to Professor Simon Chadwick, hosting the centenary edition of the World Cup would raise Saudi Arabia’s profile and help it extend its influence beyond its regional borders as a new Afro-Eurasian hub.

Now both nation-states are involved in a bidding war for the biggest football brand in England. As of February 17, Qatari Sheikh Jassim Bin Hamad Al Thani, son of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad Bin Jassim Bin Jaber Al Thani, and current chairman of Qatar Islamic Bank (QIB), is submitting a bid to purchase Manchester United via his Nine Two foundation. The value of the bid has not been announced, but securing the purchase would go a long way in helping Qatar maintain their post-World Cup momentum and push its sporting soft power strategy to new heights. Reports from the Telegraph show that Saudi Arabian private investors are also considering tabling a bid for the English club. A Saudi Arabian purchase would help the state as its aims to usurp Qatar as the centre for sport in the region and rebrand its image, still tarnished by the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.

It is important to note that both the takeover bid launched by Sheikh Jassim Bin Hamad Al Thani, and the expected bid from Saudi Arabia are not state-funded bids. This is because, according to Premier League and European football regulations, two clubs competing in the same competition cannot have the same owner. Therefore, the Qatari state, which owns PSG via their investment company QSI, and the Saudi PIF, which owns Newcastle United, cannot own Manchester United. However, this does not mean that these “private bids” have not received the blessing of the governments in their respective countries.

Both Gulf powers could be pipped to the prize by British billionaire Jim Ratcliffe who has tabled an official bid for Manchester United. But expect the Gulf nations to be there until the end. Owning Manchester United offers both states the chance to sell their identity and their values week in, week out, to fans of the most watched league in the world. The tactic has worked well for their Emirati neighbours who own Manchester City. Abu Dhabi and Dubai are now seen as business centres with international appeal. Manchester United, given its cultural appeal, would be the ultimate reward for whichever nation can secure its ownership, and the ramifications of the purchase will last long in the region, giving one of the two nations bragging rights, security and regional hegemony. 

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