Introduction

On the 8th of November 2023, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) announced that its members agreed to issue a unified tourist visa. Similarly to the Schengen visa that allows travellers to access 27 countries on the European continent and results in significant trade benefits for the member states, the new GCC tourist visa will enable travellers to freely visit Saudi Arabia (KSA), the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman, and is expected to increase tourism revenues for its members. Yet, whereas the Schengen framework enabled further European integration, this article argues that the GCC is at its highest risk of disintegration since its institutionalisation in 1981 due to the growing political and economic competition between the GCC’s two most capable members: the UAE and the KSA. As tensions in the block grow and past policies affect perspectives, the GCC’s survival is threatened more than ever before. 

Increased tensions between Abu Dhabi and Riyadh 

The relationship between the UAE and the KSA is increasingly characterised as a rift rather than a fraternal rivalry. Geopolitically, both monarchies compete for supremacy in the Middle East. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have militarily intervened in the conflict in Yemen by supporting rival factions. The UAE supports the Southern Transnational Council, a separatist movement that seeks to achieve a secession of South Yemen, whereas the Kingdom backs the internationally recognised Yemeni government. Notwithstanding the engagement of these two factions in hostilities against the Iranian-backed rebel Houthi movement, substantive conflict has concurrently transpired between them. A similar confrontation between the two Gulf states takes place in Sudan. As the military under the command of Abdel Fattah al-Burhan continues clashing with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi utilise the conflict to cement their positions in the Middle East in what has been described as a hegemonic war. While the Saudis back the military forces of al-Burhan, the Emiratis support the RSF, resulting in a proxy war between the two GCC members.

Another venue for the two monarchies’ conflict has been Washington. Historically, Saudi Arabia has been the United States’ closest Arab ally and largest customer of military hardware. However, relations between the two allies have arguably been affected following the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018 and the increasing assertiveness of the Saudi government in world affairs, illustrated by its oil production cuts that counter U.S. interests. Amid these Saudi-American tensions, the UAE has enacted several policies to replace the Kingdom as the U.S.’ staunchest Arab ally, as seen in the Abraham Accords in 2020 that saw Abu Dhabi recognise Tel Aviv’s bid to purchase the F-35, the most capable fighter plane sold. Importantly, if the U.S. were to deliver the F-35s, the Emirati Air Force would become the most militarily capable in the Middle East, surpassed solely by Israel. This Emirati manoeuvring in Washington at the expense of the KSA further reflects the UAE’s intention to ensure its supremacy in the Middle East and its rivalry with the Kingdom. 

The support for combatting factions in Yemen and Sudan as well as the UAE’s efforts in Washington at the expense of the KSA’s interests underline the rivalry between the two Gulf monarchies for primacy in the Middle East. For the GCC, this geopolitical crisis means that the resolution of future challenges and crises may become increasingly unachievable and further integration unattainable. In the case of the European Union (EU), the Franco-German axis has been, and remains, quintessential for solving challenges and enabling further integration. As such, without close cooperation between the Saudis and the Emiratis, the GCC’s future remains uncertain. Moreover, this rivalry between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi is not limited to geopolitics. On the economic front, the rise of Saudi Arabia as a geo-economic heavyweight has represented a significant challenge for Abu Dhabi as it grapples to resist and counter its neighbour’s policies. 

Within the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Riyadh has cemented its position as the uncontested leader following a costly victory over Moscow in its 2020 oil price war. Additionally, due to the size of its oil exports, which makes the KSA the world’s largest exporter of crude and enable it to both manage and recalibrate the global oil market, the Kingdom has rendered any opposition to its policies within the organisation ineffectual. For example, faced with an unsuccessful Emirati opposition to cut oil production within the organisation in 2022, Saudi Arabia has been accused by the White House of coercing its neighbour to align its production capacity with those of the Kingdom. The KSA also sought to weaken the UAE’s position in the transportation of oil and gas in 2018 through the alleged construction of a pipeline transporting oil to the Yemeni port of Nishtun, which could incentivise oil tankers to avoid the Persian Gulf and Emirati terminals. 

The Kingdom and the UAE have also enacted several business policies that contradict the GCC’s common market policies to outcompete each other. For instance, Riyadh coerces multinational firms to relocate their regional headquarters from the UAE to the Kingdom. Being the biggest market in the Middle East, the KSA effectively provided multinationals based in Dubai with two choices: move their headquarters to the Kingdom or lose government contracts. The two neighbouring states are also in fierce competition over developing a resilient and diversified economy and attracting Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) by providing tax exemptions to investors and sealing bilateral trade agreements with different states. For the GCC’s common market, this intense competition brings the risk of regional integration being replaced by nationalism. As states within the organisation compete for FDIs and economic gains, their perception of mutual gain, upon which the common markets rest, may give place to a perception of trade as a zero-sum game. 

Past experiences and ideas are understood as having an impact on states’ policies in international relations, especially when considering material power. Foreign policy is informed by the body of ideas that each state holds, their past experiences and the understandings that emanate from them, and the amount of material power they hold. Consequently, the experiences of the Saudis and Emiratis with each other are likely to negatively impact their understanding of each other’s intentions and end-games. Similarly to how the currency and monetary union project of the GCC failed in 2010 due to misunderstanding and distrust between the two monarchies, future integration efforts are doomed to fail as a result of this competition. And whereas the rivalry between the Saudis and the Emiratis is not the sole obstacle to further integration within the GCC, it does represent a key inhibitor of any serious integration effort within the organisation. 

Conclusion

The intense geopolitical and economic rivalry between the GCC’s greatest powers threatens the organisation’s survival. Upcoming challenges and crises are unlikely to be solved if Abu Dhabi and Riyadh are embroiled in severe competition. Further integration within the organisation is likely to be halted as nationalism drives foreign policy and trade, and past experiences inform future decision-making.