The Road to Mecca: Saudi-Hamas Reconciliation
Ismail Haniyeh, leader of Hamas’ political wing, visited Saudi Arabia for the first time in over a decade. Haniyeh's arrival coincided with the President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas’ arrival to the Kingdom. The Hamas delegation included other prominent members of the Islamist group, such as Khaled Mashal, whom Mossad unsuccessfully tried to assassinate in Jordan in the 1990s. Mashal was the last Hamas leader that visited the Saudi Kingdom in 2015. This nascent rapprochement between the Saudis and the Palestinian group can be seen as a by-product of the China-brokered Iran-Saudi deal.
Unsurprisingly, Hamas and Saudi Arabia were on good terms during roughly the first 20 years of the existence of the Palestinian group. Both actors shared some ideological and religious commonalities, such as their adherence to a conservative interpretation of Sunni Islam, and strongly emphasized Islamic law and morality. In 1998, a year after Hamas’ establishment, Hamas opened an office in Riyadh. The good relations continued through the 1990s, with senior Hamas officials visiting the Kingdom. This included Sheik Ahmed Yassin, Hamas’ spiritual leader and one of the group's founding members, whom Israel later killed during the Second Intifada. Global and regional events cooled down previously solid ties between the Saudi Kingdom and the Palestinian organization. After 9/11, Washington pressured Saudi Arabia over its ties with Hamas. And more significantly, Hamas's closeness to Iran, Saudi Arabia's regional arch-rival, made the desert Kingdom and the Palestinian group grow apart.
Hamas's visit to the Kingdom is significant for being the first of its kind in years and because it was made during a thaw of the Kingdom's relation with Israel. Netanyahu has been advocating for Saudi Arabia to join the Abraham Accords. For Netanyahu, the prospect of a normalization of ties with Saud Arabia would represent a significant diplomatic win. Due to the importance of Saudi Arabia in the Arab world, the normalization of relations with Riyadh would be a milestone comparable to the 1979 peace treaty with Egypt. Furthermore, in the context of the extreme polarization of Israeli society over the ongoing judicial reform plans, with protests still ongoing, the big price of a Saudi peace deal may serve Netanyahu to improve his stand before the Israeli public. The necessity of achieving a significant diplomatic victory may explain Netanyahu’s optimism about Saudi normalization.
But is Netanyahu miscalculating King Salman's, and Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman’s, intentions? King Salman may lose a major incentive to get closer to Israel if the Chinese brokered agreement significantly decreases tensions between the Saudis and Iran. In a future scenario of increased security for the Saudi Kingdom, what incentive would Prince Salman hold to get closer to the most right-wing government in Israeli history?
Another factor that may hamper prospects of normalization is the degree of tolerance that Saudi authorities will have for Hamas from this point forth. Not long ago, Saudi Arabia was prosecuting Hamas members in its territory. During the last few years, no money flew from Saudi Arabia to support Hamas. If a new era of Hamas-Saudi ties were to emerge and Riyadh were to relax its stance on the group, there is a possibility that money could flow again from Saudi Arabia to support Hamas. Prime Minister Netanyahu may be turning a blind eye to the recent Hamas visit to Saudi Arabia in the hope of achieving normalization. However, if money from Saudi Arabian charities were to reach Hamas military forces in Gaza, it could cross a red line for Israel. Such a development could hinder normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia. The potential for a Hamas-Saudi rapprochement to become an obstacle to Israeli-Saudi relations cannot be ignored.
The reconciliation between Hamas and Saudi Arabia is still in its early stages. The possibility of a new era of warmer ties between the two parties will largely depend on the success or failure of Saudi Arabia's efforts to mend its relationship with Hamas's patron, Iran. Nevertheless, after years of hostility, the Saudi government's change of stance towards Hamas is a significant demonstration of the pragmatic nature of King Salman and a small indication of a larger realignment of geopolitics in the Middle East, with China's growing influence in the region.