Türkiye 2023 Elections: An Overview
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan became President of the Turkish Republic in 2014 after serving as Prime Minister from 2003 – 2014. He founded the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2001 and led the party to parliamentary victory in the 2002, 2007, and 2011 elections, stepping down as the party’s leader after ascending to the presidency.
Erdogan became the focus of great international attention after the 15 July 2016 coup attempt, which saw an immense civic and political crackdown on those believed to be affiliated with U.S.-based exiled cleric Fethullah Gulen and his movement, known by the Turkish government as FETÖ (Fethullah Terrorist Organisation). Nine months after the failed coup, over 110,000 were detained, including over 10,000 police and over 7,000 military members. Erdogan was able to authorise these purges by instituting a state of emergency that lasted for two years, a time frame long enough for Erdogan and the AKP to consolidate immense political power over all of Turkish society.
One of the most integral legacies to come from this state of emergency period was the 2017 constitutional referendum. The referendum changed Turkish governance from a parliamentary system to a presidential one, unprecedented in the Republic’s nearly 100-year history. Once passed, the prime minister role was subsumed under that of the president and the president no longer became a neutral political force. Though backed wholly by the AKP, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) played a significant role in backing the referendum, establishing the start of a strong relationship between Erdogan, the AKP, and the MHP. In the 2018 general elections, the AKP and MHP formed the People’s Alliance, a bi-party coalition to secure Erdogan’s electoral victory. In the years since 2018, this alliance has held strong.
Since the referendum, Erdogan and the AKP-MHP alliance have ruled Türkiye with a strong hand. Massive upset for the ruling party came in 2019 with the election of Ekrem Imamoglu, a member of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), as Istanbul Mayor. As Türkiye’s largest metropolitan hub and economic centre, Turkish politics commonly understands that ‘whoever wins Istanbul wins Turkey’. As such, the AKP’s defeat – initially by a margin of 13,000 votes – sent the party into turmoil. However, the Supreme Election Council annulled the initial results after the AKP alleged irregularities in hopes to sway the results favourably. Instead, the AKP suffered an even more devastating blow, losing the elections a second time, this time by a margin of 775,000 votes.
With the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, President Erdogan’s governance challenges continued, this time economically. After a series of economic calculations many saw to be unorthodox – though Erdogan pressed they would usher in a new model of economics geared specifically for Türkiye – inflation spiked, the lira devalued, and millions could not afford basic sustenance. Inflation hit a record high of 85.5% in November of last year, though many are skeptical of government-published figures. In turn, protests and strikes have increased significantly over the past few years in response to the dire domestic situation, significantly hampering him and his party’s image leading into 2023.
This domestic situation must be recognised in conversation with Türkiye’s increasingly ambitious foreign policy portfolio. Erdogan’s regional and international approach since ascending to power has been called neo-Ottoman, an attempt to wrangle title as leader of the Islamic world from Saudi Arabia, a reclaiming of Ottoman imperial nostalgia and regional influence. As part of this outlook, Erdogan has further developed an incredibly strong relationship with Azerbaijan; supported conflicts and resolutions in Libya, Afghanistan, and Somalia; developed strong economic ties with Qatar during the Gulf blockade; maintained a hostile relationship with Greece; conducted numerous incursions into Northern Syria and Iraq in response to cross-border terrorist attacks by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK); and utilised Diyanet (The Religious Affairs Directorate) as a tool of foreign policy in the Western world. In addition, Erdogan played a key mediating role in the Ukraine grain deal last year and is currently in the midst of a tense diplomatic strife with Sweden and Finland over their bids to join NATO.
This recent history paints a rather complex landscape that Erdogan must face leading up to the general elections, currently set for 14 May. Political tensions are already extremely high: Turkish courts last month sentenced Istanbul Mayor Imamoglu to over two years in prison and a political ban in what many opposition members call a sham ruling to eliminate Erdogan’s political opponents. At the cusp of the new year, Erdogan raised the minimum wage by over 50% and dropped the retirement age requirement, a move largely seen as an attempt to regain political legitimacy ahead of the elections. In early January, Erdogan froze funding for the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) – a largely pro-Kurdish party – for alleged links to terrorism. The HDP is Türkiye’s second largest opposition party after the CHP and the frozen funding is a strategic step to suspend critical party activities while an ongoing court case, led by an AKP prosecution, is pushing for the party to be shut down entirely. However, it must be reminded that the AKP is not the sole political party searching to destroy or incapacitate all others – the MHP’s strong support of President Erdogan through the People’s Alliance serves as a formidable incumbent that wields the support of both parties.
These numerous factors generate a multivariable equation that’s solution involves taking apart the local, domestic, regional, and international risks of the upcoming elections. With a fractured economy, disparate opposition, and regional responsibilities, Türkiye’s immediate future and the future of Erdogan’s rule are on the line.