Up and out: Implications of the Resignation of the Kuwaiti Government


Last Friday saw the Crown Prince of the State of Kuwait, Mishal al-Sabah, accept the resignation of the Kuwaiti government, as reported by the state news agency KUNA. The resignation, coming less than half a year after parliamentary elections supposedly provided the executive with a mandate for much-needed fiscal change, was the fifth time a Kuwaiti government has resigned in just over 24 months.

The matter of debate in this latest episode of resignations was on the topic of two major legislative packages that were attempted by the government. The first pertained to the government’s blocking of the assembly’s advancement of populist measures that they deemed too costly; of particular note was the request for two ministers to be investigated over alleged economic mismanagement. The second included a debt relief bill, under which the state would buy Kuwaiti citizens’ personal loans, a measure that MPs still hope “remain on the table until the government officially presents just alternatives” to increase wages. Not only does the bill aim to uplift domestic welfare, but plays into a wider package of structural reforms that would put the state in a position to tap into international markets.

The most recent elections only served to inflame tensions between the cabinet and legislature, through the growth in opposition candidates making considerable gains in September. These members, drawn from largely Islamist groups (both amongst the Sunni and Shi’i blocs in the Assembly), stifled the government’s ability to pass time-sensitive economic reforms, including the introduction of a value-added tax (VAT), part of a regional agreement within the Gulf Cooperation Council. Kuwait and Qatar, in spite of Saudi Arabian orders and the rest of their Gulf counterparts, have so far resisted the moves.

By many democratic standards, the Kuwaiti National Assembly is one of the freest and most active legislatures in the Middle Eastern region, albeit under what is considered authoritarian leadership – the ruling family has the authority to make executive appointments, and can dissolve the assembly at its own mercy. Whilst traditional party political systems do not exist in the state, the ruling family has actively given its legislature the most influence in comparison to other Gulf monarchies. The ruling family has also tried to work with the executive in attempting to ease the deadlock by giving into opposition populist demands, such as the granting of amnesties to political dissidents and the restructuring of key institutions for better popular representation.

It is only through the establishment of stable governance that the law, in whatever form it may take, can be passed, which will strengthen the country’s currently lacklustre ability to borrow credit and therefore curry investment – the country has seen a recent severe depletion of its general reserve fund despite its vast oil wealth as the world’s tenth largest producer of oil, and the largest producer per capita. For a state that employs nearly 80% of its citizens, a resolution to the crisis must be of paramount importance for the domestic and international stability of the state.

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