The Maldives’ election and its implications for Sino-Indian rivalry
On September 30, Maldives opposition candidate Mohamed Muizzu, who endorses stronger ties with China, won the presidential runoff with more than 53 per cent of the vote. The coalition backing Muizzu, the People’s National Congress (PNC), has a record of being close to China, engendered under outgoing President Ibrahim Mohamed Solih’s predecessor Abdulla Yameen, and has launched an "India out" campaign, promising to remove a small Indian military presence of surveillance aircraft and some 75 personnel. Around 282,000 people were eligible to vote in the election and turnout was recorded at nearly 80 per cent. Muizzu had only three weeks to campaign and, according to analysts, lacked the leverage of a sitting president, while the turnout and the decisive results indicate that Muizzu's vehement opposition to the deployment of the Indian military in the Maldives played an influential role in the election outcome.
The election effectively became a referendum on which regional power, China or India, would sustain its influence over the Maldives. This is largely owing to the fact that Muizzu campaigned on the promise to end India's presence in the Maldives and balance trade relations with New Delhi, which he claimed were severely skewed in India's favour. While India has historically maintained cultural, financial, and security links with the Maldives, China has recently invested in infrastructure projects through which it seeks to strengthen ties and pursue its Belt and Road vision of transportation and energy networks.
According to former President Solih, India is the "first responder in times of crisis, and among the loudest supporters in times of good fortune." As per Muizzu's party, PNC, India's overwhelming influence poses a threat to sovereignty, and India is attempting to install a permanent armed presence in the archipelago. In a more global sense, due to a combination of geoeconomic and geopolitical factors, the Maldives’ strategic location in the centre of the Indian Ocean Region has rendered it an essential component in the policies of the main global and regional powers.
China & India’s current strategic outlook in the Indian Ocean
The Indian Ocean is a critical geopolitical region. It is home to several important chokepoints, such as the Strait of Malacca and the Bab el-Mandeb, which are essential for global trade and energy flows. China and India are both seeking to expand their influence in the region in order to protect their strategic interests.
Under President Xi Jinping, China has expanded upon two new principal rationales for bolstering its regional presence: firstly, to forestall a competitor state from acquiring control of the Malacca Straits, through which a substantial portion of China's trade and energy supplies move; and secondly, to accelerate President Xi's BRI and the supplemental Maritime Silk Road (MSR), linking Eurasia and Africa, via a host of comprehensive infrastructure and transportation projects. Within the Indian strategic outlook, China's growing regional footprint is deemed an infringement on its historically established area of influence. Approximately 90 per cent of Indian trade volume and oil imports pass through the area, and it has previously served as an entrance point for terrorist infiltrators, in particular during the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Moreover, viewed under the context of increased Chinese maritime involvement in the region, such as the heavy Chinese presence at Pakistan's Gwadar port, further speaks to the alarm within India's strategic community due to Beijing's perceived dual military-commercial use of such bases. As part of this strategic approach, China has similarly financed and constructed commercial port facilities in various South Asian countries. These include Chittagong in Bangladesh, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, and Kyaukpyu in Myanmar.
Respective policy approaches vis-a-vis Malé
In its engagement with the Indian Ocean, China takes an "economic force" approach, strengthening ties with countries such as Pakistan. At the same time, India is adopting a "Neighbourhood First" policy in order to claim its position as the dominant regional power .“A core component of India's foreign policy focuses on peaceful relations and collaborative synergetic co-development with its South Asian neighbours of the Indian subcontinent encompassing a diverse range of topics, such as economic, technology, research, education, connectivity.” Both nation’s policies have a prominent geopolitical tone, with a focus on gaining control of key regions with economic and security importance.
When China began engaging in dialogue with the Maldives in the 1990s, India became increasingly concerned about the expanding ties between Beijing and the island state. Despite the fact that China and the Maldives established diplomatic ties in 1972, the Chinese government did not open an embassy in Malé until 2011. Notwithstanding the lack of a Chinese diplomatic office in Malé, high-level meetings between the two countries continued. In May 2001, then-Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji became the first Chinese head of state to visit the Maldives.
Since 2013, under Yameen’s presidency, China expanded its influence by establishing linkages within the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), providing loans, and building infrastructure, while India maintained its traditional sphere of influence with its "neighbourhood first" strategy. By 2018, Beijing had completed major projects in the country, including a new runway at the main international airport and the $200 million China-Maldives Friendship Bridge – connecting Malé to the airport island Hulhule – and the National Museum and foreign ministry buildings. The timing of the airport’s construction itself is emblematic of how former President Yameen's government cultivated deeper ties with China to the detriment of India's previously uncontested position in the Maldives. China has completed the airport project in the Maldives following the cancellation of a $511 million infrastructure deal with India by President Yameen‟ 's government.
Meanwhile, under Solih, India extended similar economic concessions in a likely bid to delineate the expanded Chinese influence under the Yameen presidency. For instance, the EXIM Bank of India signed a credit agreement for $400 million for the Greater Malé Connectivity Project in October 2020. This project is deemed to be the second most important connectivity project in the Maldives, after the China-Maldives Friendship Bridge. Pertinently, at the outset of Solih’s presidency, India also gave the Maldives $1.4 billion in the form of budgetary support, currency swap agreements and concessional lines of credit as Male found itself grappling with debt from a Chinese building spree. The developments in relations with the Maldives have even led some Indian politicians, including External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar, to view it as a model for developing relations with its neighbours as part of the “Neighborhood First'' policy. Overall, India's policy in the Indian Ocean might be described as defensive realism, as a reaction to the threat of Chinese dominance. India, in particular, is safeguarding its economy and energy reliance by reinforcing its visible presence in the Indian Ocean.
Conclusion
As demonstrated above, the re-election of a pro-China leader in the Maldives is not unprecedented, highlighting that domestic trends and anti-incumbency sentiments are also likely factors in the election outcome. That said, the political divide along the lines of China and India speaks to the Indian Ocean region as being at a crossroads of the developing strategic competition between nations, particularly the growing regional rivalry between China and India. Besides the international narratives of the elections, which have increasingly emphasised the Sino-Indian competition as the most pertinent, it is also essential to consider the broader multilateral context. Given its geostrategic location, India tends to concentrate on the regional aspect, whereas China contends not only with India equally as much, if not more, with its wider global rivalry with the US. Furthermore, rising competition from China serves as further impetus for India to strengthen ties with the US and other Indo-Pacific partners such as Australia and Japan. Overall, the outcome of the Maldives election is a reminder of the growing competition between India and China in the Indian Ocean region, which is likely to intensify in the years to come given the wider multilateral contest playing out in the Indo-Pacific. However, this competition tends to serve as a balance between the two countries, motivating them to develop regional power rather than allowing a single dominant state to become a hegemon.