Overlooked Risk 2024: Pakistan’s State Fragility
Pakistan’s state of fragility is owed to its dismal economic crisis, further amplified by factors like domestic political unrest from the previous year, the devastating flood, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Pakistan saw this turmoil continue throughout 2023 and has now taken the form of a permacrisis i.e., a persistent or extended period of instability.
Executive Summary:
Economic troubles for Pakistan have built up since 2022 due to administrative mismanagement. Despite temporary relief from traditional backers, risks of debt default remain high.
The immediate consequences of a debt default would be severe financial instability followed by civil and political unrest.
The economic challenges are further compounded by multi-dimensional risks, climate vulnerabilities, political instability, and recent clashes with Iran.
An unfavourable and deteriorating living environment in Pakistan is likely to create a refugee crisis which will have political ramifications throughout South Asia.
The reason for the fragile state of Pakistan is the deep rooted structural inadequacies which future governments will be required to identify and reform these issues.
The upcoming elections are also being termed ‘less likely to to be fair’, and risk of political instability remains high.
The Situation at Hand:
Pakistan’s state of fragility is owed to its dismal economic crisis, further amplified by factors like domestic political unrest from the previous year, the devastating flood, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Pakistan saw this turmoil continue throughout 2023 and has now taken the form of a permacrisis i.e., a persistent or extended period of instability. Moreover, while the economic crisis can be directly attributed to the mismanagement by the government, there are also overlooked metrics within the society that pose significant risks to the state owing to deep structural inadequacies within the government.
For Pakistan, problems visibly started when the International Monetary Fund (IMF) stopped the bailout package in 2020 with the situation getting worse due to the floods in June 2022 and the political instability under former Prime Minister Imran Khan. Its economic problems are owed to several factors within the country. High dependency on imports, political instability, corruption, and poor governance have lowered investor confidence. Moreover, donor fatigue from countries that were willing to financially assist Pakistan has also undermined its fiscal position and the currency devaluation of Pakistan’s Rupee due to the inability to repay the foreign debt puts the state in an even more dire financial situation. Furthermore, the destruction of crops and infrastructure caused by the June 2022 floods exacerbated issues in the already struggling economy.
However, a development in the favour of Pakistan occurred with the announcement of a USD 3 billion Stand By Agreement alongside some assistance from its traditional partners like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). From the USD 3 billion, USD 1.2 billion was subjected to immediate disbursement to avoid a sovereign default and support its balance of payments bringing some temporary relief. However, with the amount of foreign debt and domestic challenges in addition to the 2024 elections, financial risks remain high.
Adding to this permacrisis is the intensified conflict on the Iran-Pakistan border. The ongoing hostilities started with Iran ordering missile strikes on Jaish al-Adl, a Sunni militant outfit in the Balochistan province which operates from either side of the border and has on prior occasions claimed responsibility of carrying out targeted attacks against Iran. Although Iran stated that it had solely targeted the Iranian terrorists on Pakistan’s soil, the strike caused two casualties and multiple other injuries. In retaliation, Pakistan carried out missile attacks inside Iran targeting hideouts used by the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) under Operation Marg Bar Sarmachar (loose translation: death to guerilla fighters). This escalation is mounted on top of a series of small scale conflicts that both Iran and Pakistan have navigated due to the militant activities at the border area over the years, however, if these actions of taking out targets in neighbour’s soil is normalised, it will only contribute to regional instability.
Multi-Dimensional Risks and Challenges:
The blame for the crisis is largely attributed to the mismanagement under the Imran Khan government. These include delays in approaching the IMF for the bailout package, incompatible welfare schemes, not raising interest rates during COVID-19, and reluctance to raise fuel prices and roll out large fuel subsidies amidst the price hikes due to the Russia-Ukraine War. A major condition for a USD 6 billion fund by the IMF was independence for the central bank, the State Bank of Pakistan, for autonomy in decisions regarding monetary policies, price stability, and fixes a tenure for the governor.
Indian author Tilak Devasher, in his book “Pakistan: Courting the Abyss” undertakes a WEEP Analysis (Water, Education, Economy, and Population) arguing that these metrics both individually and collectively are crucial in determining a state’s security and longevity. He further states that these degraded metrics take a long time to show their effects, and since they have been made worse by successive governments in Pakistan, rectifying them would take even longer.
The water crisis can be attributed not to mere scarcity, but rather to unequal distribution, monopolies over the resources, continuing policy practices in the agricultural sector, and external financial lending that have maintained this problem making the country prone to conflict. In terms of education, even though Pakistan has been able to showcase at least some progress in student enrolments, it still struggles with Learning Poverty i.e., the inability to read and understand simple texts by students of minimum age 10. The economic worsening is largely attributed to short-sighted policy actions, over-reliance on external borrowing and extensive spending on economically unviable projects. Furthermore, Pakistan’s population has touched around 240 million marking a 10% increase since the last census only six years prior. Its negligence in family planning is reflected in the UN Human Development Index with low literacy and high poverty rates looming large over a population, the majority of whom are under age 25.
Another crucial factor for Pakistan’s fragility is its climate vulnerability. The Global Climate Risk Index, 2021 put the country in the 8th position in terms of long-term climate risk. Heatwaves and floods have showcased lasting socio-economic consequences over the years with the vulnerability factor being perceived as a national level non-traditional security issue. The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) projected severe and frequent extreme weather patterns as it struggled with major floods nearly every other year between 2010-2022 where the 2022 floods caused disruptions to income and livelihood, increasing already heightened internal migration levels.
Another prominent risk haunting Pakistan is the insurgency in the Balochistan Province and frayed relations with the Afghan Taliban. In its efforts to counter the Baloch rebels, the “kill and dump '' policy of the Pakistani government has fuelled aggression toward the establishment and is likely to take the form of violent clashes with potential spillover implications for other states in the region like India, Afghanistan and China. Moreover, the geographical location of Balochistan and presence of natural resources makes it attractive for development projects especially by China. Factoring in the strategic significance of Balochistan, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) aims to build major infrastructure projects from Xinjiang region in China to the Gwadar Port in Balochistan. While both Pakistan and China remain heavily invested in CPEC with dedicated efforts towards its protection, the Baloch rebels remain averse to the Chinese presence seeing CPEC as a form of colonial exploitation. Here, it should be noted that Pakistan is heavily dependent on Chinese financial backing and therefore would want CPEC to be successful, while China remains aware of potential risks from the Baloch rebels towards its economic security in the region.
On the other hand, Pakistan’s blame on the Taliban for facilitating the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) insurgency has resulted in a somewhat hostile tone between the two countries. Conversely, the Afghan Taliban has shifted focus and raised concerns over the expulsion of Afghan refugees from Pakistan which is part of Pakistan’s pressure tactics over the Taliban until they review their support for the TTP. Going forward if these hostilities are continued it is likely to negatively affect the Af-Pak (Afghanistan-Pakistan) region’s stability with mounting security concerns.
The risk of political violence and civil unrest is further exacerbated by the 2024 general elections on 08 February. On one hand, Pakistan Muslim League (PML) officially started campaigning with Maryam Nawaz, daughter of former PM Nawaz Sharif conducting a rally in Punjab, on the other hand, Imran Khan remains imprisoned with his candidacy rejected by the Election Commission alongside most of his party members Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (TPI). The Election Commission remains committed towards ensuring a fair election. Citing security threats, it prioritised security of voters and candidates, called for strict adherence to the protocols and also rejected a Senate resolution to postpone the elections given all essential preparations are already completed. Moreover, Pakistan’s caretaker PM Anwaar-ul Haq Kakar established a seven-member committee to ensure smooth conduct of elections amidst allegations of pre-poll rigging. Imran Khan’s party, despite allegations of a coordinated effort to prevent them from contesting with Gohar Khan as party leader, has started campaigning alongside other parties.
In light of this election atmosphere, the government remains wary of security threats as election campaigns have previously faced violent conflict, bombings, and gun violence. Here, it must be noted that Imran Khan on previous occasions has been able to incite violence against the establishment through civil unrest, and might use his populist persona to incite violence claiming fraud in the election. Analysts are of the view that it is unlikely that these elections will be fair, that they may be delayed, and that an election will be done only after the establishment has ensured Nawaz Sharif’s victory upon completely sidelining Imran Khan. Hence, the possibility of political instability in Pakistan remains very high.
Potential Impact:
In case Pakistan faces a debt default, that would result in a capital flight due to low investor confidence, increased cost of external borrowing, and disrupted supply chains eventually leading to reduced imports and foreign exchange reserves causing a rise in inflation. These financial implications would be followed by civil unrest and possibly public violence due to an already politically sensitive environment. Furthermore, in a scenario where Pakistan loses its traditional financial backers, China is seen as a potential lender of last resort.
Few factors need to be taken into account while assessing or predicting the future trajectory of Pakistan in relation to China. While the scale and strategic significance of CPEC is well recognised, the CPEC investments are largely unviable with virtually no signs of any economic upliftment in Pakistan. Furthermore, Pakistan’s external debt has reached USD 100 billion, one-third of which is owed to China and it would be difficult for a debt-ridden Pakistan to pay given the long-term development dividends. Finally, CPEC’s momentum has been negatively affected after Imran Khan’s claims that CPEC is not aligned with Pakistan’s national interests and the Chinese nationals present in Pakistan for the development projects were regularly facing terror attacks. In this light, two possibilities exist. Either Pakistan will have to cede certain areas within the country like ports or military bases in exchange for financial backing such as in Sri Lanka, or China will no longer support Pakistan in its endless cycle of lending and failing to repay loans. Either way Pakistan faces a significant risk of state failure.
Moreover, in case future administrations are unable to ensure necessities to the population like electricity, water, food, education, and employment, public unrest becomes far more plausible as socio-political inequalities in a politically polarised society are a hotbed for violent clashes and civil unrest. While a full-state failure of Pakistan could be far-fetched, an assessment based on current factors indicates ramifications throughout South Asia. A fractured Pakistan based on unfavourable metrics of education, population, and climate could be the reason for a potential refugee crisis that would lead to an increased threat perception among other South Asian countries, particularly to its immediate neighbour India.
Recommendations:
Pakistan’s state fragility is the result of its multi-dimensional risks, and the failure of consecutive governments to address these challenges has consolidated them deep into Pakistan’s society. However, with the election in 2024, the future administration will have to undertake a series of reforms to establish a reliable and stable government.
The future administration will have to prioritise a stable functioning government devoid of any military interference, unlike the previous governments. Going forward, external borrowing could be relied upon for a limited time for instant relief, the government will have to introduce structural reforms to revamp the economic policies within the country with a focus on domestic manufacturing and increasing exports. Finally, in the longer run, the government will have to recognize and improve crucial sectors particularly the WEEP metrics to reduce the fragility of the state.