How a terrorist insurgency in Mozambique is benefiting Russia
Whilst ISIS may have been pushed out of Syria and Iraq, its legacy of extremism has flourished in Sub-Saharan Africa. Since 2017, Mozambique has fought to contain the successes of a novel and particularly ruthless insurgency waged by radical extremists connected to the Islamic State’s Central Africa Province. Although the conflict is largely contained to Mozambique and a few border towns in Tanzania and Rwanda, it has significant implications for the oil and natural gas markets and their impact on Western economies. In 2015, vast oil and natural gas fields were discovered in Northeastern Mozambique and offshore. Whilst Maputo awarded lucrative contracts for the extraction and processing of oil and liquid natural gas (LNG), the insurgency has deterred investment and the construction of infrastructure. Russia serves to benefit because the insurgency has cut off an alternative to Russian oil for the West and provided an opportunity for Russia to gain greater influence in Sub-Saharan Africa.
The insurgency
In 2017, an armed group called “Al-Shabaab” (not to be confused with Somalia’s Al-Shabaab) began attacking police stations and military installations in Mozambique’s Northeastern Cabo Delgado province. Motivated by poverty, inequality, and the perception that Maputo had neglected the Cabo Delgado region, Al-Shabaab set out on a campaign of violence and terror. When it became clear that local police and other government forces would not be able to stop the increasingly common and brutal attacks, Maputo turned to the Wagner Group and Dyck Advisory Group, private military companies from Russia and South Africa, respectfully. The two companies were forced to withdraw from the conflict after sustaining severe casualties and failing to make any headway in the fight against the insurgents. Maputo then turned to the Southern African Development Community, which organised a coalition of forces numbering in the thousands to combat the insurgents and train local police forces. Whilst the coalition has been successful in recapturing territory and some strategic cities, such as Mocimboa da Praia, the insurgency is still the source of major instability in Northeastern Mozambique.
In 2018, Mozambique awarded a number of contracts to oil and LNG giants from Italy, Norway, the US, UK, and South Africa, but not Russia. The fields for which the contracts were awarded are estimated to contain enough oil and LNG to supply the UK, France, Germany, and Italy for the next 20 years. However in the face of the violent insurgency, companies such as Total pulled out of their contracts and stopped the development of extraction infrastructure in 2019. Maputo thus offered certain drilling rights to Russian oil companies in exchange for the success of the Wagner Group. Little has transpired since, as international forces push to recapture oil-rich territories and companies wait for the region to be safe enough to reopen operations.
A stronger market position
The benefits of this insurgency for Russia are twofold. Russia’s market position is stronger without competition from Mozambiquan oil and when its relationship with the West is weakened. Al-Shabaab’s operations have largely crippled the oil industry in the third largest oil fields in Africa. Western companies are not capable of engaging in oil extraction and processing and cannot use Mozambiquan oil as a substitute for Russian oil. The rise in energy prices in late 2021 and then subsequent economic sanctions on Russia have meant that the supply of oil is a key concern for Western decision makers and a point of leverage for Russia. Germany imports 66.1% of its oil from Russia, and 29% of the European Union’s crude oil imports are from Russia. Russia can use its strong market position to raise oil prices and contribute to inflation in retaliation for the economic sanctions imposed on it by the West as a result of its invasion of Ukraine. Therefore, Italian President Mattarella met with Mozambiquan President Nyusi in July 2022 to discuss increased oil extraction possibilities for Italy and the European Union. However, if the West is successful in securing further oil rights, the threat posed by Al-Shabaab means that only a limited amount of additional oil could be exported, advantaging Russia.
Mozambique’s partnership with the West
The extraction contracts with Western companies served as an indication of Maputo’s desire to build its relationship with the West. Mozambique has built its foreign policy around the principle of non-alignment, seeking to balance relations with both the West and other actors such as Russia and China. This is exemplified by the granting of oil rights to Western companies and the contracting of mercenaries from Russia. Western companies’ choice to pull out of their contracts because of the insurgency presents Russia with the opportunity to expand its influence in Mozambique. Whilst the Wagner Group scheme was unsuccessful, certain oil rights are available for bidding once again and may be sold to Russian oil companies. Moreover, Mozambique has already demonstrated a desire not to take a stance on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, choosing to purchase Russian oil despite warnings from American diplomats. Therefore, the destabilisation of Cabo Delgado by Al-Shabaab has meant that Western companies have pulled out of their contracts leaving a void available for Russian companies and influence to fill.
Thus, Al-Shabaab’s terrorist insurgency against Mozambique and its governance structures has tangible benefits for Russia, not only by preventing the West from acquiring an alternative to Russian oil, but by creating an opportunity for Russian influence to increase in Mozambique and Sub-Saharan Africa.