On January 24th, 2022, Burkinabe President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré was overthrown by members of the military, following heavy gunfire in front of his residence. The military faction that has taken power, called the "Patriotic Movement for Safeguard and Restoration" (PMSR), announced the suspension of Burkina Faso’s constitution, the dissolution of the government, and the closure of the country’s borders  on national television, while committing to restore a constitutional order within a reasonable time.

The PMSR justifies this overthrow by Kaboré’s mishandling of the terrorist threat since his election, coinciding with a significant rise of attacks in the region. Indeed, terrorist groups linked to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic state have progressively gained territory and power in West Africa since 2015, whilst the G5 Sahel and international coalitions remain helpless. In Burkina Faso, the number of terrorist acts rose from 500 in 2020 to over 1,150 in 2021. 2021 was marked by extreme violence, with the massacre in Solhan in June during which 132 civilians were killed, or the attack of Inata in November which resulted in the death of 57 people including 53 gendarmes.

This latest attack epitomised the feeling of abandonment from the political authorities expressed by the militaries, as soldiers could not find water or food due to logistical issues. This was only one of the many problems militaries have experienced in the field, including issues with equipment, salaries, supplies, and the ability to take care of the families of those who were killed in combat. Moreover, Kaboré’s suppression of the “Régiment de Sécurité Présidentiel” (Presidential Security Regiment) – who protected former President Blaise Compaoré – enhanced the divide between the government and the military.

The head of the PMSR, Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, graduate of the Ecole Militaire de Paris, has thoroughly analysed West African terrorism in his book "Armées ouest-africaines et terrorisme, réponses incertaines?" (West African armies and terrorism, uncertain answers?). In this military essay, he pinpoints the key failures of Sahelian governements’ responses to terrorism, which constitute the axis of his reforms for Burkina Faso. Damiba focuses on shaping an active counter-terrorism strategy with unconventional means, reforming the intelligence service through human networks and reinforcing bilateral cooperation. To achieve this vision, he demands more funds for the military as part of the ongoing negotiations happening between the PMSR and Kaboré’s government. 

A share of the population welcomed the coup, celebrating in the streets of Ouagadougou, after months of repressed protests in the country. The international opinion sees this coup as democratic backsliding, with the worry that the military authorities will not restore a constitutional order, as happened in Mali in 2020. UN Secretary General António Guterres has "strongly condemned" the military coup committed in the country, asking the mutineers to lay down their arms and protect President Kaboré. The US, UK, and France have all denounced the coup, whilst Burkina Faso was banned from ECOWAS, the 15-nation Economic Community of West African States. 

Domestic consequences

The military coup in Burkina Faso does not bode well for the Burkinabe, who could see the economic and political situation of their country deteriorate. Even if the mutineers eventually restore the constitution, it is still very likely that the country will suffer from this authoritarian phase. An empirical study of military coups in Africa has demonstrated that military regimes frequently circumvent constitutional rule and commit human rights violations, whilst economically mishandling resources and encouraging corruption. 

The military rule of Burkina Faso and its consequential suspension from the regional economic institution ECOWAS also risks posing grave economic challenges for the country. Indeed, Burkina Faso imports the majority of its goods through ports in Ivory Coast, Togo, Ghana and Benin. Burkina Faso’s top imports, namely refined petroleum, delivery trucks, packaged medicine and electricity, will become more rare and expensive thus destabilising the country and harming the population. 

In addition to the dangers the population faces in terms of potential future human rights violations, economic shortages and inflation, UN officials Virginia Gamba and Dr Najat Maalla M’jid are gravely concerned with the effect of the coup on children's rights. Internally displaced children are at risk of recruitment by armed groups and forced labour, while the danger of sexual and gender-based violence for girls, with schools and health facilities closed, is heightened. The Special Representatives urge “positive and cooperative action from all parties to ensure the full and effective protection of children from violence.”

However, if the risk of a deteriorating situation for the population is high, Hassane Koné underlines the opportunity the coup represents for a reform of the political system, potentially beneficial in the long term. If the PMSR and civilian authorities collaborate, the Burkinabe government could transition towards a more balanced and stable governance between political and military authorities, thus ending the reciprocal distrust under Kaboré’s mandate. 

A problem endemic to the Sahel

Burkina Faso’s coup is the fourth since 2021 in the Sahel, following the overthrow of the Malian, Chadian, Guinean and Sudanese governments, adding up to more than in the previous five years combined. These recurrent coups draw West Africa into a vicious cycle of domestic turmoil. The region’s deteriorating security landscape and the apparent domino effect sparked by the coups risk to further undermine prospects of peace.

Indeed, the terrorist threat is progressively affecting more territory, with countries outside the so-called “three borders” area (straddling Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso) becoming targets of terrorist organisations. The coastal hubs of trade and investment are legitimately worried after Bénin suffered three attacks for the first time. Whilst terrorist groups cause instability in the region, their expansion is facilitated by domestic vulnerability.

Moreover, the climate of instability caused by the military coup, in the context of the fractured regional leadership, could facilitate the expansion of the terrorists’ activities. For instance, the 2021 military coup in Mali caused the country and its neighbours to experience increased terrorist attacks.

Implications for foreign intervention

Foreign intervention was already under change after France’s announcement of the end of Barkhane’s Operation following the coup in Mali in 2021. France’s military operation is gradually being replaced by strengthened bilateral partnerships (such as Operation Sabre in Burkina Faso) and a transition towards the European Takuba task force. However, the recent coup in Burkina Faso blurs the future of French and European engagement. 

As illustrated by the Burkinabe people waving Russian flags in the streets after the coup, the PMSR may decide to interrupt its military partnership with France, following Mali’s steps. This would pose a grave security threat to the region, considering Burkina Faso is logistically key for supply convoys into neighbouring countries. Whilst Burkina Faso has been reluctant in the past few years to ask for France’s support because of a desire for independence from the former colonial power,  Lieutenant-Colonel Damiba’s friendly relationship with France could suggest a desire to cooperate with France. 

However, even if the Burkinabe military authorities decide to pursue collaboration with France, the instability it has caused may well undermine it anyways. After the coup in Mali, President Emmanuel Macron had announced that France would not work in a country where there is no “democratic legitimacy nor transition.”  As Elie Tenenbaum, director of the Center for Security Studies of the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) regrets, the coup added to the instability in the region and undermines the possibility of constructing meaningful and far-reaching policies. 

The gradual withdrawal of French forces in the region would also pose numerous threats. Not only would it create a security vacuum exploitable by terrorist forces or Russian militias, suspected of having committed war crimes in Mali, but the lack of French intelligence might undermine the efficiency of other international missions like MINUSMA or the G5 Sahel. Moreover, the European Task force could risk falling apart if the pressure from terrorist forces or Russian Militias challenges domestic support. Sweden has already announced the withdrawal of its troops in 2022, following Mali’s coup and Russian militias intervention. 

The necessity of a reformed international approach to security problems in West Africa 

The deterioration of the security situation in West Africa and the numerous coups the region is experiencing are also representative of the failure of the international community’s approach to tackling the security threat. The security and development strategies adopted by foreign actors in the past years have often been too short-sighted, while sometimes “[undermining] efforts at burden-sharing, stabilisation, and any hope of the kinds of deep political reforms needed to help regional states overcome the challenges to their own populations and institutions”. The current crisis has also underlined the limits of African regional institutions such as ECOWAS, specifically its inability to severely punish the coup makers.

To solve West Africa’s cycle of violence, experts have pointed to a comprehensive approach to security, tackling both direct security threats and deeper problems endemic to African states. As Dr Jean-Luc Stalon, Resident Representative of the United Nations Development Program in Cameroon advises, the security approach should also focus on the vulnerabilities that allow the terrorist groups to function. The extent of cattle theft and trafficking, the circulation of the proceeds of crime and the continued enlisting of young people clearly indicate that beyond ideology, the fight happens in the transformation of the local economy and society. Efforts are needed to better control remittances between countries, strengthen border control and surveillance, improve intelligence gathering and analysis, and secure the collaboration of communities living in border areas. The failure of the security response is also reinforced by corruption problems.

A reform in the security strategy also has to be accompanied by development programmes to solve the bedrock of insecurity that nurtures terrorism, in cooperation with the population. Whilst France acknowledged this issue, advocating for more concrete and operational UN development programmes in early 2022, Lieutenant-Colonel Damiba’s programme takes the path of a conventional military venture that risks perpetuating the country’s vicious cycle of instability and violence.