Conflict in Sudan: What are the Implications for the Middle East & North Africa?

A conflagration of hostilities is erupting in Sudan between the forces of two rival generals, resulting in the tragic loss of over 600 lives thus far. The conflict has sparked a dire humanitarian catastrophe, with heavy artillery being used by both sides in densely populated areas. Across the region, battles persist in Khartoum and beyond as troops of the Sudanese National Army (SNA) led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan face off against those of Mohamed “Hemedti” Hamdan Daglo, commander of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). 

In addition to the severe domestic consequences of the conflict, the escalation is having international repercussions. According to analysts, the ramifications may extend beyond borders, impacting the region that is already grappling with instability. With its volatile location bordering the Red Sea, the Sahel region, and the Horn of Africa, Sudan serves as a critical crossroads connecting multiple nations, often facing their own conflicts. Many external powers entangled in Sudan for its oil and resource exploitation will be unable to simply stand by in the conflict. This strategic position attracts regional power plays, also making the spillover effects of the conflict a matter of significant concern.

Egypt

A crucial aspect of the regional implications are the deep ties between Egypt and Sudan. Sudan’s military's cooperation with Egypt in joint military exercises, including recent naval drills, underscores the alignment of their interests. As discussed by Kholood Khair, Director of the Confluence Advisory think-tank in Khartoum, Egypt is unequivocally a long-term backer of Abdel al-Burham. Interestingly, Hemedti gets his support mainly from the UAE and Saudi Arabia – two states that Egypt relies on for financial aid. 

This holds significance in light of Egypt's ongoing dispute with Ethiopia over the construction of the Blue Nile dam. As Egypt and Sudan rely on the Nile for fresh water, the states are concerned about the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) project, which will affect their distributions and supplies.

In this context, the Sudanese conflict can intensify the regional power struggle surrounding the Nile waters. As noted by Director of Research and Analysis in Arab Centre Washington DC, Imad K. Hard: 

“The ongoing clashes in Sudan do not serve Egypt’s interest because they foster instability on its southern border. They weaken Sudan’s security institutions and the ability for the Sudanese state to control its borders and regions. The clashes also limit Egypt’s ability to count on Sudan’s support and assistance in dealing with the serious issue of Ethiopia’s GERD, which negatively affects water supplies that they both rely on. With Sudan in chaos, the two cannot form a unified front against Ethiopia.”


Gulf States

In the complex landscape of geopolitics, significant power dynamics emerge as Middle Eastern states like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates vie for influence in Sudan. These Middle Eastern powers perceive Sudan as a critical theatre in their larger quest to counter the influence of Islamist forces within the region. Since the overthrow of al-Bashir in 2019, both countries have emerged as strong financial and political backers of Sudanese military leaders. As noted by Ahmed Soliman, a researcher at the Chatham House think-tank in the UK, “There’s this view of Sudan as a Middle Eastern country. The Gulf states see Sudan as being part of their sphere of influence.” 

Alongside the United States and Great Britain, Saudi Arabia and the UAE form the “Quad” - a collaborative front actively spearheading mediation efforts in Sudan. Working in tandem with prominent international bodies like the United Nations and the African Union, the Gulf countries work on pressuring both sides to negotiate, hoping to maintain their influence and preserve their strategic interests in Sudan. 

To add on the complexity to the conflict, these two are also backing different sides. While Saudi Arabia supports al-Burhan, the UAE is close to Hemedti, who they paid to provide troops to fight in Yemen. However, the recent developments and Emirati cautious foreign policy at the moment may suggest that the state might be reassessing their alliance with Hemedti. In light of mounting international scrutiny, the association with the RSF might affect their broader regional objectives and pose a strain on their relationship with other strategic allies. This divergence can also potentially hinder the collective efforts to bring about a resolution to the conflict. Therefore, it will be important to observe the UAE’s moves towards Hemedti as the conflict evolves, as it is possible that the state will recalibrate their alliances.

The conflict in Sudan also arrives at a precarious moment for Gulf commercial interests, as the wealthy oil producers have invested in Sudan. In Saudi Arabia, Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman has pursued ambitions to diversify the kingdom’s fossil fuel-dependent economy resting heavily on the Red Sea coast. Likewise, UAE also has commercial and geopolitical interests tied to Sudan, such as a deal signed last December aiming to develop a new $6 billion port 200 miles north of Port Sudan. However, as tensions escalate in Sudan, concerns arise over the potential disruption of these ambitious projects, prompting anxiety for Saudi and UAE. With the conflict persisting, foreign investors are likely to back out from the projects that were closely tied to Sudan. With that in mind, and with investments in Sudan at stake, the Gulf states have a strong interest in de-escalation of the conflict.


Libya

The conflict in Sudan has significant implications for neighbouring Libya, especially in the southern regions plagued by a security vacuum and the absence of official institutions. This vacuum has previously allowed various armed groups, including Sudanese mercenaries, to exploit the situation and establish a foothold in southern Libya. Among these groups is also the Janjaweed, the militia that gave rise to the RSF.

The presence of Sudanese mercenaries exacerbates the challenges faced by Libya in establishing stability, strengthening governance structures, and addressing security concerns. Furthermore, the flow of weapons and people across the border could increase, which contributes to the existing complexity. As the ongoing conflict in Sudan poses a threat to plans for repatriating Sudanese mercenaries in Libya, this can delay Libya’s political transition and exacerbate instability. 

It can be thus anticipated that the conflict in Sudan will result in heightened border insecurity in southern Libya, leading to the movement of fighters and displaced civilians across the border. This situation could prompt the Libyan National Army (LNA) to shift its focus towards securing the Sudanese border, where it holds the most influence, or providing sanctuary for Sudanese fighters, some of whom may have previously fought within LNA ranks. As a result, the political transition in Libya is expected to be further delayed, with the likelihood that elections will take place before 2024 doubtful. These disturbances raise the risks of spreading instability in the near term and potentially weaken prospects for economic growth.

Refugees and IDPs 

Amongst the regional repercussions of the conflict, one of the most significant issues comes from the high numbers of refugees and internally displaced people. The influx of people escaping the violence can strain resources and capacities of neighbouring countries, adding onto socio-economic and humanitarian challenges of the region. Since the conflict began, it has already been reported by the United Nations that about 100,000 people have fled Sudan. In addition to that, there has been estimated to be 700,000 internally displaced people.

For example, the UNHCR estimates that 30,000 people have already fled Sudan to its western neighbour, Chad, and more are expected. The arrival of the new wave of refugees to Chad, already hosting Sudanese refugees before the conflict began, has placed an additional strain on the country’s overstretched public services and resources. With that in mind, Chadian authorities are concerned that its neighbour’s civil conflict can compromise the security and humanitarian situation within their own territory.

“From previous Sudanese conflicts, eastern Chad already hosts 400,000 Sudanese refugees,” commented Remadji Hoinathy from the Institute of Security Studies. “Chad is very willing to receive the refugees. But the challenge is it is happening in the context where the World Food Programme is saying there are difficulties in providing for the refugees that are already in the country.”

Domino Effect

The conflict between rival generals has had devastating impacts throughout Sudan and is now poised to have far-reaching international implications. With its vast natural resources and strategic trade routes, Sudan plays a crucial role for both Africa and the Middle East. With that in mind, the outbreak of a prolonged and unpredictable conflict can disrupt trade flows, jeopardise investments, and hinder economic development. This may also lead to a decline in foreign investment, damage infrastructure, and impact the stability and growth prospects of neighbouring countries. The economic backlash might also be seen in food production decline and subsequently rising prices. Sudan, being the “food basket of the Arab world,” has been crucial in increasing the food security in the MENA region. With the prices now drastically increasing, the repercussions will add on to the regional inflation issues.

Recognising the risks associated with prolonged conflict and its potential to spread instability, regional powers have a vested interest in de-escalating the situation. Middle Eastern countries, including Saudi Arabia and Emirates, are likely to intensify their efforts to facilitate diplomatic negotiations and peacebuilding initiatives. Leveraging their influence and relationships, these regional actors may play a pivotal role in encouraging dialogue and working towards a peaceful resolution.

Shifting alliances among the foreign actors involved in Sudan is another factor to consider. The United Arab Emirates, for example, has been closely aligned with Hemedti, providing support to his forces. However, if the UAE perceives that its backing is not aligned with its broader regional interests, it may reconsider its position and recalibrate its support towards more inclusive and stable factions.

The protracted conflict in Sudan will also necessitate increased humanitarian aid. Regional powers, alongside the international community, will be compelled to provide greater assistance to address the growing needs of displaced populations, refugees, and vulnerable communities affected by the conflict. This humanitarian aid will be crucial in alleviating immediate suffering and stabilising the situation on the ground.

While the specific outcomes of the Sudanese conflict remain uncertain, the shared interests of regional powers, economic considerations, and humanitarian imperatives provide strong incentives for diplomatic engagement, peacebuilding efforts, and increased support for Sudan. The extent to which these predictions materialise will depend on the evolving dynamics on the ground and the willingness of key actors to engage in constructive dialogue and cooperative measures.

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