Wagner Group Activity in Sudan
The Wagner Group has been operating in Sudan since 2017, long before the Sahel nation descended into its latest conflict. In the past Wagner acted as a private security firm for President Omar al-Bashir, but since his removal from power in 2019 Wagner has primarily focused on securing mining rights and its grip on illegal gold exports. Prigozhin’s first recorded speech after his failed mutiny, reiterated the importance of Wagner operations in Africa and indicated that they were set to continue, although it still remains unclear in what capacity.
The Wagner Group was first invited into Sudan after a meeting between then-President Omar al-Bashir and the Russian premier Vladimir Putin. Al-Bashir, feeling his rule coming under threat, asked for Russian support to help maintain his grip on power. In return, he offered Russia a gateway into Africa through Sudan. Soon after, concessions were granted to M Invest and its subsidiary Meroe Gold - both of whom the US Treasury Department considers covering entities for the Wagner Group - to operate in Sudan. Al Jazeera reports that during this time Wagner guarded mineral reserves operated by Meroe Gold, and acted as a support force for al-Bashir’s government. However, DW reports show that behind the scenes Wagner had also begun nurturing ties with Rapid Support Forces (RSF) General Hemedti.
After al-Bashir’s rule dissolved, the Wagner Group’s influence on government was slightly reduced, but it maintained strong ties with Hemedti, helping him (and his now enemy, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan) topple the civilian-led government just two years later. The Wagner Group capitalised on its partnership with the RSF and the political turmoil to increase its control of Sudanese gold mines. The extraction of gold, manganese, silicon and uranium and the group’s spreading influence across the continent led the US Treasury Department to sanction Prigozhin, M Invest and Meroe Gold in 2020.
In July of last year, a CNN report was published showing over 16 gold-smuggling flights from Sudan to a Russian military base in Syria. The gold was being exported out of the country to help the Russian Federation curb the effects of Western sanctions and to fund the war in Ukraine. That same report shows that in 2021 as much $1.9 billion worth of gold went unaccounted for, and evidence points to large quantities of gold bypassing the Sudanese treasury in exchange for Russian - and thereby Wagner - political and military support.
Wagner’s strong partnership with Hemedti also helped secure the Russian Federation the promise of a naval base on the Red Sea. However, this plan was rejected by Heemdti’s rival General al-Burhan, only increasing the tension between the two.
After violence broke out in Sudan between the RSF and the Sudanese military (SAF) reports quickly surfaced that the Wagner Group was providing military support to its ally General Hemedti. CNN reported that not only did Wagner provide Hemedti’s RSF with surface-to-air missiles, Hemedti himself flew to Russia days before the conflict began to advance relations between the two parties. Extensive satellite imagery in the report shows that Libyan General Khalifa Haftar and Wagner forces in the area were readying themselves to back Hemedti before the violence had erupted.
Despite widespread reporting of Wagner operations in Sudan, and its recent backing of the RSF, in May Prigozhin claimed that no Wagner fighter had been in Sudan for longer than two years. "I can tell you with absolute certainty, and you can put my words in any protocols, in any highest instances, today there is not a single soldier of the PMC [private military company] "Wagner", I emphasise - not a single one, not in Sudan. And so it is more than two years. Not a single Wagner PMC soldier is present in Sudan for two years. And today there is not a single one. I think that this is the main thing that you need to know." This comes after Army general Yassir al-Atta told the Ashraq al-Aswat newspaper that Wagner was operating the Jebel Amer gold mine near Darfur and that General Hemedti had 53 tonnes of gold stored in Russia.
Prigozhin denied these claims wholeheartedly, stating that any reports about Wagner supporting either General in the Sudanese conflict were attempts at provocation and nothing more. Moreover, the RSF denied receiving any support from Wagner, the Russian government or Libya. Regardless, there is evidence to show that the group has been supplying weapons to the RSF, enabling it to gain ground in the fight, and perhaps enhancing its capabilities in the long-term. The Wagner Group has a track record of human rights offences and tends to abuse international humanitarian law, thus experts are concerned that its support for the RSF will only prolong a conflict that has already left nearly 14 million children in desperate need of humanitarian aid.
Given the opaque nature of the Wagner Group mutiny, it is unclear if the paramilitary group will continue to act as a proxy for the Russian state in Sudan, or if the Wagner forces will be folded into the state military. What is clear is that the political influence and economic control that the paramilitary group established in Sudan and neighbouring countries over the past several years is not something the Russian state is willing to give up. Moreover, the Wagner Group will have to tread carefully in the Sahel nation if it hopes to maintain its mining monopoly in neighbouring nations. If instability and conflict were to spread from Sudan to bordering countries the Wagner Group may lose its political influence and access to crucial mining areas which it can ill-afford given its newly fractured relationship with the Kremlin.