Wagner News Update (18-24 September)
By: Ciaran Murray
Summary:
The Kremlin is likely seeking to reduce the influence of Wagner domestically and internationally. Wagner remains active in a training capacity within Belarus, and former fighters appear to be returning to Ukraine under the Rosgvardia. Russia is increasing its diplomatic activity in Africa, likely trying to replace Wagner’s presence in various countries with its own. Discontent amongst Wagner mouthpieces is growing due to distrust and suspicion over Russian activity in Africa. Wagner’s influence in Africa is not lost as it continues to operate in Mali and maintains close relations with the Central African Republic (CAR) leadership.
Developments:
The FSB is investigating Russian National Guard officers’ potential involvement in the Wagner rebellion.
Wagner claims its fighters will soon begin training sessions for Cossack territorial defense volunteers in Rostov, Russia.
Wagner continues to train Belarusian Ministry of Internal Affairs special forces units.
Some former Wagner fighters have volunteered to return to Ukraine. Wagner sources stress that they are not operating under the PMC. Russia plans to pass legislation allowing volunteer units to join the Rosgvardia and fight in Ukraine.
Wagner hints at, provides information about, and advertises for imminent deployments to Africa.
Russian defense officials (Defence, GRU) seen in multiple African countries, meeting with state leaders.
International Reactions:
CAR President refuses Macron’s request to expel Wagner from the country and expresses support for the PMC at a memorial service for Ygevney Prigozhin.
Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) takes responsibility for a 14/09 ambush between Qusa and Gao in Mali that resulted in Wagner fatalities.
Scenarios/Lines of Analysis:
After reluctance to accept Russian MoD contracts, the Kremlin is likely trying to recruit former Wagner soldiers through its national guard, allowing them to return to Ukraine. The fighting experience of Wagner PMCs is highly valuable, and Russia is likely keen to retain as many Wagner fighters as possible during the Ukrainian counteroffensive. This has the bonus of removing individuals from the Wagner entity, reducing the threat they pose to the Russian state. There will likely be further attempts from the Russian government to incentivize Wagner troops to return to Ukraine under contract from the Kremlin in the near future.
Russia is likely attempting to stem Wagner’s international influence indirectly and directly. Increased diplomatic visits to African states and tense confrontations between Wagner forces and Russian defense officials in Syria suggest that Putin is seeking to dissolve Wagner's global presence, replacing it with a more controllable and reliable force. This comes at the price of losing plausible deniability, as where Russia used to be able to separate itself from Wagner operations, its new approach is far more visible, likely deepening the rift between it and the West as competition for global influence grows. While Wagner continues vying for control in African states such as Mali, Niger, and CAR, the Kremlin's diplomatic power will likely win over African leaders, causing them to choose an alternative Russian force over Wagner.
Over time, Wagner will likely significantly lose influence as it loses contracts, causing increasing numbers of unemployed mercenaries to take out contracts with Rosgvardia or the MoD.
Friction between Wagner and the Kremlin has likely bred a sense of paranoia among Wagner channels, with many remaining openly critical of the Russian state. It is unlikely the former will be able to unify itself against the latter in such a way as occurred under Prigozhin due to the current power vacuum and general disorganization.