Arms Trafficking in the Sahel
The illicit arms trade is thriving in the Sahel. Arms trafficking in the region serves multiple purposes; arms are a means of making profit, buying protection, and maintaining control over populations and trafficking routes. The region's security remains jeopardised by porous borders and the presence of transnational criminal networks, as well as terrorist and armed groups. This dangerous combination fosters illicit arms trafficking, posing a significant security threat.
The region has experienced a rise in armed actors due in part to the proliferation of illicit arms and the lack of robust state institutions. In fact, some state institutions themselves may be involved in illicit arms trafficking. This has introduced heightened levels of competition and violence in local-level conflicts. The presence of various rebel, separatist, criminal, and violent extremist groups spanning North Africa, the Sahel, and West Africa, along with connections between arms, drugs, and human traffickers, has resulted in the militarisation of traditional trading routes.
Illicit arms trafficking in West Africa occurs along conventional trafficking and commercial routes and is deeply ingrained within an established system of illegal trade that spans national borders. Numerous trafficking routes, both internal to the region and extending into neighbouring areas, cater to the regional demand for illicit weapons. National stockpiles are a key source of illicit firearms and illegal craft production also contributes to arms proliferation across the region. Particularly significant has been the outflow of weapons from Libyan state stockpiles dating back to the Muammar Gadhafi era, which has served as a crucial source of illicit weapons for sub-Saharan Africa since 2011. Although these flows have decreased after the resumption of civil conflict in Libya in 2014, they still represent a noteworthy source of arms within the region.
Arms trafficking patterns and actors vary across the region. North of the Niger River trafficking is often more organised than it is to the South. Weak governance and corruption are central to the success of arms trafficking and organised crime in the region. Arms traffickers operate at different levels of sophistication across the region. At the lower level, the majority of individuals engaged in the illicit trade are herders, farmers, gold-mining communities, and migrant smugglers. They typically seek handguns for self-defence purposes. A second tier caters to traffickers and criminal groups who resort to violence to maintain control over smuggling operations and routes. Lastly, specialised traffickers - who are increasingly becoming associated with the drug trade- handle larger shipments of arms.
The illicit trafficking of arms has been tied to state-linked trafficking strategies organised at the highest level of governments. Non-state armed groups are often used as proxies in this process, however, a wide range of actors are involved. Criminal networks with varying levels of organisation, armed groups, tribes, and border communities are all implicated in illicit arms trafficking. As weapons become more readily available and the security situation deteriorates, demand increases. Competition over scarce resources and a desire to protect oneself has created a cycle of violence in which supply creates demand. The presence of firearms in various communities heightens the risk of formerly low-level local conflicts escalating, as traditional weapons and peaceful dispute resolution methods are replaced by modern firearms. Rising insecurity in the region fuels a local demand for firearms, especially easy-to-conceal handguns, for self-protection. The emergence of local self-defence groups, the spread of craft-produced weapons, and the continually increasing market for illicit arms are a clear manifestation of insecurity.
Niger
Niger is predominantly a transit country for arms traffickers. Arms and other illicit goods enter through Northern Niger from Libya’s south-western border and move through millenia-old trans-Sahelian trade routes. Traffickers are able to avoid security forces and international actors by using lesser known routes. Flows respond to increasing demand for weapons as new conflicts arise across the region. This route is commonly used to transport arms into Mali, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria. One route passes through the Lake Chad region towards Mali, and another through Tillabéri and Tahoua in southern and western Niger. There is also a growing domestic market for illicit arms in Niger as gold-miners have begun to purchase weapons for protection. Climate change and competition for resources in Niger has also created demand for arms within rural communities. Government actors are involved in illicit arms trafficking, playing both direct and indirect roles. Connections between trafficking networks and institutional, political, and security authorities at all levels of the Nigerien government aid in facilitating the movement of illicit arms through the country.
Mali
Mali acts predominantly as a destination for arms smuggling. Peace and security in the country were seriously undermined by the Arab Spring, during which diverted arms from Libyan stockpiles enabled widespread violent conflict from which the country has never fully recovered. Despite the deployment of two French military operations (2013-2022) and a UN peacekeeping mission, the country remains unstable and the demand for arms strong. Many arms that arrive in the country flow from Libya through Niger and into northern Mali (i.e. the towns of Kidal and Gao). Since the reemergence of high levels of violence in Libya, in 2014, the influx of arms from Libya has decreased. A counterflow of ammunition and weapons back into Libya began as internal demand increased. Arms are also trafficked into Mali through Mauritania. A number of illicit goods are trafficked from coastal West Africa and arms converge at cities on the Senegal River, constituting a major trafficking and smuggling hub. Weapons are trafficked from this hub, through Mauritania and into Foïta where they converge with arms being trafficked from the Western Sahara.
Guinea also serves as a source of weapons flowing into Mali. Guinea’s National Commission for the Fight against the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (CNLPAL) insists that these weapon flows stem from illicit arms still in circulation from the Sierra Leonean and Liberian conflicts in the late 1990s and early 2000s; however, there is evidence of diversion from Guinean army stockpiles. In 2016, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) identified the use of weapons originating from Guinean stockpiles in northern Mali. Some sources estimate that 60–80 per cent of the arms circulating in northern Mali were diverted from national stockpiles.Within Mali, limited state security presence aids the circulation of arms through many parts of the country. There are at least 15 key trafficking hubs within Mali.
Guinea-Bissau
In Guinea-Bissau, high-ranking military officials have historically supplied the illicit arms market by providing military-grade weapons directly from government stockpiles. Consequently, the country’s largest source of trafficked weapons has been its own military stocks. Although significant flows of arms were trafficked from national stockpiles to separatists in the Casamance region in southern Senegal in the 1990s, this flow has largely stopped. Shotguns now make up the majority of guns trafficked in Guinea Bissau, trafficked by rural populations who use them to hunt, for self-protection, and occasionally for banditry. These weapons are often craft-produced in either Guinea Bissau or neighbouring countries.
Tri-Border Area
Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and Ghana constitute the tri-border area, and provide several key routes which are used to smuggle both legal and illegal goods between countries, including small amounts of concealed arms transported primarily by motorcycles. Some of these routes include Bondoukou–Bouna–Varalé–Doropo in Burkina Faso's southern region, bypassing Ivorian, Burkinabe, and Malian border posts, as well as 13 small crossing points near Tingréla in Northern Côte d'Ivoire. Additionally, smuggling hubs in Ghana, particularly in the towns of Bawku, Tumu, Hamile, Sampa, and Elubo, play a role in arms trafficking, albeit on a smaller scale compared to other routes.
Ghana and Guinea are both sources of arms and ammunition for small-scale traffickers, particularly for hunting cartridges, hunting rifles, craft weapons, and handguns. In Ghana, cross-border communal ties significantly influence local trafficking dynamics. Communities in North-Western Ghana, such as the Hamile and Tumu, share cultural links and a hybrid Ghanaian–Burkinabe identity with their counterparts in neighbouring Burkina Faso. Similarly, cross-border trade between Sampa in Ghana's Bono region and Bondoukou in Côte d'Ivoire further complicates efforts to identify and intercept trafficked goods, given the substantial movement of goods at the border.
Source: UNODC, 2022
Impacts of Illicit Arms Trafficking
The proliferation of arms has undoubtedly fuelled armed conflict in the region and seriously affected the security situation, especially in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. The arrival and continued growth of jihadist groups in the region has increased demand for heavy weapons. Their presence has also been a driver of demand for lighter and small weapons which rural communities use to protect themselves from such groups. Violence in the region is fuelled by weak governments and security actors who either lack the necessary resources to make a lasting impact on the security situation or, in some cases, seek to exploit the instability for monetary gain. The circulation and trafficking of arms perpetuate a destructive cycle of rising tension and violence. Armed conflicts, combined with governments' inability to protect their citizens, push communities to acquire arms for self-defence, further exacerbating the situation. Therefore, in order to effectively address weapons proliferation, it is crucial to combine efforts supporting economic livelihoods with initiatives aimed at enhancing community security.
Illicit arms and the instability caused by the violence they foment help to create an environment in which coups are prevalent. Mali, Burkina Faso, and, most recently, Niger have all suffered military takeovers. The consequences for the region are dire. Political chaos is encouraged by the insecurity and violence caused by arms trafficking, among other things. Communities living in the border areas are vulnerable to being exploited by traffickers and other criminal organisations operating in their vicinity. Coups create a dangerous precedent in the region and engender a culture of impunity. With members of the security services involved in the organisation and growth of arms trafficking in the region, military takeovers results in the further institutionalisation of arms trafficking. If this cycle of violence and impunity is not stopped the region will likely continue to descend into chaos. In the worst case scenario, countries like Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger could become entirely ungovernable. Violence may also continue to spread towards the west coast of Africa.
Recommendations
Counter-proliferation measures have been taken to secure, mark, and record weapons in national stockpiles which make them easier to trace. However, weapons tracing efforts in the region could be strengthened further to limit the diversion of weapons from national stockpiles. In order to restrict the number of crossing into neighbouring countries, border guards should be issued enhanced training and equipment to enable them to increase seizures of illicit arms. Regional cooperation is limited in the Sahel for a number of reasons; if it were strengthened and intelligence sharing became commonplace, the flow of illicit arms across porous borders would likely reduce.
Now that MINUSMA has been told to leave the region, the international presence in the Sahel has drastically decreased. Future peacekeeping missions and foreign military operations need to take a more wholesale approach to tackling instability. It will be essential to learn from the successes and shortcomings of previous international missions such as Operation Barkhane or MINUSMA. The UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea Bissau has demonstrated a more overt and strategic focus on countering arms and drug trafficking. Additionally, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has assisted in establishing transnational crime units (TCUs) in Guinea-Bissau to promote cohesive responses to drug trafficking and organised crime, with specific attention to border control and maritime security.
A more balanced approach to tackling insecurity was launched in Côte d’Ivoire in January 2022. The program's goal is to improve civilians' living conditions by enhancing infrastructure and access to basic social services. It aims to reverse the perception of state abandonment in border communities and reduce vulnerability to exploitation. It focuses on improving education, health, electricity, water access, road maintenance, professional integration, youth employment, and social safety allowances. The program's initial impact has been positive but its true impact remains unclear as the security situation improved before its implementation. Neighbouring states and the international community should watch the implementation of these social programmes closely and assess their success. Cote d’Ivoire’s approach could be used as a framework across the Sahel to tackle insecurity, trafficking, and organised crime. By addressing the vulnerabilities of border communities and restoring their trust in the state, governments in the region could hinder the operations of traffickers.
It will be imperative to take steps to combat social and economic vulnerability, while supporting community mediation programming, good governance, and initiatives against violent extremism. Security sector support should be viewed as one element of a comprehensive approach based on a deeper understanding of the factors driving both the demand for and supply of illicit arms in the region. International, national, regional, and local actors need to recognise the importance of tackling the roots of arms proliferation in the Sahel. By taking cohesive and concerted actions to address community issues, these actors could contribute to promoting stability, security, and, eventually, prosperity in the Sahel region.