The Shift Towards Private Sector-led Growth in Rwanda

Home to some of the fastest economic expansion in the world over the last 20 years, Rwanda has achieved an annual average GDP growth rate of 7% over the last two decades. Paul Kagame, who has served as the country’s president since 2000, is broadly considered by analysts and observers both domestically and internationally as the engineer of Rwanda’s notable economic transformation following the end of the genocide in 1994. 

On the demand side, economic growth over the last two decades has been the result of a large public expenditure. Notwithstanding the positive economic transformation this has engendered, it has resulted in several structural challenges for the government. Rwanda’s public-sector-led development model has led to considerable fiscal deficits primarily financed through external borrowing. Debt has risen from 15.6% of GDP in 2012 to 48.9% in 2022. Whilst the national poverty rate declined from 75.2% to 53.5% from 2000 to 2013, this trend has stagnated since, with  56.5% of the population living on less than $1.90 a day.

Capitalising on the opportunities presented by Rwanda’s relatively undeveloped private sector would help to remedy the country’s current economic challenges, and create opportunities for overseas investors and companies. 

Advocacy for private sector-led growth from policy makers

Key policy documents published over the past years and months illustrate the importance the Rwandan government attaches to private sector development to create future economic growth. Engaging the private sector and diversifying sources of finances features as one of the four strategic objectives of the country’s ‘National Investment Policy’ (NIP) published in December 2020 by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. The private sector-led economy envisaged by the NIP is one underpinned by increasing mixed funding through mechanisms such as public-private partnerships (PPPs) and joint ventures (JVs), as well as facilitating export-led growth to improve the country’s balance of payments position and increase foreign exchange earnings. The NIP outlines that whilst PPPs have traditionally been a rare form of financing they are “a suitable step to attract further domestic and foreign investors by efficiently sharing inherent project risks and thereby making investing in the provision of public goods and services more attractive for private partners”.

Equally, Kagame’s flagship national development strategy Rwanda Vision 2050, which was launched by Kagame in 2020, highlights the importance of continuing “the journey towards self-reliance through a private sector-led growth”. As is outlined in the Vision 2050 blueprint, leveraging the country’s demographic dividend, increasing the value of human capital by strengthening the country’s education system, and creating “new growth poles” through urbanisation will serve to increase competitiveness and facilitate the operations of private companies. More recently, Rwanda’s proposed budget for the fiscal year 2024-25, serves as an indicator that the government will opt for a state-driven and proactive approach to encouraging foreign investment during Kagame’s fourth term. As outlined in the proposed budget, the government intends to increase public spending by 11.2% during the fiscal year, with RWF 2,037.4 billion (approximately USD 15.5 billion) to be allocated for both foreign and domestically financed projects.

Structural challenges undermining private sector development 

Despite increasing awareness amongst policymakers of the importance of driving private sector growth, they face several structural barriers to achieving this goal.

Rwanda is confronted with a deficit of skilled workers upon which the government’s vision of private sector growth spurred by innovation and a prospering services sector is contingent upon. The country’s labour market remains characterised by low-skilled, low wage and informal work, with 85% of workers being informally employed as of 2021. Whilst Rwanda’s agriculture sector only makes up 27% of the country’s GDP, it employs 72.2% of the population, primarily in low-skilled and informal positions. Professions such as accountants, lawyers and engineers, on the other hand, are in particular shortfall. Rwanda’s educational framework is in part accountable for the current state of the workforce, with enrolment in tertiary education at 8% for men and 7% for women in 2023. Without access to higher education and specialised training opportunities, workers will be unable to fill the technical and managerial positions that private investment, especially in areas such as services, is dependent on. Investment into the service sector is of particular importance. As Rwanda lacks the natural resources of some of its neighbours, the tertiary sector will underpin future economic growth.

Access to financing solutions and affordable credit constitutes a further obstacle to private sector development. Lending rates are amongst the highest in the region not dipping below 14.16% in the last two decades and banks primarily offer short-term loans with collateral requirements regularly higher than 100% of the loan value. Viable equity financing solutions remain limited for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMMEs). The Rwanda Stock Exchange remains nascent and only constitutes an equity solution for a handful of large companies. Whilst foreign private investors and companies can overcome these issues by leveraging external sources of financing, domestic companies are not presented with the same options, with local SMMEs often lacking the low-cost financing solutions to unlock growth at the early stages of a company’s development. 

Advancing towards a private sector-led economy

There are grounds to believe that Rwanda will be successful in its transition towards a private sector-led economy. Firstly, the transition is already underway. Under Vision 2020, which ran from 2000-2020, a host of reforms were implemented to unlock private investment such as privatisation of state-owned companies and introduction of tax incentives. Between 1996 and 2017, 56 formerly state-owned companies were privatised. Large companies that the Government of Rwanda has sold its stake in through the Rwanda Stock Exchange include: MTN Rwanda - the country’s largest telecommunications company, which was first listed on the RSE in May 2021 - and the Bank of Kigali, which the government sold its 20% stake in through the company’s Initial Public Offering (IPO) in September 2011. Moreover, in February 2021, Rwanda’s Investment Code, which seeks to promote and facilitate investment in Rwanda, was enacted into law. The legislation introduced a wide array of investment incentives, including a preferential corporate tax income rate of 0% offered to any international company that establishes its headquarters and regional offices in Rwanda; invests the equivalent of USD $10 million in the company in tangible and intangible assets; and provides employment and training to Rwandans, amongst other conditions. 

Secondly, Rwanda offers foreign and local companies a favourable regulatory environment and a relatively low and declining levels of corruption and crime. In 2020, Rwanda ranked second highest in Africa on the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business index, jumping 100 places in two decades. The index ranks countries on how conducive their regulatory environments are for establishing and operating a firm in country. Countries are ranked on several topics including starting a business, registering a property and enforcing contracts. Corruption and crime are also in decline in Rwanda, with the country receiving the lowest score in East Africa on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index in 2023 and being the second safest country on the continent according to the ENACT Organised Crime Index 2023.

The top-down policy and decision-making structures established by the government have also traditionally shown themselves to facilitate the implementation of economic reforms. International commentators have noted that Western countries provide Rwanda with more aid than other African countries because they deem the country to use it more effectively. These frameworks will likely remain broadly unchanged with Kagame set for at least another five years in office. And we assess that future policies to boost private sector growth will likely be implemented with a similar efficacy. Kagame has committed to improving the economic security of Rwandans and has pledged to transform Rwanda into an upper-middle country before the end of his next term. With 37% of the country’s population under the age 15, Rwanda’s youth will become a powerful voice in the years to come. They represent a valuable driver of growth, however, in the absence of private sector development and integration, they are not likely to be better off than the generations that preceded them.

Despite Rwanda’s traditional reliance on public funds for stimulating economic growth, Kagame has remained persistent in his desire to attract private investment. In recent years, his administration has sought to implement policies, which breaking with the past, are likely to  unlock private sector growth. Coupled with high and sustained levels of growth and other progress made under Vision 2020, such as infrastructure developments, a more central role for the private sector within Rwanda’s growth strategy will likely present untapped opportunities for overseas investors and businesses in the years to come, particularly in Rwanda’s fastest growing tertiary sectors such as financial services, IT and hospitality.

Hunger Crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Overview

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is currently experiencing one of the world’s worst hunger crises, with 42.5 million people, of the country’s total population of 105.9 million, experiencing insufficient food consumption. Of these, approximately 23.4 million people are acutely food insecure, including an estimated 4.5 million children who are acutely malnourished. The resurgence of armed conflict in the eastern provinces of Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu since 2022 has further exacerbated the situation, with 7.3 million people currently displaced across the country. Women and children are bearing the brunt of the crisis, with access to food and other critical resources severely limited and incidences of sexual harassment, exploitation, and abuse surging in the affected areas.

Drivers and Causes

The hunger crisis in the DRC is fuelled by a myriad of factors, including environmental disasters, conflict, economic instability, and poor governance. Although the country possesses significant natural resources such as copper, cobalt, diamonds, and tin, the Congolese population does not benefit from the country’s natural wealth. The DRC is one of the poorest countries in the world, with a score of 0.481 on the 2022 UNDP Human Development Index (HDI), placing it 180th out of 193 countries. Poverty is widespread, with an estimated 74.6 per cent of the population living on less than $2.15 a day in 2023, and much of the population struggles to access basic necessities such as electricity and safe and reliable drinking water.

One of the key factors driving hunger in the DRC is the occurrence of frequent natural disasters such as floods, drought, volcanic activity, and epidemics. In 2021, the eruption of Mount Nyiragongo forced at least 232,000 people to flee their homes in Goma and the surrounding areas as lava flows destroyed more than 3,500 houses and toxic volcanic gases threatened both people’s lives and the environment. Similarly, the flooding of the Congo River in January 2024 affected more than 1,8 million people, destroying thousands of houses, farmland, and critical infrastructure, such as health care, water, and sanitation facilities. While the DRC’s geographical location in the Congo Basin makes it prone to climate hazards, climate change is increasing the frequency and severity of extreme weather events in the country, with floods, droughts, and heat waves all expected to increase over the coming decades.

Alongside disasters, violent conflict is another significant cause of hunger in the DRC. Since gaining independence from Belgium in 1960, the DRC has experienced persistent conflict with political tensions and rivalries over natural resources fuelling violence between different national and ethnic groups. In 1996, Rwandan forces invaded the DRC (then known as Zaire) to root out Hutu rebel groups that had taken cover in the eastern parts of the country, leading to a regional war that pitted Rwanda and its allies along with foreign and domestic rebel groups against the Congolese government of Joseph Mobutu. In 1997, Mobutu was overthrown and replaced by the rebels’ political leader Laurent Kabila. Yet, tensions between Kabila and his allies, Rwanda and Uganda, soon began to mount, resulting in the Second Congo War of 1998. While the war officially ended in 2003, ethnic tensions persisted and continue to be a significant obstacle to long-term peace and development to this day. In 2022, violence escalated between the DRC’s armed forces (FARDC) and the Rwanda-backed M23 Tutsi-led rebels in the eastern DRC, resulting in the killing of several thousand civilians and the forcible displacement of hundreds of thousands more across the region. While exact data on the number of victims is difficult to ascertain, the United Nations estimates that, since 1996, approximately 6 million people have died as a result of war in the eastern DRC, making the conflict the deadliest event since World War II.

Impact

Almost thirty years of conflict, environmental disasters, and poor governance have created a humanitarian crisis of immense proportions in the DRC. The 2024 Global Hunger Index ranks the DRC 123rd out of 127 countries based on indicators of undernutrition, child stunting, child wasting, and child mortality and rates the country’s food security situation as ‘serious’. Hunger is pervasive all across the country and the prevalence of insufficient food consumption is generally high or very high, with 22 of the DRC’s 26 provinces currently experiencing food insecurity levels at or above 30 per cent. This includes the provinces of North Kivu (4,2 million), South Kivu (3,7 million), Ituri (3,2 million), Kasaï-Central (2,9 million), Kinshasa (2,8 million), Kasaï (2,5 million), and Kasaï-Oriental (2,3 million), which together hold more than half of the DRC’s food-insecure population.

While food insecurity affects all segments of Congolese society, women and children have been particularly hard hit by the crisis and face a range of protection issues. In 2023, an estimated 2.8 million children under 5 years old and an estimated 2.2 million pregnant and breastfeeding women were acutely malnourished, with women and children in the conflict-torn provinces of Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu the most affected. Malnutrition-related effects include weakened immunity to disease and infections, increased risk of pregnancy and childbirth complications, and stunted growth and developmental delays in children. In the DRC, child stunting is especially common, with 36 per cent of children under five estimated to be affected in 2024. The child wasting rate, while comparatively lower at an estimated 6.6 per cent, is also high, as is the child mortality rate, which at an estimated 7.6 per cent is almost three times the world’s average of 2.6 per cent.

Besides the immediate risk to health and wellbeing, food insecurity makes women and children susceptible to a number of secondary threats, including sexual and gender-based violence, exploitation, and abuse. With food in short supply, many Congolese women and girls are forced to exchange sex for food and water for themselves and their families, while others have to enter forced or arranged marriages to survive. Attacks on water and food-seeking women and girls are also frequent, with those uprooted by violence and conflict the most at risk. In the conflict-affected areas of the eastern DRC, incidences of physical and sexual violence against women and children are particularly high. With no safe shelter available, women and children in the displacement camps in Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu are exposed to heightened risks of rape and abduction, while child recruitment by armed groups is also common. Although no exact data on the number of sexual offence and child recruitment victims exists, in 2022 over 80,000 cases of gender-based violence were reported in the DRC while at least 1,545 children were recruited and used by armed groups. The true number of victims, however, is likely to be far higher.

Recommendations and Implications

Relief efforts so far have focused on providing emergency food assistance, health care, and livelihood support to vulnerable populations and communities within the DRC and surrounding areas. In 2023, 6.9 million people out of a target of 10 million people were reached, but a lack of funding limits humanitarian actors’ response capacity. In 2023, the humanitarian funding gap for the DRC reached a record $1,311,860, or 58 per cent of the total budget required, with the figure for 2024 currently standing at 55 per cent. Additional help is especially needed in the eastern DRC, where a new clade of mpox is rapidly spreading and threatening the already precarious existence of people living in refugee camps. However, to carry out their work effectively and reach a greater number of people, humanitarian actors require greater financial assistance, both from donor governments and private contributions.

For those operating on the ground, personal safety has become a growing concern in recent years. In 2023, more than 217 security incidents involving humanitarian workers were recorded in the DRC, including almost 30 abductions, around 20 injuries, and at least 3 deaths. Since the beginning of 2024, this number has further increased, with more than 170 attacks on humanitarian workers reported in the first six months of the year alone. Most attacks are taking place in the eastern provinces of Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu, where fighting between government and armed opposition forces continues to rage despite the conclusion of a ceasefire agreement on July 30, 2024. 

In North Kivu, the security situation is particularly challenging. Since the beginning of the year, M23 forces have significantly expanded the territory under their control, most recently, in early August 2024, capturing the towns of Ishasha, Katwiguru, Kisharo, Nyamilima, and Nyakakoma and taking control of the southern and eastern shores of Lake Edouard and areas along the Ugandan border. Fighting between the M23, FARDC, and pro-government Wazalendo militias has also been reported in the Lubero and Rutshuru territories in recent weeks, killing at least 16 people. In Ituri, armed groups including the Islamic State-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the Cooperative for the Development of Congo (CODECO) remain active, launching recurrent attacks against civilians in the territories of Djugo, Irumu, and Mambasa. In South Kivu, the withdrawal of the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission (MONUSCO) in June 2024 has raised concerns about a potential security vacuum, especially given the M23’s recent advance into the region. In light of the rapidly changing security landscape, it is therefore vital that humanitarian organisations liaise with local stakeholders and secure timely insights on armed group activities and movements. If your organisation is interested in tailored, PRO BONO insights from London Politica’s Africa Desk, please contact us at externalrelations@londonpolitica.com.

Intelligence Brief: South African Elections

Tomorrow, 29 May 2024, At 0700 SAST (0500 GMT) South Africans go to the polls. South Africa will engage its proportional voting system to fill 400 parliamentary seats in the National Assembly. The governing African National Congress (ANC) will look to retain a majority, albeit likely a declining one. Below the forecast are factors likely to influence the vote.

Short Term Situational Forecasting

• London Political assesses with high confidence that the ANC will lose its majority due to perceived governance failures; the ANC will likely retain at least 44% of seats in the legislature, which will likely enable them to enter into a coalition with smaller parties, and without the EFF.

  • This would represent a continuation of the status quo as it relates to operational, security, and reputationl risks.

• Due to political instability caused by a reduced ANC position, it is likely that we will see unrest, and possibly clashes between party supporters during the elections. Previous clashes involving MK supporters suggest this may result in violent altercations, protests, and destruction of property.

• We assess this risk for Pietermaritzburg as high, with Johannesburg and Cape Town assessed as moderate risk locations. We are also likely to see severe congestion and petty crime in Pietermaritzburg. 

• Although political unrest is possible in Johannesburg and Cape Town, large-scale rioting and looting are unlikely. 

• Hate crimes spurred on by xenophobia are likely in all three cities; foreign nationals - particularly those from other African countries - should prepare contingency plans that take into account possible unrest and heavy congestion in cities.

 Immediate Election-Associated Risks

·       In the event of unrest, we are likely to see damage to property, arson, barricading of roads, looting, hijacking of trucks, and political violence;

·      Campaigning around illegal immigration and foreign investment in relation to unemployment can act as a trigger for episodes of targeted violence, and human right organisations have reported a heightened watch for xenophobic activity; 

·       Increased foot traffic, and possible unrest and vehicle protests may lead to movement difficulties in urban centres surrounding the elections; and,

·       Large crowds, particularly in Cape town and Johannesburg, may act as easy concealment for petty theft and gang activity.

Turnout

Turnout is expected to rise compared to recent years, according to the Chief Electoral Officer Sy Mambolo, with an increase of 1.2 million registered voters, which would be a rebound from record low voter turnouts of just below 66% in 2019. While this could be the result of important issues acutely affecting voters, or electoral inclusion campaigns, the South African median age of 27.6 is the highest it has been in the last decade, which highlights that aging young voters may simply be more likely to vote than when they were younger.

While inequality is a major issue, especially as it relates to the youth vote, other capstone issues such as the ongoing energy crisis, ageing physical infrastructure, and a volatile dependence on foreign capital have become key issues in recent years. The invigoration of young voters, and an increased age of voter-mobilisation, will likely play a large role in how key issues are assessed at the polls; South Africans appear generally more likely to prioritise social issues over economic ones. 

The Economy

South Africa’s economy is in a joblessness crisis, both leading to and being caused by sluggish growth. With unemployment reaching 32.4% in 2023, young people account for just over 40% that number. According to Reuters, falling tax revenue has been detrimental to government debt, causing debt-servicing to consume a greater share of the national budget than social spending. Further, a reliance on volatile foreign capital has reduced trust in public spending, leading to sentiments of abandonment in some regional electorates.

Infrastructure

Healthcare and Energy are at the forefront of this election. The nation’s state-owned utility company, Eskom, has resorted to major load shedding, causing crippling blackouts in recent years due to structural faults in power stations and inequity across delivery infrastructure. Much of this is the result of endemic corruption, and is perceived as a major failure of the ANC.

Healthcare inequality has sharply risen, with the rise of drug prices and poverty. While the ANC has already tabled the National Health Insurance plan, the largest opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), criticises its lack of foundation for funding, registration & administration, or hospital buy-in. As a result, the bill has sat for some time and all parties are looking to propose better solutions.

Key Players:

African National Congress

The African National Congress (ANC) is the country’s political powerhouse, with incumbent President Cyril Ramaphosa looking to secure his second and final term. Often cited as ‘Mandela’s Party’, the ANC enters the race with a 57.5% (230/400) seat majority from 2019.

Reporting from eNCA indicates that despite its status, the ANC is sitting at about 40% in the opinion polls, with major news outlets such as the BBC and Al Jazeera predicting a slim loss of the party’s majority. A perceived lack of success in stopping rolling power outages, curbing corruption, and improving both provincial and national infrastructure has been seen as a major party failure by the population and is reflected in opinion polls.

We assess that it is likely that the ANC acquires 44% - 50% of the vote, forcing it to seek alliances with several smaller parties in an effort to keep its legislative power. If the ANC gets less than 45% of the vote, it is likely that the EFF (Economic Freedom Fighters) and ANC form a coalition. The Democratic Alliance (DA) has already entered an alliance agreement isolating the EFF. 

Any event in which the ANC maintains a majority, either through an outright win or coalition, sustains risks to businesses around corruption and crime, particularly if the party joins into a coalition with the EFF. Businesses would be very likely to face continued and increasing levels of financial and reputational risks around corruption, operational risks associated with degrading infrastructure, as well as physical risks associated with crime.

An EFF/ANC coalition could have damaging effects for the ANC’s reputation and South Africa as a whole, as the EFF is economically radical and aggressively nationalist. Markets would likely react negatively to such a coalition due to concerns around populist policies, asset nationalisation, corruption, and institutional overreach.

Democratic Alliance

The Democratic Alliance (DA) is currently the largest opposition party, seeking to grow their representation in legislature from 20.77% to at least 25%, an increase of at least 19-20 seats. Led by John Steenhuisen, a career politician, the DA has capitalised on regional wins over the ANC since 2019, and has based its platform around enabling more regional governance, and curbing crime, corruption, and healthcare inequity.  

The DA is much smaller than the ANC, both in historical clout and assembly power, polling at just 18.6%., However, successful regional election wins in the Western Cape have provided a significant party stronghold.

The DA has also struck a pre-election coalition deal with the IFP, FF Plus, ASA, and ACDP, to form the Multi-Party Charter for South Africa (MPCSA). A coalition that currently maintains 112 seats and is expected to grow exponentially.

With the DA and IFP both being substantial players, it is likely that the MPCSA will grow to at least 140 seats; enough to force the ANC into a coalition of its own, but not enough to achieve a majority.

uMkhonto weSizwe Party

The uMkhonto weSizwe (MK) party is the wildcard in the race. Formed in December 2023 by Jacob Zuma, a former South African president who left the ANC amid several legal controversies and convictions. Despite being barred from standing in parliament due to his previous convictions related to charges on corruption, racketeering, money laundering and fraud, the former president is splitting votes, achieving up to 14% in opinion polls.

Hailed as an “anti-apartheid veteran and Zulu traditionalist”, MK’s targeting of the ANC plays a significant role in our assessment that the ANC is likely to lose its majority. MK may win up to 8% of the vote (32-33 seats) based on Ipsos polls. It is very likely that the majority of these seats would come from the ANC.

Economic Freedom Fighters

The EFF, led by Julius Malema, is currently polling at around 11-12%, and was founded after Malema was expelled from the ANC in 2013 for sowing divisive radical-leftist views. Known for public stunts and inflammatory remarks against minorities, the EFF is trying to capture the youth vote with promises of free WiFi and electricity – amongst other things. 

The EFF’s platform proposes land to be stripped from the wealthy and nationalised, assets to be pulled from mining companies to be redistributed towards education, and the establishment of accessible 24-hour medical clinics. While these are not the typical eye-catching pillars for moderate South African Voters, the EFF seems to be resonating with the growing lower class, promoting their manifesto at a time when the ANC is accused of failing to look after the poor and black majority. A coalition involving the EFF would likely cause capital flight, although nationalist economic policy would likely be dampened by the ANC’s overwhelming majority within the coalition.

It is likely that the EFF will see marginal gains in 2024. With polling at 11.5%, an increase from 2019’s 10.8%. Having been left out of the MPCSA, it is likely that they will be open to coalition deals.

Implications for Political Risk 

While no party is currently bringing forward a plan that will directly impact foreign investment or South Africa’s economy, international onlookers should watch for signals from the ANC tomorrow that they will prioritise continued economic stability, as well as its possible plans to join in a coalition with the EFF. During the election there is an increased risk of violence, looting, and civil unrest that may incidentally affect businesses.

The sturdiness of South African politics also has larger regional implications, as the country acts as a stabilising regional entity that wields a significant amount of soft and hard power. Less stable states within the African Union (AU) continuously rely on South Africa's steady hand to promote regional development and integration. The AU and UN also rely on their conflict resolution prowess to address conflicts in states such as the DRC or Burundi. Thus, internal unrest and/or power grappling may affect the government’s peacekeeping efforts on the continent, possibly impacting international organisations and NGOs.

Recent reports highlight ongoing disinformation around voter fraud, gerrymandering, and deceptive tactics at polling stations. The exact nature of these issues—whether they are electoral suppression or information operations—remains unclear. Unconfirmed breaches of ballot storage sites have been reported in KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga, and the Western Cape. The Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC) is investigating these claims, emphasising that they currently lack substantiation.

Despite IEC warnings against electoral disruptions, there are heightened concerns around violence and unrest following the election. This unrest would likely be largely fueled by former President Zuma’s inability to stand for office and a growing sense of disenfranchisement among impoverished populations, exacerbated by the EFF and MK. These tensions echo the 2021 riots in KwaZulu-Natal after Zuma’s imprisonment, which caused over R50 billion in economic damage.

Post-election, South Africa faces several significant risks, including heightened unrest, crime, and continued high-level corruption. The increased security measures by the National Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure (NATJOINTS) suggest that physical risks around unrest and crime are being taken seriously. Additionally, the previously suspended trucking protests from early May could resurface, gaining traction during the election period on highways that already report heavy amounts of crime.

Nigeria’s Transforming Oil Industry

The Exit of Foreign Oil Companies 

Despite having oil reserves of over 37 trillion barrels, Nigeria has undergone $21.12 billion of divestment since 2006, with over $1.1 billion of divestment occurring in 2020 alone. Since 2023, foreign companies have dramatically accelerated divestment from Nigeria’s oil industry, citing widespread theft and vandalism. The resulting takeovers of foreign subsidiaries by local companies has strong potential to worsen the Niger Delta’s already dire environmental situation due to the inability or unwillingness of local companies to follow sustainability practices. While other multinational companies such as Unilever, GSK, and P&G have also left the country, the oil industry is a particularly extreme example, one which is also likely to have significant environmental impacts. 

Equinor ASA, a Norwegian company with a three decade long presence in Nigeria, recently resold its local entity Equinor Nigeria Energy Company to an obscure local corporation, Chappal Energy.  During Equinor’s time in Nigeria, it pumped over 1 billion barrels of oil from Agbami field, where it maintained a 20.21% stake. The Agbami field, which holds an estimated 900 million barrels of recoverable oil, is operated by Chevron, which holds a 67.3% interest, and was the largest oil discovery in the world at the time of its opening in 1998. In 2022 Addax, a division of the Chinese oil company Sinopec, sold four oil mining blocs to Nigeria’s state oil company National Nigeria Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). Likewise, Eni, an Italian oil company, announced it would sell its local subsidiary to Oando PLC, a Nigerian company, although Oando’s acquisition has been challenged by the NNPC for failure to obtain prior authorization.  

ExxonMobil plans to sell four onshore oil fields for $1.3 billion to Seplat, a company dual-listed in Lagos and London. Seplat is now mostly controlled by UK investors, following prolonged boardroom disputes. ExxonMobil also plans to sell Seplat its equity interest in Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited, which held over 90 shallow water and onshore platforms and 300 producing oil wells. The deal was initially approved by then President Muhammadu Buhari, who had appointed himself as the country’s oil minister. However, Buhari reversed course days later, and the deal has yet to be approved. NNPC has also objected to the sale, leading to criticism from ExxonMobil, which states that this is creating uncertainty among contractors and communities dependent on the oil industry. Despite major onshore divestments, ExxonMobil will continue its offshore presence in Nigeria through Esso Exploration and Production Nigeria (Deepwater) Limited and Esso Exploration and Production Nigeria Limited, which include the Bonga, Usan, and Erha developments.

Shell also hopes to divest from its onshore oil fields, potentially resulting in sales of up to $3 billion, but its plan has been delayed by a series of court cases. Shell’s divestment from Nigeria stretches back to at least 2010. Between 2010 and 2014, the company sold off eight oil mining leases, and in its 2022 report it revealed that it had sold over half its Nigerian assets. Currently, Shell is offering to sell its onshore assets to Renaissance, a consortium of local companies, for $2.4 billion, ending its 88 year long presence in Nigeria’s onshore oil fields. Renaissance, which includes the Nigerian companies ND Western, Aradel Energy, First E&P and Waltersmith as well as the Swiss based Petrolin, will purchase Shell’s local subsidiary Shell Petroleum Development Corporation of Nigeria (SPDC).  SPDC operates the NNPC/SPDC/NAOC joint venture, consisting of the NNPC Limited (55% holding), SPDC (30%), Total Energies (10%), and Nigerian Agip Oil Company Limited (5%).  However, the sale is being resisted by the Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria, which has complained of maltreatment of workers by one of the companies involved.  

Shell has denied speculation that it will leave Nigeria entirely, and despite divestment from oil it remains highly involved in the natural gas industry. Shell Nigeria Gas currently distributes 60-70 million scuffs (standard cubic feet) of gas daily, and is diversifying into offshore activities. Active in Otta, Aba and Port Harcourt, it also has an increasing presence in Bayelsa state and its currently collaborating with the state government of Oyo.  

It is likely that this divestment will severely increase environmental degradation, particularly in the Niger Delta. NGOs focusing on the environment and sustainability should closely watch ongoing developments in the Delta region. 

Factors Driving the Exit

Theft and vandalism are the immediate cause of flight by IOCs (international oil companies), with environmental concerns playing a more long term role. Theft and vandalism have significantly increased in the oil rich Niger Delta over the last 5 years. Two years ago, the Nigerian economist Tony Elumelu ignited a firestorm on social media by claiming that oil companies were losing up to 95% of their profits to thieves. While the claim was exaggerated, it illustrates a very real and pervasive problem. Between March 2022 and March 2023, IOCs lost the opportunity to produce and sell approximately 65.7 million barrels of oil due to vandalism and theft. From January to September 2013, 189 crude theft points - holes drilled in pipelines to syphon off oil - were repaired by Shell. In December 2023, NNPC recorded 112 instances of theft within a single week, and has appealed to Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission for assistance in stemming theft. NNPC Chief Executive Mele Kiyari has stated that 6,409 illegal refineries have been deactivated in the Niger Delta, and 4,846 illegal pipelines have been disconnected out of a total of 5,543 illegal connection points.  Oil theft became a major issue in the 2023 presidential election, with then candidate (now president) Bola Tinubu promising to utilise technology to reduce thefts, though this promise has largely been unfulfilled.  

Foreign businesses and NGOs are advised to pay close attention to rates of oil theft, regional trends around theft, as well as to any potential efforts by the Nigerian government to seriously reduce theft and vandalism.  

The Nigerian Government’s Response

While many investors were initially hopeful that President Tinubu would speed up approval for the sale of foreign oil subsidiaries, this has proved not to be the case. Eni, Equinor, and ExxonMobil are all still waiting for their divestment plans to be approved. Many deals are currently held up in court cases surrounding oil spills, and even unexecuted court judgments.  While this may cause short term delays, such punitive measures are unlikely to slow the exodus of foreign investors in the long term.  

The current exodus of oil companies is ironic in light of Nigeria’s 2021 Petroleum Industry Act, which allowed for greater foreign investment in oil. More recently, Nigeria has tried a number of measures to boost its onshore and shallow water oil and gas industries. In March 2024, President Tinubu signed measures streamlining contracts and providing tax credits to companies in this area. These include a 25% gas utilisation investment allowance in new and current projects in the midstream sector, as well as a measure to increase investment in deepwater. The approval threshold for joint ventures and production sharing will be raised to $10 million. Such measures aim to improve on the 2021 Petroleum law. However, given Nigeria’s failure to improve the security situation in the Nile Delta, it seems likely that these actions will stem the flow of foreign companies overseas.  

The Environmental Implications of Foreign Oil Divestment

It is highly likely that the exit of foreign oil companies will significantly worsen the environmental situation of the Niger Delta, already one of the world’s most polluted areas and the site of almost daily oil spills. Approximately 40 million liters of oil are spilled in the Delta each year. While environmental groups state that over $100 billion will be required to clean up the Delta, less than $1 billion has been committed by Nigeria’s government for a clean energy program which began eight years ago (and has since stalled). Environmental damage has had a severe effect on residents' quality of life in the Niger Delta. A study conducted at the University of St Gallen shows that infants are twice as likely to die in the first month of their life if their mothers live near an oil spill, and the region suffers around 11,000 premature deaths per year.  Additionally, there is vast damage to local farmlands.  

Local companies taking over former foreign subsidiaries often have less willingness or capacity to commit to sustainability. For example, in Bayelsa State’s Nembe Region, a region covered in dense mangrove swamps, severe oil leakage continued for over a month before it was stopped.  As a result, local fishermen only catch a small percentage of their previous hauls. These issues have continued since Shell’s local licence was sold to the Aiteo Group, a Nigerian company, in 2015.  Aiteo and Nigerian regulators blame the spillage on sabotage, but environmental groups and locals have blamed faulty infrastructure. Moreover, Nigerian companies are responsible for 35% more oil spills than international companies, raising concerns about their takeover of oil fields in the Niger Delta from IOCs.  

Gas flaring is a particularly severe example of this concern. Gas flaring is caused by surplus natural gas combusting during production, leading to greenhouse gas emissions. Since the recent acquisition of foreign assets by Nigerian oil companies, gas flaring has significantly increased according to reports by Stakeholder Democracy Network and the Environmental Defense Fund. A Stakeholder Democracy Network report indicates that domestic Nigerian companies flare 10 times more gas per barrel of oil produced than IOCs. Heirs Holdings, a Nigerian company which purchased a licence from Shell, increased its flaring by eight times following the purchase. If the two companies with the highest level of flares are excluded, local companies still flare 5 times more.  

Decommissioning infrastructure left behind by departing IOCs presents another challenge.  There is no fund to pay for decommissioning the infrastructure left behind by Shell and other companies, and no law required oil companies to maintain a fund of this nature until the Petroleum Industry Act of 2021. Since Shell’s divestments do not fall under this law, new companies will have to pay for decommissioning the infrastructure, but they lack the money to do so. 

Local civic organisations have agreed on a series of principles for divestment known as the “National Principles for Responsible Petroleum Industry Divestment”, which were put forth in Port Harcourt on December 6, 2023. The document, which calls for strong government intervention to prevent IOCs from leaving local communities with the decommissioning bill, was put forth together with a report by petroleum industry expert Professor Richard Steiner, based on a fact finding trip involving input with government agencies, local communities, and experts on the industry.  

The Role of International NGOs

Environmental and humanitarian NGOs operating in Nigeria are advised to pay greater attention to the Niger Delta in the wake of the IOCs’ exit. Organisations focused on public health should pay particular attention to families facing food insecurity as a result of damage to crops, and related issues such as child malnutrition and infant mortality. NGOs focused on environmental issues should work with local communities to promote the Port Harcourt Principles to Nigeria’s government, while also seeking to partner with local oil companies to implement sustainability measures. 

U.S. Economic Engagement in Africa

The AGOA

Since 2000, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) has formed the foundations of US-African economic relations. The act provides duty-free access for African-made goods to enter the United States to advance Africa’s development. 

Since its inception, the US has imported over half a trillion dollars worth of goods from eligible states. Initiatives from the US public and private sectors have a far-reaching impact on various industries, spanning energy, information technology, and manufacturing. Among these sectors, FDI input into African renewable energy dominates other industries as global demand increases. The United States allocates funding for projects in collaboration with its international partners, extending beyond the AGOA and other US-sponsored initiatives. This underscores Washington’s dedication to fostering a shift towards a renewable energy-oriented African continent. The Green Hydrogen Portfolio project, overseen by Niger, Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco, Namibia, and South Africa, is sponsored by the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and the United States, enabling the production of green hydrogen. International project partnerships aim to incentivise African nations to join US-led initiatives, such as the AGOA, by aligning with US policies, as participants are also more likely to receive further FDI support from US partners. 

Participation in the AGOA requires African states to meet “rigorous” eligibility criteria. These include the “continual progress toward establishing a market-based economy, the rule of law, political pluralism and the right to due process.” There is additionally the expectation that African states refrain from “activities that undermine US national security or foreign policy interests” and “enact policies to reduce poverty, combat corruption, and protect human rights.” 

On the economic front, the AGOA’s eligibility criteria intend to encourage African competitiveness in international markets while producing an economic climate supporting free enterprise domestically. On the political front, the AGOA is a vessel for the US to lead African development and set an agenda for the continent. For this reason, the eligible states in the AGOA are titled “partners” to the US, whereby investing in Africa’s development may also support US foreign policy interests. According to the CSIS Commission on Smart Power, the most rational strategy for the US concerning global development is the reinforcement of “American values”, including peace, justice, and prosperity.

The AGOA’s Political Complications

The AGOA’s eligibility criteria highlight the economic and political interests the US holds in African development. The AGOA’s success connects to broader US foreign policy ambitions of increasing cooperation with African nations, increasingly viewed as the next “swing states” in international politics. 

In 2023, South Africa’s continued participation in the AGOA was questioned due to its close political cooperation with Russia. Amid accusations that South Africa had covertly supplied weapons to Russia and Pretoria’s refusal to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine publicly, South Africa’s “non-aligned” position has interfered with US attempts to build a global consensus against Russia. US Senator James Risch said he was “disappointed” to learn of South Africa’s renewed eligibility in the AGOA given “South Africa’s continued actions that subvert US national security and foreign policy interests.”

Risch’s statement signals a concern in Washington DC that the White House does not robustly enforce the conditions of the AGOA, weakening US leadership amid a political climate that presents international issues through a binary East-West dynamic. The Biden administration has maintained the attitude of great power competition from the Trump administration, which held that Beijing’s “predatory” practices in Africa should be countered by increased US economic engagement. 

AGOA is up for renewal in 2025. There is some bipartisan support for the AGOA’s re-authorisation as US congressional members have identified firms looking to “diversify their supply chains and reduce dependence on China.” Failing to renew the Act would limit the opportunity for American enterprises to find alternative sources of rare earth elements, which are critical for manufacturing high-technology equipment. It presents the opportunity for “friend-shoring”, a strategy aimed at building new strategic partnerships to access raw materials and reduce dependence on malign powers. With at least 20 African countries whose mineral sectors account for 25 per cent of exports respectively, the AGOA’s re-authorisation may enable the United States to maintain duty-free access to markets with growing mining and refining capacity, reducing reliance on China. 

Despite South Africa’s souring relationship with the US, they remain an active beneficiary of the AGOA. US Census Bureau data compiled by Brookings underline South Africa’s importance to US mineral supply chains, as the US sources 98 per cent of its chromium ore and 37 per cent of its platinum from South Africa. Chromium is used to produce alloys, whereas platinum is used to develop fibre optics and hydrogen fuel cells. Both elements are essential for improving fuel efficiency, which President Biden has identified as critical to meeting his administration’s goal of reaching 80 per cent clean energy usage by 2030. Compared with the Central African Republic (CAR), which was removed from the AGOA in January 2024 for its security cooperation with the Wagner Group, CAR’s total exports to the US were valued at less than $1 million. CAR’s minimal involvement in the AGOA allowed the US to remove its beneficiary status without exposing the US to supply chain risks. South Africa’s continued place in the AGOA suggests that the conditions for removal from beneficiary status may depend on a nation’s importance to US strategic interests. While South Africa has pursued a foreign policy that has hindered the US's objectives of challenging Russia’s war in Ukraine and China’s growing presence in Africa, its mineral abundance provides the US with a robust route to supply chain diversification. 

South Africa’s claim to neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine war demonstrates the increasing polarisation in world politics, where many African nations resist attaching themselves to one sphere of influence. Former Governor of Kaduna state in Nigeria, Nasir El Rufai, claimed that “African coun­tries should be very, very care­ful about tak­ing a side” on ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza. Of the 35 nations which abstained from the UN General Assembly vote to condemn Russia’s attack on Ukraine in March 2022, 17 were African. US Senator John Kennedy announced his support for renewing the AGOA, arguing that it “will play a pivotal role in helping Americans deter China’s growing influence” in Africa. While financial aid and political support are not the exclusive drivers prompting nations to endorse a US-led global agenda, they may contribute to gradually forming a positive perception of the US as a cooperative and valuable international partner. However, the US would continue facing the headwinds of African nations, which view the AGOA’s intended political reforms as burdensome to political support domestically and a strain to relations with US adversaries internationally.

The US and its African partners have experienced positive socio-economic advantages directly attributable to the legislation. In 2021, the top three countries in export revenue were South Africa ($15.7 billion), Nigeria ($3.5 billion), and Ghana ($1.7 billion). Ethiopia grew its clothing and leather exports by $273 million from 2000 to 2021, which also created almost 120,000 jobs in the US.

Ghana 

The symbiotic relationship between the US and the African continent, indicated by mutual socio-economic benefits, is demonstrated further by increased US foreign direct investment in strategic African nations. In 2022, the US-Ghana commodities exchange reached $3.7 billion, elevating Ghana’s trade surplus by $1.8 billion. To further bolster trade, the US increased its FDI in the country to $150 million for agriculture, economic development, human rights, governance, security, and education. These include $32 million in agricultural aid and $25 million in support for micro to medium-sized agrarian firms. Furthermore, the US unveiled a $300 million investment strategy to foster digital economic transformation. Ghana’s main exports to the US are transportation equipment ($95 million), chemicals and related products ($79 million), and agriculture products ($56 million). US investments are meant to advance the nation's most successful industries and cultivate emerging sectors. Around 25,000 businesses in Ghana have been supported through USAID and Feed the Future, a US-financed food and security initiative, with $192.9 million in financial assistance, generating over $98 million in agricultural sales. Additionally, with the aid provided by US programmes, 798,000 producers could utilise new technologies in agricultural production. US public investment also spurred private initiatives in the region, as 3Farmate Robotics (an innovative agritech company in Ghana) received an angel investment from a Silicon Valley investor to develop their AI-driven technology further. 

The high economic performance of AGOA-driven exports also supports funding for lagging industries, which have the potential to diversify national production further. The recent partnership worth $300 million between African Data Centers and the US International Development Finance Corporation will support the construction of a new data centre capable of sustaining up to 30MW of IT load. The project aims to bolster Ghana’s digital transformation and allow its data to remain within its borders. In doing so, Ghana will further its proliferation of digital services, including government services, fintech and mobile money, and digital agriculture. FinTech and mobile money are particularly significant for the country as 59.7 per cent of the population has a digital money account. Increasing national data security will stimulate digital economies by incentivising e-commerce, innovation hubs, and technological entrepreneurship. As such, Ghana has the potential to become a leading nation in digital transformation in the region and increase further investment opportunities, which could directly influence economic growth. Whilst these investments can not be credited solely to Ghana’s membership in the AGOA, their direct correlation with economic growth strengthens ties between the two nations, influencing private and public investment in the region. 

Nigeria

Nigeria is also a significant trading partner with the US due to its AGOA membership. Its three most profitable goods are transportation equipment ($510 million), energy-related products ($222 million), and agricultural products ($376 million). Similarly to Ghana, Nigeria receives a lot of FDI in its key performing industries, which also coincides with current government policy, which aims to diversify the economy away from oil and gas. To achieve this, Nigeria aims to advance its manufacturing industry, the agricultural sector, and technological development. The United States adopted a Nigeria strategy similar to their strategy in Ghana, supporting key industries and those perceived as undeveloped but with significant potential. The DFC perceives Nigeria as one of the key countries in the region, which is why it holds a portfolio of $780 million predominantly concentrated in the energy and financial sectors within the country. In 2022, cumulative FDI from the United States amounted to $5.6 billion, focusing on sectors such as mining, information services, and professional, scientific, and technical services.

Numerous US-based firms facilitate projects to support Nigerian development. Most notably, a US-based company, Sun Africa, has pledged to invest in an energy infrastructure project worth $2.2 billion. The construction of a 961MWp solar photovoltaic coupled with a 455MWh battery storage facility would significantly aid the nation as it only has a total installed power generation capacity of 16,384MW, which is significantly below total demand.

The US also seeks to develop other sectors of the Nigerian economy, which could lead to mutual economic interests between the two nations. One of the most significant industries is mining, due to a recent discovery of high-grade lithium deposits. The lithium reserves could propel the country’s mineral production and exports, substantially influencing its economy and international trade. Membership in the AGOA could play a significant role in the lithium trade and could benefit Nigeria as the prices of raw materials continue to increase. For this reason, in 2023, Nigeria initiated funding discussions with the US for mining-related projects.

Social Benefits 

Increased engagement with the US economy instigated the creation of the US President’s Advisory Council on Doing Business in Africa (PAC-DBIA), which aims to strengthen the administration’s commercial partnerships in Africa. The organisation recommends policies and programs in trade and investment engagement in various sectors, notably energy, finance, tech, food-water security, and health. Among the most recent recommendations is to increase funding for Prosper Africa, which is responsible for resource management and energy sustainability projects. 

It is also important to note that membership in the AGOA is not the only factor that acts as a determinant for aid. A good example is Cameroon, which lost its status on 1 January 2020 due to its humanitarian record. Although Cameroon has yet to regain its status, US-led social initiatives in the country are still ongoing. A notable example is a US Trade and Development Agency-funded energy study in Cameroon that helped to connect 100,000 households in rural areas to the power grid; the Renewable Energy Innovators Cameroon (REIc) partnered with a California-based energy company, SimpliPhi Power, to deliver the project. Cameroon’s rural electrification is only 35 per cent.

In contrast, 96 per cent of urban areas have access to power. Enhancing energy accessibility in the region has the potential to drive economic growth and foster social equality and environmental responsibility. According to the African Development Fund, extending electricity to rural areas would enhance the quality of education and healthcare. This initiative would positively impact individual households by increasing the adaptation of domestic appliances, thereby reducing the time spent on daily chores. Consequently, more time can be allocated to income-generating activities, encouraging the development of artisanal workshops that stand to benefit from electrical tools like small sawmills and workshops. Moreover, electrification aims to decrease water-borne diseases by encouraging modernising water supply systems.

With rising electricity access in Africa, digitalisation has become necessary in the content industry as the demand for digital services continues to rise. Trends, such as population increase and urbanisation, accelerated internet and cell phone coverage as more people require access to e-commerce and government services. Covid-19 also played a significant role, forcing many to use the internet to access information and purchase goods. Consequently, many countries in Africa have focused on improving their internet penetration. Since 2010, Cameroon has experienced an increase in internet penetration by 123 per cent, and Kenya witnessed a rise of 114 per cent. Much of this is attributed to AGOA membership, which provides access to external mobile service providers that see economic value in the digitalisation of the continent. Services and mobile technologies in Sub-Saharan Africa added $155 billion of economic value in 2019 alone. The US has a significant role in this process as it invests in various projects on the continent. The Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership (DCCP) aims to expand internet access to emerging markets, promote secure digital infrastructure, adopt cybersecurity practices, and export US Information and Communications Technology (ICT).

As Africa’s swiftly growing network supports economic activities and government services, it has become increasingly susceptible to cyber risks. AGOA initiatives work towards advancing digital security for citizens, promoting digital literacy, and encouraging the establishment of legal and regulatory frameworks. These measures are geared towards safeguarding privacy and upholding freedom of expression in the digital realm. The combination of digital infrastructure and funding initiatives from the US government, exemplified by the allocation of $100 million to the network operator Africell by the US International Development Finance Corporation, aims to support continental projects in expediting internet access, affordability, and security. Africell aims to enhance mobile network infrastructure across the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gambia, and Sierra Leone. 

The US also seeks partnerships with private US companies to promote further digitalisation efforts in Africa. The new Africa Tech for Trade Alliance created by the US Government’s Prosper Africa initiative invited US and African companies to promote e-commerce and address significant global digitalisation challenges. The alliance seeks to find solutions for existing regulatory bottlenecks and share existing technologies among the key companies to support critical sectors on the African continent, such as supply chains, digital payments, e-commerce, and digital skills and training.

The Politics Behind AGOA

In January 2024, the Central African Republic, Gabon, Niger and Uganda were officially removed from the AGOA after failing to uphold their AGOA conditions of protecting political pluralism and upholding human rights. Eligibility in the AGOA is reviewed annually, and Uganda’s removal follows the passing of the 2023 Anti-Homosexuality Act, which received international condemnation for including the death penalty for individuals found performing certain homosexual acts. Following its enactment in May 2023, President Biden described the law as a “tragic violation of universal human rights”, stating that his administration will “incorporate the impacts of the law into our review of Uganda’s eligibility for AGOA.” 

Uganda’s subsequent removal from the AGOA indicates that advancing human rights remains an inflexible objective to US economic engagement in Africa. Uganda’s Special Presidential Advisor Odrek Rwabwogo remarked that Uganda’s removal from the AGOA was “a stick to beat the populace of African countries who vote in a way that offends the social sensibilities of the developed West.” 

Rwabwogo’s statement reflects a widespread discontent among African nations for economic engagement conditional on political reforms. Survey data from Afrobarometer concludes that 45 per cent of Africans believe that economic engagement (including loans and developmental assistance) should be connected to promoting democracy and human rights. In comparison, 50 per cent thought that the domestic government should determine political reforms on democracy and human rights, free from international influence. Afrobarometer data suggests that the AGOA’s strict conditions surrounding political reforms are likely to be resisted by African nations, which oppose international interference in domestic politics, limiting its impact as a diplomatic device to drive political change in the region. 

The AGOA’s success as a tool of political reform is likely to be a factor in the conversations US congressional members will have as they decide whether to renew the AGOA next year. A 2024 US Congressional Research Service Report highlights how the “rhetorical and policy emphasis” on political reform risks “complicating” certain US objectives abroad, challenges China and Russia are less likely to encounter. 

The AGOA’s commitment to political reforms may limit its potential as a counterweight to growing Sino-Russian influence in Africa, which may weaken rather than strengthen US-African relations. Following Uganda’s removal from the AGOA, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni has maintained a defiant tone against the US, asserting that Uganda can “stand independently from Western influence.” Pro-Kremlin broadcaster Tsargrad has used Museveni’s anti-gay stance to present Russia and Uganda as nations united against the “legalisation of sodomy,” binding both nations to cooperation borne from their mutual resentment of US policy. Uganda’s removal from the AGOA effectively functions as a sanction, similar to the World Bank’s freezing of loans to Uganda in August 2023 following the passage of the Anit-Homosexuality Act. Uganda’s bilateral trade with Russia more than doubled from $30 million in 2009 to $74 million in 2018, indicating that Uganda can meet its target of increasing commercialisation and international market integration with nations other than the United States. The AGOA’s commitment to political reform may push African nations to forge closer economic and later political partnerships with China and Russia, as neither nation includes human rights reforms as a condition of increased cooperation.

Value Chains

Failure to renew the AGOA would negatively impact the value chains that lead to increased production and exportation. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa argued that extending the AGOA may “encourage the further development of value chains” and “enhance the diversification of African economies.” In 2017, Intra-continental trade in Africa stood at under 20 per cent of total exports, compared to approximately 68 per cent in Europe and 59 per cent in Asia. Sustainable economic growth in Africa requires product diversification; 50 per cent of the continent’s exports to the rest of the world are mineral goods, leaving firms exposed to external shocks.

By renewing the AGOA beyond 2025, the US would provide certainty for prospective investors who intend to capitalise on Africa’s increasing industrialisation, supporting a more comprehensive range of industries that can better insulate Africa from external shocks. Reducing dependence on a limited basket of goods requires a long-term focus, which includes national governments undertaking major public works projects to improve access to regional markets. Expanding transport networks is essential to reducing the logistical inefficiency that dissuades investment in new industries.

South African Healthcare: Opportunities & Challenges

South Africa’s healthcare system is gradually emerging from the challenges posed by the Covid-19 pandemic. In the fight against the virus, the healthcare system exhibited a number of successes, however there remain deep flaws that are yet to be addressed. The shortcomings in the government’s response to the pandemic were products of the persistent challenges that the country’s healthcare system has faced for decades. With the new ‘National Health Insurance’ scheme in the pipeline – a medical aid fund aiming to introduce universal health coverage across the country – the South African government must take into account the needs and concerns of its people, the lessons drawn from Covid-19, as well as the broader historical-structural issues that continue to plague the country’s healthcare system.

South Africa’s Healthcare Landscape

South Africa’s constitution grants every citizen the right to healthcare through the private or public sector. Public healthcare is available to all citizens for free, without the need for health insurance. It is largely funded by the National Revenue Fund, which collects payments made to local, provincial, and federal governments. The funds are then distributed from federal to sub-national authorities, who enjoy substantial independence over the allocation of resources, depending on local priorities and necessities. 

However, the constitution’s provisions are often not reflected in practice, particularly due to the gap between the public and private sectors. The public sector provides healthcare to 80-85 per cent of the population and accounts for approximately 48 per cent of total healthcare expenditure, while the private sector provides healthcare to the remaining 15-20 per cent of the population and attracts approximately 50 per cent of total government healthcare spending. The remaining 2 per cent is covered by NGOs. Just under 80 per cent of doctors work privately, where they earn higher salaries, leaving only 20 per cent of doctors in the public sector to serve the vast majority of the South African population. This presents a clear disjuncture between the public and private health sector, with major differences emerging in terms of funding, resources, and support.

The public/private healthcare divide often tracks racial lines, raising questions around the legacy of colonialism and apartheid in South Africa’s healthcare system. In the 1986-1987 financial year, just before health services were desegregated in 1988, South Africa’s spending in the former white provinces amounted to $9.30 per capita, compared with $3 per capita in former majority-black areas. Today, access to quality healthcare remains unequal and often contingent on individuals’ ability to pay for private care or live in urban centres. Public healthcare is not allocated based on need, but rather determined by each province’s relative share of the population, thus ignoring factors such as geographic expanse, as well as demographic and implementation specificities.

This legacy of racial-economic inequality is all the more alarming because diseases, such as Covid-19 and HIV/AIDS, often disproportionately affect lower-income populations. South Africa hosts the largest HIV/AIDS epidemic in the world; around 8 million South Africans are currently affected, accounting for 17-20 per cent of global cases. At first, the government’s denial of the virus’s existence resulted in a slow response; however, between 1999 and 2005, spending on HIV/AIDS increased at an average rate of 48.2 per cent annually. Since 1990, the number of people living with HIV/AIDS has continued to increase, but the mortality rate from the virus has been gradually declining since the mid-2000s, thanks to the development and diffusion of antiretroviral treatment.

Source: Our World in Data (2019)

Additionally, South Africa still suffers from a relatively high infant mortality rate, concentrated in remote and poorer areas. In 2018 alone, an estimated 43,000 children under five years of age died in South Africa. In contrast with its African counterparts, South Africa exhibits a relatively high healthcare expenditure, amounting to just over 9 per cent of GDP in 2019, a level of spending surpassed only by Lesotho.

Higher spending on healthcare, however, has not yielded proportional results. South Africa suffers from similar levels of inadequate infrastructure, social inequalities and disease burden as other countries in southern Africa. Yet healthcare systems in Rwanda and Kenya have often performed better and at lower costs. Contrary to South Africa, almost half of Kenya’s poor utilise private healthcare. Both Kenya and Uganda have used mobile health more extensively than South Africa to provide healthcare to low-income communities. In the South African market, there is thus a great amount of space for digital health-focused NGOs and startups to step in and make an impact. South Africa could also benefit from the adaptation and incorporation of policies that have proven successful in other African countries.

Source: Our World in Data (2022)

In 2012, the South African government presented plans to implement a national health insurance scheme over the following 14 years. This health financing scheme, or more precisely fund, is designed to cover the costs of healthcare services for all South Africans, thus aiming to move the country towards universal health coverage (UHC) and to improve the quality of, and access to care. In June 2023, lawmakers approved the NHI and in December, the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) voted in favour of its implementation, with opposition voiced only from the Western Cape province. It must now be signed into law by President Ramaphosa. The NHI broadly aims to address social imbalances in the world’s most unequal society. It envisages the creation of a fund that pools public and private resources, ensuring equal healthcare access and outcomes for all South Africans, regardless of socioeconomic status. The NHI will be funded through public contributions, likely in the form of income-proportional taxes. The policy could deliver various benefits: not only could it lower healthcare costs for South Africans, but also ‘standardise’ salaries and expectations of all healthcare providers. The NHI could also help eliminate health-related barriers to education, drive economic growth by building a healthier workforce, and improve social security, as access to healthcare and education may reduce crime and welfare dependency. Additionally, the NHI could open up opportunities for public-private healthcare collaboration.

Despite widespread support for the NHI and the potential advantages of universal healthcare, as seen in other middle-income countries like Brazil and Thailand, some have raised significant concerns, particularly with regards to the NHI’s implementation. First, the NHI’s funding remains a key point of contention, as its estimated cost runs over $27 billion annually. Critics point to South Africa’s weak tax base, due to the high number of people working in the informal sector, as well as slow economic growth, as evidence for impending financial challenges and increased tax burden for citizens. These worries are heightened by recurring allegations of governmental corruption and poor administrative oversight. Second, private healthcare providers have expressed concerns about the uncertainty regarding their role in this new system, highlighting the danger of job losses should the private sector not be effectively integrated. Medical practitioners may also choose to leave South Africa in search of better paid jobs, contributing to a resource shortage in the public sector. Third, critics fear that the NHI may result in lower quality healthcare, as the government does not have enough resources to meet the needs of all South Africans. Fourth, the proposed NHI framework is unclear on several issues, including the range of treatments to be covered and the rate of reimbursement. The South African government will therefore need to address the lack of trust in the NHI’s potential by outlining a concrete roadmap, evidencing the scheme’s ability to offer reliable as well as inclusive access to healthcare, and dispelling views of the proposal as a mere idealistic utopia.

Successes in South African Healthcare

In recent years, and particularly in response to Covid-19, South Africa’s healthcare system has had notable success.

1. Since the mid-1990s, the country has reduced maternal and under-5 mortality rates, as well as death rates from infectious diseases. It has also expanded immunisation programs, which were, however, paused during the Covid-19 pandemic to comply with national lockdowns.

2. Many healthcare organisations have created innovation teams and digital strategies to follow developments in AI, telemedicine, and digitisation. Both the public and private sector have also improved data analytics capabilities to track shifts in healthcare needs and resource availability in order to identify key risks and opportunities. These measures have, for instance, contributed to promising advances in the use of nanotechnology for cancer treatment. The Covid-19 pandemic further encouraged South Africa’s healthcare sector to gradually, but comprehensively embrace digital technologies, not just for data analytics, but also to support the accelerated adoption of virtual healthcare, which has helped reduce pressures on facilities and minimise inequalities.

3. Macro- and micro-level healthcare initiatives have jointly widened access to care. At the national level, the ‘Transnet Phelophepa Health Trains’ have helped treat 200,000 patients annually by taking mobile clinics into rural areas through South Africa’s railway system. At the local level, in 2013, a Cape Town resident founded the ‘Iyeza Express’ bicycle courier service, which employs local youth to collect medication from public health facilities and deliver them to people’s homes, particularly in the city’s poorer districts. In the same year, to reduce time spent queuing at health facilities, a Johannesburg local created ‘Pelebox Smart Lockers’, which sends a PIN to patients’ mobile phones to open lockers containing prescribed medications. These initiatives have boosted the efficiency of South Africa’s healthcare system.

Challenges in South African Healthcare

Despite noteworthy successes, the South African healthcare system has encountered a number of challenges that have impacted its performance. These challenges have fed many of the criticisms that are now directed against the proposed NHI.

1. Most importantly, South Africa’s healthcare system has suffered from a lack of resources and personnel, particularly when considering the country’s large population and ‘quadruple disease burden’ (HIV/AIDS, communicable diseases, non-communicable diseases like diabetes, and violence and injuries). The Covid-19 pandemic highlighted that the needs of South Africans exceed the country’s healthcare system’s human, material, and financial capacities. Throughout the pandemic, underfunded and understaffed hospitals handled insufficient and outdated equipment, while following constantly changing protocols. Long work hours, extended waiting times, and overcrowded health facilities became the norm, particularly in rural areas. South Africa’s weak primary healthcare system, the lack of political will, and the government’s underestimation of Covid-19’s severity meant that the virus was not thwarted in its early stages. The mismanagement of the pandemic also led to the stigmatisation of communities with high Covid-19 cases, increased episodes of gender-based violence, and social discrimination in the distribution of food aid.

2. In part resulting from the country’s limited resources and staff, economic, racial, and geographic inequalities remain a keystone of South Africa’s healthcare system. The private and public sectors, as well as urban and rural localities, display massive healthcare imbalances, in terms of quality and access. In regards to the former, South Africa’s private clinics charge fees that are commensurate with those of significantly wealthier nations, due to the lack of pricing regulations. This practice has made private healthcare inaccessible for the majority of South Africans. During the pandemic, access to testing and vaccines was clearly determined by individuals’ ability to pay, with lower-income groups left behind. This outcome was, at least partially, a result of the government’s insufficient spending on public healthcare. This policy does not follow from an established norm of obtaining healthcare from the private sector, as in the United States; rather, it represents an extension of South Africa’s apartheid-era policies that cater to a small, rich section of the population. 

   With regards to the rural-urban gap, residents of major urban centres have a significantly higher chance of receiving treatment than people living in rural areas, due to the disproportionate concentration of health facilities in large cities. Apartheid-era urban planning has meant that health clinics remain inaccessible to the majority of South Africans, for financial and practical reasons. Additionally, the marked disparity in skill between urban and rural regions contributes to persistent inequalities in terms of the quality and outcomes of healthcare. This inequality has nurtured a low ‘acceptance’ of the national public healthcare system among many South Africans, with patients being not only unable, but unwilling to seek treatment due to, for instance, perceptions of (in)efficiency, language barriers, and ethnic and religious under-representation.

   However, micro-level initiatives have helped redress skill shortages in rural areas. The ‘Umthombo Youth Development Foundation’, for example, provides medical scholarships to students from remote areas. The aim is that these students later return to their home communities to offer healthcare that is perceived as more trustworthy, credible, and thus more effective. Here, healthcare startups and community or national-level NGOs can thus play a key role: they can first focus on assisting the expansion of existing programs, including the ‘Iyeza Express’ and the initiative developed by the ‘Umthombo Youth Development Foundation’, both locally and nationally. Second, given the South African government’s limited resources, these organisations can prioritise providing financial and logistical support for the development of new initiatives, particularly those geared towards improving remote areas’ access to quality healthcare and those encouraging community-based health education and university-level medical education, in an attempt to raise health awareness and redress the country’s shortage of health personnel.

3. Rampant corruption, and the lack of enforcement and accountability mechanisms to counter it, pose a major barrier to progress in South Africa’s healthcare system. Private healthcare providers, for example, reportedly submit inflated or forged claims of treatment to private health insurance schemes to maximise their revenue. The difficult response to Covid-19 was exacerbated by widespread corruption, abuse of funds, and the syphoning of scarce resources away from rural clinics.

Looking Ahead

In light of these challenges, South Africa’s healthcare sector faces a set of key risks in years to come. First, persistent resource shortages and the country’s dependence on imports from countries such as India and China will continue to dictate the trajectory of its healthcare system. Without substantial investment in the domestic manufacturing industry, progress in healthcare provision will be constrained by a resource bottleneck and may also become affected by foreign interests. Nevertheless, like many other countries in Africa, South Africa is well-positioned for the development of innovative healthcare practices and technologies that address constraints such as resource scarcity. Second, in view of the NHI’s implementation, talent retention will remain a key challenge, as skilled healthcare workers, particularly from the private sector, may choose to leave South Africa in search of more profitable opportunities. Third, while technology will be central to the expansion of care in South Africa, it will also increase the country’s vulnerability to cyberattacks, which it is not yet equipped to counter. There is thus a need for increased private-public cooperation to develop stronger national cybersecurity infrastructure.

Despite such risks, South Africa is now at a critical juncture, navigating the aftermath of a devastating pandemic, nearing the deadline for the NHI’s implementation as well as the 2024 general elections, and situated amidst a global technological revolution. The country faces a pivotal opportunity to reform its healthcare system in line with the lessons learnt from past failures:

1. In the first place, as highlighted by the country’s experiences with HIV/AIDS and Covid-19, South Africa should invest in preventive measures, including R&D and risk outlook units, to better monitor and predict outbreaks of infectious diseases.

2. Second, the incoming South African government must strengthen its leadership before implementing the NHI, for example by facilitating meaningful public-private partnerships and by fostering communication between key players. At present, different parts of the public system are managed by different government units, while private doctors operate in isolation from one another. South African leadership should instead promote linkages, or even integrate, the private and public sectors, as the former generally has more resources than necessary to treat its patients and as such, can help fill major gaps in the public sector. 

   To enhance its credibility and legitimacy, the incoming government must also cultivate public trust in the healthcare system and the NHI, if it decides to persevere with its implementation. It must clarify the NHI’s provisions, encourage transparency, and promote accountability to address corruption. It can do so by making performance data publicly available to encourage improvements on the provider side, while keeping clients informed on relevant developments. It can also establish city-wide integrated management teams to replace the current fragmented system and to redirect financial oversight from the national to the city level to reduce the risk of corruption, a model that proved successful in the Chinese province of Sanming. 

   The government could also develop education initiatives to raise awareness about the current medical system and the potential benefits of universal healthcare, to enhance support for the NHI. Additionally, framing better healthcare outcomes as beneficial for South Africa’s long-term economic growth can encourage wider domestic support as well as foreign direct investment.

3. Third, and more broadly, the government will have to ensure that the transition towards universal healthcare involves all relevant stakeholders in the public and private sector, at the local and national level, in and beyond South Africa. It must carefully balance actors’ competing interests and concerns before the NHI is implemented. In particular, South Africa should capitalise on the opportunities offered by new and existing international partnerships to unlock the healthcare sector’s full potential. Although South Africa is one of the least aid-dependent states in Africa, international donors and financiers can provide critical funding and resources, support capacity-building, share best practices, and catalyse the wider delivery of healthcare services. At the same time, South African leadership should support micro-level initiatives like the Iyeza Express, which will prove valuable to reach the most vulnerable and better respond to the needs of remote communities.

4. Fourth, South Africa can benefit from adapting and adopting successful policies from fellow African countries and other middle-income counterparts worldwide. For example, Malawi’s toll-free health hotline represents one of the many strategies that South Africa could implement to provide communities with reliable access to virtual care and remove the need to travel long distances to the nearest facilities. South Africa can also learn from Mexico’s and India’s experiences with universal healthcare, which have respectively highlighted the benefits of effective regional governance to complement national leadership, and the importance of human and physical infrastructure to drive meaningful change. 

   Perhaps most importantly, Rwanda’s successful universal healthcare policies can provide a useful model for South Africa, as the two countries lack extensive public resources and must overcome a legacy of conflict and inequality. Rwanda’s healthcare system fundamentally rests on a community-based health insurance scheme, known as ‘Mutuelles de Santé’, whereby residents of particular areas contribute to a local health fund, supported by the state and international agencies, and which they draw from when necessary. The poorest do not pay anything, while richer individuals may be responsible for co-payments. To sustain this system, the Rwandan government has supported the deployment of community health workers to the country’s 15,000 rural villages, as well as the establishment of health posts in remote areas to cut patients’ average walking time to care facilities in half, from 47 minutes in 2020 to 24 minutes in 2024. These initiatives have helped close gaps in access to healthcare and have built a workforce that is more receptive to its population’s healthcare needs.

Source: KPMG (2017)

The incoming South African government must ultimately focus on balancing the goal of achieving universal healthcare with the quality of care itself, as well as with economic and political realities. It should harness contemporary digital advances, utilise lessons learnt thus far from its experiences with HIV/AIDS and Covid-19, take on board popular concerns with the proposed NHI, and approach healthcare as a human right.

Consequences of Deforestation in the Congo Basin

International Impact of Deforestation

The Congo Basin is the largest rainforest in Africa and the second largest in the world, behind the Amazon. Despite having a smaller surface area, it absorbs more carbon dioxide than the Amazon, making it the Earth’s largest carbon sink. It lies across six nations: Cameroon, the Central African Republic (CAR), Equatorial Guinea, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Gabon, and the Republic of the Congo, with 60% of the basin in the DRC. 

Large-scale deforestation in the Congo Basin is a complex problem. The environmental consequences of its destruction significantly impact the carbon-reducing capabilities of our planet. Absorbing 1.5 billion tons of carbon dioxide each year, which equates to approximately 4% of global annual emissions, the basin is one of the few places in the world that absorbs more carbon than it emits. As a result, protecting the Basin has been on the agenda of global conservation efforts, including the recent COP27. 

Unfortunately, the basin’s resource richness has driven vast land mismanagement and exploitation since the colonial period. In 2019, the DRC became the country with the second highest levels of deforestation - only behind Brazil. In 2021 alone, deforestation in the Congo Basin increased by almost 5%, affecting over 630,000 hectares of land. Estimates show that between 2013 and 2014, levels of deforestation in the DRC meant that emissions equivalent to what would be released by 50 coal power plants in one year were not captured.

Additionally, the sheer size of the basin plays a crucial role in regulating rainfall patterns across Africa, which, when disturbed, could have a devastating effect on the availability of potable water and food supplies. This is especially relevant in countries like Ethiopia and Somalia, where drought has already put significant strain on resources - continued droughts could have catastrophic consequences, likely leading to famine. Furthermore, the reduced frequency of rainfall is a direct cause of soil degradation, as soil is then unable to absorb water at the necessary pace when rain does occur, consequently enhancing the risk of flooding.

Deforestation in the Congo Basin additionally generates a significant risk of spreading deadly infections. This happens because the number of species that could be carrying infectious viruses are moving closer to human settlements as their natural forest habitat recedes. Ebola endemics have followed this exact mechanism, with the very first cases recorded in the 1970s being caused by large-scale deforestation. The 2018-2020 Ebola endemic in the DRC showcases the constant risk, which is particularly elevated by the country’s high biodiversity. The spread of the diseases was partially contained by the naturally healthy ecosystem but still managed to claim 2,000 lives in a relatively short period of time. 

Stake Weakness, Corruption, and a Lack of Political Will

The mechanisms facilitating this alarming pace of deforestation in the Congo Basin can be directly associated with the weakness of the Congolese state. As 60% of the basin is located within the territory of the DRC, the DRC is also the country where the majority of deforestation activities are taking place. 

The DRC is in the 10th percentile of the human capital index, making it one of the least developed countries in the world. With few opportunities for people to support themselves - in an impoverished region marked by instability and conflict - deforestation has become a staple of the local economy. Almost two-thirds of the DRC’s population lives on less than $1.90 a day. Large populations turn to activities like hunting and poaching, and work in the logging industry. Further, increased migration by forcibly displaced populations from South Sudan and the Central African Republic has put even more pressure on the land, pushing people to settle on previously untouched natural habitats. China, the US, and Europe - where commodities extracted from the basin, like wood, palm oil, and rubber are often falsely advertised as eco-friendly - mainly fuel the growing global demand. As seen on the map below, small-scale agriculture is the principal driver of deforestation in the Basin. 

Image Source: Science Advances

The DRC government is ineffective in exercising complete control over its territories, let alone its forests, creating a security vacuum in which militant groups exploit available resources. Although the government has been receiving significant funds from international actors to restore degraded lands and has granted specific areas with protected status, it cannot fully implement protective conversation mechanisms due to the substantial presence and influence of dispersed armed groups.  

The weakness of the Congolese state leaves limited capacity to enforce legal mechanisms across the basin’s territory. As mining and logging companies are able to influence the government and surpass checks and balances, their activities often go unmonitored. With enough power generated, they can exploit resources without limits and without control. Reports from the Environmental Investigation Agency show that consortiums of timber companies have bribed ministers to receive concessions. 

Corrupt political structures facilitate the extraction of resources in the basin through the breach of labour laws, evasion of taxation schemes, and violation of protected zones with little to no resistance to their activities. Networks of criminals operating in the DRC are often involved in drug trafficking, money laundering, corruption, fraud, and tax evasion. Local activists or communities that have attempted to interfere have faced backlash, including brutality from the police. Without punitive mechanisms in place, large-scale deforestation thrives as companies avoid control and oversight.

For years, the Forest Code of 2002 was the binding legal framework protecting the rights of local communities in the DRC to concessions; however, the code lacked specific legal tools to ensure accountability and the management of concessions. This resulted in shaky legality around property rights, which was easily abused for commercial purposes. The government regularly issues logging concessions to companies that bypass existing laws, disregarding conservation policies. In 2022, the DRC opened tenders for 30 permits to extract oil and gas, covering areas with particular carbon sequestering capabilities. 

Gabon - the Conservation Champion

The Congo Basin covers six countries, but only Gabon and the Republic of Congo have experienced a decrease in deforestation rates. Although the Congo Basin covers only 5-10% of Gabon’s total area, it has received international attention for its exemplary conservation efforts. 

In 2021, while deforestation levels rose in the DRC, in Gabon they decreased by 28%. This can be mainly attributed to rigorous standards for the management of forests, which are widely and strictly enforced. Extractive business operations in the Gabonese part of the Congo Basin require specific approvals, and the Gabonese government obliges all businesses present in the basin to offset their emissions. Enforcement is facilitated by a robust network of organisations that collaborate with the government in monitoring carbon credits. 88% of Gabon’s surface is still covered in forest, and the country has generated certified carbon credits stemming from 200 million tons of carbon absorption.

Continuity is one specific element that sets Gabon apart from other nations that span the Congo Basin. Until the 2023 coup, the Bongo family had governed Gabon for 55 years. Although their tenure was autocratic and oversaw widespread poverty, the government has displayed solid political will in promoting environmental conservation over several decades. In collaboration with numerous data collection agencies, governmental bodies have utilised large-scale data collection, including satellite and drone imaging. Satellite imagery helps to identify illegal logging, which on-the-ground workers and researchers relay on to the authorities. 

Gabon has also opened special economic zones to balance profitability and sustainability, where companies receive tax breaks and other advantages. This policy offers favourable economic conditions to businesses while ensuring that all logging activities are certified and monitored. Sophisticated QR code tracking systems exemplify robust due diligence mechanisms with clear assessment metrics. 

Gabon has been working very closely with the UN to strengthen its environmental capacity, and it is apparent that this collaboration has been fruitful. Gabon’s success has created a cycle through which visible achievements yield even more investment into protection and conservation. The challenge has been to ensure that communities benefit from the protection efforts, while simultaneously generating new opportunities for industries that communities can become involved in. Gabon’s example has shown that by creating clear protection laws and promoting sustainable producers, it is possible to promote both economic profits and environmental conservation, which has the potential to be replicated in other environments.

However, it has to be pointed out that the situation in Gabon is not directly translatable to other countries in the region. Evidence shows that mineral and oil exports are often linked with a reduction in deforestation as the wealth generated by those industries facilitates the import of food in larger quantities, reducing the size of the national agricultural sector, which is evident in the case of Gabon. It remains unclear how the new political landscape after the collapse of the Bongo family’s grip on power will affect environmental policies.

Lucrative earnings from deforestation in the Congo Basin drive companies to pursue environmentally unsustainable practices. There have been multiple successful sustainability campaigns which have informed consumers of malpractice in product supply chains resulting in the promotion of fair trade products. Putting pressure on companies involved in deforestation in the area - by increasing awareness of unsustainable practices - could have the potential to revert some of the documented consequences of deforestation in the Congo Basin.

The destruction of the Basin reduces the Earth’s ability to naturally absorb CO2, promotes the spread of diseases, and disrupts rainfall patterns affecting fresh water supplies and food access in other parts of Africa. Although funds from international donors are being invested into the Basin, high levels of corruption, especially prevalent in the DRC, have reduced their impact on its preservation. As a result, there is potential for NGOs, development agencies, and transparency focused organisations to expand activities by tracking how these funds are used on the ground and measuring how they directly contribute to the specific objectives they were designed for.

South Africa's Struggle with Corruption, Violence, and Mistrust: A Path to Reform

Overview

Over the past three decades, following the end of apartheid, South Africa has been marked by persistently high levels of violence. This violence comes in the form of confrontations between citizens and law enforcement during protests, political and economic disputes, and alarmingly high rates of violent crime. The internationally acclaimed rainbow nation, recognized for its multi-generational quest for racial equality, stands as a striking example of economic disparity, where profound poverty coexists with immense affluence. The South African state is founded upon arguably the world's most progressive and contemporary constitution, yet it grapples with deeply rooted corruption, ineffective governance, and tribal divisions.

A robust rule of law facilitates trust and confidence between citizens and their government. South African citizens exhibit a deep-seated distrust toward both the African National Congress (ANC) and the police force. At all levels of administration, there is a significant presence of organised crime and corruption which exists alongside a culture of impunity, which has contributed to lawlessness and the erosion of state institutions. As crime rates have surged, the ineptitude of law enforcement has sparked a wave of vigilantism across the country.

State Capture and Corruption

Jacob Zuma's presidency (2009-2018) was characterised by widespread corruption, substantially damaging political and institutional domains. Even before he was elected South Africa's fourth President, Zuma faced corruption and fraud charges, foreshadowing the corruption scandals that would define his time in office. Although corruption reached its zenith during the state capture period under Zuma's presidency, its corrosive influence remains pervasive and far-reaching. Rampant corruption undermines the criminal justice system, obstructs economic opportunities, disrupts social cohesion, impedes public services, and damages political integrity; thereby driving down living standards, weakening democracy, fostering organised crime, dissuading foreign investment, and exacerbating brain drain.

During Zuma's presidency, state capture was made possible by his administration and party’s meddling with the criminal justice system. He strategically disposed of leaders of key criminal justice institutions, such as the South African Police Service, the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation, the Independent Police Investigative Directorate, and the National Prosecuting Authority, appointing leaders more likely to be pliable. Concurrently, he removed those who might initiate investigations or prosecutions against him or his associates. Notably, Zuma was keen to protect and hide his corrupt dealings with the Gupta family, a prominent Indian business group. This manoeuvre systematically hollowed out state institutions and fostered an environment in which corruption flourished. The enduring consequences of Zuma's manipulation of the criminal justice system are palpable today as organised crime continues to surge throughout the country.

Corruption has inflicted a profound economic toll on South Africa. A predatory business environment has discouraged local startups and diminished the country's appeal to foreign investors. This decline in foreign investment became evident during Jacob Zuma's tenure; in 2017 Zuma removed highly respected Finance Minister, Pravin Gordhan, and instilled Malusi Gigaba, a loyalist, in his place. This move played a pivotal role in S&P Global's decision to downgrade South Africa's credit rating to junk status, with the agency explicitly stating that the removal of Gordhan - alongside other executive changes - undermined the country's fiscal health and growth prospects. In 2017, KPMG sacked its South African leadership due to its involvement with the Gupta family, who influenced mining, media, and technology assets. This led to KPMG losing twenty audit clients in that year, exemplifying the extensive repercussions of corruption and fraudulent activities, and highlighting the compliance and reputational risks of working with South African companies.

Various investigations, including the Zondo Commission, exposed irregular business dealings between the Gupta family and the South African government during Zuma's tenure. These dealings raised concerns about undue influence and corruption in allocating government contracts. One such case included the ten-year contract awarded to the Gupta family-owned company, Tegeta, to supply coal to the Majuba power station. Although such contracts were not inherently irregular, it came to light that Eskom paid more than double the rate to Tegeta than it paid to other coal suppliers, which has greatly contributed to loadshedding and subsequent power outages across the country. The investigation revealed that only the awardee benefitted from this arrangement. Interference in Eskom's operations was part of a broader pattern of state capture in state-owned enterprises under Zuma.

Loadshedding

One of the most pressing legacies of Zuma's presidency is loadshedding, resulting from years of mismanagement and state capture, which subjected South African citizens to a staggering 5,894 hours of power outages in 2023 alone. This crisis has taken a massive toll on the South African economy, costing as much as $46 million daily. Former Eskom CEO Andre De Ruyter has explained the challenges he encountered when endeavouring to reform Eskom, implying that high-ranking politicians were involved in pervasive corruption within the company, although he refrained from disclosing their identities. Furthermore, a correlation exists between load shedding and crime, with crime rates, especially in residential areas, surging during power outages. Loadshedding has also exacerbated inequality, leading to heightened tensions and increased social divisions.

State capture has led to a significant decrease in the ability of South African power stations to deliver sufficient electricity to the population. As money was syphoned out of Eskom’s coffers by corrupt officials, their lack of investment in maintenance and alternative energy sources rendered them unable to meet service obligations. Further, Eskom's power stations have been subjected to acts of sabotage and theft. Crime syndicates strategically target Eskom, where procurement teams pay excessive amounts for unnecessary contracts; syndicats orchestrate these acts to ensure their companies secure lucrative maintenance and supply contracts. The absence of substantial support from key bodies, such as the Ministry of Minerals and Energy, the South African Police, and the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), has further hindered reform efforts as internal investigations remain unactioned.

Vigilantism

South African citizens have increasingly taken the law into their own hands; vigilante groups have filled the void left by a severe shortage of police officers in the country. This trend was exemplified in 2021 when South Africans took to the streets to protest against the 15-month imprisonment of Zuma. Responding to criminal activities, looting, arson, and damage to public property, residents in affected areas assumed law enforcement roles. These protests resulted in an estimated economic loss of over 50 billion rand. Vigilantism has become a prevailing trend in townships, evolving from local vigilante groups meting out their form of justice against criminals within their communities to a widespread practice of mob justice and extrajudicial killings across South African townships. 

The erosion of public trust in the police force, undermined by corruption and mismanagement, has created a detrimental cycle in which inhabitants of the most security-deprived townships are compelled to fend for themselves. Despite the shortage of police officers throughout South Africa, a disproportionate number of officers are stationed in affluent, predominantly white neighbourhoods. Grassroots initiatives, exemplified by organisations like Operation Wanya Tsotsi, have emerged to address this void. Despite the government's firm stance against vigilantism, overburdened law enforcement officers and local government officials often disregard vigilante actions, tacitly endorsing their activities.

Extortion Rackets 

Extortion rackets present a significant threat to investment in South Africa, as they aim to coerce companies into surrendering a portion of their profits (typically around 30 percent). The previous CEO of Eskom has alleged South African Police (SAP) involvement in extortion rackets, leveraging their assistance for compensation. Uncertainty exacerbated by extortion discourages investment and impedes development in South Africa.

It's estimated that extortion rackets have disrupted 183 infrastructure and construction projects, resulting in financial losses of up to 63 billion rand. The increased risks associated with contracting operations are likely to continue to discourage companies from conducting business in South Africa. In turn, lower levels of foreign and domestic investment contribute to elevated unemployment rates, worsening inequality, and slow growth.

As highlighted in Cyril Ramaphosa's 2022 State of the Nation address, the unreliability of electricity supply, inefficiencies in railways and ports, limitations in broadband spectrum, and declining water quality collectively deter companies from investing, hindering the economy.

Implications for 2024 Elections 

Leading up to the watershed 2024 elections, it appears increasingly improbable that the ANC will retain its power in its current form. Voter apathy and a diminishing majority in the latest local government elections have encouraged further factionalism within the ANC. Internally, contenders are engaged in fierce battles for political positions spanning various municipalities. The 2021 local government elections in South Africa bore witness to a landscape marred by political violence, assassinations, and chronic instability. Opposition political parties are leveraging such political violence to portray South Africa as a lawless mafia state that has been facilitated and promoted by the ANC government. As the 2024 elections draw nearer, opposition groups are likely to continue to push this narrative and in-fighting within the ANC is anticipated to persist. Although a solid performance by the opposition might signal an increase in the ease of doing business in South Africa, risks around political uncertainty are sustained in the short to medium term. 

There is increasing dissatisfaction with the governing ANC; state involvement in criminality remains the most pervasive force in driving organised crime. Many South African political parties have a  transactional or sectarian nature, appealing to identity politics that serve to divide- the lack of viable political alternatives has increased voter apathy since 1994. 

The ANC will likely win a significant portion of the vote in the 2024 elections, even though their support dipped below 50% in local government elections for the first time. As they are unlikely to obtain a majority, they will probably be forced to enter into a coalition government with one of the two major opposition parties, the Democratic Alliance (DA) or the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), although neither of these two parties are benefiting the most from the decline in ANC support. Instead, smaller parties such as ActionSA, Good, and the Patriotic Alliance have received increased support. Power struggles between municipal administrations and the national ANC government likely contributed to the lack of support for the larger and more established parties. The lack of a cohesive relationship between local and federal police structures has been attributed to power struggles between the DA, which rules Johannesburg, Pretoria, Cape Town, and the ANC. As a result, the allocation of national police resources has remained skewed towards ANC strongholds. 

Implications for Stakeholders

Energy Sector -  The energy sector - particularly renewable energy - has the potential to attract significant foreign investment. The government has been actively pursuing renewable energy projects, but issues like corruption, mismanagement in state-owned enterprises, and power supply challenges have caused investor concerns. The lack of a stable energy supply particularly affects various industries and undermines South Africa's investment appeal, although moving towards wind and solar energy would likely make the electricity supply more reliable. Despite the obvious positive impacts of a transition to renewable energy, the vested interests of high-level politicians in the coal industry have impeded efforts to build new infrastructure to further this aim, sustaining levels of uncertainty for renewables companies interested in operating or expanding operations in South Africa. 

The move towards renewable energy would be better for the economy. The European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is designed to place a carbon price on imported goods based on their carbon content. It aims to prevent the relocation of high-emission industries to regions with weaker environmental regulations while incentivising global partners to implement greener practices. CBAM threatens South Africa’s exports and market share in several sectors. Reducing dependence on fossil fuels would help mitigate the adverse effects of CBAM, making South African exports more competitive in European markets. Increased costs from CBAM could deter manufacturing companies from initiating or expanding operations in South Africa.

Mining Sector -  South Africa is rich in mineral resources and has historically attracted substantial foreign investment in the mining sector, which significantly contributes to South Africa’s GDP and employs approximately 1.5 million people.  However, uncertainty in mining regulations, disputes over ownership, and labour unrest have deterred investors. A debate over the country’s Mining Charter requirements has created uncertainty for mining companies and hindered investment. Criminality is pervasive within the mining sector. Tens of thousands of illegal miners work for criminal outfits, costing the sector up to seven billion rand a year. De Ruyter has highlighted the dangers associated with coal mining towns in which violent cartels rule the surrounding areas and extort citizens as well as mining companies. In this climate of fear, mining companies are often obliged to hire private security to protect their assets and employees, highlighting the security risks associated with mining operations in South Africa which are exacerbated by inadequate policing. 

Conclusion/Recommendations

The government must champion transparency, accountability, and citizen participation, fostering nationwide resilience against corruption and organised crime. Rebuilding public trust and combating rampant corruption is a non-linear process. However, the government can demonstrate its commitment to reform by promoting transparency, instituting oversight mechanisms, and ensuring accountability. Crime rates are likely to decline as trust is gradually restored in state institutions. Institutions such as the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID) should be reinforced to ensure that the judicial system functions autonomously and is devoid of power abuses. Organised crime syndicates would find it progressively less attractive to operate within the country, and the legal system would be empowered to investigate and apprehend their members, even if influential figures within the government are implicated in the process. By highlighting their dedication to the rule of law and minimising state interference, the government would instil a greater sense of security among South Africans and incentivize investment.

Namibia’s Mineral Export Ban

On June 8 2023, the Namibian government announced an export ban on unprocessed lithium and other rare earth minerals (REMs). Namibia is the second African nation to impose an export ban on critical minerals, after Zimbabwe, highlighting the rise of resource nationalism, which aims to capitalise on rising global demand for sought-after commodities in the transition to net zero.

Namibia’s Domestic Interests

Rising demand for electric vehicles and consumer devices drove lithium prices to $75,000 per metric ton in March 2022, a 400 per cent increase compared to its previous five-year average of $15,000. The increasing profitability of rare earth minerals has prompted nations with known reserves to expand their processing capacity. China currently processes most of the world’s REMs, with 58 per cent of the world’s lithium processing taking place within its borders. Namibia’s ban on REM exports aims to improve domestic refining capacity. The International Energy Agency predicts that the country’s mineral export volume will triple in size by 2030. If it is all processed at home, Namibia will see a significant rise in the output’s added value.

Namibia’s President, Hage Geingob, views domestic mineral development as key to industrialisation. The Mines and Energy Minister, Tom Alweendo, asserted that there is “no way” Namibia could industrialise without processing its minerals. Mining and quarrying make up 9.3 per cent of Namibia’s GDP and 66 per cent of its total exports, driven mainly by uranium mining and rough diamonds. Lithium processing would allow for diversification in Namibia’s mining sector, reducing reliance on the fluctuating value of unprocessed mineral exports and forging a path toward sustainable growth. Banning the export of lithium is expected to increase the mineral supply in Namibia, enabling processing plants to purchase unrefined lithium at a discount. Minimising development costs is vital to incentivising domestic and foreign investment. Namibian wealth management firm Simonis Storm Securities projects that Namibia’s lithium refining industry could be worth nearly $1 billion annually by 2025. 

Namibia’s Chamber of Mines, an association of mining and quarrying organisations, announced their support for the government’s ban on lithium exports. Chamber executive Veston Malango described it as “necessary” to “grow the economy in line with the African Mining Vision.” This refers to the African Mining Vision (AMV), an African Union strategy meant to enhance Africa’s utilisation of natural resources and “underpin broad-based sustainable growth and socioeconomic development.” The Union’s decision to include lithium processing within the AMV strategy underlines the government’s expectations for future lithium demand in the medium to long term.

International Significance

Namibia signed a trade agreement with the European Union in October 2022, in which it highlighted plans to become a reliable mineral processor. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has shown explicit support for Namibia’s ambitions, stating that processing will “not only create greater local prosperity…we will ensure that we have more than just one supplier in the future.” Further, two months after Namibia’s announcement on the banning of lithium exports, it signed a joint REM exploration agreement with Japan. 

The shift in mineral-related focus toward Southern Africa is part of broader efforts from Indo-Pacific and Western nations to reduce reliance on China for sourcing REMs - China began investing in Southern African mining before any other major economy. Namibia is one of five African nations included in Japan’s critical mineral strategy designed to reduce dependence on China, which imposed export restrictions on gallium and germanium in July.

Namibian mineral refining represents another opportunity for the United States to challenge China's position in the global mining market. Amos Hochstein, United States Security Envoy, called for more “competition” across “multiple countries,” emphasising the United States’ desire to access REMs without the risk of political friction. Rystad Energy, an energy consultancy, forecasts a significant increase in Namibian lithium output from approximately 5,000 tonnes of lithium carbonate in 2024 to 33,000 in 2030, lifting investor confidence in Namibia’s mining sector. 

Whilst the capacity of Southern African nations to produce and process REMs may ease reliance on Chinese processing, China will remain a goliath. Africa’s six largest lithium mining nations could account for approximately 12 per cent of global supply by 2031, stressing the importance of multilateral trade cooperation in transitioning to net zero. Namibia’s mineral wealth means it can become a crucial stakeholder in REM supply chains.

Structural Challenges

Scaling up domestic lithium production will require firms to adjust to Namibia’s new regulatory practices, potentially delaying the launch of new processing plants. Included in the Namibian government’s mining plan is a provision which may allow for the lifting of lithium export restrictions in select circumstances, allowing the export of limited quantities of unprocessed ore at the direction of the Ministry of Mines and Energy. The government's authority in determining export arrangements may impede metallurgical testing, a vital component in the design phase of new facilities, which would further lengthen the testing period of new processing plants and negate potential marginal gains.

The Geingob government continues to battle allegations of corruption in mining, which first emerged in October 2022. Chinese mining firm Xinfeng Investments denies accusations of forgery, acquiring mining licences through bribery, and illegally exporting raw materials to China under the pretence of mineral testing; Namibia’s Business and Intellectual Property Authority has suspended two unnamed officials suspected of facilitating the purchase of lithium mining licences which Xinfeng Investments later acquired. Further, the technical advisor of the Ministry of Mines and Energy, Ralph Muyamba, awarded mining licenses to Orange River Mining, owned by his cousin, worsening suspicions of corruption.

Minister Alweendo’s subsequent amendment of the ministry’s mining licence application process indicates that the Namibian government may not have in place the requisite regulatory framework to eliminate illegal activity but also shows that it is willing to take steps towards mitigating corruption risks. Following the corruption allegations aimed at Xinfeng Investments, the Anti-Corruption Commission re-evaluated the trustworthiness of prospective investors and now requires organisations to provide comprehensive plans detailing how they intend to conduct mining operations in Namibia. The procedure aims to tighten licence procurement procedures and to stop licence-holders from selling them off to third parties. Eliminating shadow markets is essential to fulfilling Namibia’s ambition of increased value-addition in mining; failing to enforce the amendment may deter investment from capable organisations amid concern that Namibia cannot optimally exploit its mineral wealth under current regulations.

Namibia is not the latest African nation to restrict the export of unprocessed minerals. On July 27, the Ghanaian government approved its ‘Minerals of the Future’ policy, an export ban which intends to encourage domestic lithium processing. The broader trend of resource nationalism aims to empower mineral-rich states by increasing their stake in mining operations. Namibia’s decision to ban lithium exports underscores the urgency for the country to strengthen its regulatory framework to capitalise on this significant economic opportunity.

Water Scarcity in Africa: A Changing Landscape of Challenges and Opportunities

The right to water, as recognized by the United Nations, entitles all individuals to access to sufficient, safe, physically accessible, and affordable water. However, this right is not reflected in practice. The African continent has suffered from a water scarcity crisis for decades. Its implications on communities’ food, health, and economic security have been critical and have not been effectively mitigated by governments or international humanitarian actors. There is an urgent need for improved infrastructure and governance, enhanced international cooperation, and greater awareness about the effects of water scarcity to tackle the crisis in Africa and ensure that all individuals are provided with enough clean water to meet at least their basic needs.

Drivers and Recent Trends

Water scarcity in Africa has developed into a complex emergency. Changing climate patterns, a rapidly growing population, inadequate infrastructure, and poor governance have contributed to a critical water crisis that threatens both the health of the African population and the stability and development of the entire region.

Of the 23 countries worldwide labelled as ‘critically water-insecure’ by the UN Institute for Water, Environment and Health, 13 are located in Africa. These countries are characterised by low levels of access to safe drinking water, sanitation services, and water resource stability. Africa has the lowest levels of safe water access of any continent; in 2020, only 15 per cent of the continent had access to safe drinking water. In Chad, nearly 50 per cent of the population consumes drinking water with very high levels of E. coli, while just 6 per cent has access to safely managed potable water.

Source: Mason, Nalamalapu & Corfee-Morlot 2019

Over the past five decades, despite advancements in access to safe water and sanitation around the world, since 2020 Sub-Saharan Africa has witnessed an increase in the proportion of its population lacking access to secure potable water services. An estimated 70 per cent of people in Sub-Saharan Africa lack safe drinking water services.

Source: Naddaf 2023

Several mutually-reinforcing factors are contributing to Africa’s water scarcity crisis. First, the continent’s climate, characterised by high temperatures, variable rainfall, and harsh aridity, has contributed to both desertification and intense flooding. While Africa has the highest number of countries at high risk of droughts, there remains a severe threat of flooding, as evidenced in Somalia and Ethiopia earlier this year.

Second, Africa’s rapid population growth is increasing the demand for water resources. Sub-Saharan Africa’s population is growing at 2.7 per cent annually, which is more than twice as fast as South Asia (1.2 per cent) and Latin America (0.9 per cent). This is placing immense pressure on the continent’s water and food resources, especially as these are gradually being depleted by (largely human-induced) forces such as climate change.

Third, government policies have been unable to slow these trends. Distinguishing between physical and economic water scarcity is fundamental to understanding the implications of water scarcity and devising appropriate responses. Physical scarcity refers to the condition wherein available water resources fall short of fulfilling the needs and demands of the population. On the other hand, economic water scarcity arises where, despite the natural availability of water, access to water is limited due to a lack of infrastructure, high costs, and institutional constraints – in other words, due to poor policies and governance. 

Arid regions of the continent, mainly located in North Africa, are characterised by physical water scarcity, whereas Sub-Saharan Africa predominantly experiences economic water scarcity. Interestingly, water stressed countries, particularly Algeria, Libya, and Egypt in the North, and Namibia, South Africa, and Botswana in the South, make water available to a higher proportion of people than in countries with abundant water resources, like the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The DRC possesses over half of Africa’s water reserves and receives frequent rain, yet lacks the infrastructure and regulations to provide millions of Congolese with access to clean water. Even within countries, economic water scarcity impacts individuals differently, as it acts upon existing socio-economic inequalities dictated by income, gender, race, level of education, or political beliefs. These statistics highlight the role of government policy in ensuring an equitable distribution and supply of safe water for citizens.

Economic water insecurity is often derived from poor regulatory mechanisms governing the use of bodies of water. The pollution and contamination of water have become critical issues, stemming at least in part from the mismanagement of agricultural, animal, and industrial waste, as well as the overexploitation of bodies of water, as in South Africa. As a result, contaminated water is often utilised in households, particularly in settings where alternative water sources are unavailable.

Fourth, private companies and organisations have attempted to profit from Africa’s limited public water access by privatising water. This has rendered water an increasingly elusive resource by making it more expensive and inaccessible. In areas worst hit by droughts, in the Horn of Africa for example, the cost of water has increased by up to 400 per cent, leaving many without enough water to meet basic needs. Water privatisation has thereby widened inequalities, while also potentially creating opportunities for corruption. In Uganda, “private contractors estimated the average bribe related to a contract award to be 10 percent (of the total cost),” meanwhile an estimated 46 per cent of urban water consumers pay extra money to connect their households to a water network. Corruption ultimately inflates water prices, thus denying poorer segments of the population access to water.

Fifth, climate change is further complicating matters. The Horn of Africa region, for example, is in its fourth consecutive year of drought and is experiencing the impacts of “one of the worst climate-induced emergencies of the past 40 years.” The region’s minimal rainfall has triggered a water scarcity crisis, with more than 8.5 million people, almost half of them children, facing dire water shortages. This represents merely one instance amid a multitude of cases across the continent.

The Implications of Water Scarcity

The water scarcity crisis in Africa has, and will continue to have, important consequences at the local, regional, and international level. Not only does it critically impact human security, but is also intensifying migration flows and exacerbating conflicts, thereby requiring regional and international bodies to step up their operations to respond to growing humanitarian emergencies.

First, water scarcity has a prejudicious effect on the continent’s human security. The lack of safe, accessible drinking water increases the likelihood of chronic dehydration, particularly in areas with arid climates. Water scarcity also compromises food security and livelihoods. A large proportion of the African population is reliant on agriculture, farming, and fishing for both personal consumption and as a source of income. The inconsistent access to and supply of water reduces crop yields and the availability of food, exposing communities to critical socio-economic and health vulnerabilities. Moreover, water scarcity contributes to environmental degradation; parts of Africa have witnessed increasing desertification and a loss of biodiversity, which compounds existing challenges to livelihoods. For example, over one-third of Burkina Faso’s farmland is degraded as a result of both prolonged periods of drought and improper land use, thus gravely impacting the population’s food and economic security.

From a macro-level perspective, water scarcity can also slow economic growth. Inconsistent agricultural yields and industrial productivity that contribute to persistent poverty and famines, make water insecurity a critical impediment to economic development. Simultaneously, limited food outputs can induce inflation and thus impact both national and global food prices.

Water scarcity also significantly increases the likelihood and spread of diseases, such as cholera and diarrhoea. An estimated 842,000 people die from diarrhoea every year as a result of unsafe drinking water, sanitation, and hygiene. Access to hand-washing facilities ranges from 25 per cent of the population in Chad, to just 9 per cent in Burkina Faso. In regions characterised by water scarcity, communities are less inclined to allocate water resources to hygiene-related activities, thereby augmenting the probability of disease proliferation and transmission.

 Source: Our World in Data 2019

Water scarcity’s impact on human, health, and economic security inherently reinforces inequalities. While communities living in rural areas, informal settlements, or low-income settings often struggle to meet their basic water needs, individuals in comparatively advantageous socio-economic positions are able to access privatised sources of water. Water scarcity disproportionately impacts the most vulnerable people, including children who are at a greater risk of developing conditions stemming from malnutrition, such as stunting and diabetes. Water insecurity may also exacerbate gender inequalities; when water is not easily accessible, the burden of travelling to collect it often falls on women and girls. This represents a “high opportunity cost to obtaining education or employment.”

Second, water scarcity is a driving factor for migration. Internal displacement in African countries has significantly increased in recent years due to persistent conflict, resource scarcity, and natural disasters. In Burkina Faso, the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) grew from less than 50,000 in October 2019 to around 2 million in March 2023. Inherently, migration hinders the ability to secure stable and reliable access to water resources. Rural-urban migration, towards Nairobi and Mombasa for instance, has led to overcrowding in cities not equipped to deal with overpopulation, placing huge strains on water resources, further intensifying water scarcity. Water insecurity has also driven transborder migration, increasing the demand for, and pressure on, water resources in neighbouring countries. The almost-total disappearance of Lake Chad, a vital source of water and livelihoods for 30 million people in the Sahel, has forced the displacement of three million people and has left 11 million people in need of humanitarian assistance. The combination of resource shortages, forced migration, and pre-existing tensions has served to trigger violence between fishing, farming, and herding communities.

Third, water insecurity has contributed to the provocation of conflict on the African continent, both within and across borders. Violent clashes have, in turn, exacerbated human security and triggered further migration and conflict. Beyond Lake Chad, tensions have emerged between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia over access to the Nile Basin, especially after the latter began the construction of a hydroelectric dam that Egypt claims could drastically reduce water flows into the country. Moreover, the potential for, and fears of, transboundary conflict have triggered intra-state discontent. For example, the development of the ‘Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam’ heightened the Egyptian public’s concerns about reliable water access and generated significant pressure on the government to respond firmly. Furthermore, human dependence on water has been intentionally exploited during conflicts; water resources, systems, and infrastructure required to deliver water have come under direct attack. In fact, children under the age of 5 living in conflict zones are 20 times more likely to die from diseases linked to unsafe water and sanitation than from direct violence.

Fourth, on a more global scale, the combination of famines, droughts, diseases, migratory flows, and armed conflicts resulting from water scarcity in Africa have generated an urgent demand for international humanitarian interventions. The international community is confronted with growing expectations regarding the coordination of increasing volumes of aid to help African governments mitigate the local impacts of water stress. Additionally, international actors must overcome barriers to the access of remote or crisis-affected settings to ensure the timely delivery of essential water resources and facilitate the development of vital infrastructure. The international community finds itself at a critical juncture as current efforts to address the unfolding water scarcity crisis hold the potential to shape long-term trajectories and trends.

Looking Ahead: Challenges and Opportunities

Evidently, the water scarcity crisis entails significant risks and challenges for African governments and the international community in years to come. Current trends indicate that water scarcity, as well as its consequences for human security (including famines, poverty, inequality, health insecurity, migration, and conflict) are likely to worsen. Both climate change and Africa’s rapid population growth will place increasing pressure on the continent’s water resources, while central governments may lack not only the capacity, but also the political will, to respond adequately. Guaranteeing equitable access to safe, clean, and sufficient water to meet individual basic needs, both personal and economic - and thus preventing the onset of large-scale humanitarian crises - will represent a critical governance challenge in coming years. Measures must be taken to improve national water management, storage, distribution, and recycling capacities, especially through infrastructure expansion. Governments will have to recentre their efforts towards preventing and managing water scarcity, instead of merely attempting to deal with its consequences. 

At the same time, the unfolding challenges linked to water scarcity in Africa present important opportunities for both governments and the international community. First, huge potential exists for states to invest in and develop durable infrastructure to ensure the reliable supply of clean water to homes. This specifically includes piped water systems, which can help provide communities with readily available drinking water, while removing the need for women and children to travel long distances and forgo education or work. This would inevitably increase children’s school attendance and free up time for women to engage in more productive activities, which would have positive implications for countries’ economic growth. 

Simultaneously, governments should invest in the development and distribution of sustainable, water-efficient, climate-resilient practices and technology, such as drip irrigation, reforestation, and the extraction and recycling of groundwater, to sustain livelihoods and mitigate physical water scarcity in the long term. Thus far, “water resources harnessed and land area developed for irrigation in Africa are still far below the (region’s) potential,” opening up an opportunity to fill this gap. The digitisation of agriculture and farming would significantly help conserve water resources and render activities more productive and efficient, thus contributing to communities’ food, health, and economic security. Some African countries have already taken important steps in this regard: Namibia has improved urban wastewater management in Windhoek, recycling sewage water into drinking water, meanwhile the Kenyan government has sought to increase the distribution of drought-tolerant maize varieties. 

Equally important is the need for improved data collection; governments must cooperate with sub-national actors to expand the available data on both physical and economic water scarcity, to ensure that implemented projects yield desired results and are endorsed by recipient communities. All the above efforts can be pursued jointly by national governments, the private sector, and the international community.

Relatedly, the water scarcity crisis presents an important opportunity to enhance cooperation on water management at the regional and international level, whether through development institutions, regional bodies, or inter-state frameworks. Currently, multilateral efforts to combat climate change and reverse water scarcity trends in Africa are insufficient. There is still no global framework for addressing water stress, like there is for climate change and the preservation of biodiversity. Water insecurity must be prioritised on international and regional agendas. State and non-state actors alike should increase their support to African governments, through capacity-building programmes, disbursements of financial assistance, exchanges of technical expertise, and infrastructure development. 

The United States’ Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), developed in 2022, represents a good starting point, as it seeks to mobilise private capital investment towards infrastructure linked to climate and energy security, digital connectivity, health security, and gender equality. Such goals could support important investments in water infrastructure. Yet this initiative does not go far enough to prioritise the issue of water scarcity and forefront the urgent need for improvements to water management policy and infrastructure in Africa.

Source: Our World in Data 2021

Meanwhile, within Africa, the African Risk Capacity (ARC) Group, as part of the African Union, has been playing an important role in tackling water scarcity. Its sovereign insurance mechanism has paid out over $36 million to African countries affected by drought since 2014, preventing further famines, poverty, and health insecurity. However, this framework has mainly focused on assisting countries to respond to the effects of water scarcity, rather than encouraging the development of infrastructure and technology that can mitigate and prevent these effects in the first place. Despite providing important assistance in times of crisis, more needs to be done to ensure that all individuals across Africa obtain reliable access to safe, clean, and readily available water before having to suffer the impacts of water scarcity.

Lastly, there is a crucial opportunity to enhance education and raise awareness about water scarcity and its effects, particularly on human health. Governments must invest in initiatives aimed at encouraging behavioural changes, particularly where water scarcity is less pronounced, and promoting climate-resilient agricultural practices. Central governments must simultaneously support bottom-up, micro-level initiatives seeking to tackle both the causes and effects of water insecurity. Only through a combination of local, regional, national, and international efforts can the current water scarcity crisis be mitigated and communities across Africa be provided with long-term access to clean, safe, and affordable water.

Tunisia’s Migration Crisis

Climate change is a major driving force behind migration and is one of the most controversial topics in today's geopolitical debates. Migration is often a reaction to dramatically shifting climate conditions, which is especially evident in Africa where rural flight - often partially driven by climate change - is a significant contributor to increasing urban populations. According to some estimates, 216 million people could be displaced across six world regions by 2050 as a direct result of climate change. The number is highest in Africa, where it is projected that as many as 86 million people will become internal climate migrants. This issue is notably prominent in Tunisia; Tunisias constitute the predominant nationality among migrants travelling to Europe via the Mediterranean Sea, comprising 18.7%.

 Between 2009 and 2014, 46,000 people migrated to Tunis, and around 119,600 people migrated to the central and southeast regions of Tunisia. Although, according to the Wilson Center, about 64% of individuals who pass through Tunisia are principally motivated by economic factors, it is important to note that climate change and economic performance are interconnected. In rural regions the economy is especially dependent on climate; thus, climate change is a significant contributor to the deteriorating economic conditions that drive migration.  

Climate change: The primary driver of the Tunisian migration crisis

Climate change trends in Tunisia highlight a consistent increase in observable average seasonal temperatures. Between 1901-1930 average annual temperatures were 10.63, 17.60, 27.17, and 20.61 celsius for winter, spring, summer, and autumn, respectively. In contrast, between 1991-2020, these averages were 11.62, 18.96, 29.12, and 22.09 for the same seasons. In the last 30 years alone, temperatures increased by 0.4 celsius per decade on average. A similar pattern is observable for precipitation, which has decreased by 3% per annum since 1901, according to the World Bank. These changes have an impact on agricultural yield in the country, which is influenced by temperature and precipitation fluctuations as well as extreme climatic events. In addition to agricultural production, these changes affect ecosystems, which play a crucial role in national food security. Moreover, the low precipitation rate combined with temperature increases directly facilitates soil degradation and the multiplication of pests and diseases. 

Although Tunisia only moderately relies on agriculture, which accounts for 12% of the country's GDP, the agricultural sector employs around 16% of the country’s population. Younger generations in rural areas that rely on agriculture are more likely to migrate to urban centres or abroad as they search for more stable livelihoods and socio-economic prospects. Although these decisions are economic, the precarious economic state many in Tunisia find themselves in is driven by climate change as it causes rural areas to become less fertile.

This exodus in part explains Tunisia’s 16.1% unemployment rate. High unemployment in Tunisia is magnified by urban migration. This is an increasing economic risk as Tunisia's slowly developing economy cannot provide sufficient employment opportunities to migrants. But Tunisia’s rural-urban migration is only a fragment of a broader issue. Over the years, Tunisia has evolved into a pivotal junction for international migrants seeking passage into Europe. Historically, Libya occupied the central role as a transit hub for migration northwards. However, from 2017 onwards, the influx of migrants reaching Italian shores from Libya declined due to increased Italian support for the Libyan coastguard. By 2020, 40% fewer migrants departed from Libya, with Tunisia emerging as the new epicentre for transit to Europe via the Mediterranean. 

This is partly due to the current political situation in Tunisia, where the government has begun to silence dissent and terrorise opposition figures. Political oppression is a key trigger for migration, including for migrants from other parts of Africa who reside in Tunisia. The government has accused African migrants of bringing violence into the country, which has instigated aggression towards the migrant population. A report from 5 July described a machete attack on a group of migrants in the city of Sfax, which left two people wounded. In this case, the economic hardships brought on by climate change can also lead to political oppression, which further influences migration. Many critics, namely the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights, have stated that the anti-migration speech given by Tunisian President Kais Saied on 21 February was designed to distract Tunisians from ongoing economic problems.

Migration and Europe

Migration is currently at the top of the European political agenda as more migrants continue to attempt to travel to the EU. Between January 2023 and July 2023, the number of migrants travelling to Europe rose by 13% and reached 176,100, the highest figure since 2016. Simultaneously, migrants have started to use a sea route through the Central Mediterranean, which according to Frontex, is the most dangerous. Increasing pressure is being placed on Tunisia and Libya to curb the influx of migrants. In both countries smugglers are offering lower prices for passage to Europe, leading to higher demand for their services.

For European countries, and specifically for point of arrival countries, migration is starting to become a major financial and political struggle. Italy, which has the highest number of arrivals, spent around 1.7 billion euros on migrant reception alone in 2018. This is causing political dilemmas as Italy and other countries begin to question the role of the EU in dealing with irregular migration. In 2018, the EU contributed only 46.8 million euros, or 2.7% of total Italian spending on migration-related measures. Increasing pressure from its member states has forced the EU to rely on alternative solutions. On 16 July, the EU signed a memorandum of understanding with Tunisia, which includes a 700 million euro funding package for the country. 105 million euros are to be designated for migration management. 

The EU is attempting to transfer the responsibility for migration to the port of origin countries; however, sceptics question the ethics and sustainability of such an approach. In the case of Tunisia, the official purpose of the EU support package is budgetary support. But given the rising tensions in Tunisia, it is difficult to predict how much is going to be allocated to providing services to migrants in need. Further, accounting for the Tunisian government's recent rhetoric surrounding migration and its resulting violent consequences, the EU’s migration policy may lead to human rights abuses at the hands of Tunisian security forces. In Libya, where the EU provided financial assistance for migration management efforts, people face high levels of violence and abuse from the coast guard and other militias. 

Despite the decrease in the number of individuals attempting to journey to the EU from Libya, the EU has faced allegations of overlooking human rights violations in Libya, and adopting short-term measures rather than formulating a substantive, enduring solution. As the numbers of those migrating from Libya dwindled, a corresponding surge occurred in Tunisia. Implementing a similar approach in Tunisia would likely have similar results, facilitating human rights abuses and pushing migration routes into neighbouring countries. According to a Human Rights Watch report from 19 July, three days after the memorandum was signed, there had already been documented cases of abuses against migrants by Tunisia’s security forces. These included torture, arbitrary arrests, and detention. The report also states that the majority of these incidents occurred after the presidential speech on 21 July. 

Implications 

Although it is difficult to estimate the impact of the signed memorandum between Tunisia and the EU, organisations should monitor the development of efforts, especially with regard to potential human rights abuses. Tunisia should be held accountable for how it spends the money it receives from the EU. Although Tunisian efforts to address criminal groups that facilitate illegal migration into Europe have the potential to reduce the overall number of migrants travelling from Tunisia to the EU, these efforts could come at a cost. As climate change continues to worsen, many will continue to migrate north as supplies become scarcer, employment more difficult, and conflicts more frequent. As Tunisia battles internal and external migration, it has the chance to create a policy - which can act as an example for other African nations - that aims to forge long-term solutions and combat the source of the problem, not just the symptoms of it.

Kenya Plans to Send a Police Task Force to Haiti

On 29 July, Kenyan Foreign Minister Alfred Mutua announced that Kenya will commit to sending a 1,000 strong police task force to Haiti to train and assist the Haitian Police in restoring security and stability in the country. The small Caribbean island state has been struggling with a severe security crisis for years now. Violent gangs control around 80% of the nation’s capital Port au Prince and local law enforcement is not sufficiently staffed, trained, and/or equipped to effectively counter such a threat. The deployment still needs to be approved by Haitian authorities and by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), but both UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken have signalled support for the initiative. The Haitian Foreign Minister, Jean Victor Geneus, expressed gratitude for Kenya’s offer and announced that the country is willing to receive its support.

In October 2022, Guterres began calling for a non-UN international mission to support the local police, and in July 2023 the UNSC passed a resolution encouraging UN member states "to provide security support to the Haitian National Police," potentially through "the deployment of a specialised force." Although most member states supported the deployment of a multinational force to support Haiti, Kenya was the first and only country to commit to sending a task force. In late August, a Kenyan delegation travelled to Haiti to evaluate the mission’s operational needs and assess the specifics of its mandate.

The call for outside support was first issued by interim Prime Minister Ariel Henry in October 2022 following an increase in murders, kidnappings, and rapes committed by criminal gangs that control much of the capital. Henry took over leadership of the country after the murder of President Jovenel Moise in July 2021 by a group of foreign mercenaries. The humanitarian crisis was exacerbated by a gang blockade of one of the capital's main fuel terminals that has caused shortages and a significant increase in the price of basic necessities. The growing humanitarian crisis has led to an increase in demonstrations against the government, further worsening social instability. The UN estimates that about five of Haiti’s nearly 12 million people suffer from hunger.

Despite calls for foreign support by Haitian officials, human rights groups warned against the intervention due to human rights abuses committed by previous international missions in the country. Before their withdrawal in 2019, UN troops were accused of sexual violence towards Haitian women and girls. Moreover, UN peacekeepers who were deployed to Haiti after a devastating earthquake in 2010 were responsible for a cholera outbreak that killed over 9,600 people. These, along with other similar incidents throughout the country's history, have made the local population particularly averse to the presence of foreign military contingents in the country.

Kenya's proposal to send its own task force is in line with the country's commitment in recent years to present itself as a stabilising actor. Kenyan police have been involved in several peacekeeping missions over the last 15 years, including in Somalia and South Sudan. However, questions remain surrounding the potential effectiveness of a deployment of Kenyan police in Haiti. The first concerns the distance between the two countries, while the other relates to accusations of violent abuse by Kenyan police in managing domestic unrest. Coordinating a task force in a country as far as Haiti cannot be compared, in terms of logistics, to previous missions in other African states, and will certainly test Kenya’s ability to match its ambitions with logistic and coordination capabilities.

Despite the fact that the United States and Canada have already demonstrated their willingness to offer financial resources in support of the Kenyan mission, what it will likely require is logistical assistance from entities with greater experience in executing missions of this nature. The crux of the challenge lies in effectively strategizing, facilitating transportation, and ensuring the sustained presence of the task force within Haiti. The Kenyan police force's relative lack of experience in conducting long-distance operations is a notable vulnerability that may particularly affect the mission during the preparatory stages. This weakness could lead to significant complications during the operational phase. While the transfer of personnel and resources could present temporary problems, the ongoing maintenance of the task force in Haiti over an extended period could expose substantial logistical deficiencies posing serious challenges to the long-term sustainability of the mission.

Haitians still vividly recall the 2010 cholera epidemic, which was traced back to a malfunction in the wastewater facility within the UN forces' compound, resulting in the contamination of a river. This underscores the critical importance of thoroughly assessing and effectively managing all the requirements associated with international missions in Haiti. Instances such as the 2010 incident significantly contribute to the deepening of the population's resentment towards external interventions, contributing to the growth of negative sentiment over time. In addition to accommodating the task force, there is also the essential task of equipping the Kenyan police adequately for their duties. The equipment provided will need to be regularly replaced and supplemented to match the rapidly evolving situation. Given the pervasive level of violence that characterises the crisis in Haiti, it is reasonable to anticipate a substantial demand for equipment replacement and turnover. This further amplifies the logistical challenge at hand.

Language presents another complicating factor. Given that Kenyan police officers are not proficient in either French or Haitian Creole, the languages predominantly spoken by the local population, the task force will encounter a significant language barrier. This barrier presents a dual challenge; it hampers effective communication between the Kenyan and Haitian forces, as well as impeding the task force's ability to engage with the population. Considering the Kenyan police's intended role of providing support and training to the local police, the potential impact of communication difficulties on the mission's objectives is readily apparent. Particularly in joint operations, the inability to communicate efficiently and effectively has the potential to undermine operations. Further, the language divide between the task force and the local populace could give rise to tensions. This is especially relevant given that the task force's policing responsibilities necessitate consistent and close interaction with civilian communities. In an environment marked by elevated levels of violence and a general distrust of external entities, this barrier could further worsen the population's discontent with international missions.

A significant area of concern raised by Haitian civil society pertains to the history of abuse and violence associated with Kenyan police. During the Covid-19 outbreak, there were accusations that the police fatally shot individuals who had violated government-imposed curfews. In a more recent incident that occurred in July 2023, approximately 30 people were killed by the police during protests sparked by increases in the cost of living. These events have led to a substantial level of apprehension regarding the Kenyan task force's deployment and the behaviour of its officers. The concern stems from the fear that the Kenyan police could introduce a highly violent and extrajudicial approach to handling the security crisis in Haiti. If the Kenyan police take a highly repressive approach, the general population may bear the brunt of the consequences, rather than the gangs that are largely responsible for the ongoing violence. Considering that the purpose of the task force is to provide training to the Haitian forces, there is a risk that similar violent tendencies might be adopted by Haitian forces, potentially exacerbating abuses and violations within the country in the long term.

The End of MINUSMA: An Uncertain Future for Mali’s Security

On 16 June, the Malian transitional government asked the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to terminate all activity in the country. The UN mission, currently comprised of 15,000 personnel, had been involved in Mali as a peacekeeping force since 2013. Its aim was to help facilitate peace amidst a war in 2012 between the Malian government and armed separatist groups in Northern Mali; Tuareg separatist groups were demanding the independence of a region they call ‘Azawad.’ In accordance with the Malian government’s decision, the UN Security Council voted to conclude its operations and progressively withdraw its personnel, a process that will likely be completed before the end of this year. The transitional government’s decision was not completely unforeseen; the military junta had begun to make changes in the actors and methods employed in combating terrorism since it claimed power in 2021. The countries involved in the MINUSMA operation were concerned by this decision, taken by a government which is still largely struggling to maintain peace and abate the threat of advancing terror groups. The presence of Wagner troops is another source of anxiety for the West, as the group’s deployment represents a further extension of Russian influence on African soil and could be detrimental to peace and security in the country. 

The Malian Foreign Minister, Abdoulaye Diop, justified his government’s decision by highlighting MINUSMA's failure to resolve the security crisis in Mali after 10 years of engagement. He also claimed that the mission’s reporting of human rights violations fostered distrust towards the government and fuelled communal tensions. The UN published a report in May 2023 accusing - through a well-evidenced investigation - the Malian Army and foreign mercenaries of killing 500 civilians during a counterterrorist operation in Moura a year prior. This accusation contributed to the deepening of tensions between the UN and the Malian government. In response, Mali announced the opening of an investigation against the multilateral organisation for “espionage, undermining the external security of the state” and “military conspiracy.” This decision follows a general shift in the country’s security strategy undertaken by the transitional government.

Since 2019, Russia has been actively engaged in a propaganda campaign in Mali that has effectively swayed public opinion. Russia has deployed paid and non-paid activists and influencers, multimedia platforms, and bot accounts on social media platforms to successfully win over hearts and minds in Mali. According to Jean le Roux of the Atlantic Council, Russia coerces communities “through the influence of these talking heads,” referring to local activists. Many of these disinformation efforts are being directly carried out by the Internet Research Agency, a bot farm financed by Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of the Wagner Group (now deceased). A 2023 study revealed that over 90% of Malians now trust Russia as a partner. Although the study lacks significant feedback from rural populations, it effectively paints a picture of public opinion. A similar pattern is emerging across the Sahel, particularly in Niger and Burkina Faso, who find themselves in similar security dilemmas. 

A week before Mali’s decision, Malian President Assimi Goïta and Vladimir Putin had a phone conversation, likely discussing the MINUSMA mandate. According to Jean-Hervé Jezequel and Ibrahim Maiga of the Crisis Group, Russian diplomats have also attempted to limit MINUSMA’s withdrawal budget under the threat of blocking funding for other peacekeeping missions around the world. They were likely hoping to create a disorderly withdrawal that would augment the perception that MINUSMA was a failed mission, and during which the UN would have to abandon material that the Malian army and Wagner could retrieve. 

Moscow has a lot to gain from the UN mission’s retreat. Putin is benefitting from countering western influence across the continent, whilst Wagner has found in Africa a great source of natural resources, as well as a space to strategically redeploy its troops after the Russian insurrection. However, for Mali, the advantages of MINUSMA’s withdrawal are less evident than its dangers. The termination of the international mission poses great risks for the country’s security, most notably for the northern regions where most of the UN bases were located. Although MINUSMA did not have a military mandate, the presence of peacekeepers in urban centres helped to reduce the influence of terror groups. In MISUMA’s absence, these groups may now consider cities to be easier targets. In addition, MINUSMA’s departure risks increasing tensions between the signatory groups of the Alger Peace Accords and the government, and could challenge the current state of territorial unity in Mali. 

The Alger Accords, signed in 2015 between separatist groups and the government, established a system of decentralisation, the creation of a common army, and specific development measures for the northern regions. Few of the agreed reforms had been implemented since its signing, but MINUSMA’s departure makes it even less likely to be upheld. The UN mission not only provided government representatives and humanitarian missions with secure access to the country’s north, but also invested in stabilisation projects which created thousands of jobs for the local population. The deterioration of security in certain areas, hindering access to many of these regions, and the loss of economic opportunities accompanied by the current government’s failure to offer economic incentives to leave armed groups, are signals that the security situation is likely to continue to worsen. The Malian government signed the Algiers Peace Agreement from a position of weakness, but has been able to develop its army during the eight years since its signing. The authorities will now likely favour a solely military solution over investing in peace and economic development.

Imperfect efforts that combine security and development initiatives continue to see success in the Ivory Coast and the Lake Chad Basin Area; combatants were provided with incentives - such as amnesty, job training, and more - to leave extremist groups. In the Ivory Coast, the government coupled these programs with efforts to invest in infrastructure and public services in affected regions. In both cases, membership in extremist groups fell following the implementation of these initiatives. The Malian Junta’s security focused approach is unlikely to be successful, as it is likely to merely drive more Malians into extremist groups to protect and provide for themselves and their families. This is especially relevant in Mali given the human rights abuses frequently committed by the army and the Wagner Group.

If the Malian government continues to respond to the terrorist threat and inter-communal conflict by sending Wagner troops alongside the Malian military, who has also accumulated a grim record of human rights abuses, levels of violence and conflict are likely to worsen. Wagner has been active in Mali since at least December 2022, playing an active role in security provision in Central and Northern Mali. In doing so, the group has killed thousands of Malians. It is not clear how many were members of armed or extremist groups. Since 2020, after the first of two military coups, deaths from armed violence have more than doubled. Almost all of these deaths can be attributed to extremist violence and the security response to it. Terror groups across the Sahel, including in Mali, are targeting civilians more frequently in 2023 than in years past. 

In West Africa, where security challenges often transcend national borders, this poses a serious threat to Mali’s neighbours. Over the last several years, jihadists have streamed across the Malian border with Burkina Faso, where armed and extremist groups control almost half of the country’s territory. If the Malian Government fails to take a more holistic approach to addressing extremism, extremists within Mali may begin to pose a serious threat to the Ivory Coast, Niger (where a military junta has just overthrown a government with an effective policy track record on extremism), and even Guinea, Senegal, Algeria, and Mauritania. This is why the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has taken such a strong stance against the most recent coup in Niger, having recently deployed a standby force for a potential intervention.

The continued proliferation of terror groups across the Sahel is not inevitable, but local, ECOWAS, and western efforts to address it are being further complicated by the actions of the military juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Starting in January, Algeria will sit on the UN Security Council and may be keen to get more involved in the peace process to avoid regional insecurity. The Malian opposition has also expressed its concerns, and some segments of the population are lending support to their views. Despite this, the lack of a holistic strategy and the likely prospect of increased Wagner involvement in Mali does not bode well for the country or the continent as a whole. 

Nigerian Senate Opposes ECOWAS Military Intervention in Post-Coup Niger

The recent coup in Niger led by the head of the presidential guard, General Abdourahmane Tchiani, was met with extensive condemnation, both regionally and internationally. Principally, the Nigeria-led ECOWAS bloc imposed various economic and travel sanctions against Niger to pressure the coup leaders to reinstate democratically-elected President Mohamed Bazoum. The West African organisation also issued a one-week ultimatum to the putschists, which if ignored, would entail a military intervention. ECOWAS claimed the use of force would be a “last resort”.  The bloc aimed to develop a detailed plan for the use of force, including the resources needed and the timing of a possible intervention. Meanwhile, the Nigerian president and head of ECOWAS, Bola Ahmed Tinubu, expressed his support for Bazoum. He declared that “[w]e will stand with our people in our commitment to the rule of law” and signalled Abuja’s “readiness to intervene” in Niger as soon as ECOWAS gave the order. Additionally, Nigeria stopped supplying electricity to Niger - Niger depends on Nigeria for around 70% of its electricity.

Despite these measures, Niger’s coup leader has repeatedly claimed he will not give into pressure to restore President Bazoum. Instead, General Tchiani has proceeded to form his government, naming a 21-member cabinet and appointing a new prime minister, Ali Mahaman Lamine Zeine, to replace Ouhoumoudou Mahamadou. Given the putschists’ steadfastness and Nigeria’s stern response to the coup, calls for a Nigerian-led ECOWAS military intervention were to be expected. Yet, on 6 August, Nigeria’s senate rejected Tinubu’s plan to send forces to Niger. It instead encouraged ECOWAS to pursue “political and diplomatic options” to resolve the crisis in Niger. This will undoubtedly give the military junta a respite.

Why Oppose an ECOWAS Military Intervention in Niger?

Although an ECOWAS-led intervention in Niger may have helped Nigeria boost its regional geopolitical standing and restore political stability in its neighbourhood, the senate’s decision to oppose this measure was not senseless. Several factors may have informed its ruling on 6 August.

Within Nigeria many believe that President Tinubu’s assertiveness abroad constitutes an attempt to distract from domestic problems, and shore up much-needed popularity. Tinubu has been accused of electoral misconduct and has been criticised for his slow response to the country’s economic and security challenges, including the continued Boko Haram attacks across North Eastern Nigeria. Accordingly, the public has been vocal in denouncing Tinubu’s ‘unnecessary’ external interference. The Nigerian senate may have similarly recognised a need to refocus the regime’s attention to domestic issues. Nigeria’s participation in ECOWAS’s planned intervention may have further risked jeopardising relations with Niger, which remains an important partner in the Nigeria-led joint force fighting armed groups in the Lake Chad region.

While the coup leaders cement their hold on power in Niger, the resistance to a potential ECOWAS intervention is growing. Within Niger, the public has widely shown its support for General Tchiani while President Bazoum has found little support on the ground. Although a former Nigerien rebel and politician has recently launched a movement to oppose Tchiani’s coup, this merely constitutes an incipient campaign that will likely be quashed by the military junta. Public rallies have also evidenced Nigerien citizens’ disapproval of the continued French presence in the country, in which many demonstrators openly displayed support for Russia. Although Niger is one of the world’s poorest countries, its military has been trained to fight jihadists by France and the United States, and may thus have the capability to successfully oppose forces deployed by ECOWAS. Importantly, Niger’s troops would not be fighting alone; Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, as well as Algeria, Mauritania, and Benin have expressed their support for Niger’s new leaders in the midst of a possible ECOWAS intervention. Mali and Burkina Faso have gone further, exclaiming that any attempt to restore Bazoum would be treated as a “declaration of war” against them all. Additional support from private actors like the Wagner Group may also have bolstered Tchiani’s ability to defend against an ECOWAS invasion. ECOWAS’s internal challenges would likely have undermined its prospects for success in Niger, and may have thus pushed the Nigerian Senate to reject ECOWAS’ plans for intervention. 

Analysts have claimed that ECOWAS doesn’t possess the military capacity to launch an operation in Niger. Although the West African bloc intervened in The Gambia in 2017, when former President Yahya Jammeh refused to step down after his electoral loss, the intervention was largely possible because ECOWAS was “invited in by the Banjul government.” ECOWAS also suffers from a lack of coordination in providing security regionally and often fails to align its policies with those of other regional organisations. For example, ECOWAS gave the Niger junta a one-week deadline to reinstate President Bazoum while the African Union issued a 15-day ultimatum. Insufficient trust among ECOWAS members would have further compromised any attempt to mount a strong front against General Tchiani. Lastly, western support may have been necessary to address ECOWAS’ financial and logistical difficulties. The Nigerian Senate’s approval of a western-backed ECOWAS intervention would likely have sparked more protests and resistance in Niger, as well as more divisions within the West African bloc.

An ECOWAS-led intervention would have also carried the risk of further escalation; a mere attempt to restore President Bazoum could have ushered in a war transcending multiple African countries. Even in the best-case scenario, an intervention would have likely compelled ECOWAS troops to remain in the country for a lengthy period. This would strain countries’ military budgets and make “Bazoum look like he is only a president because of foreign armies, and that [would] destroy his legitimacy.”

Lastly, civilians would have likely borne the greatest costs of an ECOWAS military intervention. ECOWAS troops have a suboptimal record when it comes to avoiding collateral damage. Before parliamentary talks on 6 August, Nigerian senators issued a joint statement claiming they would not accept military action in Niger because it could worsen the humanitarian crisis in northern Nigeria. Refugee flows from Niger, which shares a 1,600 kilometre border with Nigeria, would have strained the central government’s capacities.

Looking Ahead: A Multi-Level Strategic Predicament

The Nigerian Senate’s rejection of ECOWAS’s plans for a military intervention presents an important question: What’s next? As the West African bloc struggles to find an alternative solution to the coup in Niger, the implications of the abortive ultimatum and intervention are becoming increasingly evident. ECOWAS’s credibility will undoubtedly take a hit. The West African bloc had been criticised for its poor response to the coups in Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Mali in recent years. The lack of firm retaliation against the Nigerien military junta reiterates this pattern and will further harm ECOWAS’s perceived relevance and effectiveness. ECOWAS’s failure to respond militarily also reveals important cracks in the alliance, as countries scrambled to pick a side between the wealthier pro-democracy states and their military-led counterparts.

The senate’s rejection of ECOWAS’s plans will have grave implications for West African geopolitical stability. First, ECOWAS’s weak response will have a significant impact on how politics will be conducted in the region; it may provide leaders across the region with a ‘green light’ to stage coups or ignore constitutional limits. As such, the use of force may increasingly supersede the rule of law. As a result, democracy in West Africa remains very fragile. Additionally, the lack of military retaliation will open up space for greater Russian presence in Niger and in the wider West African region, at the expense of western influence. In particular, the Wagner group may capitalise on its existing ties in Mali and Burkina Faso to expand its reach into Niger. 

The coup will also likely undermine the efficiency of the western-backed anti-terrorism campaign across the Sahel. Niger has been a key ally and security buffer for western states against al-Qaeda and Islamic State insurgent groups, but the recent coup will likely affect collaboration on counter-terrorism. The new Nigerien leadership will unlikely view the west as a valued partner, but rather as a colonial power. Thousands of French troops were forced to withdraw from Mali and Burkina Faso after their respective coups. As foreign armies retreat, terrorist and armed groups will be able to exploit political instability and uncertainty throughout political transition periods to expand their operations. Islamic extremists may intensify their recruitment exercises and violent campaigns. This occurred in Burkina Faso after its coup last September.

As the putschists continue to strengthen their political authority and support base in Niger, the West African bloc is at a crossroads. Realistically, ECOWAS’s alternatives to resolve the crisis are now largely limited to diplomatic avenues and/or continued sanctions. Both should not be discounted as pathways towards stability. Yet both unfortunately seem to have bleak prospects. On one hand, repeated attempts at negotiations over the past week have yielded little progress. Nigeria may be able to utilise the existing commercial and diplomatic relationship between Nigeria and Niger to pressure the military junta into backing down, but this outcome does not seem probable. Niger’s new leaders retain key leverage, as Bazoum constitutes a valuable bargaining tool. Tchiani is therefore unlikely to surrender. Further, ECOWAS sanctions have thus far had little impact on decisions made by the Nigerien military junta. 

On Tuesday, ECOWAS imposed more sanctions on Niger after General Tchiani denied a joint delegation from West African states, the African Union, and the United Nations permission to enter the country. Yet, the sanctions will unlikely be effective. In both Mali and Burkina Faso, sanctions were lifted soon after they were imposed. Instead, sanctions will likely harm civilians already facing acute poverty and hunger. Sanctions may also prove politically counterproductive; in Mali, the military junta was able to use the “international campaign against Malian sovereignty” to rally people behind it and gain legitimacy.

Niger’s neighbours and the international community are now faced with a critical strategic predicament. Irrespective of ECOWAS’s next strategic move, there is a need for extreme caution. If not properly managed, the coup in Niger may set the stage for similar political disruptions elsewhere, produce deep rifts among African countries, and may eventually be overlooked.

Arms Trafficking in the Sahel

The illicit arms trade is thriving in the Sahel. Arms trafficking in the region serves multiple purposes; arms are a means of making profit, buying protection, and maintaining control over populations and trafficking routes. The region's security remains jeopardised by porous borders and the presence of transnational criminal networks, as well as terrorist and armed groups. This dangerous combination fosters illicit arms trafficking, posing a significant security threat.

The region has experienced a rise in armed actors due in part to the proliferation of illicit arms and the lack of robust state institutions. In fact, some state institutions themselves may be involved in illicit arms trafficking. This has introduced heightened levels of competition and violence in local-level conflicts. The presence of various rebel, separatist, criminal, and violent extremist groups spanning North Africa, the Sahel, and West Africa, along with connections between arms, drugs, and human traffickers, has resulted in the militarisation of traditional trading routes. 

Illicit arms trafficking in West Africa occurs along conventional trafficking and commercial routes and is deeply ingrained within an established system of illegal trade that spans national borders. Numerous trafficking routes, both internal to the region and extending into neighbouring areas, cater to the regional demand for illicit weapons. National stockpiles are a key source of illicit firearms and illegal craft production also contributes to arms proliferation across the region. Particularly significant has been the outflow of weapons from Libyan state stockpiles dating back to the Muammar Gadhafi era, which has served as a crucial source of illicit weapons for sub-Saharan Africa since 2011. Although these flows have decreased after the resumption of civil conflict in Libya in 2014, they still represent a noteworthy source of arms within the region. 

Arms trafficking patterns and actors vary across the region. North of the Niger River trafficking is often more organised than it is to the South. Weak governance and corruption are central to the success of arms trafficking and organised crime in the region. Arms traffickers operate at different levels of sophistication across the region. At the lower level, the majority of individuals engaged in the illicit trade are herders, farmers, gold-mining communities, and migrant smugglers. They typically seek handguns for self-defence purposes. A second tier caters to traffickers and criminal groups who resort to violence to maintain control over smuggling operations and routes. Lastly, specialised traffickers - who are increasingly becoming associated with the drug trade- handle larger shipments of arms.

The illicit trafficking of arms has been tied to state-linked trafficking strategies organised at the highest level of governments. Non-state armed groups are often used as proxies in this process, however, a wide range of actors are involved. Criminal networks with varying levels of organisation, armed groups, tribes, and border communities are all implicated in illicit arms trafficking. As weapons become more readily available and the security situation deteriorates, demand increases. Competition over scarce resources and a desire to protect oneself has created a cycle of violence in which supply creates demand. The presence of firearms in various communities heightens the risk of formerly low-level local conflicts escalating, as traditional weapons and peaceful dispute resolution methods are replaced by modern firearms. Rising insecurity in the region fuels a local demand for firearms, especially easy-to-conceal handguns, for self-protection. The emergence of local self-defence groups, the spread of craft-produced weapons, and the continually increasing market for illicit arms are a clear manifestation of insecurity.

Niger

Niger is predominantly a transit country for arms traffickers. Arms and other illicit goods enter through Northern Niger from Libya’s south-western border and move through millenia-old trans-Sahelian trade routes. Traffickers are able to avoid security forces and international actors by using lesser known routes.  Flows respond to increasing demand for weapons as new conflicts arise across the region. This route is commonly used to transport arms into Mali, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria. One route passes through the Lake Chad region towards Mali, and another through Tillabéri and Tahoua in southern and western Niger. There is also a growing domestic market for illicit arms in Niger as gold-miners have begun to purchase weapons for protection. Climate change and competition for resources in Niger has also created demand for arms within rural communities. Government actors are involved in illicit arms trafficking, playing both direct and indirect roles. Connections between trafficking networks and institutional, political, and security authorities at all levels of the Nigerien government aid in facilitating the movement of illicit arms through the country. 

Mali

Mali acts predominantly as a destination for arms smuggling. Peace and security in the country were seriously undermined by the Arab Spring, during which diverted arms from Libyan stockpiles enabled widespread violent conflict from which the country has never fully recovered. Despite the deployment of two French military operations (2013-2022) and a UN peacekeeping mission, the country remains unstable and the demand for arms strong. Many arms that arrive in the country flow from Libya through Niger and into northern Mali (i.e. the towns of Kidal and Gao). Since the reemergence of high levels of violence in Libya, in 2014, the influx of arms from Libya has decreased. A counterflow of ammunition and weapons back into Libya began as internal demand increased. Arms are also trafficked into Mali through Mauritania. A number of illicit goods are trafficked from coastal West Africa and arms converge at cities on the Senegal River, constituting a major trafficking and smuggling hub. Weapons are trafficked from this hub, through Mauritania and into Foïta where they converge with arms being trafficked from the Western Sahara.

Guinea also serves as a source of weapons flowing into Mali. Guinea’s National Commission for the Fight against the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (CNLPAL) insists that these weapon flows stem from illicit arms still in circulation from the Sierra Leonean and Liberian conflicts in the late 1990s and early 2000s; however, there is evidence of diversion from Guinean army stockpiles. In 2016, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) identified the use of weapons originating from Guinean stockpiles in northern Mali. Some sources estimate that 60–80 per cent of the arms circulating in northern Mali were diverted from national stockpiles.Within Mali, limited state security presence aids the circulation of arms through many parts of the country. There are at least 15 key trafficking hubs within Mali. 

Guinea-Bissau

In Guinea-Bissau, high-ranking military officials have historically supplied the illicit arms market by providing military-grade weapons directly from government stockpiles. Consequently, the country’s largest source of trafficked weapons has been its own military stocks. Although significant flows of arms were trafficked from national stockpiles to separatists in the Casamance region in southern Senegal in the 1990s, this flow has largely stopped. Shotguns now make up the majority of guns trafficked in Guinea Bissau, trafficked by rural populations who use them to hunt, for self-protection, and occasionally for banditry. These weapons are often craft-produced in either Guinea Bissau or neighbouring countries. 

Tri-Border Area

Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and Ghana constitute the tri-border area, and provide several key routes which are used to smuggle both legal and illegal goods between countries, including small amounts of concealed arms transported primarily by motorcycles. Some of these routes include Bondoukou–Bouna–Varalé–Doropo in Burkina Faso's southern region, bypassing Ivorian, Burkinabe, and Malian border posts, as well as 13 small crossing points near Tingréla in Northern Côte d'Ivoire. Additionally, smuggling hubs in Ghana, particularly in the towns of Bawku, Tumu, Hamile, Sampa, and Elubo, play a role in arms trafficking, albeit on a smaller scale compared to other routes.

Ghana and Guinea are both sources of arms and ammunition for small-scale traffickers, particularly for hunting cartridges, hunting rifles, craft weapons, and handguns. In Ghana, cross-border communal ties significantly influence local trafficking dynamics. Communities in North-Western Ghana, such as the Hamile and Tumu, share cultural links and a hybrid Ghanaian–Burkinabe identity with their counterparts in neighbouring Burkina Faso. Similarly, cross-border trade between Sampa in Ghana's Bono region and Bondoukou in Côte d'Ivoire further complicates efforts to identify and intercept trafficked goods, given the substantial movement of goods at the border.

Source: UNODC, 2022

Impacts of Illicit Arms Trafficking

The proliferation of arms has undoubtedly fuelled armed conflict in the region and seriously affected the security situation, especially in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. The arrival and continued growth of jihadist groups in the region has increased demand for heavy weapons. Their presence has also been a driver of demand for lighter and small weapons which rural communities use to protect themselves from such groups. Violence in the region is fuelled by weak governments and security actors who either lack the necessary resources to make a lasting impact on the security situation or, in some cases, seek to exploit the instability for monetary gain. The circulation and trafficking of arms perpetuate a destructive cycle of rising tension and violence. Armed conflicts, combined with governments' inability to protect their citizens, push communities to acquire arms for self-defence, further exacerbating the situation. Therefore, in order to effectively address weapons proliferation, it is crucial to combine efforts supporting economic livelihoods with initiatives aimed at enhancing community security. 

Illicit arms and the instability caused by the violence they foment help to create an environment in which coups are prevalent. Mali, Burkina Faso, and, most recently, Niger have all suffered military takeovers. The consequences for the region are dire. Political chaos is encouraged by the insecurity and violence caused by arms trafficking, among other things. Communities living in the border areas are vulnerable to being exploited by traffickers and other criminal organisations operating in their vicinity. Coups create a dangerous precedent in the region and engender a culture of impunity. With members of the security services involved in the organisation and growth of arms trafficking in the region, military takeovers results in the further institutionalisation of arms trafficking. If this cycle of violence and impunity is not stopped the region will likely continue to descend into chaos. In the worst case scenario, countries like Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger could become entirely ungovernable. Violence may also continue to spread towards the west coast of Africa.

Recommendations

Counter-proliferation measures have been taken to secure, mark, and record weapons in national stockpiles which make them easier to trace. However, weapons tracing efforts in the region could be strengthened further to limit the diversion of weapons from national stockpiles. In order to restrict the number of crossing into neighbouring countries, border guards should be issued enhanced training and equipment to enable them to increase seizures of illicit arms. Regional cooperation is limited in the Sahel for a number of reasons; if it were strengthened and intelligence sharing became commonplace, the flow of illicit arms across porous borders would likely reduce.

Now that MINUSMA has been told to leave the region, the international presence in the Sahel has drastically decreased. Future peacekeeping missions and foreign military operations need to take a more wholesale approach to tackling instability. It will be essential to learn from the successes and shortcomings of previous international missions such as Operation Barkhane or MINUSMA. The UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea Bissau has demonstrated a more overt and strategic focus on countering arms and drug trafficking. Additionally, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has assisted in establishing transnational crime units (TCUs) in Guinea-Bissau to promote cohesive responses to drug trafficking and organised crime, with specific attention to border control and maritime security. 

A more balanced approach to tackling insecurity was launched in Côte d’Ivoire in January 2022. The program's goal is to improve civilians' living conditions by enhancing infrastructure and access to basic social services. It aims to reverse the perception of state abandonment in border communities and reduce vulnerability to exploitation. It focuses on improving education, health, electricity, water access, road maintenance, professional integration, youth employment, and social safety allowances. The program's initial impact has been positive but its true impact remains unclear as the security situation improved before its implementation. Neighbouring states and the international community should watch the implementation of these social programmes closely and assess their success. Cote d’Ivoire’s approach could be used as a framework across the Sahel to tackle insecurity, trafficking, and organised crime. By addressing the vulnerabilities of border communities and restoring their trust in the state, governments in the region could hinder the operations of traffickers.

It will be imperative to take steps to combat social and economic vulnerability, while supporting community mediation programming, good governance, and initiatives against violent extremism. Security sector support should be viewed as one element of a comprehensive approach based on a deeper understanding of the factors driving both the demand for and supply of illicit arms in the region. International, national, regional, and local actors need to recognise the importance of tackling the roots of arms proliferation in the Sahel. By taking cohesive and concerted actions to address community issues, these actors could contribute to promoting stability, security, and, eventually, prosperity in the Sahel region. 

Coup in Niger Likely to Further Destabilise the Sahel

On the night of the 26 July and into the following morning, the Niger’s presidential guard, led by General Abdourahmane Tchiani, captured and detained President Mohamed Bazoum, declaring control of the country through a coup d’etat. The military junta set up the ‘National Council for the Salvation of the Homeland’ (CNSP), simultaneously suspending the existing constitution and installing a curfew and closing country borders. Officials have presented the past government’s inability to protect citizens from the threat of terrorist violence as a justification for the coup. This seems to be at least partially true, as reports show that the government has underestimated the security threat presented by Boko Haram in the south and armed groups with links to ISIL and al-Qaeda in the west. Additionally, there have been recent internal divisions between the presidential guard and the military, which is likely to have further pushed General Tchiani towards rebellion. After the coup was announced, protesters gathered in the capital, showcasing support for Bazoum. Estimates suggest the presence of hundreds of people, however, the crowd’s advances towards the presidential palace were met with a stern reaction from the presidential guard, which dispersed the protests through warning shots. 

African leaders have been seeking a peaceful resolution. Both the African Union (AU) as well as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) - Niger being a member of both - have been vocal in condemning the coup in an attempt to reestablish stability. Benin’s president, Patrice Talon, has personally flown to Niger in order to evaluate the situation. Now both the AU and ECOWAS have given the new military leadership strict deadlines to cede power, reinstall Bazoum as head of state, and restore constitutional order under the threat of sanctions. ECOWAS has gone a step further in not ruling out the use of force if the new authorities refuse to cooperate.

Growth of ‘Coup belt’ weakens region, strengthens paramilitary groups 

The coup in Niger bodes poorly for western influence in the region. Niger has been called the “west’s only hope” in the Sahel region as it acted as a rare ally in the region under Bazoum. Both the EU and the US have been dedicating substantial financial resources to keep Niger secure and fit to combat the activities of regional paramilitary and terrorist groups, while also managing irregular migration from the sub-Saharan region. Revolts in Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Sudan have created a wave of coups in the region, where predominantly pro-western leaders have been repeatedly replaced by heavy handed military juntas.

After a military takeover in Mali, the new anti-western regime expelled all French military staff from within its borders. Consequently, French troops relocated to Niger which served as a regional hub for western resources and troops fighting armed groups in the region. With Niger’s new military junta at the helm, the ‘coup belt’ grows and further reinforces instability in the Sahel. Without a strong and legitimately recognised leadership, groups like Boko Haram and networks of al-Qaeda and ISIL could potentially grow in strength and further weaken an already weak state.

Western woes mean opportunities for Russia

Military governments that lack democratic legitimacy have a tendency to coddle up to non-democratic global powers in order to stay in power and exert control over their territories. Russia, often through the hands of the Wagner group, has been benefiting from this phenomenen in Africa in recent years. Mali has been the most recent example where exiled western troops were replaced by Russian mercenaries. In Niger, Russia has a history of launching destabilising disinformation campaigns, which could indicate that Russia may also be interested in expanding its physical presence in the country.

Niger produces approximately 7% of the world's uranium. Historically, a significant portion of its uranium production has been channelled to France, primarily for use in the nation's nuclear power stations that account for around 70% of French power generation. Notably, France relies heavily on uranium imports, with about three-quarters of its supply coming from just four countries: Kazakhstan, Australia, Niger, and Uzbekistan. However, the dynamics surrounding Niger's uranium trade have been evolving. The country has diversified its customer base, reducing its dependence on traditional buyers like France, and has started selling significant shares of its uranium to customers in Canada and China, with companies from both of these nations operating their own extraction sites within Niger.

Wagner's history of accepting payments in natural resources and particularly valuable raw minerals is no secret. The coup in Niger has raised suspicions regarding Wagner's involvement and the potential objectives of the Russian government. Although information on the scale of alignment between the Wagner group and the Russian government is sparse, Yevgeny Prigozhin's decision to attend a Russia-Africa conference suggests that Wagner is deeply interested in the region. Below are two possible motives for that interest in Niger:

• Uranium for Wagner and Russian Interests: The coup might open up opportunities for Wagner to establish operations in Niger, likely in exchange for access to uranium resources. These uranium reserves could then be transported to Russia for military or civilian purposes or be sold on international markets. This would likely have a significant impact on uranium extraction businesses currently in operation in Niger.

• Disrupting the French Energy Market: Another speculated objective is that the coup may enable Wagner to divert significant amounts of uranium away from the French energy market. This disruption could potentially jeopardise the supply of uranium to France, leading to fluctuations in energy prices. The potential consequences of this disruption include an energy-related cost of living crisis in France, similar to what some European countries have experienced when dependent on Russian gas.

Given the geopolitical implications and potential economic repercussions, it is imperative for the international community to closely monitor the situation in Niger and collaborate to ensure stability, transparency, and accountability in the region's natural resource trade. Additionally, addressing concerns regarding Wagner's activities and their potential impact on global security and energy markets should be a priority for relevant international organisations and nations.

Too early to declare coup successful

The reason behind the exact timing of the rebellion remains unclear. The most probable scenario is that General Tchiani, who was installed as commander of Niger’s presidential guard by Bazoum’s predecessor, had been dismissed from office days prior to the coup and spearheaded the rebellion in an attempt to remain in power. Tchiani has declared himself the leader, however, it remains unclear exactly how much backing he retains within the militaty and business establishment. A financially sanctioned presidential guard with limited support from the military and civil society may eventually find itself in a weak and vulnerable position.

Conclusion

Once the current fluid situation becomes more clear and the structures of power become at least partially reestablished, Niger could become another African state involved in a wider international power struggle. The west, mainly represented in Africa by France diplomatically, and by the US financially, will want to retain Niger as a security buffer against military insurgent groups in the region. However, Wagner will aim to add Niger to its growing list of allies in the West African region.

Although Bazoum had a history of restricting democratic freedoms and was ultimately unable to ensure security across the country, his rule did see an increase in per capita income, improvement in humanitarian indicators, and at least partially competent inflation management. Conversely, frequent military coups in other countries have led to visible regressions in most of these areas, and it is difficult to find reasons why Niger will become an exception. If Tchiani is successful in securing his position as the new leader, Niger’s fate could closely resemble that of Mali, which has been characterised by worsening cases of violence against civilians, constitutional impasse, increasing Wagner activities, and the rise of militant groups.

The Expansion of the ADF in East Africa

On 16 June, eight people were kidnapped and 41 were killed in an attack on a school in Mpondwe, a small village in Western Uganda located in a mountainous region that borders the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces (UPDF) attributed the responsibility for the attack to the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), an Islamist rebel group active in the eastern provinces of DRC since the late 1990s. The group initially operated in Uganda, as it emerged as a force against President Museveni, but was then pushed into DRC after Ugandan forces conducted military operations against it. The attack occurred late at night, when around 20 attackers set fire to school dormitories and assaulted students, all between the ages of 13 and 18, with machetes and firearms. According to the UPDF, the attackers fled into the DRC towards the Virunga National Park. On 20 June, the UPDF announced that they rescued three of the kidnapped. Two ADF rebels were killed during the resulting firefight.

The day prior to the rescue, 20 people were arrested by the Ugandan security forces for cooperating with the ADF in planning the attack. In the aftermath of the attack, the commander of the UPDF announced that the assailants' efforts were supported by local residents, who showed them around the village before the massacre. A witness declared that they heard one of the attackers shout “Allahu Akbar” and “we have succeeded in destabilising Museveni's country." 

The education minister and first lady Janet Museveni commented on the attack, suggesting that there was a conflict between residents in Kasese, the district where Mpondwe is located, and the Partnerships for Opportunity Development Association (PODA), a Canadian NGO. The NGO built the school and currently retains control over its administration - part of the local population wants to administer the school themselves, which had led to increasing tensions before the attack. According to Janet Museveni, auditors from the PODA inspected the structure the day before the attack. It remains unclear whether these tensions played a role in the school massacre.

ADF militants are not novices at targeting children. The ADF targets schools for recruitment and propaganda purposes. In most cases, attacks on schools and facilities that host children result in kidnappings. This allows the ADF to sustain its recruiting effort through the forceful assimilation of young people in its ranks. The use of children is advantageous to the group in several ways. Kids are considered more manipulable and therefore more obedient, but more importantly, they have less monetary and social ambition than adult fighters. This makes them a mostly-inexpensive and easily expendable force in an insurgent campaign. 

This was not the case in the Mpondwe school massacre, suggesting the group is more concerned with large-scale attacks that draw publicity. Children are regarded as the most vulnerable component of every society; thus, attacks in which many are killed have a strong media impact. These incidents make government authorities appear incapable of protecting vulnerable populations. As a result, this fuels ADF propaganda, portraying state institutions as inept and corrupt, which further stirs resentment among the population towards these institutions.

The United States and the UN sanctioned the ADF in 2014 for terrorist activities, including the targeting of minors. The group was condemned by the US Department of Treasury "for targeting children in situations of armed conflict, including through killing, rape, abduction and forced displacement." The Ugandan army leadership said the attack aimed to divert the focus of the Ugandan forces from the fight against the ADF in the DRC, where the UPDF are operating following an agreement with Kinshasa to counter the group’s activities. The attackers, who reportedly crossed the border into Uganda two days before the attack, were allegedly initially planning on targeting a military installation. It is still unclear what led them to change their target if this was the case.

Although the circumstances of the attack are still under investigation, especially relating to the possible local support that the attackers received, this event is indicative of the ADF’s growing presence and activity in the region. After intense repression in Uganda, where the group was founded, it now operates from the forests of the Congolese North Kivu province. In 2019, the Islamic State (IS) recognised the ADF as part of its international network of affiliate groups. Since then, the group has killed more than 4,000 people and is now comprised of around 2,000 members, some of whom were recruited through kidnapping.

The attack in Mpondwe points to an increase in attack capabilities by ADF militants. In November 2021, in a set of coordinated attacks, three ADF members detonated suicide vests in the Ugandan capital of Kampala, killing four people. This event was particularly effective in highlighting the group’s ties with the central authority of IS, as the latter claimed responsibility for the attack and used the footage of it to promote its presence in the region, praising the actions of the ADF.

The financial support provided by the Islamic State is enabling the expansion of the ADF in the DRC’s eastern provinces. The funding is conveyed through a complex scheme running through Somalia and South Africa; the UN documented that IS cells in South Africa are in direct contact with ADF leadership in the DRC. In recent years, the group has relied on the organisational and logistical support offered by the Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'a (ASWJ) militia in Mozambique, which also has direct links to the Islamic State. The expansion of the ADF’s network is likely strengthening the group and enabling it to conduct higher-impact attacks.

Additionally, the group has demonstrated the ability to adapt to Operation Shuja, a joint offensive by the Ugandan and Congolese armed forces. Following an intensification of military operations in North Kivu, ADF militiamen have begun to move into the province of South Kivu (further south) and Ituri (further north) in recent months. This expansion is also part of the group's strategy to pursue territorial gains along the border between Uganda and DRC. According to a United Nations report, the group aims to conduct attacks in the capital Kinshasa and in Haut-Uele province, north of Ituri.

A trend that is becoming more entrenched, as demonstrated by the school attack in Mpondwe, is an increasing targeting of groups and structures that attract media attention. This is reflected in high casualty incidents and the targeting of locations that were not previously considered to be at a high risk of attack. This approach particularly reflects the strategy of the Islamic State, which exploits images and videos of large-scale attacks to attract more recruits.  The self-representation of the ADF as a powerful, expanding group that is able to hit targets inflicting great damage, helps the group in its recruitment campaign, which is accompanied by a Salafist jihadist ideological communication campaign. The influx of foreign fighters from other countries in the region, such as Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Kenya, is exemplary of the success of the group’s recruitment efforts.

In recent years the ADF has been refining its combat tactics, especially from a technological standpoint. Since the group prefers an asymmetric approach in clashes with security forces, there has been an increased use of IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices) and drones. The latter is used for reconnaissance purposes and for collecting footage of combat scenes, which is then employed for propaganda purposes. The drones used are commercially purchasable and are usually manufactured by the Chinese company DJI. The ADF has also perpetrated an increasing number of IED attacks frequently targeting government security forces. The ADF also uses drones to defend key access points to strongholds while initiating ambush-style attacks.

The increasing penetration of the Islamic State in East Africa and the increase in collaboration among affiliated groups represent a growing risk. The Islamic State's propaganda and recruitment platform facilitates the seamless movement of militiamen, financial resources, and know-how between countries and groups, posing significant difficulties for security forces. The lack of cooperation among the states affected constitutes a dangerous flaw in counterinsurgency capabilities in the region. Further, the presence of vast areas with limited governance functions allows groups to more easily adapt, expand, and flourish, as the ADF has done in the Eastern DRC.

The school attack in Mpondwe confirms the vulnerability of Ugandan communities located near the DRC border. Attacks in Uganda allow the ADF to strike targets in Ugandan territory and then immediately return to their strongholds in DRC. The group's recent expansion into Ituri and South Kivu increases the extent of border territories where the group is able to mobilise militiamen and conduct attacks. It is consequently likely that in the short to medium term attacks such as the one on the school will increase in number.

The ADF’s expansion is also facilitated by the security crisis in the DRC's eastern provinces, which is aggravated by the presence of a multiplicity of armed groups. The increase in violence in recent months has resulted in an increase in the flow of refugees crossing the border into Uganda. The ADF is exploiting this uncontrolled movement of people to enter and exit Uganda without being intercepted by Ugandan security forces. In addition, the inability of the two countries' security forces to counter the violence of the ADF and other armed groups is exacerbating the population's resentment towards government authorities. The ADF will likely continue to exploit this resentment on both sides of the border in order to attract recruits and facilitate movement between the two countries.

Blood in the Batteries: Cobalt Mining in the DRC

As technology advances and global demand for sustainable products increases, the resources used to create batteries become more and more desirable. Over the last two decades, the use of cobalt in batteries has increased 26-fold, creating a drastic increase in cobalt mining activity. Many battery manufacturers source their cobalt from mines in third-world countries, where vast mineral wealth is extracted with loose regulations and poor working conditions, allowing for cheap prices. One of the most affected countries is the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), where cobalt miners suffer from extremely poor working conditions and staggeringly low pay, creating an environment where child labour, slavery, and human rights violations are prevalent. 

Powering the New World

Cobalt mining has become one of the main economic activities in the DRC, accounting for around 30% of the country's GDP and 95% of its exports. Cobalt mines in the DRC are responsible for 73% of the global cobalt supply, an industry with a yearly global market value of $9.6 billion. The profitability of this sector has caused rapid expansion throughout the country, facilitated in many cases by a lack of comprehensive regulation. In the past decade, these cobalt mines - and artisanal mines in partcular - have been host to a myriad of human rights violations. Artisanal mines, responsible for 15% of the world's supply of cobalt, are mostly independent and informal mines where miners work under precarious conditions. 

Workers in these mines often lack proper tools, meaning many dig into the earth with their bare hands. Cobalt mines sell to larger companies and, as they are informal in nature, are not governed by the regulations that do exist. These mines are mostly located in rural areas where poverty is rampant, causing the population to depend on mining activities despite low wages and poor working conditions. Bribes is widespread and regulations are rarely enforced, exacerbating the poor working conditions in these mines. Miners are also not provided with any protective gear, causing workers, and especially children, to be exposed to toxic chemicals that cause vomiting, nausea, cardiac issues, and even cancer. Various workers also suffer from infertility, with women present in mines being exposed to an increased risk of birth defects. Reports recount women working in mines with their babies wrapped around their backs and their older children working alongside them in pools of toxic chemicals. The diseases and deaths caused by these conditions are impossible to quantify, as accidents in mines are hardly ever recorded, let alone publicly recognised by the government. A mother of a worker who died in a mining tunnel accident highlighted the indifference toward worker deaths. This mine collapsed in Central DRC in September of 2019 and claimed the lives of 63 workers, yet no company or individual took responsibility for the tragedy. Most information regarding poor working conditions and accidents is anecdotal as mines engage in stringent oversight to prevent reporting; witnesses describe mining areas where secrecy is enforced by security personnel. 

The presence of children in cobalt mines has drawn the most attention internationally. Estimates show that 20% of small-scale artisanal cobalt mines employ child workers as young as three, paying them no more than two dollars per day. Research conducted by Amnesty International and Afrewatch has shown that children in cobalt mines work upwards of 12 hours per day, and are subject to the same poor conditions as adult workers. These children carry out arduous tasks, including hauling heavy metals and materials - with no overhead protection or gear to prevent injury. Much like adult workers, children are exposed to toxic substances and gases, yet they are especially susceptible as these ailments stunt their growth. A witness identified a Chinese-owned mine in Kasulo where children work in environments with radioactive minerals, contracting various diseases as a result. Children in these mines are forced to crawl into small spaces to extract minerals, often resulting in injury and death. 

Various international aid organisations have led initiatives to prohibit the presence of children in these mines. A collaboration between UNICEF and the Global Battery Alliance seeks to reintegrate children who worked in mines into education. Further efforts by UNICEF and RCS Global Group have developed tools to identify child-rights infringements, seeking to develop an efficient protective system for child slaves. Despite the advances provided by these initiatives, child labour is still prevalent in cobalt mines. Children work out of necessity, as their poverty-stricken families are unable to pay for food, clothing, or education. As long as poverty ravages villages near mines, children will be forced to resort to arduous labour to help keep their families afloat. 

Poor mining practices in formal and informal mines alike severely impact the environment. The chemicals created in cobalt mines are toxic and the improper disposal of these substances harms the health of those working in the mines, as well as those living near them. Chemicals from cobalt mines are often disposed of in rivers, polluting water supplies for nearby villages and towns. The contaminated water is often radioactive and contains carcinogens, gravely affecting those reliant on these rivers for drinking water. The river in Lubumbashi, a neighbouring city hosting over 2 million people, has become barren due to these chemical disposals. Various residents have reported a lack of fish in rivers due to the mines’ disposal of acid and waste, along with ailments from exposure to polluted air, including metabolic disorders and tumours. Pollution has spread to other areas, such as the Katapula, a main waterway of the Congo River, that is now littered with toxic metals. The people who use this river as a source of food or drinking water have contracted respiratory disorders and seen an increase in birth defects. The practice of improper disposal also harms crops and impacts soil fertility, leading to decreases in agricultural production and, in turn, food availability. The DRC's agricultural sector already faces setbacks and is unable to meet domestic food demands, meaning further hindrances to production could reduce availability for the 6.7 million food insecure people in the country.

Poor working conditions and improper disposals are prevalent due to the corruption that pervades the cobalt mining sector. In December 2022, Glencore, a Swiss mining company operating in the DRC, paid $180 million to settle claims of corruption, adding to the $1.6 billion in fines they faced due to fraudulent activity. The company has admitted to bribing African nations, namely the DRC. Applying fines and financial sanctions to companies that generate billions in revenue from cobalt mining practices is ineffective and will do little to prevent corruption. Despite the case against Glencore, the vast majority of cobalt-related corruption goes unchecked.

The involvement of international corporations in cobalt mining operations creates difficulties in enforcing regulations. China is one of the most prominent stakeholders in cobalt mining in the DRC. As of 2023, private and state-owned Chinese companies control 80% of all cobalt mining operations in the DRC. China, the largest refined cobalt producer in the world, is heavily invested in obtaining a constant flow of cobalt from the DRC. One of the ways they protect their investments is by supporting the DRC's military in their efforts to protect and monitor cobalt mines. Having influence over military forces and building relationships with military leaders has helped Chinese companies skirt regulations and ensure a constant flow of cheap cobalt. This impunity also extends to other countries, with tech giants in the US successfully dodging accountability for their abusive operations. In 2021, a US judge dismissed the case against Apple, Dell, Microsoft, and Tesla for the deaths of workers in cobalt mines, adding to the list of companies that ignored precarious working conditions in mines and escaped conviction. Of these deaths, many were children; as many as 11 children suffered broken limbs and spines, and five others died due to tunnel collapses or a lack of mine shaft protection. This lack of accountability has enabled mining companies to maintain poor mining infrastructure to reduce costs, causing further deaths.

Departing from Cobalt

The cobalt mining issue has gained international relevance over the past few years, prompting various companies that use cobalt to purchase less. As concerns for environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) increase, many companies are looking into the supply chains of their products to ensure humane and sustainable practices. Apple, the tech company with the second-highest sales revenue in the world, uses cobalt for all the batteries in its products. Their resolve to use 100% recycled cobalt in their products by 2025 would drastically reduce their reliance on cobalt produced in the DRC. While this would help to reduce worker abuses, it would also have a starkly negative economic impact on the Congolese that rely on mining employment to sustain themselves.

Other companies are also opting for cobalt-free battery alternatives in light of the human rights violations in cobalt mines. Many tech giants - including Samsung, Panasonic, and Tesla - have already begun their transition to lithium iron phosphate (LFP) batteries. Apart from having fewer ethical implications, these alternatives are cheaper, providing financial incentives for companies seeking to reduce costs. Tesla has increased the affordability of its products through the use of LFP batteries, and tech companies seeking to provide competitive prices are following in their footsteps. More alternatives to cobalt are in development; nickel is a prime candidate, boasting higher energy density and fewer emissions in its extraction.

Dependency and Withdrawal

Although these initiatives seek to eliminate the negative effects of cobalt mining, a drastic reduction in demand for cobalt could end up causing more harm than good. The combined decrease in demand has caused a 30% fall in cobalt prices as of June, with the possibility of prices dropping further as more companies adhere to ESG initiatives. These price reductions have resulted in reduced incomes for miners in the DRC. Nearly 200,000 people are directly employed by cobalt mines in the DRC, with a million more indirectly dependent on the sector. The loss in revenue and profits will directly affect those already earning low wages in the sector, and will consequently hurt the DRC’s economy, where 62% of the population lives on less than $2.15 a day.

Instead of intentionally reducing demand for cobalt, a source of subsistence for an entire country, companies should push for a remodelling of laws, regulations, and policies that will improve working conditions and reduce the mines’ impact on the environment. These regulations should also consider finding means to reduce foreign influence, in order to reduce corruption, as the tight-knit relationship between the Congolese military and outside actors has provided fertile grounds for bribery and regulatory misconduct. This is a tall task, especially for a region where legislation is rarely passed, let alone enforced. Pressure from international institutions and countries could help accelerate these processes, however, the impact of international efforts is likely to be limited. Restricting trade would directly impact the DRC’s food-insecure population. Pushing for change in mines through economic sanctions, such as embargoes, would also see little success, as the DRC’s main cobalt importer is China, which has so far shown little initiative in improving working conditions in mines. A more viable solution to this issue is to target the companies responsible for mining abuses in the DRC, seeing as the vast majority of cobalt mining operations in the country are privately owned, and incentivize them to improve conditions in their mines. Pushing for accountability in international courts could also be effective in punishing mining companies that do not adhere to regulations, which may incentivise companies to adjust practices to avoid losses in productivity and investment.

The future of cobalt as the metal powering the world is uncertain. Conflicting predictions paint different landscapes in the upcoming years. Despite recent decreases in cobalt demand and prices driven by ESG initiatives, many experts believe that the demand for cobalt will continue to grow as the use of cobalt-based batteries increases. Some estimates show a growing global market for cobalt, with revenues and prices predicted to rise to $19.47 billion by 2030. In this case, the best solution to the pernicious effects of exploitative cobalt mines would be reforms of judicial entities aimed at purveying accountability and the adherence to stricter regulations.

Gradually parting from cobalt mining and switching to other economic activities could help reduce dependence in this sector without aggravating poverty or food insecurity.The government could seek to aid the transition into non-extractive activities by providing subsidies and regulations to incentivise growth in these sectors and create safe employment opportunities for those reliant on cobalt mining. The regions of North and South Kivu, for example, have great agricultural potential for domestic consumption and exports. Although investments in agriculture are already underway, the country’s vast arable land could be further exploited and operations could be developed to provide mine workers throughout the country with alternative and sustainable income sources. Focusing on providing formal employment in this sector is crucial to ensuring safe working conditions, as formal entities are binded by regulation.

The further development of the agricultural and mining sectors, alongside other activities such as foresting, would also require improved infrastructure to transport goods. The construction of roads, rail networks, and other forms of transport could also provide employment to those reliant on extractive activities. This alternative is not attractive to stakeholders in cobalt mines, many of whom have immense power and influence over the DRC. The government itself is investing in cobalt mining and continues to increase its involvement in the sector, meaning a full transition into non-extractive sectors in the near future is unlikely. The Congolese government could, however, consider undertaking the development of alternative industries in parallel to the development of cobalt mining activities.

Given the uncertainty around the future of cobalt, the DRC should consider a hybrid approach. Judicial reforms and stricter regulations will help Congolese citizens in any case. Further development of the mining sector without providing alternative employment opportunities would cause the country and its population to become increasingly dependent on cobalt. Although it remains unlikely due to global demand fuelled by tech advances, if ESG initiatives prevail before the DRC has properly addressed the concerns surrounding its mining industry, causing demand for cobalt to dwindle, millions of people will fall deeper into poverty. However, in a more likely scenario, the demand for cobalt will continue to increase throughout the foreseeable future; in this case, should the concerns around Congolese mines not be addressed, more and more Congolese will fall victim to abuses in the mining sector.

Scholz’s Visit to East Africa

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz arrived in East Africa on 4 May for a trip split between Ethiopia and Kenya, two of the region’s most influential actors, to discuss future environmental and political cooperation. The chancellor described the visit as preparation for a “multi-polar world.” Scholz’s recognition of the world’s increasingly complex international order has motivated a growing number of nations to develop relations with East African countries that are expected to grow in political and economic significance in the long-term. Germany’s decision to increase cooperation with East Africa follows a trend of major international actors dedicating infrastructure investment to a growing region facing economic headwinds. 

On the first leg of Scholz’s visit, in Ethiopia, he supported calls for the African Union to be represented at the G20. Germany has joined a growing list of G20 nations including China, France, and the United States, in advocating for more African representation in the G20. Only one African nation, South Africa, is currently a member. Representation in international organisations would act as a significant step towards fulfilling a “partnership of equals,” something much of the continent has been pleading for. Scholz recognised that a seat at the table allows for a “louder African voice” in the world, which may elevate African concerns on issues that may otherwise be ignored. 

During the second leg of Scholz’s visit, in Kenya, he pledged to provide $215 million to expand the Olkaria geothermal power plant in Nakuru. This investment into Kenya’s power grid provides a boost to Kenya’s ambitions of constructing a reliable and renewable electricity grid. Kenyan President William Ruto aims for the country to become fossil fuel free by 2030 - the country already satisfies 90 per cent of its energy needs via renewable sources. The transition to renewable energy has occurred fastest in Africa where levels of fossil fuel dependency are lower. Yet, advancements in renewable energy on the continent have not significantly negated Africa’s energy vulnerability during international crises. Approximately 43 per cent of Africa’s population remains without electricity. The lack of energy security which persists within the region remains a limitation to economic growth (For more detail on this topic check out our African Energy Crisis Report). 

At COP27 in November 2022, President Ruto advocated for ‘loss and damage’ relief funds, an initiative to mitigate the consequences of climate change for nations who are exposed to its worst consequences. Loss and damage funds proved a difficult topic of negotiation at COP27, exposing African frustration with the international system. Ruto held that delays in establishing the funds were “cruel and unjust” while former Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari had written to COP27 asserting; “don’t tell Africans they can't use their own resources.” Africa in total produces six per cent of global fossil fuels yet it faces disproportionately large climatic events. Berlin announced they would support the loss and damage scheme, with a contribution of $185 million. Scholz’s recent visit to Kenya, enhancing green technology cooperation with Ruto, embodied the “rise to the challenge” which Ruto petitioned for at COP27. Scholz’s support for environmental initiatives in Africa underlines Germany’s commitment to environmental action on the continent.

Scholz’s visit to the continent was his second in only 17 months in office. On the first visit in May 2022, he toured Senegal, Niger, and South Africa, focusing on private investment into sustainable energy production and the war in Ukraine. Scholz’s first visit to Africa was significant in timing. Both before and after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, NATO member states have criticised Germany for failing to uphold NATO’s defence spending commitment and for hesitating to ship arms to Ukraine. Scholz’s widening of Germany’s diplomatic reach to include African nations furthers their commitment to multilateralism amid the Ukraine war, which has strained western relations with Africa.

While bilateral agreements have produced positive outcomes for African nations with German cooperation, Ruto’s frustration with the international system during COP27 has driven calls for the creation of a New Energy Pact at the African Climate Action Summit for September 2023 in Nairobi. Ruto’s claim that Africans were being “mistreated” during international conferences by non-African nations has inspired a pan-African response, where African problems are resolved by African solutions. The agenda of September’s Climate Action Summit includes: Energy systems, infrastructure, environment, and human development – important concerns in the midst of a cost of living crisis which has sparked demonstrations continent-wide. Ahead of COP28 in Dubai, Ruto’s focus on the African summit highlights the shift toward intra-African multilateralism, which may result in more constructive conversations between nations who understand Africa’s unique environmental challenges.

Ethiopia and Kenya are important nations in African affairs. The headquarters of the African Union is based in Addis Ababa and the regional office of the United Nations is based in Nairobi. This heightens the diplomatic status of both nations and has resulted in closer scrutiny of their economic management, which has drawn concern from Berlin. Loans used for infrastructure development have deepend concerns over the future economic stability of the region. Kenya, despite being at high risk of debt distress, has recently stabilised their debt load by maintaining resilient growth rates and cutting the budget deficit. According to IMF managing director Kristalina Georgieva, Kenya is “definitely” not among sub-Saharan nations at an increasing risk of default. Though both nations were negatively affected by Covid-19, drought, and the Ukraine War, Ethiopia has faced additional economic pressure due to the two-year civil conflict in Northern Tigray. Coupled with the IMF projection that Ethiopia and Kenya will become the third and fourth largest sub-Saharan economies on the continent, capitalising on their increased productivity is of growing importance to foreign governments and multinational firms.

Despite Kenya and Ethiopia’s current growth challenges, it is likely that their governments will position themselves as crucial actors in the fight against climate change. Africa holds 40 per cent of the world’s total cobalt, manganese, and platinum, minerals essential for green technology. Utilising the continent’s material wealth allows its population to develop domestic industry and improve energy security. Insecure and inefficient access to energy has frustrated the development of key industries in Africa, increasing dependence on imports. Sub-Saharan Africa currently spends 26 per cent of GDP on the imports of goods and services. A regional focus on improving energy security would involve improved regulation, which left unresolved, may negate Africa’s material advantage. 

Scholz and Ruto’s common interest in the advancement of green technologies depends on levels of energy efficiency. Introducing building codes and efficiency standards which limit the use of inefficient appliances would contribute to a roughly 30 per cent fall in energy demand by 2030. Reducing total energy demand through improved efficiency would reduce energy imports and household expenditures, allowing more funds to be injected into home-grown infrastructure projects. Ruto’s ambition of making Africa the “clean, green factory of the world” centres on regional infrastructure projects which Germany has already invested in. With the African agenda increasingly focused on climate change, domestic technology development may allow Africa’s export volume to grow, relieving wider European and Asian dependency on Russian energy amid the war in Ukraine.

The Influence of China’s Belt & Road Initiative on Kenya’s Economic Development

Africa’s economic development in the 20th and 21st centuries has been heavily influenced by foreign investment, most notably from the US, France, the UK, and China. Despite becoming involved in the 1980s, China did not become a significant investor until the beginning of the 2000s. The annual rate of Chinese compound investment in Africa increased by 18% per annum from 2004 to 2016 and peaked in 2015 at $55 billion. According to scholarly data, a 1% increase in foreign direct investment has equated to a 0.138% increase in economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa, meaning that economic growth in African countries can be partially attributed to foreign investments and international projects. Such projects are vital for the development of African infrastructure, namely roads, rail networks, and dams. However, these investments come at a cost, with around 12% of the continental debt burden being owed to China and Chinese lenders. In some cases, debt payments have the potential to overshadow the benefits of international investment. Some countries, including China, are using financial leverage in Africa to win political favours and gain an economic foothold on the continent. 

China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Kenya

As of March 2020, 138 countries have signed cooperation agreements for the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which aims to facilitate connectivity and international trade, as well as boost financial integration. Between 2013 and 2019, sub-Saharan Africa received around 22% of all BRI related investments, which amounted to approximately $160.6 billion. Kenya has the largest economy in East Africa and is a major regional transportation hub, which is largely why it has become a major benefactor of BRI investments. Various ‘mega projects’, such as the construction of the Nairobi Expressway, the upgrade of the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR), and the formation of the Eldoret Special Economic Zone (ESEZ), which is part of the African Economic Zone project, have all been developed in close cooperation with China as part of the BRI. The expressway and the SGR upgrade are aimed at improving the transportation infrastructure linking Nairobi to key hubs in the country to boost trade and social mobility. The purpose of the ESEZ is to increase levels of technological development and attract manufacturing and service companies. 

Both the Nairobi Expressway and the SGR were contracted to the China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC). The expressway started trial operations in 2022 and is currently managed by Moja Expressway Company, another Chinese firm. Totalling 27km, the toll road was designed to ease city traffic and provide access to the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport. Since the trial operation in 2022, around 50,000 motorists have been using the road daily. However, because the CRBC’s government contract states the corporation will collect all proceedings for the first 27 years, the proceeds from the expressway will go to CRBC instead of the Kenyan government. As of February 2023, 10 million motorists had used the road and CRBC had collected around $14,396,538. The SGR, which is designed to connect the port in Mombasa to Uganda, is also predominantly financed by China. This new fast rail link project is designed to increase domestic and international trade and promote international cooperation, but is far from completion. While the Kenyan government has already spent $5 billion to upgrade the SGR, mostly financed by China, it still requires an additional $3.7 billion to finish the project. 

Kenya also accepted strict terms on their Chinese loans. The government borrowed $1.6 billion from China for the construction of the Nairobi-Naivasha portion of the rail network at a 2% annual interest rate, and signed an agreement that states that 42% of all revenues will be used to repay the loan. The agreement also stipulates that Kenya needs to approach China first if it wants to purchase any goods with the proceeds from the rail network. Such terms force Kenya into economically unviable decisions, of which China is the only beneficiary. If the SGR is not profitable, Kenya has to repay its debt to China, and if the SGR is profitable, Kenya has to repay its debt and purchase Chinese goods with the rail proceeds. Onerous contracts are incentivising Kenya to seek alternative funding from Europe to finalise the construction of the railway. Being unable to finance the construction of new tracks, the government decided to upgrade part of a 120-year-old track to Melba for $400 million, which was originally constructed by the British in the 19th century. With no additional funding, the country will not be able to finalise the construction of the SGR, which could impact its long-term profitability and consequently prevent Kenya from meeting its debt obligations in the future.

Kenya signed an agreement worth 200 billion Kenyan shilling with China for its Special Economic Zone project in Eldoret. The town is projected to become a major industrial hub, promoting technological innovation and attracting manufacturing and service companies. Kenya contracted the project to Guangdong New South Group Ltd. Five years since the project’s initiation, no progress has been made. From the beginning, water shortages and lack of road access halted progress, and whilst the government predicts that construction will finish within 10 years, the project’s profitability remains uncertain. The official website indicates that only one manufacturer signed a non-legally binding memorandum of understanding, and no additional companies have confirmed that they will operate in the SEZ. The details of the project’s financing remain opaque; however, the Kenyan Finance Act of 2022 might be an indication that the government intends to pay its debts through the Kenyan taxpayer rather than through project proceeds. 

Is China ‘Debt-Trapping’ Kenya?  

These Kenyan mega projects play a vital role in stimulating the domestic economy. Kenya estimates the projects will create thousands of new jobs. For example, the construction of the SGR created around 30,000 new employment opportunities, whilst the construction of the ESEZ added around 40,000. According to the Kenyan Investment Authority, Kenyans make up 95% of the workforce within 106 Chinese companies operating in the country. As of 2014, foreign contractors were also mandated to subcontract a third of their projects to Kenyan companies; however, Chinese companies often failed to meet this requirement. 

Kenya predicts that the successful completion of all projects will contribute to the diversification of the country’s economy. Despite the projects’ faults, the ESEZ attracted the world’s largest silk producer. If the agreement comes to fruition, the company will set up silk production facilities, in addition to contracting around 8,000 hectares of surrounding land for the production of mulberry leaves. The manufacturer is predicted to create a further 300,000 jobs. Economic cooperation with China can also attract Chinese investments in manufacturing plants, which would promote Kenyan exports and help diversify its economy. Currently, Kenya’s economy is reliant on agricultural production. Because Kenya has trade agreements with the US, the UK, and the European Union, augmenting Kenyan manufacturing would provide additional trade opportunities.

However, many of the projects remain economically dubious. The most significant issue is that new employment opportunities created by Chinese contractors are low paying. In addition, as Chinese companies fail to sub-contract Kenyan firms, local businesses miss out on lucrative infrastructure projects. Kenyan companies received only 0.9% of the 1.31 billion shillings for a road construction project from Kisumu to Mamboleo. Another difficulty is that the projects must be successful for Kenya to economically benefit in the long-term. The current state of the SGR indicates that projects may fail as the railway currently operates at a loss. Within three years, the SGR lost around $200 million mostly due to truck transportation, which is more efficient in Kenya. Kenya might have to look for alternative sources of financing to complete its projects and pay its debts to China, which might demand payment in other forms, such as natural resources, if the projects remain unprofitable. This is further worsened by the fact that Kenya’s debt is already substantial. In 2019, Kenya’s public debt was 55.5% of GDP. In 2022, due to mounting economic pressures, China began to request repayments. It also fined Kenya around $11 million for defaulting on one of its SGR payments. China’s ownership of a substantial part of Kenya’s national debt gives them leverage over Kenya, which is required to repay its debt in full regardless of the profitability of the projects. 

Consequences for China and the World

Economically, investments in Africa are beneficial for China. By providing loans for projects in various countries, China can secure trade agreements with its borrowers and assure a continuous stream of goods. In the case of Kenya, Chinese companies were not only chosen as contractors for the projects. All required materials were also sourced from China, increasing the revenues of Chinese companies. For instance, all locomotives and freight wagons for the SGR upgrade were purchased from Chinese companies. In addition to collecting financial proceeds, China also collects produced goods. Angola repays its Chinese loans in oil - in 2020, Angola exported 61% of its oil to China. This is an indication that debt ownership provides China with economic influence over African countries. 

China’s dominance in Africa can also manifest politically. Africa is a major voting power internationally; by providing economic support to African countries, China can secure African votes in its favour. A study in 2022 by the Foreign Policy Research Institute determined that $1 billion invested in Africa equates to around an 8% increase in political alignment with China based on “ideal points,” which is a metric constructed from the United Nations General Assembly voting data, indicating national voting preferences. The same study determined that as political alignment with China increases, political alignment with the US decreases by an average of 1.3% for every $1 billion invested between the years 2008 and 2012. 

There is evidence of pro-Chinese alignment and anti-US sentiments in certain African countries. Like China, many African countries have maintained a neutral stance with respect to the ongoing war in Ukraine, and together have pressured Russia and Ukraine to end the conflict. Simultaneously, many African countries criticise US hegemony and advocate for a multinational global order facilitated by a shift in the balance of power. In the past, African nations have also supported China in its domestic issues. In 2020, around 25 African countries supported Chinese suppression of the Hong Kong protests. In return for supporting China’s domestic policies, African nations not only hope to receive further economic aid and investment, but also legitimacy and political recognition. This is especially the case for nations that the West would consider undemocratic or abusive - undemocratic leaders laud China for not intervening in their domestic affairs. China’s rise in Africa could also increase its global influence. As China continues to win political support from Africa because of its economic influence over the region, China could dominate key resource sectors (as in Angola) and influence the global resource market through both trade and production. 

‘debt-trapping’ is in action that is hard to define, but there is evidence which indicates that China benefits from its economic sway over the region. Kenya owes billions to China and has signed agreements which gift most of the projects’ proceeds to the country over more than two decades. China benefits regardless of the success of the projects, as it receives debt repayments and political support. The growing importance of the African continent on the international stage will likely continue to incentivise other nations to invest in Africa, as well as to engage in mutually beneficial partnerships with African countries.

Over the last year, the United States Government, through a number of state linked development finance entities, has drastically increased levels of concessional financing to African countries, as Chinese investment in Africa has dwindled amid a domestic economic crisis and frustration derived from unprofitable projects on the continent. As the US and western partners are likely to maintain higher levels of development financing over the long-term to abate Chinese influence, western and African companies operating on the continent stand to benefit, particularly in countries with strong governance frameworks. These opportunities, especially if met with increased levels of FDI, will likely be particularly fruitful in the fields of trade logistics, mineral and resource extraction, healthcare, contracting, renewables, agriculture, and manufacturing.