The End of MINUSMA: An Uncertain Future for Mali’s Security
On 16 June, the Malian transitional government asked the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to terminate all activity in the country. The UN mission, currently comprised of 15,000 personnel, had been involved in Mali as a peacekeeping force since 2013. Its aim was to help facilitate peace amidst a war in 2012 between the Malian government and armed separatist groups in Northern Mali; Tuareg separatist groups were demanding the independence of a region they call ‘Azawad.’ In accordance with the Malian government’s decision, the UN Security Council voted to conclude its operations and progressively withdraw its personnel, a process that will likely be completed before the end of this year. The transitional government’s decision was not completely unforeseen; the military junta had begun to make changes in the actors and methods employed in combating terrorism since it claimed power in 2021. The countries involved in the MINUSMA operation were concerned by this decision, taken by a government which is still largely struggling to maintain peace and abate the threat of advancing terror groups. The presence of Wagner troops is another source of anxiety for the West, as the group’s deployment represents a further extension of Russian influence on African soil and could be detrimental to peace and security in the country.
The Malian Foreign Minister, Abdoulaye Diop, justified his government’s decision by highlighting MINUSMA's failure to resolve the security crisis in Mali after 10 years of engagement. He also claimed that the mission’s reporting of human rights violations fostered distrust towards the government and fuelled communal tensions. The UN published a report in May 2023 accusing - through a well-evidenced investigation - the Malian Army and foreign mercenaries of killing 500 civilians during a counterterrorist operation in Moura a year prior. This accusation contributed to the deepening of tensions between the UN and the Malian government. In response, Mali announced the opening of an investigation against the multilateral organisation for “espionage, undermining the external security of the state” and “military conspiracy.” This decision follows a general shift in the country’s security strategy undertaken by the transitional government.
Since 2019, Russia has been actively engaged in a propaganda campaign in Mali that has effectively swayed public opinion. Russia has deployed paid and non-paid activists and influencers, multimedia platforms, and bot accounts on social media platforms to successfully win over hearts and minds in Mali. According to Jean le Roux of the Atlantic Council, Russia coerces communities “through the influence of these talking heads,” referring to local activists. Many of these disinformation efforts are being directly carried out by the Internet Research Agency, a bot farm financed by Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of the Wagner Group (now deceased). A 2023 study revealed that over 90% of Malians now trust Russia as a partner. Although the study lacks significant feedback from rural populations, it effectively paints a picture of public opinion. A similar pattern is emerging across the Sahel, particularly in Niger and Burkina Faso, who find themselves in similar security dilemmas.
A week before Mali’s decision, Malian President Assimi Goïta and Vladimir Putin had a phone conversation, likely discussing the MINUSMA mandate. According to Jean-Hervé Jezequel and Ibrahim Maiga of the Crisis Group, Russian diplomats have also attempted to limit MINUSMA’s withdrawal budget under the threat of blocking funding for other peacekeeping missions around the world. They were likely hoping to create a disorderly withdrawal that would augment the perception that MINUSMA was a failed mission, and during which the UN would have to abandon material that the Malian army and Wagner could retrieve.
Moscow has a lot to gain from the UN mission’s retreat. Putin is benefitting from countering western influence across the continent, whilst Wagner has found in Africa a great source of natural resources, as well as a space to strategically redeploy its troops after the Russian insurrection. However, for Mali, the advantages of MINUSMA’s withdrawal are less evident than its dangers. The termination of the international mission poses great risks for the country’s security, most notably for the northern regions where most of the UN bases were located. Although MINUSMA did not have a military mandate, the presence of peacekeepers in urban centres helped to reduce the influence of terror groups. In MISUMA’s absence, these groups may now consider cities to be easier targets. In addition, MINUSMA’s departure risks increasing tensions between the signatory groups of the Alger Peace Accords and the government, and could challenge the current state of territorial unity in Mali.
The Alger Accords, signed in 2015 between separatist groups and the government, established a system of decentralisation, the creation of a common army, and specific development measures for the northern regions. Few of the agreed reforms had been implemented since its signing, but MINUSMA’s departure makes it even less likely to be upheld. The UN mission not only provided government representatives and humanitarian missions with secure access to the country’s north, but also invested in stabilisation projects which created thousands of jobs for the local population. The deterioration of security in certain areas, hindering access to many of these regions, and the loss of economic opportunities accompanied by the current government’s failure to offer economic incentives to leave armed groups, are signals that the security situation is likely to continue to worsen. The Malian government signed the Algiers Peace Agreement from a position of weakness, but has been able to develop its army during the eight years since its signing. The authorities will now likely favour a solely military solution over investing in peace and economic development.
Imperfect efforts that combine security and development initiatives continue to see success in the Ivory Coast and the Lake Chad Basin Area; combatants were provided with incentives - such as amnesty, job training, and more - to leave extremist groups. In the Ivory Coast, the government coupled these programs with efforts to invest in infrastructure and public services in affected regions. In both cases, membership in extremist groups fell following the implementation of these initiatives. The Malian Junta’s security focused approach is unlikely to be successful, as it is likely to merely drive more Malians into extremist groups to protect and provide for themselves and their families. This is especially relevant in Mali given the human rights abuses frequently committed by the army and the Wagner Group.
If the Malian government continues to respond to the terrorist threat and inter-communal conflict by sending Wagner troops alongside the Malian military, who has also accumulated a grim record of human rights abuses, levels of violence and conflict are likely to worsen. Wagner has been active in Mali since at least December 2022, playing an active role in security provision in Central and Northern Mali. In doing so, the group has killed thousands of Malians. It is not clear how many were members of armed or extremist groups. Since 2020, after the first of two military coups, deaths from armed violence have more than doubled. Almost all of these deaths can be attributed to extremist violence and the security response to it. Terror groups across the Sahel, including in Mali, are targeting civilians more frequently in 2023 than in years past.
In West Africa, where security challenges often transcend national borders, this poses a serious threat to Mali’s neighbours. Over the last several years, jihadists have streamed across the Malian border with Burkina Faso, where armed and extremist groups control almost half of the country’s territory. If the Malian Government fails to take a more holistic approach to addressing extremism, extremists within Mali may begin to pose a serious threat to the Ivory Coast, Niger (where a military junta has just overthrown a government with an effective policy track record on extremism), and even Guinea, Senegal, Algeria, and Mauritania. This is why the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has taken such a strong stance against the most recent coup in Niger, having recently deployed a standby force for a potential intervention.
The continued proliferation of terror groups across the Sahel is not inevitable, but local, ECOWAS, and western efforts to address it are being further complicated by the actions of the military juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Starting in January, Algeria will sit on the UN Security Council and may be keen to get more involved in the peace process to avoid regional insecurity. The Malian opposition has also expressed its concerns, and some segments of the population are lending support to their views. Despite this, the lack of a holistic strategy and the likely prospect of increased Wagner involvement in Mali does not bode well for the country or the continent as a whole.
The Zambian President Visits Paris
On 10 May, Zambian President Hakainde Hichilema flew to Paris to meet Emmanuel Macron and discuss future cooperation between the two countries. Hichilema asked his French counterpart to advocate for a faster restructuring of Zambian debt to the Paris Club of Creditors Committee and the G20. This represents the latest effort by the former Chief Executive Officer of both Coopers Lybrand Zambia and Grant Thornton Zambia to drive Zambia past its debt problems and towards long-overdue social and political reforms. Hichilema said that the country needs to “close this long overdue debt restructuring, put it to bed, and release resources and time and attention to the development side of our agenda.”
Zambia became the first African nation to default on its financial commitments in 2020 as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. Before 2020, Zambia had borrowed heavily and owed an estimated $17.3 billion to its creditors. The country’s already fragile economic situation deteriorated as the global pandemic caused a decline in export earnings, remittances, and tourism revenues. As Zambia became unable to pay a coupon on one of its Eurobonds, consequently sparking cross-defaults on its other pending Eurobonds, its credit rating was downgraded to default by major credit rating agencies.
Since then, the Zambian government has attempted to negotiate with its creditors to find a solution to the sovereign debt crisis. In February 2022, Hichilema successfully negotiated a three-year extended credit facility of $1.3 billion with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This financial package was accompanied by an economic reform plan for Zambia, including measures to stabilise the macroeconomic situation, reinforce the country’s eroded rule of law, and improve debt management. The first tranche of financial help is scheduled to be distributed soon, according to an IMF announcement made on 5 May, and is anticipated to provide the Zambian economy with a much needed boost. At the end of April, Lusaka also sent a debt-restructuring proposal to its government creditors.
Managing the country’s debt crisis is the first step in Hichilema’s comprehensive plan to reform the country. The Zambian President was elected on a promise to revamp the nation’s healthcare and agriculture systems whilst taking measures to combat entrenched corruption. Hichilema aims to move the copper-rich country past its over-reliance on primary resource extraction and towards a more diversified economy, thereby improving the lives of the 20 million Zambians living in poverty.
The Zambian President is pursuing this ambitious program through a well-designed network of economic partnerships, both with western countries and Chinese investors. The west sees potential in Zambia as a strong democratic ally in Southern Africa. Hichilema’s visit to France demonstrates and further solidifies his commitment to partnering with the west to restructure his country’s debt. Zambia notably signalled its amicability when it voted with the United Nations (UN) against the Russian invasion of Ukraine, contrary to its neighbours Zimbabwe and South Africa, who abstained from the vote. Although some of his critics have accused him of pursuing a neo-colonialist relationship with European powers, Hichilema has emphasised that he is seeking a partnership of mutual interest.
The Zambian President has also engaged with China through balanced diplomacy and has taken a strong but friendly stance to reinforce the great power’s investment in the country. In an interview for the Chinese media channel CGTN, Hichilema stated that “China and Zambia’s working relationship, strategic working relationship is so cardinal to the achievement of our own objectives, our own developmental agenda to better the lives of the people of Zambia. And obviously, we believe this is also mutual.” According to the Chinese, Hichilema had a phone conversation with Chinese President Xi Jinping in May 2022 and decided on the creation of the first China-Zambia investment forum, which was held in September 2022, and brought together state ministries and private companies from both countries. According to Christopher Vandome and Professor Stephen Chan OBE of Chatham House, Hichilema has “displayed regional leadership – demonstrating the merits of ‘positive neutrality’ in pursuing policies that run across global geopolitical divides for the benefit of the national interest.”
Despite having assumed power just over a year ago, Hichilema’s plan has rejoiced international investors. His politics have favoured a climate of confidence and incentivised foreign investment in the country. For instance, the African B2B e-commerce company Wasoko has recently announced a $1 million investment in the creation of a central hub in Lusaka, that it will use as a platform for future expansion into Southern Africa. Its founder, Daniel Yu, justified the choice of Zambia due to its “pro-business government administration keen on expanding the country’s digital economy.” On 11 May, the United Arab Emirates signed a memorandum of understanding to boost tourism to Zambia.
These recent changes could boost the Zambian economy and provide an anchor of stability in Southern Africa; however, the country still faces many challenges. Programs of fiscal consolidation, public expenditure management, and structural reforms can be hard to implement as they require strong state capacity and an efficient administrative system. Zambia’s endemic corruption, reinforced under President Lungu’s term from 2015 to 2021, and the country’s significant reliance on copper exports, which represents an unreliable financial input as commodity prices are highly volatile, could amount to significant obstacles for Hichilema’s ambitious reform program. Zambia’s finance minister, Felix Nkulukusa, recently projected 4.2 per cent GDP growth in 2023 – a decrease compared to last year’s 4.7 per cent. Yet, Hichilema's measures have so far been widely praised for their positive impact on the country's development.
Drones and the Future of African Warfare
Drones have taken centre stage in international security conversations. The nature of violence, its accessibility, its purpose, and its meaning for the balance of power are being reshaped by the emergence of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). In Africa, however, drones are viewed through the frame of development, meaning their military significance often goes under the radar. Whilst drones have a great potential to bring about positive change on the continent, they carry the dangerous risk of misappropriation. Therefore, understanding the security implications of drones in Africa is crucial.
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or drones, are “aircraft that do not require the presence of a human pilot on board.” They have permeated African geopolitics since 2011, gaining increasing importance in North Africa, the Sahel, and the Horn of Africa. The Libyan Civil War, during which drones were used in more than 900 missions by both sides, has put the spotlight on their strategic importance. More recently, the Libyan conflict also made headlines as the first lethal autonomous drone without human oversight was used to track and attack a military convoy in March 2020. Between 2011 and 2021, “drone operations have been carried out in at least 20 [African] states.”
Terrorist Use of UAVs
Military air power has traditionally been only enjoyed by state militaries due to the high material, financial, and technical resources required. However, drones have recently become a relatively cheap and accessible appliance for the general public, which disrupts the established power balance between state and non-state actors. The proliferation of commercial and hobbyist drones has enabled armed groups to acquire aircraft relatively easily, which they equip with weapons, cameras, and sensor systems. As an example of accessibility, Audrey Kurth Cronin, distinguished professor of international security, found that the most common type of drone used by the Islamic State was the DJI Phantom, priced between $450 and $800 on Amazon. Equipped with the ability to remain fully autonomous for up to 30 minutes, and a high-definition video function that can capture images up to 2 miles away, this inexpensive drone became a great military tool for ISIS in leading surveillance and identification missions.
The extensive availability of unregulated explosives, in addition to the transfer of technical know-how from terrorists and their affiliates, makes the militarisation of drones achievable for terrorists in Africa. Moreover, the development of 3D printing technology opens the possibility of extremists producing spare parts autonomously in the near future. Military drones, such as “miniature loitering munitions,” namely specialised kamikaze drones, are available on the dark web for a couple of thousands of dollars. As Major Thomas G. Pledger explains, “The massive increase in the number of form factors, capabilities, ease of access and ease of operation of drones at low cost will make them the weapon of choice for future terrorists.” Don Rassler of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point confirmed that it is “only a matter of time before drones get deployed more actively across Africa.”
Cases of non-state armed groups’ use of UAVs have been recorded in Africa in recent years. IS affiliated terrorist group Jamaat Ansar al-Sunna, fighting in Mozambique since 2017, has reportedly used drones to identify targets in the Cabo Delgado province, according to Mozambique’s Interior Minister Amade Miquidade. Drones have also been deployed for intelligence, surveillance, or propaganda operations by armed factions in Nigeria, Somalia, Kenya, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. They are especially useful in gathering data about infrastructure and potential weak spots which may not be visible from the ground. Terrorists have also used drones to record their attacks and release shocking images which increase the effectiveness of their propaganda. As of yet, armed organisations in Africa have not led “active-offensive” attacks with unmanned systems, but this dangerous scenario is likely to happen in the next few years. According to Abebe Muluneh, director of the Security Sector Program of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa and head of mission to Ethiopia, terrorist organisations operating in Eastern Africa are already attempting to transform commercial drones into attack drones.
Recent developments in the Middle East provide insight into the dramatic strategic advantage drones can bring to terrorist groups. In Syria and Iraq, ISIS carried between 60 and 100 aerial drone strikes every month during 2017. These new weapons, acquired through an always-changing network of providers and local manufacturing sites, became a critical weapon for ISIS. Drones enabled the armed group to conduct synchronous attacks, not only increasing their military impact but also the psychological effect on the local population. ISIS also developed drone strategies to improve the effectiveness of other operations and weapons, such as guiding vehicle-borne suicide bombers and enhancing mortar and rocket fire accuracy. African armed groups have already started to incorporate unmanned systems into their weaponry and are progressively increasing their use, which could pose dramatic challenges to the security balance in Africa.
The asymmetrical nature of unmanned vehicles - representing a relatively cheap investment for great strategic and military capabilities - has the potential to change both the balance of power between state forces and terrorist organisations and the nature of the conflict. Drones give secluded terrorist groups the capacity to project beyond their borders as never seen before. If they acquire militarised drones, terrorist organisations would be capable of destroying heavy artillery from a distance without risking the lives of insurgents. This could threaten civil and military infrastructures located in geographical areas that were not vulnerable to terrorist attacks before and destabilise states’ forces. An additional consequence would also likely be a dramatic increase in civilian casualties, which African states already have trouble preventing and responding to.
The solutions available to governments appear insufficient to face the spread of unmanned weapons amongst armed non-state organisations. One of the measures available to states is to identify and disrupt terrorist supply routes. To be effective, this endeavour would require a careful mapping of the supply chain networks, systematic investigation of the equipment used in past attacks, and more efforts to restrict the distribution of dual-use equipment in conflict-ridden regions. Some initiatives focusing on drone supply have emerged in Syria and Iraq could be developed more extensively in the context of African conflicts. Former BBC Foreign Correspondent and visiting fellow at King’s University Karen Allen explains that “there is scope for exploring early warning systems to flag the large consignments of drones procured and delivered to areas of known conflict [...] a registration scheme similar to that used for mobile phones may be considered for smaller shop-bought drones that are not mandated to apply for a license.”
However, many obstacles could hinder the development of appropriate tools to target drone supply routes in Africa. Such initiatives would require extensive financial and technical efforts from African governments, which may not consider the restriction of drones a priority in their allocation of public funding. Civil society actors could attempt to carry out such efforts, but they are likely to face financial and legal constraints. As many West African countries are breaking ties with larger military allies which could have provided support on such initiatives, international institutions will likely act as a necessary partner in garnering the required resources to address this threat. However, their involvement might be restricted by the lack of political will of African governments and/or member states.
Another option for governments to counter the use of drones by terrorist organisations is the development of “active defence measures.” For instance, manufacturers can implement geofencing control during the construction phase, which prohibits the usage of drones in certain delimited geographical locations, such as military bases or airports. Easy hacking of the geofencing and restricted geographical delineations, however, limit the potential effectiveness of this tool to counter terrorist groups and protect civilians. Geofencing can be easily overcome, but not all terrorist organisations using drones are aware of this, or have the knowledge necessary to identify what drones are equipped with geographical restrictions. Therefore, forms of drone tracking can be used by law enforcement to surveil and gather intelligence about terrorists and their affiliates. Finally, other active defence measures, such as nets, physical impactors, or birdshots, would be limited to narrowing pre-defined geographical areas, and cannot protect large swaths of the population.
The development of efficient countermeasures will require strong cooperation between the private and public sectors, in addition to strict regulatory and legislative frameworks on the production and supply of commercial drones. The military approach to counterterrorism should not supersede human rights considerations and the protection of civilians should be prioritised in future conversations. If African governments want to counter terrorism, they should uphold international legal regulations in their use of UAVs. If African governments act in a neglectful or corrupt manner while implementing the usage of armed drones in their militaries, these technologies are likely to be misappropriated and more civilians are likely to end up dead. Considering the past records of some African countries’ on weapons governance, this is not unnecessarily an unlikely scenario.
African States’ Use of UAVs
Drones have also become an attractive investment for African governments, who view them as an effective counterterrorism weapon. UAVs have already demonstrated their efficiency in military applications in Ethiopia and Mozambique, where they were deployed by government forces to counter non-state armed groups. After 2021, Ethiopia’s fleet of drones, composed of Iranian, Chinese, and Turkish devices, were used to strike the Tigray People's Liberation Front’s (TPLF) remote garrisons. Unmanned vehicles were crucial in disrupting the TPFL’s logistical supply and played a decisive role in the battle of Gashena, according to the Africa Report. Although the government has not officially confirmed the use of drones, evidence from satellite images and social media investigations has proven that they were utilised. Ethiopia is considered “the heaviest user of drones on the continent,” according to Wim Zwijnenburg, drone specialist for the peace organisation PAX.
Since 2020, a growing number of African states have acquired UAVs. Ethiopia, Morocco, Niger, Togo, Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, South Africa, Sudan, and Zambia have added new drones to their counterterrorist repetoire. South Africa, Nigeria, and Kenya are anticipated to be the main African participants in the worldwide commercial drone industry, which is anticipated to reach $43 billion by 2024. Whilst growing African interest in UAVs does not represent a continental arms race, it seems to play into regional power politics. Morocco is gaining a strategic lead in this race after the signing of an agreement in October 2022 with Israeli defence companies, agreeing on the construction of two drone manufacturing facilities in Morocco. In the two years preceding the agreement, Morocco had already started to acquire important stocks of foreign UAVs, in the context of hostilities with Algeria over Western Sahara. This Israeli-Moroccan cooperation will enable the government to produce drones at a lower cost, and to become the first African drone manufacturer, affecting the balance of power on the continent.
African governments’ growing acquisition of drones is also influencing global dynamics. While the majority of western powers are limited in their ability to export drones due to legal restrictions, authoritarian states, particularly Turkey, China, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have emerged as the continent's primary suppliers of UAVs. Africa represents an important market for UAVs, and demand on the continent is steadily rising, which could lend great financial and diplomatic influence to drone-exporting countries. Turkish defence and aerospace exports alone have risen from $83 million in 2020 to $288 million in 2021 in Africa, and is likely to continue to grow in years to come. Ankara’s development of “drone diplomacy” clearly reflects the geopolitical significance of drone trade, as military partnerships have become a tool of rapprochement with African countries. The tightening of diplomatic ties as a result of the drone trade can then be leveraged for varying aims, such as the acquisition of business deals or voting support in international institutions.
In addition, this trend reflects a wider shift in geopolitical influence in Africa, as countries diversify military partnerships and begin to engage more directly with non-western powers. As Paul Melly, consulting fellow with the Africa Programme at Chatham House, argues “for both Togo and Niger the supply partnership with Turkey is also politically useful, reducing their public reliance on close security partnerships with France.” This pivot to the East also comes in a context of growing tension between former colonial powers and African states, with increasing domestic criticism and challenges posed by the recent wave of military coups.
Consequences for Civilians
Whilst the power gained through the drone trade by authoritarian powers poses a risk to the future of international security and the upholding of the rule of law, the growth of unmanned weapons in Africa is already threatening civilian lives across conflicts. In July 2022, the Togolese military confirmed the killing of seven civilians who had been mistakenly assumed to be militants during a drone strike. Over the course of the Ethiopian conflict, drones have been reported to be the cause of 300 civilian deaths, according to aid workers on the ground. This dramatic death toll has two main explanations. First, drones employed militarily in Africa are often not very precise, meaning many civilians become collateral damage. Second, offensive decisions are mad on inferred cues about local conditions, which might confound civilian and military activities. Whilst civilian casualties caused by drone strikes remain relatively low compared to other weapons, the narrative that drones are exceedingly precise can contribute to excessive use of UAVs and a lack of accountability surrounding that usage.
The threat posed by drones to civilians is also compounded by the blurriness of African states’ legal position on unmanned weapons, the secrecy of their arms trade deals with foreign powers, and the lack of mechanisms to ensure accountability. As a PAX review summarises, “this ongoing secrecy by states about drone deployments in Africa and censorship of the press limits the space for civil society to engage meaningfully in a debate about drone warfare in Africa.” In addition, drones could provide repressive African states with an incredibly efficient tool to track and surveil civilians with relative secrecy. Members of civil society and political parties already struggling to organise and voice their concerns under the coercive environment of authoritarian states, such as in Equatorial Guinea or Chad, would have to avoid the “live-feed video cameras, infrared cameras, heat sensors, and radars” of state-acquired drones.
Global conversations have already taken place around the implications of drone adoption on civilian lives, but no international regulation has followed, notably due to the resistance of major powers, such as the United States and China. It is highly unlikely that we will see any international ban on drones in the short to medium term, considering their strategic importance and relative precision. Regulations limiting their use in populated areas, similar to the recent political declaration adopted by 82 states to prevent the use of explosive weapons in populated areas (EWIPA), appear more realistic but remain unlikely in the near future. Even if such a treaty was agreed upon, many African states would probably not sign it, as only 11 African states were signatories of the political declaration on EWIPA.
A first step towards a more ethical use of drones is to recognise their physical and psychological impact oncivilians by offering accountability and justice to victims. This initiative has been fostered by NGOs for many years, such asAirwars or theRed Cross, who have already initiated projects to map and limit the use of drones whilst promoting accountability and transparency. Investigations on drone strikes that leave civilian casualties are crucial to raise awareness needed to push for political solutions. The work done by NGOs is crucial, but should be complemented by governmental regulations and private-public partnerships to advance technological restrictions on the nefarious misuse of drones.
Food Insecurity in Africa
Examining contributors & consequences across sectors
The problem of food insecurity in Africa is becoming increasingly severe, exacerbated by its intersection with other crises. In this report by Africa Watch, we investigate some of the most prevalent factors that contribute to this problem and their consequences, both in Africa and globally. By analysing the agriculture, economics, politics, and human security sectors, we identify the complexity of the issue and conclude that regional action alone is not sufficient to solve the problem. International cooperation is also necessary to tackle the issue of food insecurity in Africa.
Read the report HERE
The Impact of African Coups on Chinese Economic Interests
Chinese engagement in Africa has significantly increased in recent years as China has become an important economic and political actor on the continent. As Africa is receiving loans and infrastructure development funding, China is taking advantage of a resource-rich continent and a large market to export its manufactured goods. However, the deepening of Chinese interests in the African continent have led to increased security considerations. As Africa has recently witnessed an “epidemic of coup d’états,” with six military overthrows during the year 2021 alone, the question of the protection of Chinese interests is coming back to the forefront.
Impact on Chinese Interests
At first sight, African coups do not seem to affect Chinese interests significantly. The new military governments have never taken an anti-Chinese stance and most have reaffirmed their commitment to Sino-African cooperation. In some cases, China has benefitted from the coups’ instability by gaining bargaining power and new opportunities for Chinese companies. Beijing also seems to have accepted the continent’s insecurity into its foreign policy. Although Beijing has not been completely disengaged from African security, actively using propaganda and information control, the idea prevails amongst Chinese officials that instability is inevitable with Africa’s current state of development and that “in the meantime, China has to be flexible and create new opportunities for both political leaders and African societies,” commented a Chinese representative.
However, presenting the impact of African coups as negligible would be overlooking the indirect consequences of uncertainty and instability which constrain Chinese benefits and foreign policy’s efficiency. Firstly, a change in government always questions the future of existing agreements - if there is a risk that the new administration will renege completely on the deal, it might also want to renegotiate the terms for a bigger share, more local overview, or higher taxes. This change is likely to stretch the period of delay before the deal is agreed on and implemented, which can sometimes take decades in the African case. Moreover, the insecurity flowing from a military overthrow leads to a slowdown of the economy, reducing trade for a temporary period or longer if international sanctions against the new military government are imposed. For instance, the stark sanctions implemented by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on Mali this January significantly impacted the country’s trade, with liquidities drying up and the government accusing the banking restrictions for its $31 billion default default in bond payments. Finally, military overthrows pose the risk of increased violence and turmoil. Whilst domestic unrest risks slowing down trade and services, it can also directly threaten the Chinese workers involved in the country. For instance, during the Malagasy uprising in 2009, numerous Chinese businesses were the target of looting and required Chinese officials to demand greater protection of the citizens.
The risks of coups for Chinese interests have been more visible after the 2021 Guinean coup, which has sparked a more assertive response from Beijing. Guinea is an essential partner for China, as its great iron ore and bauxite resources are crucial for its industry. China imports around 50 per cent of its bauxite from Guinea, which is used for the automotive, technological, and manufacturing sectors. The two countries also cooperated on the Simandou deal, a $19 billion mining project for iron ore in the West African state.
Col. Mamady Doumbouya’s military overthrow in September 2021 highlighted Guinea’s importance for Chinese interests and therefore Chinese vulnerability to instability in Guinea. The coup raised uncertainty around the Samandon project, threatening to cancel the deal which had been signed a year before after more than two decades of negotiation. Prospecting on the effects of the Guinean coup a week after the event, Natalie Sambhi, analyst for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, declared “it’s not clear that the coup leaders and interim administration will honour agreements signed with Chinese companies under the previous government.”
Moreover, the prices of aluminum rose up to their highest levels since 2008 as a result of the coup; directly impacting the Chinese industrial sector. If the country had been exposed to repeated coups and a high price of aluminum or bauxite for a prolonged time, China would have been required to diversify its imports or rely more on Australia, from which it currently imports 30 per cent of its bauxite. However, this would have required an adjustment of China’s foreign policy, as Beijing was trying to gain more independence from the island which had supported an international inquiry into China’s role in the Covid outbreak. If the new Guinean government reasserted its commitment to China, keeping the impact of the coup on Chinese interests to a low, the 2021 overthrow showed that China is not completely unconcerned by the security situation in Africa, as its interests can be quickly threatened in case of prolonged instability. Therefore, if the African coups’ direct impact on Chinese interests is not evident, they do seem to have diffuse effects which require adaptability from China.
Chinese Response to the Coups
Chinese foreign policy rests on the principle of non-interference; it considers that it is the state’s responsibility to ensure security in its own internal affairs. Whilst the European Union (EU) and ECOWAS are vocal in their condemnation of the coups, often imposing stark sanctions against the military governments deemed anti-democratic, China does not usually make an official condemnation or support sanctions against African military governments. China expressed no criticism of the five African coups between 2003 and 2010. In response to the 2017 coup in Zimbabwe, China declared, “We hope that Zimbabwe could properly handle its internal affairs,” whilst stating that Sudan is “capable of managing its own internal affairs and ensuring its national peace and stability” after the 2019 coup. Chinese condemnations are rare but increasingly more common and are usually voiced when Chinese stakes are higher in the concerned countries. Representatives have officially condemned the 2012 coup in Mali and Guinea-Bissau, the 2013 coup in the Central African Republic, and most recently the military overthrow of Guinea’s former president Alpha Condé. However, they have never supported or implemented sanctions against the new military governments.
Although the Chinese response may appear neutral or nonpartisan, China’s non-interference doctrine has many political implications. For one, this policy represents indirect - if not direct - support for the new governments. Increasing its aid to Madagascar in return for more security for its citizens and infrastructures after 2009, Chinese support was represented in local media as an achievement of the new Madagascar government and important international recognition, helping to root the new government’s legitimacy.
Being associated as an ally and supporter of military governments can turn detrimental to Chinese interests, notably for its image in African civil society. When the military overthrows are criticized by the population, the Chinese reputation, already low due to perceptions of economic aggressiveness, risks to decrease even more. As Chris Alden and Christopher R. Hughes, experts on Chinese foreign policy argued, “the Chinese presence then becomes a potential target for dissent from any segment of society that is discontented with the prevailing circumstances under the government of the day, whether trade unions concerned about safety standards or businesses that are unable to compete against Chinese imports, superior access to supply chains or low-cost bidding.” They use the example of Chinese cooperation with the Democratic Republic of Congo, which was decried in Parliament by Jean-Lucien Mbusa, an important member of the opposition party, to rally civil society.
Secondly, its policy of “non-interference” leads China to actively oppose sanctions in international institutions. Refusing to vote for UN-backed sanctions against the coups, China positions itself closer to Russia, which is more actively engaged in its support of the military regimes. As Richard Gowan explains, UN director for the International Crisis Group, “Russia has backed the coup-plotters in Sudan and Mali even more strongly than China. Beijing and Moscow tend to coordinate their positions over these crises.” This position has tended to deteriorate China’s relations with African members of the UN Security Council, as their historical Chinese ally in the UN went against their decision to sanction the coups. This policy also goes against ECOWAS’ position, which has become more assertive in its condemnations of the African military overthrows. ECOWAS’ policy used to be based on the principle of non-interference, but in recent years the regional organization has taken a more intervening stance, therefore breaking away from its accordance with China. David Shinn, former US ambassador to Burkina Faso and professor at George Washington University summarized: “Military coups in Guinea, Mali, and Burkina Faso complicate both China’s economic interests and foreign policy in the region, especially when Beijing’s policy is contrary to the prevailing African view.”
The recent wave of coup d’états in Africa, therefore, impacts Chinese foreign policy, by forcing Beijing to position itself and protect its interests whilst not worrying local opinion. As China is expanding its investment on the continent, its security engagement will become increasingly significant. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that China will shift from its non-interference approach as it represents the backbone of its foreign policy. China will be more inclined to increase its presence through the outsourcing of its security to private companies or through UN peacekeeping missions, as it has started to do in recent years. For instance, following the Darfur crisis, the Chinese government pressured Sudanese authorities to accept UN peacekeeping forces in order to protect its interests in the region. Besides, it is likely that Beijing will develop its diplomatic presence in unstable countries. In recent years, there has been an important augmentation of Chinese staff, both in political and economic cabinets, whilst the first special envoy in charge of the eastern region of Africa, Xue Bing, was appointed this February. Finally, experts have noted that China should improve its reputation in African civil society as it has started to do in recent years through its “charm offensive.”
Coups d’état in Africa are therefore not as negligible on Chinese interests as it may appear prima facie. The recent wave of military overthrows, exemplified by Guinea, has highlighted the vulnerability of Chinese engagements in the continent. Whilst China is unlikely to undertake a drastic shift in its approach to African security, it will have to adapt its policy to protect its interests in the future. Beijing’s choices in Africa will be determinant for the security of the continent and for Chinese foreign policy globally.