The End of MINUSMA: An Uncertain Future for Mali’s Security

On 16 June, the Malian transitional government asked the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to terminate all activity in the country. The UN mission, currently comprised of 15,000 personnel, had been involved in Mali as a peacekeeping force since 2013. Its aim was to help facilitate peace amidst a war in 2012 between the Malian government and armed separatist groups in Northern Mali; Tuareg separatist groups were demanding the independence of a region they call ‘Azawad.’ In accordance with the Malian government’s decision, the UN Security Council voted to conclude its operations and progressively withdraw its personnel, a process that will likely be completed before the end of this year. The transitional government’s decision was not completely unforeseen; the military junta had begun to make changes in the actors and methods employed in combating terrorism since it claimed power in 2021. The countries involved in the MINUSMA operation were concerned by this decision, taken by a government which is still largely struggling to maintain peace and abate the threat of advancing terror groups. The presence of Wagner troops is another source of anxiety for the West, as the group’s deployment represents a further extension of Russian influence on African soil and could be detrimental to peace and security in the country. 

The Malian Foreign Minister, Abdoulaye Diop, justified his government’s decision by highlighting MINUSMA's failure to resolve the security crisis in Mali after 10 years of engagement. He also claimed that the mission’s reporting of human rights violations fostered distrust towards the government and fuelled communal tensions. The UN published a report in May 2023 accusing - through a well-evidenced investigation - the Malian Army and foreign mercenaries of killing 500 civilians during a counterterrorist operation in Moura a year prior. This accusation contributed to the deepening of tensions between the UN and the Malian government. In response, Mali announced the opening of an investigation against the multilateral organisation for “espionage, undermining the external security of the state” and “military conspiracy.” This decision follows a general shift in the country’s security strategy undertaken by the transitional government.

Since 2019, Russia has been actively engaged in a propaganda campaign in Mali that has effectively swayed public opinion. Russia has deployed paid and non-paid activists and influencers, multimedia platforms, and bot accounts on social media platforms to successfully win over hearts and minds in Mali. According to Jean le Roux of the Atlantic Council, Russia coerces communities “through the influence of these talking heads,” referring to local activists. Many of these disinformation efforts are being directly carried out by the Internet Research Agency, a bot farm financed by Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of the Wagner Group (now deceased). A 2023 study revealed that over 90% of Malians now trust Russia as a partner. Although the study lacks significant feedback from rural populations, it effectively paints a picture of public opinion. A similar pattern is emerging across the Sahel, particularly in Niger and Burkina Faso, who find themselves in similar security dilemmas. 

A week before Mali’s decision, Malian President Assimi Goïta and Vladimir Putin had a phone conversation, likely discussing the MINUSMA mandate. According to Jean-Hervé Jezequel and Ibrahim Maiga of the Crisis Group, Russian diplomats have also attempted to limit MINUSMA’s withdrawal budget under the threat of blocking funding for other peacekeeping missions around the world. They were likely hoping to create a disorderly withdrawal that would augment the perception that MINUSMA was a failed mission, and during which the UN would have to abandon material that the Malian army and Wagner could retrieve. 

Moscow has a lot to gain from the UN mission’s retreat. Putin is benefitting from countering western influence across the continent, whilst Wagner has found in Africa a great source of natural resources, as well as a space to strategically redeploy its troops after the Russian insurrection. However, for Mali, the advantages of MINUSMA’s withdrawal are less evident than its dangers. The termination of the international mission poses great risks for the country’s security, most notably for the northern regions where most of the UN bases were located. Although MINUSMA did not have a military mandate, the presence of peacekeepers in urban centres helped to reduce the influence of terror groups. In MISUMA’s absence, these groups may now consider cities to be easier targets. In addition, MINUSMA’s departure risks increasing tensions between the signatory groups of the Alger Peace Accords and the government, and could challenge the current state of territorial unity in Mali. 

The Alger Accords, signed in 2015 between separatist groups and the government, established a system of decentralisation, the creation of a common army, and specific development measures for the northern regions. Few of the agreed reforms had been implemented since its signing, but MINUSMA’s departure makes it even less likely to be upheld. The UN mission not only provided government representatives and humanitarian missions with secure access to the country’s north, but also invested in stabilisation projects which created thousands of jobs for the local population. The deterioration of security in certain areas, hindering access to many of these regions, and the loss of economic opportunities accompanied by the current government’s failure to offer economic incentives to leave armed groups, are signals that the security situation is likely to continue to worsen. The Malian government signed the Algiers Peace Agreement from a position of weakness, but has been able to develop its army during the eight years since its signing. The authorities will now likely favour a solely military solution over investing in peace and economic development.

Imperfect efforts that combine security and development initiatives continue to see success in the Ivory Coast and the Lake Chad Basin Area; combatants were provided with incentives - such as amnesty, job training, and more - to leave extremist groups. In the Ivory Coast, the government coupled these programs with efforts to invest in infrastructure and public services in affected regions. In both cases, membership in extremist groups fell following the implementation of these initiatives. The Malian Junta’s security focused approach is unlikely to be successful, as it is likely to merely drive more Malians into extremist groups to protect and provide for themselves and their families. This is especially relevant in Mali given the human rights abuses frequently committed by the army and the Wagner Group.

If the Malian government continues to respond to the terrorist threat and inter-communal conflict by sending Wagner troops alongside the Malian military, who has also accumulated a grim record of human rights abuses, levels of violence and conflict are likely to worsen. Wagner has been active in Mali since at least December 2022, playing an active role in security provision in Central and Northern Mali. In doing so, the group has killed thousands of Malians. It is not clear how many were members of armed or extremist groups. Since 2020, after the first of two military coups, deaths from armed violence have more than doubled. Almost all of these deaths can be attributed to extremist violence and the security response to it. Terror groups across the Sahel, including in Mali, are targeting civilians more frequently in 2023 than in years past. 

In West Africa, where security challenges often transcend national borders, this poses a serious threat to Mali’s neighbours. Over the last several years, jihadists have streamed across the Malian border with Burkina Faso, where armed and extremist groups control almost half of the country’s territory. If the Malian Government fails to take a more holistic approach to addressing extremism, extremists within Mali may begin to pose a serious threat to the Ivory Coast, Niger (where a military junta has just overthrown a government with an effective policy track record on extremism), and even Guinea, Senegal, Algeria, and Mauritania. This is why the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has taken such a strong stance against the most recent coup in Niger, having recently deployed a standby force for a potential intervention.

The continued proliferation of terror groups across the Sahel is not inevitable, but local, ECOWAS, and western efforts to address it are being further complicated by the actions of the military juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Starting in January, Algeria will sit on the UN Security Council and may be keen to get more involved in the peace process to avoid regional insecurity. The Malian opposition has also expressed its concerns, and some segments of the population are lending support to their views. Despite this, the lack of a holistic strategy and the likely prospect of increased Wagner involvement in Mali does not bode well for the country or the continent as a whole.