Drones and the Future of African Warfare
Drones have taken centre stage in international security conversations. The nature of violence, its accessibility, its purpose, and its meaning for the balance of power are being reshaped by the emergence of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). In Africa, however, drones are viewed through the frame of development, meaning their military significance often goes under the radar. Whilst drones have a great potential to bring about positive change on the continent, they carry the dangerous risk of misappropriation. Therefore, understanding the security implications of drones in Africa is crucial.
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or drones, are “aircraft that do not require the presence of a human pilot on board.” They have permeated African geopolitics since 2011, gaining increasing importance in North Africa, the Sahel, and the Horn of Africa. The Libyan Civil War, during which drones were used in more than 900 missions by both sides, has put the spotlight on their strategic importance. More recently, the Libyan conflict also made headlines as the first lethal autonomous drone without human oversight was used to track and attack a military convoy in March 2020. Between 2011 and 2021, “drone operations have been carried out in at least 20 [African] states.”
Terrorist Use of UAVs
Military air power has traditionally been only enjoyed by state militaries due to the high material, financial, and technical resources required. However, drones have recently become a relatively cheap and accessible appliance for the general public, which disrupts the established power balance between state and non-state actors. The proliferation of commercial and hobbyist drones has enabled armed groups to acquire aircraft relatively easily, which they equip with weapons, cameras, and sensor systems. As an example of accessibility, Audrey Kurth Cronin, distinguished professor of international security, found that the most common type of drone used by the Islamic State was the DJI Phantom, priced between $450 and $800 on Amazon. Equipped with the ability to remain fully autonomous for up to 30 minutes, and a high-definition video function that can capture images up to 2 miles away, this inexpensive drone became a great military tool for ISIS in leading surveillance and identification missions.
The extensive availability of unregulated explosives, in addition to the transfer of technical know-how from terrorists and their affiliates, makes the militarisation of drones achievable for terrorists in Africa. Moreover, the development of 3D printing technology opens the possibility of extremists producing spare parts autonomously in the near future. Military drones, such as “miniature loitering munitions,” namely specialised kamikaze drones, are available on the dark web for a couple of thousands of dollars. As Major Thomas G. Pledger explains, “The massive increase in the number of form factors, capabilities, ease of access and ease of operation of drones at low cost will make them the weapon of choice for future terrorists.” Don Rassler of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point confirmed that it is “only a matter of time before drones get deployed more actively across Africa.”
Cases of non-state armed groups’ use of UAVs have been recorded in Africa in recent years. IS affiliated terrorist group Jamaat Ansar al-Sunna, fighting in Mozambique since 2017, has reportedly used drones to identify targets in the Cabo Delgado province, according to Mozambique’s Interior Minister Amade Miquidade. Drones have also been deployed for intelligence, surveillance, or propaganda operations by armed factions in Nigeria, Somalia, Kenya, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. They are especially useful in gathering data about infrastructure and potential weak spots which may not be visible from the ground. Terrorists have also used drones to record their attacks and release shocking images which increase the effectiveness of their propaganda. As of yet, armed organisations in Africa have not led “active-offensive” attacks with unmanned systems, but this dangerous scenario is likely to happen in the next few years. According to Abebe Muluneh, director of the Security Sector Program of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa and head of mission to Ethiopia, terrorist organisations operating in Eastern Africa are already attempting to transform commercial drones into attack drones.
Recent developments in the Middle East provide insight into the dramatic strategic advantage drones can bring to terrorist groups. In Syria and Iraq, ISIS carried between 60 and 100 aerial drone strikes every month during 2017. These new weapons, acquired through an always-changing network of providers and local manufacturing sites, became a critical weapon for ISIS. Drones enabled the armed group to conduct synchronous attacks, not only increasing their military impact but also the psychological effect on the local population. ISIS also developed drone strategies to improve the effectiveness of other operations and weapons, such as guiding vehicle-borne suicide bombers and enhancing mortar and rocket fire accuracy. African armed groups have already started to incorporate unmanned systems into their weaponry and are progressively increasing their use, which could pose dramatic challenges to the security balance in Africa.
The asymmetrical nature of unmanned vehicles - representing a relatively cheap investment for great strategic and military capabilities - has the potential to change both the balance of power between state forces and terrorist organisations and the nature of the conflict. Drones give secluded terrorist groups the capacity to project beyond their borders as never seen before. If they acquire militarised drones, terrorist organisations would be capable of destroying heavy artillery from a distance without risking the lives of insurgents. This could threaten civil and military infrastructures located in geographical areas that were not vulnerable to terrorist attacks before and destabilise states’ forces. An additional consequence would also likely be a dramatic increase in civilian casualties, which African states already have trouble preventing and responding to.
The solutions available to governments appear insufficient to face the spread of unmanned weapons amongst armed non-state organisations. One of the measures available to states is to identify and disrupt terrorist supply routes. To be effective, this endeavour would require a careful mapping of the supply chain networks, systematic investigation of the equipment used in past attacks, and more efforts to restrict the distribution of dual-use equipment in conflict-ridden regions. Some initiatives focusing on drone supply have emerged in Syria and Iraq could be developed more extensively in the context of African conflicts. Former BBC Foreign Correspondent and visiting fellow at King’s University Karen Allen explains that “there is scope for exploring early warning systems to flag the large consignments of drones procured and delivered to areas of known conflict [...] a registration scheme similar to that used for mobile phones may be considered for smaller shop-bought drones that are not mandated to apply for a license.”
However, many obstacles could hinder the development of appropriate tools to target drone supply routes in Africa. Such initiatives would require extensive financial and technical efforts from African governments, which may not consider the restriction of drones a priority in their allocation of public funding. Civil society actors could attempt to carry out such efforts, but they are likely to face financial and legal constraints. As many West African countries are breaking ties with larger military allies which could have provided support on such initiatives, international institutions will likely act as a necessary partner in garnering the required resources to address this threat. However, their involvement might be restricted by the lack of political will of African governments and/or member states.
Another option for governments to counter the use of drones by terrorist organisations is the development of “active defence measures.” For instance, manufacturers can implement geofencing control during the construction phase, which prohibits the usage of drones in certain delimited geographical locations, such as military bases or airports. Easy hacking of the geofencing and restricted geographical delineations, however, limit the potential effectiveness of this tool to counter terrorist groups and protect civilians. Geofencing can be easily overcome, but not all terrorist organisations using drones are aware of this, or have the knowledge necessary to identify what drones are equipped with geographical restrictions. Therefore, forms of drone tracking can be used by law enforcement to surveil and gather intelligence about terrorists and their affiliates. Finally, other active defence measures, such as nets, physical impactors, or birdshots, would be limited to narrowing pre-defined geographical areas, and cannot protect large swaths of the population.
The development of efficient countermeasures will require strong cooperation between the private and public sectors, in addition to strict regulatory and legislative frameworks on the production and supply of commercial drones. The military approach to counterterrorism should not supersede human rights considerations and the protection of civilians should be prioritised in future conversations. If African governments want to counter terrorism, they should uphold international legal regulations in their use of UAVs. If African governments act in a neglectful or corrupt manner while implementing the usage of armed drones in their militaries, these technologies are likely to be misappropriated and more civilians are likely to end up dead. Considering the past records of some African countries’ on weapons governance, this is not unnecessarily an unlikely scenario.
African States’ Use of UAVs
Drones have also become an attractive investment for African governments, who view them as an effective counterterrorism weapon. UAVs have already demonstrated their efficiency in military applications in Ethiopia and Mozambique, where they were deployed by government forces to counter non-state armed groups. After 2021, Ethiopia’s fleet of drones, composed of Iranian, Chinese, and Turkish devices, were used to strike the Tigray People's Liberation Front’s (TPLF) remote garrisons. Unmanned vehicles were crucial in disrupting the TPFL’s logistical supply and played a decisive role in the battle of Gashena, according to the Africa Report. Although the government has not officially confirmed the use of drones, evidence from satellite images and social media investigations has proven that they were utilised. Ethiopia is considered “the heaviest user of drones on the continent,” according to Wim Zwijnenburg, drone specialist for the peace organisation PAX.
Since 2020, a growing number of African states have acquired UAVs. Ethiopia, Morocco, Niger, Togo, Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, South Africa, Sudan, and Zambia have added new drones to their counterterrorist repetoire. South Africa, Nigeria, and Kenya are anticipated to be the main African participants in the worldwide commercial drone industry, which is anticipated to reach $43 billion by 2024. Whilst growing African interest in UAVs does not represent a continental arms race, it seems to play into regional power politics. Morocco is gaining a strategic lead in this race after the signing of an agreement in October 2022 with Israeli defence companies, agreeing on the construction of two drone manufacturing facilities in Morocco. In the two years preceding the agreement, Morocco had already started to acquire important stocks of foreign UAVs, in the context of hostilities with Algeria over Western Sahara. This Israeli-Moroccan cooperation will enable the government to produce drones at a lower cost, and to become the first African drone manufacturer, affecting the balance of power on the continent.
African governments’ growing acquisition of drones is also influencing global dynamics. While the majority of western powers are limited in their ability to export drones due to legal restrictions, authoritarian states, particularly Turkey, China, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have emerged as the continent's primary suppliers of UAVs. Africa represents an important market for UAVs, and demand on the continent is steadily rising, which could lend great financial and diplomatic influence to drone-exporting countries. Turkish defence and aerospace exports alone have risen from $83 million in 2020 to $288 million in 2021 in Africa, and is likely to continue to grow in years to come. Ankara’s development of “drone diplomacy” clearly reflects the geopolitical significance of drone trade, as military partnerships have become a tool of rapprochement with African countries. The tightening of diplomatic ties as a result of the drone trade can then be leveraged for varying aims, such as the acquisition of business deals or voting support in international institutions.
In addition, this trend reflects a wider shift in geopolitical influence in Africa, as countries diversify military partnerships and begin to engage more directly with non-western powers. As Paul Melly, consulting fellow with the Africa Programme at Chatham House, argues “for both Togo and Niger the supply partnership with Turkey is also politically useful, reducing their public reliance on close security partnerships with France.” This pivot to the East also comes in a context of growing tension between former colonial powers and African states, with increasing domestic criticism and challenges posed by the recent wave of military coups.
Consequences for Civilians
Whilst the power gained through the drone trade by authoritarian powers poses a risk to the future of international security and the upholding of the rule of law, the growth of unmanned weapons in Africa is already threatening civilian lives across conflicts. In July 2022, the Togolese military confirmed the killing of seven civilians who had been mistakenly assumed to be militants during a drone strike. Over the course of the Ethiopian conflict, drones have been reported to be the cause of 300 civilian deaths, according to aid workers on the ground. This dramatic death toll has two main explanations. First, drones employed militarily in Africa are often not very precise, meaning many civilians become collateral damage. Second, offensive decisions are mad on inferred cues about local conditions, which might confound civilian and military activities. Whilst civilian casualties caused by drone strikes remain relatively low compared to other weapons, the narrative that drones are exceedingly precise can contribute to excessive use of UAVs and a lack of accountability surrounding that usage.
The threat posed by drones to civilians is also compounded by the blurriness of African states’ legal position on unmanned weapons, the secrecy of their arms trade deals with foreign powers, and the lack of mechanisms to ensure accountability. As a PAX review summarises, “this ongoing secrecy by states about drone deployments in Africa and censorship of the press limits the space for civil society to engage meaningfully in a debate about drone warfare in Africa.” In addition, drones could provide repressive African states with an incredibly efficient tool to track and surveil civilians with relative secrecy. Members of civil society and political parties already struggling to organise and voice their concerns under the coercive environment of authoritarian states, such as in Equatorial Guinea or Chad, would have to avoid the “live-feed video cameras, infrared cameras, heat sensors, and radars” of state-acquired drones.
Global conversations have already taken place around the implications of drone adoption on civilian lives, but no international regulation has followed, notably due to the resistance of major powers, such as the United States and China. It is highly unlikely that we will see any international ban on drones in the short to medium term, considering their strategic importance and relative precision. Regulations limiting their use in populated areas, similar to the recent political declaration adopted by 82 states to prevent the use of explosive weapons in populated areas (EWIPA), appear more realistic but remain unlikely in the near future. Even if such a treaty was agreed upon, many African states would probably not sign it, as only 11 African states were signatories of the political declaration on EWIPA.
A first step towards a more ethical use of drones is to recognise their physical and psychological impact oncivilians by offering accountability and justice to victims. This initiative has been fostered by NGOs for many years, such asAirwars or theRed Cross, who have already initiated projects to map and limit the use of drones whilst promoting accountability and transparency. Investigations on drone strikes that leave civilian casualties are crucial to raise awareness needed to push for political solutions. The work done by NGOs is crucial, but should be complemented by governmental regulations and private-public partnerships to advance technological restrictions on the nefarious misuse of drones.