The Nile Negotiations

Since 2011, Ethiopia has been in the process of constructing an immense hydropower dam that has the potential to make the country energy independent, and influence the entire East Africa region. Once fully operational, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), located on the Blue Nile River, is expected to generate 15,692 Gigawatt Hours (GWh) of electricity and store around 74 billion cubic metres (BCM) of water. In contrast, the largest water basin in Ethiopia, Lake Tana, has only around half of this capacity. When successfully constructed, the dam is expected to supply electricity to around half of the Ethiopian population, and any excess energy will be exported to neighbouring Sudan, Kenya, and Djibouti. The project - worth around $4.7 billion - has created thousands of employment opportunities in the region and stimulated infrastructure growth, such as the construction of transmission lines and roads which are necessary for future power exports. 

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam 

The GERD is part of a broader redevelopment plan from 2012, titled the Green Development Strategy. The plan aims to tackle poverty in Ethiopia through a series of projects that will stimulate employment and provide necessary electricity to the population, whilst also reducing the national carbon footprint. However, the strategy has not been fully implemented since its formulation 11 years ago. According to a UN report from 2021-2022, Ethiopia ranks 175th out of 191 countries on human development. This can be broadly attributed to past crises, namely armed conflict and famines. At present, Ethiopia’s northern regions are facing famine, in part brought on by the war in Tigray, which has also caused severe population displacement. Repeated conflicts and economic hardship are partly why Ethiopia is considered one of the most educationally disadvantaged countries in Africa. Levels of access to healthcare in Ethiopia are some of the lowest on the entire continent, which leads to higher mortality rates and hinders development. Health outcomes are worsened by poor electricity access, as only around 40 per cent of the country has access to power. The GERD will likely help Ethiopia to address poverty, and presents it with an economic opportunity to become a major hydroelectric power. However, the GERD’s completion faces significant diplomatic obstacles, which if not addressed have the potential to lead to armed conflict. 

The Negotiations  

Since the beginning of the GERD’s construction, Egypt has been the largest critic of the project, arguing the dam poses a threat to its water security. Since circa 3000 BC, Egypt has relied on the Nile. Today, around 90 per cent of Egypt’s fresh water is supplied by the river, which stimulates agricultural production and fishing, as well as supplies water to urban dwellings. Most of Egypt’s settlements are located along the Nile, as the remainder of the country lacks sufficient access to fresh water. The Nile has two main tributaries: The Blue Nile and White Nile Rivers, which intersect in Khartoum, Sudan. Of the two, the Blue Nile is more crucial as it makes up approximately 85 percent of the Nile’s waters during the rainy season. Egypt and Sudan are therefore dependent on these tributaries to provide enough water to satisfy demand. 

The GERD when fully operational will not obstruct water flow and will have the capability to regulate supply downstream during dry seasons. However, the filling of its 74 BCM storage during construction could disrupt water flow downstream, depending on how fast Ethiopia decides to finish the project.  A compromise is required for Ethiopia to fill the dam without compromising the water supply downstream. In 2015, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt signed a Declaration of Principles which stipulated that the filling and the operation of the GERD must be agreed upon by the three parties. 

Since the declaration, none of the parties have been able to agree on the details of how the GERD should be operated and how long it should take to fill. The Nile plays a key role in narratives around domestic identity in both countries, which makes any bilateral negotiations a zero-sum game. For Ethiopia, the project is a symbol of renewed socio-economic hope, with the potential to revolutionise the country’s energy production and transform it into one of the greenest economies on the continent. Whilst for Egypt, the Nile is a symbol of ancient power as well as its primary source of freshwater. 

In 1929 Britain signed a colonial agreement with Egypt which stated that Egypt had the uncontested right to 48 BCM of the Nile’s annual flow. The same agreement gave Sudan the right to 4 BCM. In 1959 Egypt and Sudan revised the document in a bilateral agreement, agreeing to a split of 55.5 BCM and 18.5 BCM respectively. The 1959 agreement did not consider any other nation that benefited from the Blue or  White Nile, and Egypt received the right to veto any projects that could impact its share of 55.5 BCM. For this reason, Egypt has demanded that the GERD’s filling cannot impact its annual water flow. But Ethiopia refused to accept this demand on the basis that it was not part of the 1929 nor the 1959 agreement. To find a compromise, Ethiopia sanctioned an independent scientific study of the GERD by the National Independent Scientific Research Group (NISRG) to determine the impact of any future filling plans. Although the study was endorsed by the three countries, Egypt disregarded the group’s findings and in 2019 demanded that Ethiopia release 40 BCM of water from the first filling. It also demanded that Ethiopia obtain approval from Egypt on any subsequent fillings. Ethiopia countered the proposal in 2020, presenting a two-stage plan for the first filling of the GERD; 4.9 BCM in the first year and 13.5 BCM in the second year. As the plan was again refused by Egypt, the negotiations came to a halt and in May 2020 Egypt took the matter to the United Nations Security Council. 

International Involvement 

After Egypt made its case to the Security Council, Ethiopia began the two-stage filling of the dam in June 2020 and later in 2021. It did so without reaching an agreement with either Sudan or Egypt. Egypt has since warned that any disruption to its water supply will have a devastating effect on its population, hinting that a decrease in water supply may lead to an increase in illegal migration to Europe. In doing so, Egypt is trying to pressure European nations to get involved in future negotiations. Simultaneously, Egypt wants the United Nations to acknowledge that the issue of the GERD violates the standards of Article 34 of the UN Charter. In response, Tunisia drafted a resolution demanding that Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt resume negotiations mediated by the African Union, and resolve the dispute within six months. But adoption of the resolution has the potential to escalate the issue into a military conflict. If an agreement is not reached within six months, Egypt may opt to use military force to satisfy its demands. In 2021, Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi made a public statement warning Ethiopia that if water flow into Egypt decreases, Egypt might have no choice but to use military force; however, a case can be made that Egypt wants to abate the possibility of an open conflict with Ethiopia, as it did not pressure Tunisia’s resolution.      

Possibility of Conflict 

It has been over 10 years since the construction of the GERD commenced. With no resolution in sight, the possibility of conflict remains. Egypt already made threats in the case that diplomacy fails and has the military capability to carry out an assault. The CIA Factbook estimates that Egypt has around 450,000 armed personnel, including 325,000 ground force, 18,000 Navy, and 30,000 Air Force personnel. In contrast, Ethiopia has around 150,000 troops, which includes around 3,000 Air Force personnel. Egypt has the military capacity to attack and destroy the GERD, securing its downstream water flow and preventing any future disruptions. Such an attack would unlikely be without consequences. Any Egyptian offensive action would not only impact Ethiopia, but also every member of the Eastern African Power Pool (EAPP). In the case of an attack, EAPP countries might support Ethiopia in protecting their own power supply from the GERD. Whilst it remains highly unlikely in the short to medium term, this could result in a cross-national armed conflict on the scale of  The Great War of Africa (Second Congo War). A conflict of this magnitude in Ethiopia would kickstart a cascade of humanitarian crises. It might also instigate further internal conflict in Ethiopia. 

Although there is no mediation plan for the Nile negotiations, foreign investors have taken an interest in the GERD. China has invested heavily in the GERD’s construction. In 2013, China granted a $1.2 billion loan to Ethiopia for the construction of power transmission lines to deliver electricity produced by the GERD, and an additional $1.8 billion in 2019, for the expansion of the Ethiopian energy sector. Chinese contractors, such as Sinohydro, the Gezhouba Group, and Voith Hydro Shanghai have also worked on the project. Whilst China has been expanding its military presence across Africa, namely in South Sudan, Djibouti, and Mali, an intervention in Ethiopia remains unlikely. This is due to China’s non-interventionist policy and lack of interventionist precedent outside of the Korean War. However, China’s military presence in Africa gives China a strategic advantage in terms of troop deployment, which it could use to pressure a diplomatic resolution to protect its financial interests. Possible foreign intervention - direct or indirect - in this issue is significant, as conflicting geopolitical interests in Africa are playing a growing role in the continent’s affairs. If international economic and political interests clash in Ethiopia, they could spark further proxy-wars, the likes of which we are currently witnessing in Sudan and Yemen.

The GERD’s ability to deliver electricity to the majority of Ethiopians has the potential to change the country’s global economic position and stimulate further socio-economic growth. Simultaneously, Ethiopia could become a leading energy exporter in the region. These two factors are the primary reasons why Ethiopia is unwilling to agree to Egypt’s demands on the GERD’s filling. The pursuit of energy self-sufficiency and security is also a primary reason why Ethiopia does not accept Egypt’s water claims, which it perceives to be backed by unlawful colonial agreements. But the Nile dispute could also have a detrimental effect on Ethiopia if Egypt opts to respond militarily. Although it remains unlikely, the destruction of the GERD would not only prevent Ethiopia from delivering valuable power to its people but also would cost the country billions in lost investment. Any such conflict would further underline geopolitical risk in East Africa, potentially driving foreign investors elsewhere.