South Korea (hereafter, the ROK) has unveiled its Indo-Pacific framework (IPF) in a move long awaited since the election of President Yoon Suk-yeoul in May 2022. With threats to its economic security proliferating constantly, the ROK has begun to reorganise its foreign policy and enter the Indo-Pacific as what it has termed a ‘Global Pivotal State’. The framework is in many ways bold, committing the ROK to the region’s complexifying nexus of economic-security fora. The country has strongly aligned itself with human rights, freedom, and international law, and has placed these values at the centre of its approach. It does, however, make unambitious assertions about its relationship with both the US and China, with the former largely praised for its aid in stemming North Korea’s proliferation, and the latter hardly mentioned. Much more interestingly, the ROK calls for continued ASEAN centrality - a huge vote of confidence for the organisation at a time of internal turmoil - and warmly greets Japan as their “closest neighbour” with which cooperation is “essential” for fostering solidarity among like-minded nations in the region. 

This article seeks to draw upon the emphases and omissions that make this report what it is, unpicking the newest piece of geopolitical jargon; the Global Pivotal State, and highlighting what should be taken away from this document in tandem with ongoing policy. 

Why is South Korea entering the Indo-Pacific now?

The last few years have witnessed the coronation of the Indo-Pacific as the new frame of analysis, with nations from across the globe adopting frameworks, pivots, and tilts for approaching this new conception. In this sense, the ROK is a little late to the party, and in the eyes of some analysts, has arrived unexpectedly. Despite being the world’s 10th largest economy and military spender, as well as commanding a fleet of cultural and soft power tools, the ROK is sometimes regarded as a lesser nation when it comes to wider-pacific geopolitics. The North Korean security threat, naturally, is the ROK’s premier consideration and one that dominates a considerable amount of its attention. 

The reason it has now fully entered the foray can be tied to the complexities emanating from the Sino-American strategic rivalry, as well as the short-term shock of the Ukraine war. The IPF begins by outlining the nation’s wholesale economic interdependence (or simply dependence) with the Indo-Pacific, though fails to specify how much of this is directly with China. The ROK witnessed its largest-ever trade deficit, and its first in over a decade, in 2022 which in large part resulted from two factors: massive external energy reliance, and China’s zero-Covid policy which crippled demand for ROK imports. While the ROK has seen relatively amicable relations with China through 2022 and enthusiastically touted the trilateral summit which included Japan, the nation has leaked its frustration at times over China’s lack of support with Kim Jong-un. This tells us that the country is not yet ready to move in line with the US and directly criticise China as the regional antagonist, with the framework specifying it is not targeted at any one nation. Instead, through an emphasis on international laws and norms it shows its (more toned down) support for the US’s own framework. 

The year 2022 broadly saw positive engagement between the US and the ROK following intensifying aggression from North Korea. Despite this, the US’s major plans for reorganising and insulating the semiconductor industry not just against China, but thoroughly in their own favour, have shaken the ROK, which is yet to receive any exemptions from the CHIPS act. They have also so far turned their nose up at the US’s planned Chips 4 alliance with Japan and Taiwan. On the back of US-led sanctions which have directly targeted China’s stake in the semiconductor market, firms and lawmakers in the ROK have decried the US's impact on the chips industry, and pointed to a plethora of potential threats to the nation’s economic security. The US state department quickly praised the framework, as on the surface it reflects the US’s own in many ways, particularly regarding its emphasis on values. Glaring omissions, however, mean the ROK does not graze solely in the US’s paddock. 

Understanding the global pivotal state

To begin to pull what we can from a shiny public policy document, I would like to highlight two aspects of the ROK’s strategy that potentially reveal pieces of the nation’s grand strategy. These two aspects work under the overarching framework of maintaining a status quo and throwing its weight behind an Asian Asia that has the institutional capacity to sidestep great-power war and calamity. Alongside the fact the document makes little practical reference to China and does not openly endorse the US’s wider economic strategies in the region, it actively chooses ASEAN, extends an olive branch to Japan, and puts emphasis on international law, norms, and confidence building. 

The document itself - tactfully avoiding its grievances with China and the US - even emanates the ‘ASEAN way’ of rigorous pragmatism. In reality, the ROK has little interest in either of the great powers dominating the other, and so bolstering unpolarised fora in which problem-solving and great power management can happen is a top priority. ASEAN in the 2000s was hailed by academics as hugely successful in managing the great powers and allowing the group space to comfortably hedge. Southeast Asian nations, while often painted as aligned with either the US or China, are for the most part still broadly neutral, and in the words of David Kang are extremely keen to stay this way. Growing narratives, for example, suggest that Vietnam is de-facto aligned with the US due to growing mistrust with China. In reality, domestic Vietnamese analysts describe their place as a constant tightrope walk between two powers. The ROK has spent 2022 investing heavily in its ties with Vietnam and Indonesia especially, but with ASEAN more broadly. We should expect to see the ROK’s entrance into the Indo-Pacific going hand in hand with ASEAN, the body from which so much of the region’s institutional alphabet soup derives. 

Secondly, following several years of intense trade controversy over the wartime labour dispute and ongoing popular resentment towards Japan in the ROK, the Yoon government has taken considerable steps towards reconciliation, and highlights said cooperation as essential for regional stability. This should be seen as the ROK looking for a friend. Japan, too, has a great interest in regional cooperation, and is wary of the impacts of US economic measures on the region's stability. For the ROK to succeed in its goal of keeping great power conflict at bay, it is likely to seek Japan’s support. Through trilateral summits with China and Japan, there can be both progress and problem-solving at the regional level. If the ROK can achieve this ‘more Asian’ approach at managing regional affairs it reduces the US-centred nature of East Asian politics. Domestic barriers to the normalisation of Japan-ROK ties abound, but with the current administrations showing high willingness we expect more constructive politics. The ROK’s strategy involves strengthening the institutional bonds between Southeast and Northeast Asia, as well as the spokes that connect the individual nations. The policy gives language to the inclusion of Australia and India, but due to geographical proximity and the history of ASEAN+3 dialogues, the focus on Japan and ASEAN should be privileged. 

Conclusion

As a result, we can see the Global Pivotal State is highly motivated by economic security, keen to manoeuvre the hegemons into stabilising their portion of the security-economic order. We are not likely to see a triumphant alignment with the US as the region’s fabric continues to fray. The Global Pivotal State will aim to maintain inclusivity towards China, whilst trying to bolster the international order using regional voices to collectively push for the respect of international law and norms. By working with ASEAN’s interests of non-alignment, the ROK will seek to use institutionalised - but importantly Asian - pressure and socialisation techniques. With a wariness towards great power confrontation and economic conflict, the ROK will not throw its lot in with the US, though will continue to identify with its value-based vision and welcome a military presence that props up the status quo. Most intriguing, the Global Pivotal State will look to Japan - a nation with enormous economic and military bite - to support its efforts in building a stable, prosperous, and Asian order, capable of withstanding our fractious multipolarity.