What is next for Japan and East Asian security? An interview with Dr. Shogo Suzuki
Japan has a history of grappling with the issue of its own defence policy, with the traditional political camps divided over the question of its militarisation versus pacifism. In recent years, the policies most influential in this regard have been those of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who worked to ‘normalise’ the nation’s military and broaden the role of its Self Defence Forces (SDF). Among these were, for example, the participation of the SDF in foreign missions, as well as greater military equipment procurement methods. Such steps, seen as controversial in the time of Abe’s administration, are now transforming into slow but steady realisation, as Japan’s security environment increasingly undergoes change that does not warrant falling back on old habits.
Accordingly, in December of last year, Japan unveiled its most recent National Security Strategy (NSS), prompting a surge of debates and analyses around the role it plays in East Asian security and its potentially changing nature. The NSS, which had first been conceptualised in 2013, sets out a largely defensive posture, in keeping with Japan’s constitution, but also underscores the transformation of the security environment that the country finds itself in. Observers have pointed out that the document challenges previous policy positions and steers the country towards a more open view of security and defence capabilities, one that is backed by a change in public opinion. Acknowledging the implications of Russia’s war in Ukraine, and a continuous threat from North Korea and potentially China, the new NSS thus sets out clear goals for Japan’s future engagement in the region, and underlines its recent move to assume greater leadership of its own defence policy. This includes agreements with European states as a part of a greater commitment to contribute to an expanded Western alliance. The developments have already been somewhat welcomed by South Korea, as it continues to concentrate on the North Korean threat, which shows no signs of abating. The two countries recently issued a Joint Statement to strengthen their trilateral security cooperation with the United States, and have been engaged in what are termed ‘milestone’ talks since. Nevertheless, not all of Japan’s neighbours are likely to welcome these developments, for various reasons, not the least of which is what is still largely regarded as Japan’s “militarist” and colonial history, even in some domestic circles.
So, what is next for Japan and its role in East Asian security? To get better insight, I spoke with Dr Shogo Suzuki, a senior lecturer in politics at the University of Manchester, who specialises in East Asian international relations, Sino-Japanese relations, foreign policy and reconciliation, and Asia-Pacific security. Dr Suzuki joined the University of Manchester in 2007, after spending two years at the Centre of International Studies at the University of Cambridge, where he was a Mellon Foundation Postdoctoral Fellow. His engagements also include posts at the University of Copenhagen, University of Auckland, and Peking University.
Eva: Dr Suzuki, welcome, and thank you very much for your time. Before we get started, could you tell us a bit about your work on East Asian security, and what led you to pursue it?
Dr Suzuki: Thank you. Well, in many ways it’s by chance, really. I was always more interested in issues of post world war remembrance, but actually, for my PhD, I did 19th-century diplomacy, and the expansion of European international order in East Asia. In a way, it wasn’t something that I had as an academic mission, and East Asia only came into it because, well… apart from being born in Japan - I grew up there - I did Chinese at university. And since I had Japanese and Chinese, why not use the languages to good effect?
And security? I wasn’t particularly interested in things like guns or planes, but I was interested of course in war responsibility and how the war is remembered. Even as a teenager in Japan, I remember finding the kind of nationalistic tone, glorification, or attempts to downplay certain aspects of what Japan did in the past a bit weird, shall we say. I was always interested in that, and I guess things like security came when I stumbled across it reading literature on ontological security. And of course, I ended up doing East Asian security partly because security studies was the first ever course I taught after I finished my PhD. So, that’s how I ended up there.
Eva: So, what would you say has been Japan’s role in the region historically and how has it evolved?
Dr Suzuki: Well, how far back do you want to go? I mean, it is hard to say. I think until the 19th century Japan didn’t do much. As far as it was concerned, it kept a pretty low profile internationally. It maintained international relations, of course, with the Netherlands, China, Korea, Ryūkyū Kingdom, and present-day Okinawa… but it didn’t have much of a role. It becomes a regional power in the late 19th century when it starts acquiring its colonies, the first one in 1895 - when it annexed Taiwan and got its first colonial possessions. So, it became one of the great powers of the time and also probably the hegemon in East Asia, until, of course, it got defeated in 1945.
Since then, when it comes to a security role, it has mainly chosen to incorporate itself into an American security order, and in a way free-ride off it. That has been its role, or that is how it has been understood traditionally, and on the whole, it has been a passive actor. Of course, there have always been these ‘hawks’ who wanted Japan to play a greater role, but traditionally there has been a pacifist discourse. And I think that is eroding, but at the same time, there is still this reluctance to play a greater security role, mainly because it takes away from a lot of resources. Militaries cost money, but also where do you find the people? The SDF needs strong recruits. So, even if it wants to, it is not possible to play a big role without the United States, it is not possible to do. On the whole, then, Japan is still a fairly low-key actor, even though it is gradually pushing the envelope, bit by bit.
Eva: How would you say then that the pacifist role and the gradual movement away from it is perceived by Japan’s allies and adversaries?
Dr Suzuki: In terms of Japan’s allies, basically, America’s interest has always been getting Japan to play a greater role. And most of the time it has to do with its frustration that Japan is free-riding a bit too much. It was particularly a problem in the late 1980s, and early 1990s, when Japan was perceived as about to catch up with, or overtake America, and become the largest economic power. So, America has always asked these kinds of questions; why should we pay the human cost of protecting Japan? I think it was Donald Trump who said something like, “If we’re attacked, Japan doesn’t have to do anything. They can sit home and watch Sony television”, and that is pretty much the dynamic that has pushed the US to get Japan to… not militarise completely, and Japan probably doesn’t have the capacity to do that anyway, but to play a slightly larger role, maybe a more supportive role, and maybe start paying with blood rather than just money; to open the bank account isn’t enough; Japan needs to contribute human resources, and shoulder the human risk as well, rather than pushing the risks onto the Americans.
So, recent changes have meant that Japan’s SDF can play a more supportive role, let’s say in a combat which isn’t linked to Japan being directly attacked, but which might have implications for Japanese security. If the Americans are involved there, the Japanese SDF can now play a supporting role in those types of activities as well. And while this caused a huge fuss in Japan among certain quarters, it ultimately passed.
Eva: And how is this push by the US for a greater role for Japan perceived in neighbouring countries like South Korea and China, who are the historical victims of Japanese colonialism?
Dr Suzuki: Well, obviously, China does not like it. Traditionally though, both the South Koreans and the Chinese were happy to have the Americans there, because it prevented Japan from becoming a military power once more. But now America is seen more as the enabler, so China probably does not like it that much. Korea is not an area I know a lot about, so it is hard to say. There might be certain knee-jerk reactions to that as well, but probably less so than the Chinese reaction. Japan and Korea do have spats and they don’t get along, but whether or not they will clash militarily? I don’t think that’s something that is being seriously considered anyway. They are both key US allies and liberal democracies, so I doubt very much that the Americans will let that happen anyway.
Eva: Moving onto the more recent developments, particularly the new National Security Strategy, there seems to be an acknowledgment of the changing security environment and Japan’s role in it. Namely, “Japan is finding itself in the midst of the most severe and complex security environment since the end of WWII” (p. 35). How would you say then that the new NSS is likely to impact Japan’s relations with neighbouring countries?
Dr Suzuki: Well, it depends on which neighbours you look at. I hardly think Taiwan is going to be that bothered about it. The United States is probably going to welcome it; finally, Japan is paying a bit more than it used to, rather than free-riding off the US. I think the main actor that would not like it is China. China is identified as Japan’s main hypothetical adversary in its security policy planning. The Japanese military is primarily trained for, and the strategic planning is based on a possible clash with China, nowadays. It used to be the Soviet Union, now Russia, but it’s shifting more and more towards China. So, I think China is more likely to feel like it is on the receiving end of this; that’s the country that is most likely to react negatively towards it.
Eva: How are these dynamics likely to play out for the defence alliance in the coming year and beyond? What’s spelled out for the future of Japan’s security role in East Asia?
Dr Suzuki: To be honest, I don’t see any radical change. Most Japanese opinion polls seem to suggest that when it comes to what should be done with defence spending, or how Japan’s defence policy should change, the reaction is pretty much one of maintaining the status quo. I think what Japan is most likely to do is to make absolutely sure that it embraces America in an ever tighter grip, so as not to get abandoned, and at the same time try to still capitalise on its alliance with the United States, so they don’t have to spend more. If the Americans withdraw and Japan wants to maintain the same level of deterrence, it has to spend tons of money, much more than it does now. Japan can’t afford to do that. It has a huge national debt, an ageing population, most people don’t want to pay more taxes, and people also don’t want to become soldiers. So, I can’t see a radical change, all things held equal.
If North Korea, or let’s say China start becoming more aggressive, then that might change the game. North Korea will probably not become a greater problem, assuming that it’s rational. It is probably not going to do anything totally stupid - it is mainly about protecting the regime, and regime survival. So, I don’t think it is going to do anything that is going to reduce it to the stone age, that would be a rather silly thing to do. And what will China do? We don’t know. But despite all the rhetoric, I don’t think the Chinese are that bothered by it yet.
So, in the next two or three years, I don’t think we will see that big of a difference. Obviously, if the US administration changes, and they get another Trumpist saying that we are going to withdraw from Japan and let them deal with their own stuff, things could change, but I don’t really see that happening.
Eva: Thank you very much, Dr. Suzuki, for your insight and for agreeing to speak with me.
Dr Suzuki: No problem, thank you!
Concluding analysis
Thus, according to Dr Suzuki, the overall outlook is one of steady, perhaps incremental change in Japan’s security policy, but not something that should cause undue speculation or concern in the near future. The nation might be changing its position quite significantly since its post-WWII constitution went into effect, however, equally considerable caution remains in both political and public circles. The main shift can be seen in Japan’s contributions to an already existing security alliance, as well as its priorities in East Asian security, which are pivoting towards an emphasis on China and North Korea, rather than the historical adversary, Russia. Despite domestic concerns and considerations, these two factors in fact have one actor in common: the United States.
From the beginning, Japan’s post-WWII security policy has largely been defined by its relationship with the United States. In the historical context of the Cold War, and persistent great power rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union meant that Japan’s relationship with the former reflected these geopolitical circumstances. The emphasis on countering the Soviet Union, and Russia in the 1990s, in the post-war security policy of East Asia, is thus understandable, given the extent of Japan’s reliance on the US alliance. Presently, the United States makes its pivot towards China as the number one strategic adversary in the security domain abundantly clear. And Japan, once again it seems, follows suit. At the same time, it is important to remember Japan’s own autonomy and agency in its international security policy. As Dr Suzuki specifies, China and North Korea are, after all, Japan’s neighbours - countries quite far away geographically from the United States. It is therefore ultimately up to Japan to ensure its national security.
This article has been made possible by the insightful contribution of Dr Shogo Suzuki of the University of Manchester, to whom this author wishes to express her sincere gratitude.