Between Leverage and Diplomacy: Afghanistan’s Growing Ties with Central Asia
Executive Summary
Afghanistan remains unrecognised by any state or multilateral institution, with limited formal diplomatic channels, especially with Western countries.
Informal regional relations have emerged, initially led by Pakistan and China but now increasingly involving Central Asian states.
Deteriorating Afghan-Pakistan relations and China’s frustrations with regional security risks could force Afghanistan to prioritise CA states in its quest for recognition.
Afghanistan holds leverage over CA states, particularly through regional security dynamics, economic connectivity, and control over water resources, creating potential avenues for coercion.
The evolving Afghan-CA relationships merit close monitoring due to implications for regional stability and international diplomatic strategies.
Introduction
Afghanistan remains diplomatically isolated, with no formal recognition from any state or multilateral organisation. The United Nations has denied the Taliban a seat, and the Taliban, in turn, rejected UN envoy proposals. Engagement with Western nations has also diminished, as evidenced by the Taliban cutting ties with diplomatic missions abroad and Western countries refusing to accept Taliban-appointed diplomats. Limited communication continues via intermediaries, such as Qatar, primarily to address deportations.
Despite this, Afghanistan has forged informal ties with regional states. China and Pakistan initially led these efforts. China became the first country to accept a Taliban-appointed ambassador and retained its diplomatic presence in Kabul. Pakistan followed closely, granting the Taliban access to its embassy in Islamabad as early as October 2021. Both countries maintained their diplomatic missions in Kabul and facilitated Afghanistan's early international outreach. Central Asian states (CA) have since followed, albeit cautiously. However, recent fractures in Afghan-Pakistan relations and growing Chinese frustrations with regional instability may shift Afghanistan’s focus towards CA states. This raises pressing questions about Afghan-CA relations, the Taliban’s leverage, and the potential for coercion in its pursuit of recognition.
Deteriorating Afghan-Pakistan Relations: A Critical Juncture
Relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, historically fraught with tension, have recently entered a phase of sharp deterioration. Pakistan has persistently accused the Taliban of sheltering militant groups, notably the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which has intensified cross-border attacks. Adding to the strain, China—Pakistan’s strategic ally—has expressed growing frustration over assaults on its nationals in Pakistan, allegedly orchestrated by groups based in Afghanistan. The situation further escalated on 24th December 2024, when Pakistan carried out airstrikes on Afghan territory, prompting retaliatory attacks by Afghan forces along the border.
As tensions escalate, China may not only face growing challenges but also exhibit a decreasing willingness to advocate for Afghanistan’s integration, particularly if pressured by Pakistan to adopt a more assertive stance. This shifting dynamic diminishes Afghanistan’s expectations of support from China and Pakistan—both of whom previously championed its reintegration—potentially prompting Kabul to recalibrate its strategy by leveraging ties with Central Asian states to achieve recognition, or even pressuring them to advance its diplomatic goals. Given these states’ increasing vulnerability to security, economic, and water-related challenges linked to Afghanistan, analysing these evolving relationships is imperative.
Afghan-CA Relations in Focus
CA states have engaged Afghanistan to varying degrees, forming a spectrum of relationships:
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan were among the first to establish formal engagement with the Taliban government. Turkmenistan transferred control of its embassy in Ashgabat to a Taliban-appointed Chargé d’Affaires in March 2022, while Uzbekistan followed in early 2023 and went further by accrediting a Taliban-appointed ambassador in October 2024. Both countries maintain economic ties with Afghanistan, with Uzbekistan having already signed multiple agreements. Additionally, they are actively involved in water negotiations related to Afghanistan’s Qosh Tepa Canal.
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have taken a more cautious approach but have gradually expanded their engagement with the Taliban. Kazakhstan removed the Taliban from its terrorist list in 2023, accepted a Taliban-appointed Chargé d’Affaires, and signed the first bilateral trade agreement, focusing on economic cooperation. Similarly, Kyrgyzstan delisted the Taliban as a terrorist organisation and established formal dialogue channels.
Tajikistan with its longstanding opposition to the Taliban and their religious extremism, remains the most resistant to their rule, , openly opposing the Taliban and hosting Afghan opposition leaders, including members of the National Resistance Front—an anti-Taliban resistance group. It has also retained control of its embassy through officials appointed by the previous government. Nevertheless, Tajikistan has made limited concessions, including transferring control of its consulate in Gorno-Badakhshan to Taliban representatives and continuing electricity deliveries based on agreements established during the previous government.
The Taliban’s Leverage: Opportunities for Coercion
The Taliban’s leverage over CA states varies, largely shaped by economic dependencies, security vulnerabilities, and water resource management:
Uzbekistan relies heavily on water from the Amu Darya river, which Afghanistan controls through the Qosh Tepa Canal, while also standing to benefit from improved regional connectivity via the Trans-Afghan railway, linking it to South Asian markets through Pakistan. Because of its economic engagement in trade and investment, Uzbekistan maintains a balanced relationship—aside from the water issue—effectively limiting Afghanistan’s capacity for coercion.
Turkmenistan, similarly dependent on water from the Amu Darya, which is controlled by Afghanistan, also relies heavily on Afghanistan for regional economic connectivity. Key projects such as the TAPI pipeline—linking Turkmenistan’s vast gas reserves to South Asian markets—and the Lapis Lazuli Corridor are central to Turkmenistan’s efforts to diversify its economic routes, particularly in the face of competition from Russian gas exports. These dependencies afford Afghanistan considerable coercive leverage over Turkmenistan.
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are less directly impacted by Afghanistan due to their greater geographic distance. However, both remain exposed to regional security threats and seek to strengthen economic connectivity. Cooperation with Afghanistan aids their efforts to manage transnational risks and advance economic interests. Given this dynamic, Afghanistan holds only limited coercive leverage over Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
Tajikistan’s primary interest in Afghanistan centres on border security, particularly concerning its Gorno-Badakhshan region. Since 2022, Dushanbe has sought to consolidate control in this area, cracking down on regional networks. Tajikistan relies on the Taliban to secure the porous border, both to restrict these networks and to combat drug trafficking. However, Tajikistan retains significant leverage by supporting Afghan opposition groups and continuing electricity exports to Afghanistan. Furthermore, Tajikistan’s strategic partnership with China, which maintains a military presence in the region, further limits Afghanistan’s coercive influence.
Overarching regional security challenges—particularly threats posed by ISIS-K and aligned groups like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)—affect all CA states. These common security vulnerabilities significantly increase Afghanistan’s leverage and make it a necessary partner for cooperation.
Conclusion: Implications and Recommendations
Deteriorating relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan—and potentially China—may push the Taliban to deepen ties with CA states as an alternative pathway to international recognition. While Afghanistan has gradually cultivated these relationships, the prospect of leveraging economic dependencies, water resources, and regional security vulnerabilities introduces significant risks for CA states.
Uzbekistan—and particularly Turkmenistan—appear notably vulnerable due to their immediate reliance on economic connectivity and water access. Tajikistan, despite maintaining an oppositional stance, remains partially reliant on Taliban cooperation for border security and counter-narcotic measures.
Given these dynamics, the international community must monitor Afghan-CA relations closely. Policymakers should prioritise supporting CA states in managing dependencies, strengthening regional stability, and mitigating Afghanistan’s capacity for coercion. Collaborative approaches that leverage multilateral institutions and regional frameworks can enable Central Asian (CA) states to address this emerging challenge more effectively. The Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC) serves as a prime example. By facilitating a unified position in engagements with Afghanistan, the ICWC offers a structured framework that could inform and guide future negotiations, ensuring a more coordinated and strategic response, and promoting regional cohesion among CA states.