Afghanistan’s Qosh Tepa Canal: Water Scarcity in Central Asia and its Geopolitical Dimension
Water scarcity, increasingly indivisible from the climate crisis, is already one of the great threats of the Anthropocene affecting people, places, and politics across the globe. Central Asia, around 60% of which is desert, ranks high in global measures of water risk – a situation set to worsen with continued global warming. While governments from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan have begun taking action to mitigate some aspects of this problem, new threats are constantly cresting the horizon. One of these is the construction of the Qosh Tepa canal by Afghanistan, an undertaking which seeks to divert water into the country’s desert centre as an attempt to enliven the agricultural sector. The water for this project is being syphoned from the Amu Darya River – the source upon which much of Central Asia depends.
Map of the region: Aqueduct Water Risk Atlas
The issue of water-sharing has a long human history and can be found across the globe today, from the Nile to the Indus and Mekong. In Central Asia, water has been recognised as a precious and finite resource since records began, so it is no surprise, considering the scale of population growth since the start of the 20th century, that such anxieties exist and are exacerbated today. United Nations data predicts a population of over 100 million by 2050 – an alarming figure considering how, according to a 2024 study by the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB), 14% of the population already lacks access to clean drinking water. The scale and complexity of Central Asia’s water problems are too extensive to address in full here. The effects of anthropogenic climate change are compounded by the water-intensive agricultural legacy left behind by the Soviet Union which accounts for 80% of the region’s water use (most of which is the result of a cotton-monoculture prioritised over traditional crops). The water available is also poorly managed, and its associated infrastructure obsolescent. Monitoring and policy support are limited, and despite consumption growing steadily every year, tariffs are low. As a result, the issues of water scarcity, though also environmental, are in large part worsened by mismanagement: across Central Asia, water and sanitation networks reportedly suffer up to 80% wear and tear, and a huge proportion of network infrastructure requires immediate replacement. All the while, up to 55% of water is lost throughout the distribution process, and what remains is increasingly unsafe to drink.
Amidst this brewing crisis, Afghanistan is pushing ahead with the construction of the Qosh Tepa canal, a 115-mile investment in the country’s future hoping to restore agricultural production to its increasingly inhospitable heartlands. Set for completion in 2028, the canal seeks to divert up to 20% of the Amu Darya’s river into the centre of Afghanistan – a river which runs from its source in the Pamir mountains through to the Aral Sea.
Serving as the frontier between Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in the north, the Amu Darya is a resource upon which the region as a whole depends. Surveys by agencies such as the Central Asian Bureau for Analytical Reporting, scepticism from environmental watchdogs, and independent experts have all not only raised concerns about the project’s consequences for water scarcity in the region, but questioned the quality of its construction. Serious leaks have been detected using satellite imagery, outside observers query the structural sufficiency of its engineering, and experts have voiced fears over the possibility of widespread salinisation through mismanagement.
Map of the waterways
Despite initially expressing concerns over the significant reduction of water flowing to regions which were already water stressed, the Central Asian governments have, in general, been somewhat tiptoeing around the issue. After a cautious beginning, all but Tajikistan have, in large part, settled into comfortable diplomatic relations with the Taliban post 2021. In part, this is due to the increasingly interlinked economic relationship between each of the Central Asian countries and Afghanistan: Uzbekistan, for instance, as well as being the country most threatened by the Qosh Tepa project, had in 2023 a trade turnover reaching $266 million with Afghanistan – six times greater than in 2022. A similar story can be seen in Turkmenistan, the other key recipient of the Amu Darya’s river basin, whose trade volume with Afghanistan has doubled in the last year. Despite their serious issues with domestic supply, Central Asian countries particularly profit off exporting electricity to Afghanistan at approximately double the price of tariffs at home. There is likewise huge excitement about the potential Central Asian-Afghan railway under discussion which would open up a trans-Afghan corridor, allowing for serious bilateral trade with Pakistan. In addition to these immediate term economic benefits, Central Asian countries not only seek to contain the presence of political Islam in their own societies, but they, along with Moscow, rely on the Taliban to control the export of extremism out of Afghanistan. As such, the continuing conversation about the Qosh Tepa canal is restrained by other concerns.
It is evident that this will need to change. The facts as we know them paint a deeply concerning picture, one which foreshadows mass migration, agricultural and economic collapse, and escalating conflict. The Amu Darya is crucial for irrigating agricultural produce worth up to 17% of Uzbekistan’s, and 10% of Turkmenistan’s GDP. With the severe reduction in flow towards the Aral Sea basin, already imperilled by poor irrigation systems and global warming, whole swathes of farmable land may have to be abandoned. Mass eastwards migration away from the desert western half of Uzbekistan will see an increase in population density on its eastern border with Tajikistan – a zone long fraught with territorial disputes, and one which continues to see violent clashes over ethnic tensions, energy disparities, and the control of water. Qosh Tepa will likewise be the final nail in the coffin for the Aral Sea – a rapidly diminishing body of water, once the fourth-largest lake in the world, which used to occupy large parts of northwest Uzbekistan and Southern Kazakhstan. Long sapped in order to satiate these countries’ agricultural needs, it has decreased by 90% in the last 50 years. While the Amu Darya already fails to flow into the Aral Sea where it once had its mouth, the predicted 15% decrease in waterflow will destroy any chance of saving it from total ecological collapse. The catastrophic effects of its disappearance are already being felt by its surrounding population who suffer from food shortages and poor health from drinking the polluted, salinated water. Storms of toxic dust, laced with carcinogenic pesticides, likewise have had widespread health impacts.
Water scarcity on the scale predicted will impact life across the region. Intolerable living conditions, coupled with a decline in agricultural capabilities, may see a mass migration of people for which each of the Central Asian governments is ill-prepared. With mass migration and socio-economic discontent comes poverty, conflict, and perhaps even violence – all issues for which climate change is a threat multiplier. Responsibility for this building catastrophe cannot be laid solely at Afghanistan’s door; the construction of the canal may be an accelerant, but the impending crisis was already well underway. It should likewise be remembered that the Qosh Tepa project is, in and of itself, an attempt to mitigate these exact same issues which are occurring in Afghanistan today. Moreover, it is only now – with the stability afforded by the Taliban’s control – that Afghanistan is able to launch a solution of this kind after years of being excluded from the water sharing agreements established across Central Asia (a combined legacy of Soviet influence over the region and Afghanistan’s own state of conflict). There is an argument to be made that Afghanistan is entitled to this share of the water, especially considering its chronic food shortages and the sheer scale of water-wastage conducted in Central Asia’s recent history. And yet, its persistence in this project will undoubtedly cripple its downstream neighbours so as to have knock-on consequences for Afghanistan itself. In 2023, for instance, violence broke out between the Taliban and Iran over the Helmand river: it is possible that Afghanistan's claim on the Amu Darya will trigger something similar.
Regardless of the Qosh Tepa project, Central Asia as a whole must act immediately to preserve what resources it has left. In the big picture, water consumption – both general systemic consumption and inefficient overuse – must decrease, management of existing supply improve through better infrastructure, and provisions put in place for the eventual (and likely inevitable) migration of people. The economy needs to shift away from its dependence on water-intensive agriculture, and water tariffs might be raised to incentivise conservation. While the green transition ought to help by offering an alternative zone of industry, issues spring out of the fact that many renewable energy sources are deeply water dependent. The technologies behind Kazakhstan’s forthcoming green hydrogen project, for instance, require large volumes of water to function. The same is evidently true for hydroelectricity. While Tajikistan may have significantly more water than the rest of Central Asia, its reliance on hydropower for the vast majority of its electricity makes it dependent on a resource which is increasingly unstable due to prolonged drought and the shrinking of glaciers in the Pamir mountains. Even Kyrgyzstan, the second least water-poor of the Central Asian countries, reported that on the 4th of March 2024 its Toktogul reservoir (which provides water for farmland in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan), was radically below usual levels at 7.7 billion cubic metres (bcm) – its hydropower plant will stop working at 6.5 bcm.
The EDB’s 2024 report makes it clear that any attempt at resolving the region’s water issues must take an integrated approach with solutions addressing systemic issues on an institutional, technical, and financial level. While overall, an emphasis is placed on devolution and localised public-private-partnerships, the report stresses that an independent national regulatory body should be formed to oversee investments made to the water and sanitation companies, and to impress the overall objectives upon the multifaceted system. The fact remains, however, that the gap between the water sector’s financing needs and its achievable financing goals is huge – estimated at $12 billion for the period between 2025-2030. Factoring in the Qosh Tepa canal sees the situation become even more complex. As it stands, communication between the most affected Central Asian countries and Afghanistan is ongoing, but proving unproductive. While there have been suggestions that the Taliban is attempting to use its chokehold over water in the region as an international bargaining tool, the Taliban’s reticence and passive placation seems indicative of a policy based more upon immediate need and domestic political gain. While the third International Water Conference was held in Dushanbe in June 2024, very little actionable policy has been taken forwards – other than a supposed re-affirmation of a commitment to the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals. More encouraging was the 2023 trilateral summit between Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan. The emphasis placed on regional cooperation at this event could perhaps encourage refreshed versions of the kind of bilateral water agreements established in the newly independent Central Asia of the 1990’s. If this does occur, Afghanistan must be involved to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past.