Azerbaijan’s Snap Presidential Election 2024 - Present and Future Implications
Overview and key takeaways
On 7 December 2023, President Ilham Aliyev called for moving the originally scheduled 2025 elections to 7 February 2024. The concept of a snap election is not unfamiliar to Azerbaijan, as the previous election in 2018 was similarly called on early, where Aliyev secured approximately 86% of the vote. The forthcoming election results are anticipated to align with the observed trend: the continuation of Ilham Aliyev’s leadership since 2003. Despite the presence of six other candidates, long-standing deficiencies within Azerbaijan’s electoral system, in addition to the recent victory in Nagorno-Karabakh, are expected to pose minimal challenge to Aliyev’s incumbency. It is highly probable that he will retain his position of power.
Domestic politics: favouring incumbency
The Republic of Azerbaijan is classified as a consolidated authoritarian regime, despite its constitution proclaiming it to be a semi-presidential republic. Although presidential elections are conducted on a regular basis through popular votes, they are frequently marred by unfair practices, including electoral frauds and media censorship. The country has operated under de facto authoritarian rule since its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, where transitions of power are orchestrated to maintain continuity within the ruling elite. The political landscape has been dominated by the Aliyev family since 1993, with Ilham Aliyev currently in his 4th term.
The Constitution and the Election Code constitute the main regulatory framework for presidential elections. Two constitutional amendments made by Aliyev have significantly altered the electoral landscape: the 2009 amendments removed presidential term limits; the 2016 amendments extended the presidential term from five to seven years and introduced snap elections, which allow Aliyev to call early presidential elections. This new framework has been instrumental in consolidating the power of the ruling authority, eliminating mechanisms of accountability, and further entrenching Aliyev’s administration.
Democratic electoral process has been facing profound challenges, including the lack of political diversity and restrictions on opposition. Upon the enactment of a new law on political parties on 11th January 2023, which has since led to the dissolution of 15 parties and further constricted the operational space for the opposition, their outlook is decidedly grim. In the parliament, the ruling New Azerbaijani Party (YAP), led by President Aliyev, commands an overwhelming majority. During the 2020 early parliamentary election, YAP secured 70 out of 125 seats, with the remaining seats divided among self-nominated candidates (42), the Civil Solidarity Party (3), and six other parties. It is noteworthy that among the self-nominated candidates, a portion were members of major opposition parties, which had boycotted the parliamentary elections but permitted their members to run as independents. The Popular Front of Azerbaijan Party (PFAP) and The Musavat Party currently stand as the main opposition. Together with the National Council of Democratic Forces, an alliance of opposition groups, they have boycotted two presidential elections (2008 and 2018), the 2020 parliamentary election, and have pledged to boycott this year’s presidential election as well. Through boycotts, opposition parties demand a fair and equitable electoral process and the advancement of human rights. At the same time, opposition groups have shown minimal efforts to mobilise public support, most likely influenced by the increased focus on Armenia-related matters. This notable absence of opposition forces leaves Aliyev with an unquestionable victory.
Although the 2024 presidential election features a total of seven candidates, the other six contenders seemingly act as participants in a performance simulating pluralism and democratic process instead of as challengers. During a TV debate on 17th January, all six candidates openly praised Aliyev’s victory in Nagorno-Karabakh and the governance of YAP, without offering any critique of the current regime. One of the candidates, Zahid Oruj, who was appointed by Aliyev as head of the Social Research Center, praised Aliyev as a ‘great leader’ and expressed his desire for the continuation of Azerbaijan’s victory, implying his support for Aliyev.
Electoral justice in Azerbaijan is further sabotaged by the lack of media freedom. With the enactment of a new Media Law in 2022, Azerbaijan’s already limited space for independent journalism and media has encountered even greater obstacles. The legislation eliminates the presence of foreign media within Azerbaijan, while its ambiguous provisions give authority to arbitrarily shut down media agencies. Media censorship has become particularly acute as the election approaches, with reports of 10 journalists arrested since November on various charges, including smuggling foreign currency, hooliganism, and illegal house-construction. This crackdown on dissent leads to elections that are merely ceremonial and performative, undermining the integrity and legitimacy of the electoral process.
Nevertheless, there has not been evidence suggesting whether electoral injustice will impact voter turnout. Since Aliyev first took office, voter turnout in presidential elections has consistently remained around 75%. Reports from the Central Election Committee show that the total number of permanent registered voters now stands at approximately 6.3 million, an increase of 1 million since the 2018 election.
Regional and international politics: Nagorno-Karabakh
This snap election follows Azerbaijan’s victory in Nagorno-Karabakh, a strategic move by Aliyev to capitalise on the current victorious nationalistic sentiments and support for his leadership. In September 2023, Azerbaijan regained control of Nagorno-Karabakh with a lightning operation. The operation was framed within a broader irredentist conflict with Armenia to maintain state and national identity. The triumph in Karabakh significantly boosted faith in Aliyev’s leadership and diminished the potency of any opposition arguments. However, in the longer term, an ideological vacuum emerges: if Aliyev fails to redirect public attention to a new rallying point, dissatisfaction with his authoritarian regime may resurface, potentially undermining his legitimacy.
Despite a mutually expressed willingness for peace and clear territorial definitions, a peace agreement with Armenia has repeatedly been postponed. In November 2023, Azerbaijan refused to take part in a meeting with Armenia’s foreign minister in Washington, sending a clear signal to keep regional conflicts localised. The potential normalisation of relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia, as envisaged by peace negotiations, would signal the termination of a protracted political strategy rooted in the unresolved conflict that has structured Azerbaijani dynamics for over three decades. Even if a peace agreement is eventually made, the process of constructing and refining a conflict resolution framework is anticipated to be lengthy. In the interim, it is likely that Aliyev will continue to commemorate the Nagorno-Karabakh victory, in order to sustain nationalist sentiments and public support.
Moreover, the leadership has been able to capitalise on the geopolitical void precipitated by the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Aliyev assumed leadership of the 120-member Non-Aligned Movement, steering its institutionalisation and thereby bolstering its efficacy, as well as assuming a pivotal role as one of the architects of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), leveraging the momentum engendered by the Karabakh victory to bolster OTS influence in Eurasian affairs. Aliyev’s emphasis on the Zangezur Corridor has also become increasingly pronounced during the past month. With strong support from Turkey, he has repeatedly expressed a keen interest in establishing this corridor, which would directly link Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave by cutting through Armenia without border checks. In January 2024 Aliyev recurred to his advocacy for the Zangezur Corridor, threatening not to open any border with Armenia if Zangezur was not constructed. This demand again exacerbated tensions in Azerbaijani-Armenian relations, and emerged as a potential short-term strategy for Aliyev to perpetuate his nationalist narrative, while placing pressure on the already fragile bilateral relationship.
There is further indication of a longer-term strategy, with a shift away from the West. Only the OSCE/ODIHR has been invited to observe the election, while the European Parliament, a common observer in previous elections, has been excluded. While it is not a definitive indicator of rising hostility towards Western countries, it marks a shift towards an increasingly anti-colonial and anti-imperial rhetoric, albeit selectively applied. For instance, Armenia’s biggest European ally, France, is the primary target, while the United Kingdom was invited to an anti-neocolonial conference in Baku in October 2023. Similarly, the United States has been accused by Azerbaijan of bias and interference in its internal affairs. This also benefits Azerbaijan’s efforts to prevent more Western actors from entering regional politics of the Southern Caucasus.
Strategic partners
With Armenia’s pivot towards the West, ties between Azerbaijan and Russia have been strengthened. Despite some concerns and dissatisfaction among the Azerbaijani public towards Russia, President Aliyev’s continued leadership provides a stable foundation for this relationship to flourish. Azerbaijan has emerged as a key strategic partner for Russia in the South Caucasus. On the one hand, Azerbaijan acts as a conduit for Russia’s natural gas exports to Europe, and has been purchasing Russian gas to fulfil increasing European demand through the Southern Gas Corridor, thereby partially helping Russia circumvent EU sanctions. In terms of geopolitical dynamics, a Russo-Azerbaijani axis has emerged: Azerbaijan has replaced Armenia as Russia’s proxy to maintain its influence in the South Caucasus, while Russia provides diplomatic support for Azerbaijan in the United Nations Security Council, and refrains from criticising its operation in Nagorno-Karabakh. Additionally, there is a possibility that Azerbaijan may follow in the footsteps of Russia and withdraw from the Council of Europe and pivot from a balanced foreign policy to one that is more aligned with Russia. The two countries appear to have aligned their interests, intentionally excluding Western presence from South Caucasus, and seeking to deter or obstruct Armenia’s pivot to the West. As long as Aliyev’s regime continues, the authoritarian consensus is expected to persist, resisting Western influences and international legal instruments.
Another crucial strategic ally for Azerbaijan is Turkey. Rooted in strong ethnic, cultural, and historical connections, Turkey’s support for Azerbaijan tends to be more direct compared to Russia’s. During the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Turkey provided a significant amount of military support to Azerbaijan, from technology to army building. Since the launch of the Zangezur Corridor plan, Turkish president Erdoğan has been vigorously urging its construction, demonstrating Turkey’s ongoing commitment to Azerbaijan’s strategic objectives. Indeed, Turkey's support is also driven by its own interests in expanding its influence in the South Caucasus, a region where Russia’s influence is perceived to be decreasing. Azerbaijan, with its historically positive relations with Turkey, serves as an ideal partner. The enduring friendship and mutual objectives between the two countries are expected to persist beyond the election.
Business opportunities
A significant factor influencing Azerbaijan’s domestic politics has been the revenue from oil windfalls, leading to its characterisation as a ‘rentier state’. Overtime Aliyev’s government has forged a robust alliance with various nations and energy corporations. The continuation of his rule will most likely fortify these relationships further, and allow stability for operating businesses to continue. With significant reserves of gas and oil, Azerbaijan exported a total of 11.4 billion cubic metres of gas to Europe in 2022 and has recently committed to double this quantity by 2027. Economic cooperation allows Azerbaijan to adeptly avoid direct conflicts with European interests, despite the threat of sanctions. Azerbaijan’s high dependence on the oil-gas sector (35% of GDP and 90% of exports) currently indicates low levels of economic diversification, although the country possesses substantial potential for generating solar and offshore wind energy and has started pursuing a new diversification strategy. This shift is expected to catalyse more business opportunities within the green energy sectors, although its success remains unpredictable. The country has demonstrated proficiency in stimulating interest and securing non-binding agreements for new renewable energy ventures, but has grappled with obstacles in actualizing these projects. Furthermore, Azerbaijan is attempting to assert itself as a key player in this area by hosting the COP29. At the same time, this is likely to bring closer scrutiny of its climate policies and assessment of compatibility with the Paris Agreement.
The Infrastructure sector is also on the rise in Azerbaijan’s market. As a key member of IGC-TRACECA, Azerbaijan serves as a crucial hub for economic relations and transportation links between the EU, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. To capitalise on its strategic position, Azerbaijan is investing heavily in developing its transportation infrastructure. The focus on the Zangezur Corridor also suggests significant investment in infrastructure to enhance connectivity with Nakhchivan and Turkey, potentially benefiting construction, logistics, and trade sectors.
Conclusion and forecast
The 2024 snap election is unlikely to mark a significant shift in Azerbaijan’s domestic political landscape, with Aliyev expected to maintain his grip on power. Thus, while reinforcing the existing wave of presidential legitimacy and executive authority, it raises concerns regarding democratic checks and balances. Given his gradual tightening and centralising of control, the space for opposition and democratic discourse will likely continue to diminish. This is further evidenced by the increasingly prominent public presence of Heydar Aliyev junior alongside government officials, indicating the potential of another dynastic succession within the country.
In the geopolitical space, following the retake of Nagorno-Karabakh, the leader’s attention is now projected to pivot towards a new ambition, namely securing the Zangezur Corridor from Armenia. Increasing antagonism towards Western countries and closer strategic partnerships with other authoritarian regimes, such as Russia and Turkey, are also to be expected. Although Aliyev’s continued leadership is not conducive to Azerbaijan’s democratic transition, the regime’s stability is favourable for the investment and business environments.