The Middle Corridor - A Tool for China and Türkiye to Extend Their Influence Over Central Asia and the Caucasus
Executive summary
The Middle Corridor is a trade route initiated by Türkiye in 2009 and connecting Asia to Europe.
With Russia’s war in Ukraine, Central Asia and the Caucasus are seeking to diversify their partnerships, turning to China and Türkiye for trade development, especially through the Middle Corridor.
The current geopolitical situation provides opportunities for Beijing and Ankara to advance their influence in the region, through development and regional stability initiatives, the promotion of the Middle Corridor being at the centre of these efforts.
Renewed interest in the Middle Corridor
The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR or Middle Corridor) is a land-based trade route connecting China to Europe, closely tracing the ancient Silk Road. The project was launched in 2013 with an agreement between representative companies from China, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, and later expanded into an official committee (2014) and international association (2017). It encompasses about 4,250 km of rail lines and 500 km of seaway, and recorded an increase in goods transport from 350,000 tons (2020) to 3.2 million tons (2022).
The Middle Corridor is thus gaining prominence, especially given regional and geopolitical developments. Trade and energy alternatives to the Northern Corridor (which passes through sanctioned Russia and Belarus) are sought after. This prominence confers direct and indirect benefits on most states in the Central Asia and Caucasus region, but it also opens them up to geopolitical influence, especially from China and Türkiye.
The need for diversified regional cooperation
The potential for Chinese influence through the Middle Corridor is not an entirely new phenomenon, with economic ties strengthening in the past couple of decades. Yet with Russia’s attention focused elsewhere, and the United States’ presence in the region weakening as a result of withdrawal from Afghanistan, countries in the region have intensified efforts to diversify their economic and security guarantors, with a bid to strategically balance between them. With its historical ties to the region, and the potential to benefit in both the economic and security domains, China emerges as a strong contender. While the majority of diplomatic exchange between Central Asia and China has been focused on the economic front, the attention it is given also masks gradual security activities, which have been a priority for China since the start. Chinese influence on the Middle Corridor developments thus impacts on a range of domestic, regional, and global issues.
Türkiye’s regional role in the Caucasus and Central Asia has evolved considerably in the last decades, and even more so since Russia’s war in Ukraine. The war has prompted Central Asian countries to reconsider their relations with Russia. While China appears to be a partner of choice, they do not wish to depend on Beijing either. Türkiye therefore seems to be another alternative to these two powers. Aware of this situation, Ankara is taking advantage to promote its interests in Central Asia and the Caucasus, in particular by making the Middle Corridor the centrepiece of its foreign policy in the region. With the launch of the Middle Corridor, Türkiye is seeking to build an alternative multimodal route linking Europe to Asia and strengthen regional cooperation and coordination with transit countries along the TITR. As a result, the TITR not only offers Türkiye a direct connection with Eurasia, but also enables the development of privileged relations with Turkic states participating in the development of the Middle Corridor, including Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, as they see it as an attractive alternative to the Northern Corridor and seek to strengthen Ankara’s involvement in the region.
Greater Chinese and Turkish presence in Central Asia and the Caucasus
Domestic stability: While the Middle Corridor is a primarily economic endeavour, its potential as a trade route between China and the wider Central Asia and Caucasus region opens up the possibility of transfer of internal security infrastructure, as well as traditional objects of trade. In line with China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI), Central Asian domestic governments are also interested in greater regional and domestic stability, prompting an increased uptake of Chinese aid and support in the spheres of law enforcement and the internal apparatus of domestic security. The Middle Corridor thus provides the means for the expansion of Chinese influence in material as well as institutional terms.
Global Initiatives: GSI is one of three long-term projects focused on re-establishing the prominence of the ancient Silk Road in the modern age. As such, Central Asia is of particular interest when pursuing the goals of these initiatives. The other two include the Global Development Initiative (GDI) and the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI). Aside from gaining better access to European markets in the economic domain, the GDI and GCI supplement regional security by financing ‘soft power’ - broader societal development - in counteraction to the post-Cold War influence of the United States. To this end, China has allocated $3.8 million in support of Central Asian development through the GDI alone, including the financing of trade route improvements through the Middle Corridor.
Diversified economic opportunities: While Western sanctions against Russia prevent Central Asian countries from using the Northern Corridor, the fear of suffering the same fate as Ukraine is forcing them to reconsider and decrease their dependence on Russia. The Middle Corridor, which attracted little interest when the idea was first put forward, has regained momentum as it opens up Central Asia and the Caucasus to a new sanctions-free trade route, but also to new markets more quickly, enabling them to diversify their trade relations. In addition, the Middle Corridor allows infrastructure and economic development in all the countries it crosses, the construction of the Trans-Kazakhstan railroad, the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway, and the Marmaray tunnel in Istanbul being prime examples. If used effectively, the TITR could offer Caucasus and Central Asian countries major economic opportunities by enabling them to benefit from trade between China and the European Union, which is estimated to be worth $600 billion annually.
Regional influence: Türkiye seeks to extend its economic, political, and cultural relations with the five Turkic Republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia, namely Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan, to unite them under its leadership, which it is doing in particular through the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS). The OTS plays a major role in the development of the TITR, as all its members, bilaterally or multilaterally, show a determination to make it operational and more attractive by reducing bureaucracy and harmonising legislation. For instance, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Georgia have agreed to establish a joint venture to develop the TITR by addressing the issues of tariff setting, goods declaration, and the use of unified IT solutions in 2022, while in the same year, the OTS Heads of Customs met in Kyrgyzstan for their eighth meeting to discuss the creation of a simplified customs corridor.
Recommendations
If the Middle Corridor develops the necessary infrastructure, it may become an important trade route in the future. With the Northern Corridor, which goes through Russia, subject to sanctions, and the Southern Corridor, going through Iran and also subject to sanctions, this is an increasing possibility. Current trends also suggest it would be almost entirely under Chinese/Turkish control, and can therefore be used as leverage in trade and energy relations with other crucial actors, such as the EU.
As such, maintaining constructive relations with China, Türkiye, Central Asian and Caucasus countries should remain high on the European agenda. Investing in the development of Middle Corridor infrastructure would also prevent complete monopoly and influence by China and Türkiye, and better serve the interests of EU member states in the region, which have been on the rise since the start of Russia’s war in Ukraine.
For Central Asia and the Caucasus, effectively balancing between the regional and global powers involved should also remain a priority, albeit a moderate one - leaders need to take into account regional security dynamics as well as national security and sovereignty guarantees, in order to maximise the benefits of the Middle Corridor and not suffer the full force of the geopolitical constraints intrinsically linked to the development of such a trade route.