Chinese stratospheric balloons: Loopholes and limit testing
The stratospheric balloon cruising over North America, which has inflated tensions between Washington and Beijing, was shot down by the US Air Force over the Atlantic Ocean during the afternoon of Saturday 4th of February (local time).
First spotted above the continental United States on Wednesday 1st of February in Montana when it crossed over from Canada, it was rapidly identified as Chinese by US officials. China’s Foreign Ministry only commented on the balloon’s nature on Friday the 3rd, claiming that it was a ‘meteorological balloon’ that had been blown of course by the wind. However, the US Department of Defense has officially characterized it as an ‘intelligence-gathering balloon’.
The US government had initially decided to not shoot it down. That decision had been criticized by the political right in the United States as a show of weakness and inaction. It had been explained by the fact that the falling debris could represent a risk for people and structures on the ground, and that the balloon did not represent a threat to civilian aircraft because of its cruising altitude of approximately 18.5 km / 60 000 feet, well above aircraft. The decision to shoot down the balloon over the Atlantic Ocean can therefore be explained by this concern over falling debris, but it could also have given time to the United States to study and scrutinize the balloon and its equipment during its flight from Montana to South Carolina. The military is now recovering the pieces of the balloon.
Regarding the operational implications of this incident, it sheds light on the stakes of Very High Altitude (VHA), without having a tangible impact. For several years now, VHA has become a major issue. The fact that the progress of a “Chinese intelligence balloon” has been made public by US officials is an example of those growing stakes.
It is difficult to see what such a balloon, which by definition depends on the prevailing winds, can bring in comparison to ISR satellites or commercial imagery. Unless China has integrated a specific payload or maneuverability system, a stratospheric balloon would offer little technological advantage. If not, it could be indicative of a technological choice process favouring low-tech solutions which are less expensive but require less technical effort (a balloon is easier to launch than a satellite). In any case, the operational impact of this manoeuvre is small, which indicates that the issue at stake here is primarily diplomatic and legal and will have an impact on Sino-American relations.
Pratical Consequences?
Considering that Beijing has more sophisticated surveillance technology at its disposal, the balloon may have had another purpose than to gather intelligence. It could be a test to see how the US would react, to see how far it is possible to push (a grey zone tactic). It could be a diplomatic signal to the US, in the context of growing tension between Beijing and Washington, through a demonstration of capability to penetrate US airspace without risking a serious escalation. In this regard, a balloon is an ideal choice: because of its slow penetration and low threat, it allows China to test the US government’s ‘level of acceptance’. Moreover, the fact that it was an unmanned craft lowered the risks of escalation. Finally, the limit between the atmosphere, which composes national airspaces, and space, which is regulated by international law, is not legally defined. The stratospheric balloon used falls into this legal loophole by entering a space that is geographically over the US but vertically outside of aviation legislation.
The timing of this incident enlarges the rift between China and the US. In the past week, Japan and the Netherlands reached an agreement with Washington to restrict exports of advanced chips to China. This would be only the latest step by the US to limit Beijing's access to sensitive semiconductor technology, cutting it out of microchip supply chains. A few days before the balloon entered Montana airspace, the US military announced it was expanding its presence in the Philippines - one of several moves to strengthen regional alliances as it positions itself to counter China amid growing concerns over a possible conflict with Taiwan. The Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin was indeed still in the Philippines when the balloon was spotted.
However, since the G20 summit, where Presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping met in November, where the two leaders expressed the desire to avoid conflict. They had reduced the heat of their rhetoric. The Secretary of State Antony Blinken had announced his objective of building upon that dynamic during his official visit to Beijing that was supposed to take place between the 5th and 6th of February, the first summit of its kind in five years. The visit was cancelled by the US State department a few hours after the Chinese recognition of its ownership of the balloon and apology, on Friday. What Mr. Blinken has previously called “good lines of communication” between the two powers seems to be in jeopardy.
At a moment where some, like Mr. Blinken, hoped for an opportunity to “avoid competition veering into conflict”, the balloon incident’s timing, whether it was a coincidence or a deliberate act, will probably result in bolstered tension between the US and China. Beyond this week-long incident, deeper trends, such as US semiconductor restrictions, the strengthening of their alliances in the Asia-Pacific region, or the reports of other ‘Chinese balloons’ above Canada and South America, tend to suggest that Sino-American relations are not in the process of reconciliation.