Are China’s Arctic Ambitions a Cause for Concern?
This report examines the emerging partnership between the People’s Republic of China (China) and the Russian Federation (Russia) in the Arctic, focusing specifically on how the war in Ukraine has served to strengthen economic and military relations between both states. China and Russia have both attempted to exploit the economic opportunities that have arisen in the Arctic due to climate change and have cooperated to develop commercial projects and collaboratively launch military exercises. Due to the strategic significance of the region, it is of utmost importance to understand how this partnership will affect the balance of power in the Arctic, as well as regional governance regimes.
Understanding China’s Arctic Ambitions
China is primarily interested in gaining access to sea routes, energy resources and minerals in the Arctic, and has utilised economic, scientific, and diplomatic means since the beginning of the twenty-first century to increase its influence in the region. Despite such efforts, the eight Arctic states - Canada, the United States, Denmark (Greenland), Sweden, Iceland, Finland, Norway, and Russia - have utilised foreign direct investment screening laws to prevent China from establishing a physical presence in the Arctic. Russia has also opposed China’s activities in the Arctic due to security concerns. While China is afforded certain rights in the region under international law, these factors have historically prevented the state from becoming a true polar power.
The Emerging Sino-Russian Partnership
The war in Ukraine has provided China with a long-sought opportunity to increase its role in regional affairs. Sanctions imposed by the West in the wake of Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine have isolated Russia from the international financial system and the most technologically advanced sectors of the global economy, meaning it has had to turn to China to realise its regional economic and military objectives. For its part, China has attempted to exploit Russia’s precarious economic and political position to increase its role in the region and accomplish its economic objectives. While these factors have served to strengthen the economic and security partnership between both states, a series of legal and diplomatic limitations will likely limit China from relying exclusively on Russia in the medium-to-long term. For these reasons, China is likely less of a threat to the regional interests of those Arctic states that align with the West than is commonly perceived. Regardless, the United States would be wise to pursue an agenda that advances its own Arctic objectives and devote the required resources needed to do so.
The Future of Regional Governance
The emerging Sino-Russian relationship in the Arctic and the temporary pause to the Arctic Council’s activities have also raised concerns regarding the future of Arctic governance. Although some observers suggest that new governance forms that do not include Russia should be created to maintain state-tostate cooperation in the Arctic, such initiatives are unlikely to come to fruition. While non-Arctic states like Singapore, South Korea, and Japan will likely assume a larger role in Arctic governance due to the war in Ukraine and China’s increasing presence in the area, the best situation would be one where the Arctic Council resumes work with Russia’s full participation. Apart from soft-law forums like the Arctic Council, the treaty-based, global governance frameworks that apply in the Arctic remain active under international law.