The Indonesian Election and the Future of Sino-Indonesian Relations under the Prabowo Administration
The Indonesian elections on Wednesday, February 14th saw former general and current Defence Minister Prabowo Subianto sweep the polls and defeat challengers Anies Baswedan and Ganjar Pranowo with nearly 60% of the vote.
In the final weeks before the election, Anies and Ganjar steadily lost support to Prabowo, whose position in the polls has steadily climbed over 50%. Prabowo’s skill at developing his image on social media platforms has been placed in stark contrast with his record on human rights as a general under former dictator Suharto. Prabowo’s democratic record is also questionable, after standing for and rejecting the results of the two previous presidential elections in Indonesia. His refusal to accept the results of the 2019 election contributed to deadly riots in Jakarta. Those riots preceded his appointment as defence minister, in an apparent deal to keep the peace. In a democracy as young as Indonesia’s, these signs are concerning for longer-term stability.
The signs are also somewhat concerning for Indonesia’s relationship with China. Polls show Indonesians’ opinions of Beijing are slipping across a range of issues, from economic ties to security issues. Economic ties remain a bright spot. President Joko Widodo’s highly successful terms in office have left Indonesia with a significantly stronger economy since he took office in 2014, and he remains very popular. The “Jokowi” administration, as the current President is commonly known, has supported this growth in part with significantly expanded trade with and investment from China. These policies relied in large part on industrialisation with the help of enormous Chinese investment and have formed an economic relationship that both sides are keen to develop. Investment from China is a core component of the current president’s list of accomplishments and has been concentrated in strategic sectors that Jakarta is keen to develop, like transportation, energy, and metals. While Prabowo has promised to continue these policies, his record hints at possible changes to the relationship between Jakarta and Beijing.
Prabowo Subianto harbours suspicions of China, but believes there is still much to be gained from cooperation with the country. He has in the past attacked Joko Widodo for his perceived closeness to Chinese economic interests, but has recently made efforts to bridge the political gap between them. He picked the president’s son as his running mate, all but securing his endorsement, and has made the promise of continuing President Joko Widodo’s economic policies a core pillar of his campaign. Prabowo has moderated his language throughout the campaign, emphasising the importance of Indonesia’s relationships with both the United States and China.
Prabowo’s record in the defence space demonstrates a clearer trend away from China. As Defence Minister, Prabowo was largely responsible for the increasing closeness of the Indonesian military with the American one, and the strengthening of the military generally. Owing to President Joko Widodo’s tendency to delegate issues of foreign policy to his ministers, Prabowo has played a major part in the military’s development. Under his watch, the military has focused on the development of its outward-facing capabilities, a departure from the previous anti-terrorism focus. China claims a portion of Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone near the Natuna Islands in the South China Sea, a claim that Indonesia rejects. Indonesia has increased both naval patrols and civilian economic presence in the area to deter encroachment by China and other nearby countries. He also played a major role in obtaining a 20% increase in Indonesia’s defence budget for FY 2024. In executing this expansion and the modernisation plan, Prabowo has worked in close partnership with the US Military in training Indonesia’s armed forces. Meanwhile, Indonesia’s military cooperation with China has been slow to recover following the COVID-19 pandemic, and communications from Jakarta on the matter are somewhat tepid.
Throughout the Joko Widodo Administration, Indonesia has struck a similar balance between the US and China as other ASEAN countries have done, pursuing trade and investment ties with China while increasing defence cooperation with the United States. Prabowo’s election is unlikely to change the fundamentals of this relationship.
For domestic political reasons, namely, the need to continue to deliver on Joko Widodo’s legacy of economic growth, Indonesia is unlikely to seek to reduce Chinese involvement in its economy outright. The current economic relationship with Beijing works for Jakarta, although Prabowo may seek to reduce the country’s dependence on its northern neighbour. Beijing is aware that trade and investment are its best tools for maintaining relations with Jakarta, and will likely continue to remind Indonesians of the value of the bilateral relationship. Chinese trade and investment can be expected to remain robust under the Prabowo administration, and Indonesia will likely continue its long tradition of non-aligned foreign policy more generally. Probowo’s suspicions of Beijing’s efforts in the South China Sea, however, may lead to the diversification of its inflows of foreign direct investment and trade. US efforts to increase trade and investment with Indonesia and others in the region are slow-moving, but Jakarta remains interested. A Prabowo administration will likely look to other players like Japan, Korea, and India for investment as well.
The hallmark of the Prabowo administration, however, is likely to be the strengthening of the Indonesian military. Prabowo will likely continue to challenge Beijing’s claims in the South China Sea, as he is afforded even more strategic autonomy than in his role as defence minister. Furthermore, he can be expected to take a somewhat more aggressive posture in the region, likely increasing naval presence in contested waters around the Natuna Islands in Riau Province, at the south end of the South China Sea. In terms of institutional checks on Prabowo’s power, the PDI-P party, while forced into opposition, remains the largest party in the legislature. While their continued strength will likely serve to check some of Prabowo’s more extreme tendencies, the current PDI-P government has approved expansions to the military budget as of 2023 and is unlikely to oppose further expansion. Generally speaking, while continuity is the order of the day, some shifting of Indonesian policy away from Beijing is likely.