This series will cover China's military development overseas, in relation to its foreign policy. The economic success of China in the past decades has reignited its foreign ambition, and slowly pushed the country into a geopolitical competition with the West. The series seeks to investigate how China is developing its military capabilities globally, and how its developments affect the global balance of power.

Introduction and Overview

In the history of international power politics, a great power is categorised as a state with immense dominance over its region. Under a dichotomy of tellurocracy, an empire of land, and thalassocracy, an empire of the sea, the study of great powers could fall under such a divide. Focusing on the latter, Thalassocracy, a maritime empire, is a popular form of global hegemony. From the Ancient Athenians dominating the Mediterranean, to later the Spanish treasure fleets traversing between Europe and the Americas, the dominance of the sea is a symbol of power, an achievement of hegemony. Developed by Alfred Thayer Mahan's argument in The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, it illustrated the pivotal point of naval power in the 20th century, setting the security priority for the US, and consequently resulting in its global hegemonic status. Today, the dream of becoming a thalassocracy remains popular, As the two geopolitical giants crashed into a new bipolar rivalry, the old naval power, the US, and the newly emerged challenger from the East, China, fight for control of the sea, namely in the Pacific theatre. This article seeks to examine the development of Chinese naval power, its recent emergence, and the prospect of its naval dominance. 

The Chinese Navy has a total of five branches: the Submarine Force, the Surface Force, the Coastal Defense Force, the Marine Corps and the Naval Air Force. With 300,000 active personnel, +535 ships, and +600 aircraft, it becomes one of the strongest naval forces in the world. Recently the Chinese Navy has grown to the largest in the world. Despite only owning three carriers, it has reached a total of 355 front-line warships, surpassing the US’s 305. It has two active carriers, the purchased Liaoning (Type 001) and self-made Shandong (Type 002), whereas the Type 003 is currently under construction. Its fleets fall under 3 commands, the North Sea Fleet, the East Sea Fleet, and the South Sea Fleet, the last has seen the most operations and funding due to China’s expansion in the South China Sea. Destroyers, cruisers, and corvettes form its main naval offensive power, most of which are equipped with guided missiles. China's only overseas naval base, in fact, its only overseas military base, is located in Djibouti, and is primarily engaged in anti-piracy support, protecting Chinese-owned facilities, and supporting the evacuation of Chinese civilians from unstable regions. It is suspected, however, that China is secretly developing its second naval base in Cambodia after reaching an agreement with its government to share the use of its Ream Naval base positioned in the Gulf of Thailand. 

Chinese Naval Doctrine

The image of China’s naval history might not be as apparent as the British Empire, where the sun never sets, or today’s US, with numerous carrier groups around the world. Despite this, its current doctrine draws great inspiration from its historical naval development. The Maritime Silk Road of the Han dynasty saw China establishing a string of coastal trading posts along the Indo-pacific region and reaching the Mediterranean. Subsequently, the seven naval voyages of Zheng He in the Ming dynasty, the peak of Chinese sea power, travelled along the Indo-Pacific region and reached the East African coast, earlier than most European powers. Such examples prove China’s capabilities of naval navigation, and its global maritime presence; hence, inspiring the creation of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a partly maritime trading network in Asia, and Africa. 

The history of China’s maritime expansion, however, ended abruptly with the Haijin declaration banning sea exploration in 1433, and continued through the subsequent Qing dynasty. The end of Chinese sea power eventually saw its failure to establish its hegemony in the east East and South, and crucially, led to its failure to prevent the invasion of European colonists. A lesson the current Chinese Communist Party (CCP) constantly reflected on. Later, both the Nationalist government and the Communist government suffered from a lack of funding, in addition to internal socio-economic instability. Few combat vessels were operational and most left mainland China as the Nationalist government (Kuomintang) fled to Taiwan. Thus the era of Chinese sea power remained inferior, until today.

Today the CCP already operates a blue water navy, and has opened a new page in China’s maritime and naval development. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has gone through a comprehensive modernisation effort in the past 10 years. With the fruit of economic growth, its annual defence budget follows suit, rising for the 8th consecutive year, to 230 billion dollars in 2023. The PLA Navy (PLAN) enjoys a considerable share of China’s thalassocracy Dream. The beginning of China’s naval era followed three seismic changes in global politics. First, the collapse of the Soviet Union, once an adversary competing for leadership in the global communism movement, meant the end of a possible land war along its Manchurian border, resulting in the shift of attention to its coastal border. Second, eyeing its economic dominance, Beijing became aware of its potential in influencing global politics, which requires a strong military arm, one that can effectively reach all corners of the world. Lastly, the emergence of a Sino-American bipolarity marks the necessary defence repositioning. Separated by the Pacific Ocean, and surrounded by the US’s regional allies under its Island Chain Strategy, a defensive protocol of containing China, Beijing is determined to reinforce its coastal border. The shift of global politics marked a changing necessity which has driven the procurement of a world class navy.

In 2015, China announced its strategy of “Near Seas Defense and Far Seas Protection,” one with an emphasis on expanding its maritime influence and its operational effectiveness. The first step, Near Seas Defense, calls for the strengthening of Chinese control in its regional seas, including the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and regions around the first island chain. Centuries of historical tensions resulted in territorial conflict between China and regional states, including the Diaoyu Island with Japan, and Taiwan itself with the Nationalist government. Creating its own security zone could also protect the country away from foreign powers. The century of humiliation, a time of foreign invasions and colonisation of China, saw foreign powers arriving by sea. British and French troops landed in the Southern Canton district, while the 1937 Japanese invasion of China saw troops land in Shanghai. Thus, to China, the strengthening of its coastal border protects the country from foreign intervention. 

Moving on to Far Seas Protection, it aims for the establishment of China’s naval presence globally in the pursuit of its political and economical agenda. Up until now, its far sea military operations have focused on the Indian Ocean and the West Pacific, corresponding with its BRI projects and its Pacific diplomacy which includes the expansion of security agreements with Pacific island states. Currently, China’s Far Seas operation is only limited to anti-piracy campaigns around Somalia, but by continuing this trend, and likely facing increasing hostility from the US, China will likely develop its far sea capabilities, mirroring its Western adversaries, and eventually building up its carrier group.

The Backbone of Naval Development: Shipbuilding and Naval Technology

For China to build up a sizable navy, a strong shipbuilding backbone is a necessity. Shipbuilding in China began in the 1990s following economic liberalisation. China grew to become a cheaper manufacturing alternative with cheaper production costs compared to its neighbours. With more investments and practice, China’s technological level and scale in shipbuilding grew considerably. Today, China’s shipbuilding industry is already top of the world, leading its competitor Japan and South Korea in terms of vessel completion and orders. 49% of global orders are built on China, with a total of 20.34 million compensated gross tons. China mainly produces cargo ships, tankers, container ships, and offshore support vessels, with 90% of them mid-to-high-end ship types, such as large-scale liquefied natural gas tankers, ultra-large container ships, even aircraft carriers. Additionally, it also enjoys a well-established ship maintenance and repairing service, essential to any shipbuilding docks, and critical during wartime. 

It is important to highlight that commercial and military shipbuilding is under the same ownership in China. Compared to Western states where both sectors are clearly divided into commercial companies and defence contractors, the nature of the Chinese economy is dominated by state-owned enterprises; most companies are heavily involved in government projects, military-related ones being a gigantic part. In 2019, the two largest players in China’s shipbuilding business are the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC) and China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC), which produce three-quarters of the overall shipping output, and crucially, all domestically built naval vessels. The two companies later merged into one conglomerate, also under the name CSSC. Thus the fusion of commercial and military shipping allows China to apply for technological transfer across the two sectors, boosting the productivity and quality of its product. And in the case of war, a smoother transition from civilian production to wartime production.

There are 6 major shipyards in China, all located away from the potential conflict zone of the Taiwan Strait, and away from South Korean and Japanese-controlled waters. Despite the fact that most are commercially dominated, they have also been used to build most of China’s newest warships. Each is also currently going through rapid expansion to satisfy the PLAN’s growing needs. Jiangnan shipyard, located on the Yangtze Delta, has recently expanded multiple warehouses, factories, and assembly facilities. It is also in charge of the construction of China’s third aircraft carrier, the Type 003 carrier. Dalian and Huangpu have seen the construction of China’s Type 052d destroyers, whereas Huludao has increasinging tackled the construction of nuclear submarines.

With the advancement in shipbuilding, China becomes the new leader of naval development. Numerical superiority does not necessarily entail naval superiority; the US still controls the world’s most advanced Navy, and with most forward deployments, thus retaining the title as the strongest naval power. China is therefore investing in its naval R&D, hoping to close the technological gap between the US. The modernisation of the PLAN has been in motion since its return in the mid-1990s. China switched from purchasing foreign secondhand vessels, to constructing its own, noticeably from the purchase of its first carrier to constructing its third today. A similar trend extends to destroyers, where the PLAN has developed its stealth-guided missile destroyers, the Type 055, and numerous models of Type 052, each equipped with long-range air defence missiles. Its submarine forces have expanded with new offensive capabilities, including new attack variants, tailored for fighting against modern navies.

Its naval programme focused not only on ship development. According to the US Department of Defence, “China's modernization effort encompasses a wide array of platform and weapon acquisition programs, including anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), submarines, surface ships, aircraft, unmanned vehicles (UVs), and supporting C4ISR (command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance).” ASBMs and ASCMs have been a flagship project for China, as it secures its Near Seas from any US naval threat. And most importantly, threatened any US carrier group, in turn denying its air superiority in the region. The comprehensive weaponry, intelligence, or logistical support for the PLAN boosts its operational efficiency, effectively challenging the US’s naval dominance.

A New Form of Maritime Power: Civilian Fleets

Other than the official development of its naval power under the PLAN, there has been increasing use of state-funded civilian fleets. It is common knowledge of China’s territorial dispute with neighbouring states, Taiwan, Diaoyu Island, and the South China Sea. Since direct military confrontation with its regional adversaries could trigger a conflict Beijing could not afford, the civilian fleet became a shadowing strategy for expanding its naval influence. 

The civilian fleet, a mixture of fishing boats, scientific research ships, and ocean ferries, has become a shadow branch of the PLAN, often used to state China’s territorial claim over disputed areas. According to Gregory Poling, director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies' Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, “China pays trawlers large sums of money, more than they can make through fishing, to anchor for at least 280 days a year to enforce Beijing's claim on the islands,” referring to the artificial reefs built by Beijing in the South China Sea. Most of these ships are not armed, and their sailors have no military background. But as they operate as a large fleet, it became a strong opponent to coast guards of various nations. 300 to 400 civilian vessels are anchored around the South China Sea currently. It is difficult for navies to forcibly evict Chinese civilian boots from the area, as any use of force may trigger diplomatic pressure from China. Incidents of Chinese fishing boats colliding with adversaries’ destroyers have already occurred in recent years, such as with both Japan and the Philippines, consequently sparking diplomatic rows.

Though the use of civilian fleets is often combined with the use of the Chinese Coast Guard (CGC). The CGC is already the largest coast guard force in the world with 150 vessels, often composed of retired military warships, thus reflecting its longevity for offshore operations. In supporting China’s territorial claims, it operates across the Taiwan Strait, East China Sea, and South China Sea, and often came into contact with the Japanese, Taiwanese, and Filipino navies. Its last confrontation was against the Philippine Coast Guard, where a CGC vessel pointed a military-grade laser at the former, and temporarily blinded its crew. The Filipino government submitted an official complaint to Beijing in the aftermath, to little effect. The growing use of CGC has demonstrated a similar effect as its civilian fleet, a non-military extension of the PLAN to reinforce its Near Seas claim, buying time in constructing its blue water navy.

Crossing the Strait: Amphibious Power

In the discussion of Chinese naval power, it is necessary to study Beijing’s primary political, and ultimately military, goal, the reunification of Taiwan. Taiwan has been China’s biggest security challenge, one that threatens its political legitimacy, territorial integrity, and security. The remnants of the Nationalist Party fled mainland China having lost the civil war in 1949, and through the lens of the CCP, a political challenge to its legitimacy, and an obstacle to its quest for reunification. Given Taiwan’s close and improving relations with the US, and given the latter supplies weapons to the former, it directly threatens the security of China. Therefore, the PLA has been geared toward such a task through its modernisation programme. The PLAN, undeniably, is a crucial part of this operation.

Between Taiwan and mainland China, is a 180 km waterway connecting the South and East China Sea, commonly known as the Taiwan Strait. The area has seen countless confrontations between the CCP and the Nationalist government, including the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, where the Chinese military fired missiles into the area in retaliation for Taiwan's presidential election that challenges its One-China policy. Today, the PLA often flys sorties across the median line, an unofficial border between the two, or carrying out missile drills as retaliation, for example in the aftermath of US former House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to the country. 

In preparation for any military invasion, the PLAN’s objective is clear and simple: assist the PLA to land in Taiwan, and establish control over Taiwanese water. To achieve the first, the PLAN has been developing its amphibious capability. Geographically, there are only a few beaches in Taiwan suitable for landing, with only 14 small invasion beaches, and they are bordered by cliffs and urban jungles. All are well-defended by Taiwanese troops. For China to break through, it requires a robust force. In 2021, it commissioned its newest amphibious assault vessel, the Type 075, which could carry up to 30 helicopters, numerous landing crafts, and up to 900 marines. Currently, 3 are in service, with more under construction. It could possibly be transformed into an aircraft carrier if China develops a vertical landing mechanism for its fighter jets, similar to how the Japanese Defence Force operates its helicopter carrier with US-made F-35Bs. The landing itself will be conducted by the PLAN Marine Corps, a 20,000, soon to be 100,000-strong force tailored for amphibious landing and consisting only of the elite of the PLA. The landing will be supported by amphibious fighting vehicles, which transport troops onto the beachhead. The PLAN will be supported by the PLA Air Force, which seeks air control and land paratroopers to support the landing.

Though currently China still lacks the necessary transport vessels to move its army to Taiwan. It is expected that the PLA will need an estimated 400,000 to more than two million fighting personnel to win the war and occupy the territory, in addition to a colossal amount of ammunition and supplies. Plans to construct more Type 075 are underway and the PLAN has also experimented with transforming civilian ferries to transportation ships once war broke out. However, China still needs to construct more ships for a successful invasion to happen, as the conflict in Ukraine demonstrates the necessity of efficient logistics in war.

Secondly, the PLAN is in charge of securing control of Taiwan’s territorial waters, and preventing any naval attack by its allies, namely the US. When the invasion takes place, the preparation of anti-ship missiles is key to its success, striking any attempts by the US to secure the island. Furthermore, by utilising its vast numbers of destroyers and cruisers, it could effectively surround Taiwan, cutting off military aid from its regional ally and isolating Taiwan. Such a strategy is likely to follow with China’s declaration of a combat zone over Taiwan, threatening any Taiwanese allies from participating. Taiwan also controls various islands around the East and South China Sea, and most are armed and stationed by professional soldiers and not conscripts. It includes Penghu, an archipelago located in the middle of the Taiwan Strait, giving Taiwan a strategic position to target any PLAN vessels attempting to reach Taiwan with anti-ship missiles. The PLAN needs to eradicate such threats before the major battle group approaches the island, which could be achieved with missiles from the mainland, a bombardment from its cruisers, followed by an amphibious landing.

Conclusion

To summarise, over the past decades, the PLAN has undergone a comprehensive modernisation effort. From a small regional naval force centred on patrolling its coast, the PLAN today has evolved into the world's largest navy, capable of carrying out China’s geopolitical agenda in the region and around the world. With the expansion of a newly modernised navy, composed of heavily equipped destroyers, nuclear attack submarines, and advanced aircraft carriers, the PLAN has demonstrated potential in rivalling the US, its biggest challenger on the naval world stage. 

Indeed, it could be argued that China has achieved its dream to become a maritime power, a return to its historical influence over the seas of Asia. Its shipbuilding industry dominates its regional competitor, while its technology, skills, and resources in constructing both commercial and military ships continue to grow significantly. Furthermore, the use of civilian fleets, an innovative way outside of traditional military doctrine, has reinforced Chinese presence in many of its disputed territories. Lastly, remaining focused on the quest to reunify Taiwan, the PLAN is on track in delivering a strong amphibious landing force, capable of spearheading its invasion and establishing dominance over Taiwanese water. However,  China’s naval advantage remains solely based on its numbers. The overhaul of the PLAN is still in motion, as only a few of its most advanced warships are active; many are still under development or construction. Still, China is a well-developed naval force and a strong maritime power in Asia. And with the success and continuation of its modernisation plan, the PLAN is very likely to dominate the world’s oceans. For America and its allies, it could shift the world’s geopolitical balance. While for China, the PLAN could be the long-awaited solution to resolve all geopolitical disputes it has, and to achieve its final dream of reunification.