Conception and Application of the “One Country, Two Systems” Principle
The white paper released in August 2022 by the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council and the State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China (PRC) re-proposes the formula of “one country, two systems” (OCTS) for a peaceful “reunification” with Taiwan.
Since 1949, cross-Strait relations have evolved from military to peaceful confrontation. Domestic and international factors contributed to this shift. The PRC, although it has never excluded the use of force, has repeatedly and only put forward OCTS for a peaceful solution of the so-called Taiwan issue. However, the proposal did not receive much endorsement on the island. Considering the rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait and Beijing’s constant emphasis on it, this series investigates “one country, two systems”, the only peaceful proposal put forward by the PRC to end the conflict.
This is the first article of the “One Country Two Systems” series. It analyzes the formulation of the OCTS principle, what it would entail for Taiwan and why it was applied to Hong Kong.
Origins of the “One Country, Two Systems” Principle
After failed military actions in the 1950s and the refusal by the US to “abandon” Taiwan during the Sino-American rapprochement, by the mid-1970s, PRC leadership began to realize that without economic prosperity the rhetoric of reunification with Taiwan would not be realistic.
During Deng Xiaoping’s era the priority had to be economic development and modernization. Deng’s policy involved patience and refrain from the use of force while pressing forward with new proposals for cross-Strait relations, as long as Taiwan did not definitely split from the mainland. Hence, in the 1980s, Deng promoted mainland investments in Taiwan within a strategy to tie Taipei’s prosperity to the mainland and, in doing so, create long-term prospects for “reunification”. Furthermore, PRC’s strategy to focus on economic development and an international environment with fewer security threats facilitated the transformation from the Maoist policy of class struggle to the Dengist policy of national unity. In this perspective, the citizens of the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan could not be considered anymore class enemies, as occurred under Mao’s leadership, but compatriots that had to be encouraged to “return” to the mainland. Only with the PRC's rediscovered power could the Taiwan issue become solvable.
On January 1, 1979, the day Washington opened diplomatic relations with Beijing and cut those with Taipei, the CCP National People’s Congress addressed a “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan”. The statement offered a policy of “peaceful reunification” (hé píng tǒng yī, 和平统一) with the “Chinese motherland”, contrary to the long-time threats to “liberate Taiwan” (jiě fàng Tái wān, 解放台湾). In September 1981, the National People’s Congress sent a follow-up “greetings to Taiwan Compatriots” in which promised that in case of reunification Taiwan would become “a special administrative region which could retain its armed forces” and its “current socioeconomic system”. The idea of “one country, two systems” (yī guó liǎng zhì, 一国两制), already outlined by Deng in an interview with Time Magazine on February 5, 1979, thus completely emerged. In order to give “one country, two systems” a constitutional basis, the PRC introduced Article 31 in its Constitution, instituting special administrative regions.
A historical deadline forced the enactment of the “one country, two systems” principle, although slightly modified, to Hong Kong and Macao. Hong Kong was occupied by the British in 1841 during the first Opium War and then definitely ceded to Great Britain the following year with the Treaty of Nanjing. With the Second Opium War the Kowloon Peninsula was annexed and in 1898, with the Second Convention of Beijing, Britain was granted a 99-year lease over the New Territories. The expiration of the 99-year lease over the New Territories was due in 1997. By the end of the 1970s it was clear that the PRC had no intentions to allow British sovereignty over Hong Kong beyond the lease deadline. Therefore, an agreement needed to be found before 1997.
The CCP undertook negotiations in 1982 fully aware of their implications for the potential “reunification” with Taiwan. In 1984, the Sino-British Joint Declaration outlined the implementation of “one country, two systems” with the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) under Chinese sovereignty from July 1, 1997. The HKSAR had to enjoy a high degree of autonomy, except in foreign and defence affairs, and the PRC had to preserve Hong Kong's social and economic systems for at least fifty years. The hope was that by 2047 mainland China would reach an economic and political level similar to Hong Kong’s and therefore make the PRC an attractive partner.
Soon after the deal on Hong Kong’s future was concluded in 1984, Deng secretly proposed to the Reagan Administration to forcefully apply the “one country, two systems” even to Taiwan. The US, however, had no interest in determining Taiwan’s future.
Based on inferences on how the model was applied to Hong Kong and on various statements over the years from PRC officials, although not clear, we can outline the characteristics of the PRC’s proposal for a “peaceful reunification” with Taipei:
• Both parts should accept the “one China” principle: there is only one China, the People’s Republic of China, and Taiwan is an inalienable part of China.
• There would be a coexistence of the two economic systems: socialism and capitalism.
• Taiwan will be granted a high degree of autonomy in internal and economic affairs. Taiwan will become a PRC’s special administrative region, maintaining its administrative, legislative and socioeconomic system, as well as its independent judiciary. Taipei could rely on Beijing in case of financial difficulties. In the past, the main concession was that Taiwan, unlike Hong Kong, could keep its own armed forces and that Beijing would not have sent its “troops or administrative personnel to be stationed in Taiwan”, but only if Taiwan’s armed forces would not pose a threat to the mainland.
• Reunification will be achieved through peaceful negotiations: the inability and unwillingness to occupy Taiwan militarily has led the Chinese leadership to prioritize a peaceful reunification.
The principle never appealed to Taiwanese political leadership before or Taiwanese voters later which repeatedly refused it. The current Taiwanese government, leaded by Tsai Ing-wen, coined the term “Taiwan Consensus” to express their conviction that there is a consensus on the island refusing the so-called “one China” principle and the 1992 Consensus, that states that there is only one China without specifying if it is the Republic of China or the People’s Republic of China. Consequently, the entire basis for the implementation of “one country, two systems” in Taiwan disappeared.
“One Country, Two Systems” in Hong Kong
The “Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China”, passed in 1990 and entered into force in 1997, is a PRC law that regulates Hong Kong’s executive and legislative system. Hong Kong has an executive-led government, headed by the Chief Executive, a local legislature appointed by the Central People’s Government (CPG) which is not subject to effective supervision by Hong Kong's people or institutions but by the CPG, a legislative body, the Legislative Council (Legco), where only a small part of the members is elected by popular vote, and an independent judiciary. The Basic Law was formulated to guarantee the continuation of Hong Kong's capitalist system and lifestyle: it contains commitments to democratic reform and to the protection of human rights and freedom of expression. However, Beijing retained space for control: the Central People's Government has the power to appoint the Chief Executive and to issue directives to them. The ultimate power of interpreting the Basic Law rests with the PRC’s National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC), that holds even the power to review local laws before enactment.
Since the early 2000s, Hongkongers have perceived an erosion of the city’s autonomy, a “mainlandization” of the city, and worsening economic opportunities. In July 2003, a huge manifestation forced the HKSAR government to withdraw a proposed National Security Bill intended to enact Article 23 of the Basic Law that entails “laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People's Government”. Hongkongers feared that the PRC could have used broad definitions of these crimes to limit freedom of speech and political participation. Further protests occurred in 2012 against the “moral and national education” school curriculum that praised communism and criticized democracy and republicanism.
Two events represent the turning points in the PRC’s Hong Kong policy. In 2008, Cao Erbao, director of the research section of the PRC’s Central Liaison Office in Hong Kong, wrote an article in which he argued that Hong Kong had two “governing teams”: the Hong Kong SAR government and the PRC government authorities responsible for Hong Kong issues on the mainland (Cao 2008). The second one was the release in 2014 by the PRC of “The Practice of the 'One Country, Two Systems' Policy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region” white paper in which Hong Kong’s autonomy was defined as not inherent, nor a decentralized power, but solely determined by the Central Authorities’ delegation of power. It also asserted that the Central Authorities had “comprehensive jurisdiction” over the HKSAR. Such statements indicated a new tightened policy of the PRC in Hong Kong’s affairs and contradicted PRC’s pledge to manage only Hong Kong’s external and defence relations leaving the city’s administrations to Hongkongers.
Soon after, the change in policy became clear even in practice when the PRC, through the HKSAR government, began to impose policies aimed at accelerating the PRC’s assimilation of Hong Kong. In August 2014, the NPCSC decided to allow universal suffrage in the Chief Executive election but only with a limitation in candidates’ number and a screening process conducted previously by Beijing, de facto prohibiting the chance of a pro-democrat nominee. This event gave reinforcements to the civil disobedience campaign “Occupy Central with Love and Peace” (ràng ài yǔ hépíng zhànlǐng Zhōnghuán, 让爱与和平占领中 环) that advocated for democratic reforms. During the fall and the following spring, student organizations took over the campaign and gave life to radical demonstrations and occupations. The HKSAR reacted aggressively. Several candidates and political parties advocating democratic reforms or more autonomy for Hong Kong were barred from political activities, elections or removed from office.
In 2019, after the pan-democratic camp had won the district council elections, the HKSAR Government presented the Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation (Amendment) Bill 2019. The bill proposed a mechanism for case-by-case transfers of fugitives, on the order of the executive branch, to any jurisdiction with which Hong Kong lacks a formal extradition treaty, including the PRC. It appeared to give mainland authorities wide discretion in obtaining a rendition of someone charged in the PRC, where there is a lack of the due process standards ensured by the Basic Law in Hong Kong and a history of suppressing political dissent. The bill was withdrawn after months of violent protests. Beijing, convinced that the local government had proved unable to face the demonstrators, responded with statements hinting at a direct control over the situation and then directly promulgating a new national security law in June 2020. The national security law effectively amends and ignores the Basic Law criminalizing “any act or activity related to secession, subversion, terrorism or collusion with foreign and overseas forces”. The bill’s vague statutory language, placing no boundaries between free expression and criminal offense and adopting broad definitions of the four crimes listed, was perceived as a serious threat to Hong Kong’s freedom of expression and political participation. According to the bill even as unauthorized protests, disruption of transports or of government policies could be included. The law also sets special police force branches with unchecked power and empowers the Hong Kong Committee for Safeguarding National Security and the Central Government Office for Safeguarding National Security, composed both of PRC officials, to oversee and override Hong Kong’s institutions as well as limiting the actions of the judiciary system. Furthermore, the national security law calls for the promotion of national security education, a stricter supervision over schools, universities and social media.
In March 2021 the National People’s Congress decided to revolutionize Hong Kong’s electoral system. It increased the members of the legislative bodies but decreased the share of members directly elected. The reform also introduced a new vetting system that requires every candidate to receive approval by the Hong Kong Committee for Safeguarding National Security, according to the review of the National Security Department of the Hong Kong Police Force (HKPF) whose decision would be final. Candidates need to prove their “patriotism”. The PRC has justified the reform with claims of facilitating the realization of universal suffrage, debate within the Legislative Council and of ensuring that only patriots serve in the legislative system.
The 2021 reforms represent the biggest regression of Hong Kong’s political system since the handover and introduce limitations aimed at narrowing opportunities for the pro-democratic candidates. “One country, two systems” was allegedly conceived to protect Hong Kong’s political and legal life from intrusions by the PRC. Nevertheless, during the years the disconnection between Beijing’s and Hong Kong’s interpretations of “one country, two systems” and the Basic Law became clear. The PRC sought the realization of a unitary state and regarded the “two systems” as nothing more than a brief transitional phase towards “one country”. Hong Kong, on the contrary, aspired to a permanent and effective devolution of autonomy. With the 2019-2021 laws and repressive measures the PRC de facto suppressed Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy. Beijing’s highest priority has always been to maintain control over Hong Kong’s levels of power. Even the election in May 2022 of John Lee as new Chief Executive is in line with Beijing’s top priority. Lee, the former Hong Kong’s Chief Secretary, played a leading role in the crackdown on the 2019-2020 protests. Through its reforms, Beijing assured the control of Hong Kong’s executive and legislative branches, scrubbed of any authentic political opposition. Beijing repudiated its own constitutional promises by its acts.
The reasons that explain “one country, two systems”’s lack of appeal, and consequently Beijing’s harsh reactions over the years, must be reconducted to the structural flaws of the principle. However, in the case of Taiwan other factors, peculiar to the island, play an important role. We will focus on these two topics, i.e. “one country, two systems”’s structural flaws and the Taiwanese ultimate barriers for a peaceful reunification, in the following articles.