An Analysis of “One Country, Two Systems”
“To say that one country, two systems can work has always required an article of faith”
Henry Kissinger[1]
The white paper released in August 2022 by the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council and the State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China (PRC) re-proposes the formula of “one country, two systems” (OCTS) for a peaceful “reunification” with Taiwan.
Since 1949, cross-Strait relations have evolved from military to peaceful confrontation. Domestic and international factors contributed to this shift. The PRC, although it has never excluded the use of force, has repeatedly and only put forward OCTS for a peaceful solution of the so-called Taiwan issue. However, the proposal did not receive much endorsement on the island. Considering the rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait and Beijing’s constant emphasis on it, this series investigates “one country, two systems”, the only peaceful proposal put forward by the PRC to end the conflict.
This is the second article of the series dedicated to “one country, two systems”. It illustrates how the principle was structured to assure PRC’s political control. The OCTS’ contradictions, lack of safeguards, its transitional nature and asymmetries are the inevitable outcome of a general project aimed at ensuring the CCP’s control on the embedded territory.
“One country, two systems" apparently provided a rational mechanism for the coexistence of contradictory systems: socialism on the mainland and capitalism in its new territories. It is worth noticing indeed that the theoretical difference between socio-economic systems was still pregnant in the initial Deng Xiaoping’s era and a case can be made that it still is, at least at the rhetoric level. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has argued over the years that “one country, two systems” is a new scientific concept connected with orthodox Marxism-Leninism: socialism is an intermediate stage on the road to a communist society. In this period of transformation, various economic forms can co-exist. Hence, “one country, two systems” acts as an historical transition before China can thoroughly replace the capitalist system with a socialist one. In other words, the merging of the systems is inevitable, but a transitional period is granted due to Taiwan and Hong Kong’s exceptional characteristics.
The structural flaws
The principle, on one hand, is creative, pragmatic, and peace-oriented. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) uses “one country, two systems” to claim that it not only respects the social system and living style in Taiwan but also that it wants to share the developmental opportunities on the mainland with the Taiwanese people. The formula, it is claimed, will serve Taiwan’s peace and stability. Taiwan would not need to worry anymore about its security, and it would gain access to huge markets and resources.
On the other hand, “one country, two systems” is innately contradictory, inflexible, asymmetrical and transitional by design. It was conceived as a policy for a transition period, set at fifty years for Hong Kong, before the definitive merge of the two territories. The principle is created for the only purpose of achieving a smooth transfer of power towards national unification. Once that goal is reached, keeping the formula becomes less and less desirable for Beijing. The repressive measures enacted in Hong Kong from 2014 represents a perfect example. Exactly because of this, there is a lack of safeguards against PRC’s unilateral regressions. Furthermore, the formula does not clearly define the socio-cultural lines between the “one country” and the “two systems'' or how to manage the convergences between the two systems. Without clear understanding on both parts, it was only a matter of time before unfettered integration would culminate in cultural tensions and identitarian flare-ups. Hongkongers and Taiwanese, perceive these to be signs of the PRC dominating over the “two systems”, whereas the central government views these tensions as merely expected transitory costs of the formula. Indeed, the recent PRC white paper on its Taiwan policy also repeats the assertions made in the Hong Kong context that “Two Systems is subordinate to and derives from One Country”.
Additionally, the existence of two models in the same country would likely create socioeconomic inequalities and generate discontent among regions that would be difficult to sustain. It is for this reason that the CCP cannot tolerate nor sustain for an indefinite period of time the existence, although restricted, of a capitalist-democratic model. On the one hand, PRC leaders are promoting state identity and promoted state nationalism in order to prevent separatist claims in other autonomous regions, such as Tibet or Xinjiang, but on the other hand are appealing to common culture and ethnicity when referring to Taiwan. Ironically, while in Taiwan, there was deep development of a unique civic identity based on its democratic institutions, in the PRC the development of civic identity has fallen behind that of ethnic identity.
Conclusions
For Taiwan, a Hong Kong model presents many problems. Firstly, the implementation of “one country, two systems”, as with the Joint Declaration in Hong Kong, cannot really bind Beijing but relies entirely on People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) promises. There is nothing that could enable Taiwan to resist interference from the center. By design, “one country” is the premise and “two systems'' the promise. Should Beijing violate the contents of the Joint Declaration or of the Basic Law, as happened in Hong Kong, there would be very few resources to exploit, other than to protest. There is a lack of legal guarantee against any changes. The status of special administrative regions is granted from above and can be withdrawn.
Beijing seems to be aware of the shortcomings of its formula. The PRC implicitly recognizes that its model is not attractive when it makes concessions to enhance the appeal of “one country, two systems”. Its unwillingness, or inability, to modify the principle shows how little Beijing relies on the attractiveness of “one country, two systems” rather than pressure and coercion.
[1] Interview in Far Eastern Economic Review, November 16, 1995