The growing influence of the PRC on international organisations: The case of the OHCHR report on human rights abuses in Xinjiang

On August 31st 2022, The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, led by Michelle Bachelet, published a report titled “OHCHR Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China”. The report is the result of an extended investigation on the Chinese government’s drive against alleged terrorism and extremism in Xinjiang between 2017 and 2019. Investigators found patterns of large-scale arbitrary and discriminatory detention against predominantly Muslim communities, constituting severe human rights violations that could amount to international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity. The report was a bombshell not only because of its content, but also because of how long it took for the UN to publish it. Ms. Bachelet’s office had promised the report since mid-2021, but it took over a year for it to see the light of day. This report by London Politica offers a comprehensive analysis of the controversies surrounding the timing and content of the OHCHR investigation, as a case study of the growing influence of the PRC on international organisations. 

We begin with a timeline of how the report was initiated and then published after much delay. Reasons for the delay of the report can only be speculative: we conjecture it is partly due to a ‘carrots and sticks’ tactic used by the PRC towards Bachelet’s office. The PRC at the same time offered a visit to Xinjiang and delivered immense political pressure against the publication of the report. The OHCHR was caught between a rock and a hard place: confronting the PRC may hinder its ability to carry out work in the country, but at the same time a failure to speak out would damage its credibility. 

The second section focuses on how civil society organisations responded to the report, through an analysis of media sources. While there were some positive responses, there was a predominant sense of confusion, frustration, and anger. The repeated postponing of the report led observers to question the will of Bachelet’s office to publish the report. In addition, many believed that the report was too little too late: it did not go far enough in condemning the PRC, particularly by designating the situation a genocide, and the lack of urgency was suspected to be the result of an arrangement between the UN and the PRC at the expense of the people of Xinjiang. A large number of activists see this as endemic of the UN’s weakness in the face of an assertive PRC and the growing influence of the PRC within UN institutions. 

The third section concentrates on government responses to (alleged) human rights violations in the PRC. Upon a brief review of the PRC’s human rights record, we introduce a ‘manual’ that the PRC government uses when being accused of human rights violations: 1. Craft its own narrative; 2. Deny; 3. Re-characterise the nature of human rights issues; 4. Divert attention; 5. Denounce and warn the accuser. This approach is exemplified by its response to the OHCHR report. The PRC recognises that human rights are an international norm yet it prioritises the consolidation of power, hence it intuitively denies, deflects, and denounces, while tactically using the principle of national sovereignty to shield itself from accusations. This is enabled by its authoritarian one-party nature and powerful state apparatus, and is undeterred by foreign governments voicing out. While the UN is likely to struggle to bring transparency about situations in regions with grave human rights abuses, it could become increasingly difficult for the PRC to keep everything within the great firewall, as there is a growing international effort in holding the PRC accountable for its human rights violations. This effort will likely continue to be spearheaded by the US. 

The final section assesses how the case of the OHCHR report on Xinjiang is linked to political risk factors. Firstly, we outline how the PRC has been able to gain increasing influence over human rights mechanisms and international organisations more broadly. Its pressure techniques have included large contributions to the UN budget, ascension to leadership positions in UN agencies, alliances with like-minded countries, as well as harassment and intimidation. These activities bear strong geopolitical consequences, not just in the aspect of human rights but in all other aspects of UN operations. Secondly, we introduce political risks related to the PRC’s human rights record. Companies must not underestimate the strength of Chinese consumer backlash in assisting to shut down overseas businesses that are threatening to Beijing’s reputation. They should also be wary when balancing between growing ESG concerns and tapping into the world’s second largest economy. Furthermore, the increasing prevalence of sanctions, linked to a more sensitive geopolitical climate, could be threatening to supply chains. Thirdly, we propose a number of risks facing international NGOs operating in regions such as Xinjiang. There could be barriers to entry, risks of surveillance, difficulties of obtaining local partnerships, and security risks facing volunteers on the ground. 

All in all, the OHCHR report and its delay offers a detailed look into a number of widely discussed issues in international business and geopolitical circles: the growing influence of the PRC, the increasing significance of human rights (and ESG more broadly), the power of international organisations (or their lack thereof), and the potential power of public pressure.