The Implications of the 20th Chinese Communist Party Congress for the US-China Competition

In mid-October, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) held its 20th Party Congress: one of the most important events for Chinese politics and governance. It is, indeed, the moment in which key appointments and promotions are announced and the strategic direction of the next political cycle is provided by the party. The implications of both Xi Jinping’s opening speech and the Party Congress Report- the most relevant document emerging from the report- are very significant for foreign affairs in general and in particular for the future of the great power competition between China and the US. In his speech on the opening day of the Congress, Xi highlighted the struggle between China and “external attempts to suppress and contain it”. Moreover, Xi defined the current international political and economic state of affairs as “the most severe and turbulent since the end of the Second World War”, as the world structure is undergoing significant changes and adjustments, but the balance of power is shifting in China’s favor. For Xi, this is an era of endless challenges and risks for China, where Cold War mentality and bloc politics are rising again.

An important aspect of the report to watch is China’s intention to hasten the integration of Artificial Intelligence and other advanced technologies into its existing capabilities. Moreover, from the report it is also clear that China wants to establish a strong system of strategic deterrence. If such objectives are implemented, both the technological and military competition between China and the United States will intensify dramatically. The most recent sign of this intense competition is the Biden administration’s decision to increase the export controls on high-end microchips and microchip making sales to China. What is particularly significant for the long term perspective, is the increasing ‘modernisation’ that this technological and military competition could undertake with the expanded use of AI.This is especially true given China’s broad definition of strategic deterrence, ranging from space and cyberspace and including ways in which AI and information technology can be used for deterrence purposes. One of the purposes of the aforementioned US ban was indeed to slow down China’s progress in Artificial intelligence. The Chinese strategic goal of “integrated development of the military through mechanization, informatization, and the application of smart technologies” that emerged from the Congress runs the long term risk of leading to a dangerous AI arms race. The knowledge on the application of AI in defense is at a preliminary stage and a competition shaped by this aspect might not be easily controllable by humans.

Another aspect of great relevance for the future of the US-China competition is Xi’s suggestion that resolving the Taiwan question should be the competence of the Chinese, outlined during the Party Congress. He rebuked ‘external forces’ for the soaring relationship with Taiwan, stating that they would be the ones to blame if China felt forced to attack. Xi emphasized that Beijing’s priority is to carry out a peaceful reunification, but also that China would not renounce to the use of force if needed.These statements clearly increase the likelihood and intensity of tensions around the Taiwan issue in the future and are going to put the security relationship between the US and China in a riskier position moving forward. The US has tried to contain the Chinese security ambitions in the Indo-Pacific by reviving the ‘Quadrilateral Security Dialogue’ (QUAD), along with India, Japan and Australia. Beijing has reacted quite adversely to the initiative, describing the QUAD as “the Asian NATO” aiming to contain China. Xi’s declarations about Taiwan in the 20th CCP Congress and the constant US efforts to contain China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific indicate a deteriorating security relationship between the two powers over time and into the future.