Georgia Walking a Fine Line between Russia and the West
On 20 May 2023, news broke out that the daughter of Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, had arrived in Georgia and was attending a wedding; just as protests were being held across the country over the resumption of direct flights between Georgia and Russia following a four-year hiatus. Both of these events increased the frustrations of the majority of the Georgian population who strive for their country’s Euro-Atlantic integration.
Since the Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008, which resulted in the military occupation of 20% of Georgian land by Russia, the government of Georgia has walked a thin line trying to maintain strong relations with the West, all the while appeasing Russia in more recent years. Direct flights between the two countries were banned by Russia’s President, Vladimir Putin, in 2019 following violent clashes between the police and protesters in Georgia after a Russian lawmaker visited the country. After the 4-year break, the decision of President Putin on 10 May to lift visa requirements for Georgian citizens and to resume direct flights between the two countries was announced by the Russian Transport Ministry, also triggering large protests across the country, most significantly at Tbilisi International Airport. Importantly, even though this decision was unilateral, it is suggested that an agreement from the Georgian government would have been necessary for its implementation. The Georgian government’s involvement in this is even more evident through the Georgian ruling party’s, Georgian Dream’s, claims of ‘xenophobic’ protests. The latter statement was criticised by the President of Georgia, Salome Zourabichvili, claiming that “This is an insult to the Georgian people” and that it is unacceptable to accuse Georgians of xenophobia, given that the public has accepted hundreds of thousands of migrants from Russia in the last 18 months.
The arrival of the daughter of Sergey Lavrov to Georgia, reportedly by land, added fuel to the fire and brought further condemnations from President Zourabichvili who expressed disbelief that the Georgian government was unaware of the presence of “the daughter of the highest-ranking official, from Putin’s immediate circle, who is under sanctions”, urging the government to protect Georgia from Russian individuals on the sanctioned list. Furthermore, politically, this decision was met with strong discontent by EU diplomats in Georgia, arguing that if Georgia is set on EU integration in the future, they should follow the decisions made by the 27 EU Member States with regards to sanctions. However, Georgian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economic and Sustainable Development, Levan Davitashvili, pointed out that Georgia is not yet an EU member State and therefore the country’s actions and decisions, be it political or economic, cannot be equated to that of EU members. The Minister further noted that the EU position with regards to trade with Russia is not clearly defined, pointing to the supposed EU-Russia trade increase of over $5 billion in 2022, and therefore called for an open dialogue with the EU to discuss any issues within this context. However, it must be noted that conflicting reports exist with regards to the amount of trade between Russia and the EU following the invasion of Ukraine and the establishment of sanctions; this is mostly due to the varying trade relations between Russia and the individual 27 EU Member States.
With regards to the resumption of direct flights, several interests exist in increased relations between the two countries. For the Russian government it is clear; they seek to promote their efforts in improving relations with Georgia, simultaneously strengthening transit opportunities, and establishing shipment prospects of prohibited and sanctioned items. Whereas for Georgia, the direct flights provide benefits with regards to increased trade and tourism as well as diffusion of tensions following the 2008 war. However, these benefits are not met with as much enthusiasm by the general public as by the Georgian government. Although taken in isolation, the resumption of flights and the lift of visa requirements may not be alarming, it is however when they are coupled with the recent more pro-Russian approaches of the Georgian Dream party that the government is put under heavy scrutiny.
Recent Pro-Russian Movements
Although the Georgian government has condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, expressed solidarity, and has provided humanitarian aid and shelter for Ukrainian refugees, following the invasion, Georgian Prime Minister, Irakli Garibashvili, announced, and has stuck by his announcement, that “considering [Georgia’s] national interests and interests of the people, Georgia does not plan to participate in the financial and economic sanctions [on Russia], as this would only damage our country and populace more.” Furthermore, other politicians such as Irakli Kobakhidze, head of the Georgian Dream party, can also be seen to have a pro-Russian sentiment through his public statements. Between February and July 2022, he has criticised Russia nine times mainly on its invasion of Ukraine, whereas his criticisms towards Ukraine equated to 26, mainly focusing on Ukraine’s condemning comments of Georgian officials, and 57 towards the West, including criticisms towards the EU Ambassador in Georgia, as well as accusing the US Ambassador in Georgia, Kelly Degnan, of pushing the country to go to war with Russia.
More pro-Russian acts within Georgia can be traced back to the Foreign Agent Bill that was announced by the Georgian Parliament on 9 March 2023, which included the requirement for any organisation within the country receiving more than 20% of its annual funding from overseas to be declared as "agents of foreign influence". Criticism stemmed from the similarity of the aforementioned legislation to one introduced by President Putin aimed at silencing his opponents. The draft legislation was coined as the “Russian law” in Georgia and resulted in mass protests in Tbilisi denouncing the bill. The Georgian Dream party subsequently withdrew it. Russia claimed that these mass protests were an attempted coup orchestrated from abroad. What the protests in fact demonstrated is the growing distrust in the government, as identified by President Zourabichvili, and demonstrated the Georgian public’s desire for the country to remain on a pro-Western path and to be part of the European family. In light of this, the Georgian government has been receiving criticisms over the state of its democracy, and has somewhat damaged its ties with the EU.
Hence the resumption of direct flights and the case of Lavrov’s daughter in Georgia are not isolated instances and have evidently further exacerbated the criticisms and raised concerns over “Georgia's EU path and Georgia's commitment to align with the EU decisions in foreign policy”, as stated by EU Spokesman Peter Sano. The Georgian government, for the most part, has downplayed the political implications of the most recent events and has focused more on the economic benefits of the $400 million a year that Russian tourism would bring to the country. Hence Russia’s attempts of harming Georgia’s European integration through the normalisation of relations between the two countries, as identified by the US Ambassador to Georgia, Kelly Degnan, have been arguably ignored by the government and are more of a concern for the Georgian public and President Zourabichvili.
Georgia’s Western Path
Following Georgia’s Independence in 1991, the European path was enshrined in the country’s constitution, emphasising the country’s pro-Western aspiration. This is precisely why as a response to the recent actions by the government that during her speech on Georgia’s Independence Day on 26 May 20203, President Zourabichvili called on the government to meet the Georgian public's “will to strengthen the country's independence, establish democracy, and join the European family”. This call is vital for Georgia’s application for EU candidacy and its “perspective” position (rather than the candidacy status that was granted to Ukraine and Moldova) which includes following and implementing the reforms suggested by the EU; among them judicial reform, de-oligarchisation, addressing organised crime, improving the media sources, addressing political polarisation, and considering independent individuals in the appointment of a new Public Defender. However, reports have identified that only two of the twelve suggested reforms have been addressed. In this vein, it is important to note that for Georgia and its population, Euro-Atlantic integration, or EU and NATO membership, is not just a desire but a need for Georgia’s national security, even more in light of the war in Ukraine. The recent decision undertaken by the ruling party, Georgian Dream, can be seen to be drastically different from that of the population's wishes. This can be seen through the protests held in Georgia over the past couple of years as well as through recent studies that identified that 89% of the Georgia population supports EU membership, and 80% wish to join NATO in the near future. This is precisely why the recent protests have seen as many as 160,000 participants chanting the slogan “Home to Europe'' and carrying EU flags.
Bigger Picture
When looking at the most recent developments with direct flight resumption, it is important to question why these efforts from Russia to increase relations with Georgia are being made now, and what this means for Georgia. Essentially, experts have claimed that Russia is employing a carrot-and-stick approach, the carrot being economic benefits for Georgia, and the stick being the spread of fear of the same situation as what Ukraine has found itself in. Ultimately, there is no denying that Russia is employing a long-term strategy for Georgia, part of which relies on the maintenance of power and the loyalty of the current government and the ruling party, Georgian Dream, who is also in turn benefiting from increasing relations with Russia and branding itself as a party looking for a resolution to the Russo-Georgian conflict. The start of the flights between the two countries have even been followed by bilateral talks on the resumption of railway traffic through the occupied region of Abkhazia. There are probably one-sided hopes that this may even lead to the recognition of Abkhazia’s sovereignty by Georgia, which will further deepen the country’s ties to Russia and will also deepen the divide between Georgia and the West. Furthermore, there is a likelihood that these decisions may be implemented by the Georgian government against the population’s will, labelling the actions as restorations of relations with the occupied regions.
Overall, with the increasing relations between Georgia and Russia, it may be questioned what these decisions, which may be coined as confidence building measures or conflict resolution, would mean for Georgia’s overall security. Evidently, if Georgia strives for EU candidacy status and eventual EU and NATO membership, and hence the security that this guarantees, one would expect the government to comply with the existing sanctions against Russia, implement the reforms suggested by the EU and not be distracted by Russian influence. However, the resumption of flights may only be the start of the increasing distance away from Georgia’s Western path and towards closer ties to Moscow.
The Kosovo Clashes - Escalating Tensions in the Balkans
Following the outbreak of violence in northern Kosovo on 26 May, the relationship between Serbia and Kosovo has deteriorated considerably, and fears of it bringing increased instability in Europe, coupled with the war in Ukraine, have been expressed. Tensions have escalated in other parts of the Balkan region, exacerbating long-standing ethnic divisions. On the international stage, there have been conflicting reactions to the tension, with European countries adopting a more balanced approach, while others, such as China and Russia, firmly side with Serbia. How will the conflict develop and what could an escalation of the situation mean?
Background information
A Western-backed plan between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo was verbally agreed in March 2023 with the aim of defusing tensions between the two countries, and specifically granting further autonomy to Serbs living in various regions of Kosovo, with the government in Pristina retaining authority. To this end, local elections were held in four regions of northern Kosovo where Serbian communities are dominant, after Serbian representatives abandoned their posts in protest at the end of 2022. The aim was to improve representation and coordination in education, healthcare, economic development, and land planning between the Serbs and the government of Kosovo at the local level. However, the low turnout in the April 2023 elections, specifically 3.47%, and the election of ethnic Albanians as mayors of the four municipalities, was not favourably received by the 50,000 Serbs living in the regions, who claimed that they did not feel well represented and that demands for increased autonomy had not been met.
Nemanja Starovic, state secretary of Serbia’s Ministry of Defence said the local elections were a “unilateral attempt by Pristina Albanian authorities to forcefully install Albanian mayors in the four municipalities in the north of Kosovo, which does have a Serbian majority.”
Recent developments
On 26 May in Zvecan, one of the towns where the elections were held, the Kosovo police, staffed by ethnic Albanians, fired tear gas in an attempt to disperse the crowd of Serbs who had broken through security barricades to forcefully enter the municipality building, according to one witness, to prevent the newly elected mayor from entering his office. Furthermore, NATO peacekeepers blocked off the municipality of Zubin Potok to prevent the same attempts to enter, with the other four ethnic Albanian mayors being escorted by police to their offices. Additionally, the President of Serbia ordered an urgent movement of troops towards the Kosovo border, which was announced live on television by the Defence Minister, Milos Vucevic.
Violence has since escalated, with Serbian protesters in Zvecan throwing Molotov cocktails and hitting the riot shields of NATO's KFOR troops in Kosovo with metal pipes, setting cars on fire and firing shots. Hundreds of ethnic Serbs alsogathered with a 250-metre-long Serbian flag. However, some have argued that the flag may be Russian, as reports have also identified spray-painted ‘Z’ on NATO vehicles, a reference to a Russian sign that has been frequently used in the war in Ukraine. The significance of this will be explored further in this article.
International responses
The escalation of the situation prompted NATO to announce “prudent steps” by increasing the number of KFOR troops from 700 to 4,000 in order to give it “the forces and capabilities it needs to fulfil its mandate.” Turkey also announced that they will be sending commandos to Kosovo as per NATO’s request. Furthermore, Stoltenberg commented that “such attacks are unacceptable and must stop. KFOR, the NATO forces, will take all necessary actions to maintain a safe and secure environment for all citizens in Kosovo, and will continue to act impartially, in line with our United Nations mandate.”.
The President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vucic, announced that “We have never had a more difficult and bigger crisis” and that Serbia would “not sit idle”. For his part, Kosovo's President, Vjosa Osmani, asserted that the Kosovo police was acting “against Vucic's illegal structures and criminal gangs… in fulfilment of their constitutional duties to defend all citizens without distinction.”
The United States (US) and the European Union (EU) reprimanded Kosovo for the escalation of tensions with Serbia and urged Pristina to put an end to the violence in order to not face “consequences”. In his statement, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, stated that Kosovo’s actions were “sharply and unnecessarily escalated tensions, undermining [Western] efforts to help normalise relations between Kosovo and Serbia and will have consequences for our bilateral relations with Kosovo”. Furthermore, reports have indicated that the relations between Kosovo and the US have deteriorated, with Washington imposing sanctions on Kosovo, such as cancelling Kosovo’s participation in the Defender Europe 2023 military exercise, because of the violence.
Similarly, Britain, France, and Germany issued astatement calling on Kosovo and Serbia to de-escalate the situation and “to immediately step back and de-escalate, and to closely coordinate with EULEX (the EU mission) and KFOR (NATO's mission) in Kosovo.” Furthermore, French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz called for new elections in northern Kosovo. These developments resulted in ameeting between Osmani and Vucic on 1 June in Moldova, as requested by the EU. No formal agreement has been reached to end the escalation of the situation.
The bigger picture
Aleksandar Vucic is reportedly facing an unprecedented revolt against him following the two mass shootings that took place in Serbia in early May and in combination with his autocratic rule. The opposition accuses him of causing divisions in Serbia. In addition, opposition supporters have mobilised to demand his resignation. As such, one may predict that the escalations between Serbia and Kosovo may be used by the President to strengthen his political position in the country, as he continues to demand the withdrawal of the mayors in Kosovo, and has proclaimed himself as the defender of the nation. In the same vein, Russia, which remains Serbia’s ally, has accused Kosovo of increasing tensions and exacerbating the conflict, while blaming the growing tensions in the region on the US and the EU. More recently, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov declared that “a big explosion is looming in the heart of Europe.” Reports claim that Russia has no interest in the issue with Kosovo being resolved. Furthermore, Russia’s involvement in other parts of the Balkans may be worrying, as the pro-nationalist and pro-Russian Bosnian Serb leader, Republika Srpska President Milorad Dodik, has expressed his desire to see the Serb Republic become autonomous, independent from the rest of Bosnia, in order to unite with Serbia. This has raised fears of ethnic divisions in Bosnia.
Overall, the impact of the escalations between Serbia and Kosovo and the effects they could have on European stability, combined with the destabilisation caused by the war in Ukraine, are still unclear. The international community, specifically the EU and the US, has made significant efforts to support the negotiation process between Serbia and Kosovo. However, Kosovo has been criticised for provoking tensions by allowing ethnic Albanian mayors to take office in Serb-dominated municipalities, despite the low turnout due to the boycott of elections in northern Kosovo by ethnic Serbs. As well as threatening to end support for international recognition of Kosovo, the US has also excluded Kosovo from the "23 Defender" military exercise. In this context, there has been growing frustration among Serbs living in Kosovo at being used as “bargaining chips” in the negotiation process, according to Tare, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.
It is essential that efforts are made to integrate the Serb minority living in Kosovo in order to normalise relations not only between the two states, but also with the international community, in particular the EU and the US, especially as the creation of an Association of Serb Majority Municipalities was agreed in the 2013 Brussels Agreement between Serbia and Kosovo. With the aim of normalising relations between Kosovo and Serbia, the agreement set out the establishment of the aforementioned Association to integrate Kosovo Serbs from the northern municipalities into Kosovo's institutions. Ethnic Serbs expected the creation of the Association to provide institutional autonomy to the communities concerned and overall integration into Kosovo’s political system. However, the vagueness of the nature and the power of the approved Association was heavily criticised by the opposition and the Kosovar public, leading to mass protests and a petition with 200,000 signatures that was presented to the Parliament. This situation delayed the process of establishing the Association.
Given the current situation and escalating tensions, this Association is all the more essential to ending the violence as it would integrate Serbs living in Kosovo into political institutions and allow a certain level of self-management in Serb-dominated municipalities. Ultimately, the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia is key for their respective paths towards Euro-Atlantic integration, as well as for Kosovo’s bilateral relations with the US. Similarly, neutralising Russian influence in Serbia, and more broadly in the Balkans, is extremely important and dependent on how the current situation develops. Only time will tell how tensions between Kosovo and Serbia will develop and how this will affect the region as a whole.