London Politica 5/6/23 London Politica 5/6/23

Psychological Warfare and Hybrid Threats - Attacks on Hearts and Minds

Psychological warfare may, in some respect, seem an outdated term. Instead, specific concepts such as information manipulation or, conversely, broader terms such as foreign influence operations are increasingly more prevalent. What is often less understood is that while these are important threats to take into account, they generally exclude a potent human quality open for targeting - emotion. Unlike information manipulation, which targets cognitive processes and perceptions, psychological warfare aims to dig deeper, exposing the most basic of human emotions (anger, fear, hatred) and seeking to transform them into something stronger for political, ideological, and security reasons. So, what is the state of psychological warfare today? What are states and other entities doing to combat it, and are their efforts sufficient? This article explores these questions, seeking to assess the prominence of this hybrid threat, and what can be done in defence.

A brief overview of psywar

Psychological warfare has a long history, dating back to Ancient times, although such an explicit label was most likely not available. However, its use really took off during the two World Wars, where targeting the morale of enemy soldiers played a key role in numerous battles. The effects were two-fold: first, the intended effect was to demoralise the enemy, and break his will to fight; second, a common by-product (whether intended or not) was often greater mistrust, confusion and uncertainty within enemy circles. This is due to the fact that, as our previous article mentioned, psychological warfare “is designed to target deeper feelings and processes outside of perception, many of which are difficult, if not impossible to control”, rendering not only the results, but also the source of attack unspecified. As the subsequent section argues, these blurred lines are becoming increasingly difficult to discern properly as both state and non-state entities leverage new technologies and tactics to aim at an ever-wider range of targets.

Targeting modern hearts and minds

Psychological warfare today comprises a range of tactics and actors, including media propaganda, pamphlet distribution, false flag operations, and information warfare. Apart from its historical use, psychological warfare (or ‘psyops’, as it is more readily known in contemporary military circles) has been a standard feature of military doctrine in countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, China, Iran, as well as a more diverse set of actors such as Estonia. While its tactics continue to be used in foreign conflicts, they are also increasingly incorporated into domestic defence planning. In other words, countries are not only interested in developing offensive capabilities to strike an enemy and demoralise him psychologically, but also to ensure that the same enemy does not succeed in using such tactics against them domestically. A number of contemporary examples demonstrate the international and domestic security implications psychological warfare continues to bring.

The Russo-Ukrainian war

Since the beginning of the war on Ukraine, Russia has been using disinformation, propaganda, and false flag operations to target the psychological state of Ukrainian armed forces and political and military leadership. Starting with the build-up of troops on and around the Ukrainian border for almost a month, Russia's objective from the outset went beyond mere military preparation for an invasion - an equally important objective of these actions was to intimidate Ukraine and break its will to resist even before the fighting began. Similarly, continuous and coordinated propaganda narratives (fascistic nature of Ukrainian leadership, genocide in Donbas and other human rights violations, development of biological weapons, surrender of President Zelenskyy, and anti-refugee sentiments among others) aimed at domestic and international audiences proliferated.

Russia’s chief method of psychological warfare has been social media, with reports of fake accounts and groups spreading information favourable to the Russian view. Their usage of Facebook, Twitter, but also relatively recent forms of social media, such as TikTok, has increased with the war’s progression. Another common source of dissemination is foreign news outlets favourable to the Russian stance, besides domestically controlled state media and their international branches. These include Chinese state media such as CGTN and Beijing News.

The objectives are varied but converge on a few common goals: first, to demoralise Ukraine, its leadership and armed forces, and break their will to resist; second, to turn Russian, Ukrainian and international public opinion against Ukraine and in favour of Russia. The latter goal is, nevertheless, also associated with political ruling regimes in these countries - the populations most favourably disposed towards the Russian narrative are those whose political leadership entertains (hopes of) positive relations with Russia.

Russia and the Baltic states

Russian psychological operations warrant another section, since outside of Ukraine (as well as Georgia), the Baltic states are also a frequent target. As former Soviet republics and current members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), modern-day Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania occupy a particularly important position in Russia’s foreign policy and on its list of target countries for psyops. Despite a significant shift in cultural and political leanings and the fact that Russian ability to influence their populations has been decreasing, the Baltic states continue to be home to a substantial Russian or Russian-speaking population. This linguistic legacy allows Russia to utilise the same, or similar tactics, narratives, and methods as it might otherwise only be possible domestically. Among the most prevalent narratives are the usual ideological triggers, such as WWII, the USSR, and anti-Western sentiment.

In terms of methods, the primary source of propaganda tends to vary from country to country. In Estonia and Lithuania, Russian social media such as VK (V Kontakte - In Contact) tend to be prevalent, while Latvian audiences turn to Facebook. The salience of the above-mentioned topics also varies accordingly.

Figure 1: Popularity of topics on the Russian social medium, VK

Figure 2: Popularity of topics on Facebook

The goals of these psyops evolve constantly. Besides continuously evoking a nostalgic image of the ‘good old days’ and the Soviet past, Russian psyops also primarily target fear - fear of Western influence and even invasion. Nevertheless, as noted above, its influence has been decreasing steadily. This is a result of geopolitical as well as domestic developments within the Baltic states themselves. First, unlike Ukraine, the Baltics have been quite successful in separating themselves from Russian influence politically and economically after the fall of the USSR. They were furthermore aided in this endeavour by their early admission into NATO and the European Union (EU). Finally, Russia’s own activity domestically (Chechnya in 2004 in particular) and in former Soviet republics, Georgia and Ukraine (2008 and 2014 respectively) has stoked fears in the Baltics of a possible invasion of their own territories, and thus served to alienate much of the now Western-oriented political and social establishments along with the wider population.

France in Mali

The French military operations in Mali (Operation Serval and a later, broader Operation Barkhane in particular) present further examples of the use of psychological warfare during a time of conflict. The motivations for it are complex and steeped in geopolitical interests and considerations of France, the UN, and a number of West African countries. In the former case, France engaged in psyops against separatist rebels during a coup in 2013, an operation which aimed to discredit the Islamist narratives taking over the country. The latter was in many ways a continuation and an extension of these objectives, continuing at least into 2017. The aims of the second operation included further crackdown on Islamist ideology and terrorist activity, as well as boosting the image of France to justify and legitimise the operation.

The methods France used in these two operations were both psychological and information-based and supported by direct action on the ground. In the case of Operation Serval, French intervention forces were deployed and consolidated in Bamako, the capital of Mali, within three days. While often overlooked in studies of psychological warfare, such quick consolidation and response often serves to demoralise the enemy in addition to particular pieces of information, since it creates a specific image of the operation - speed, mobility, efficiency. Mobility was especially important, with French troops being on the move almost constantly between 12 January and 11 May 2013. The second set of methods, more typical of Operation Barkhane, consisted primarily of influence operations through social media, Facebook in particular. At the same time, French military personnel posting as locals were attempting to conduct counter-influence operations against Russian disinformation in the country (which carried certain grassroots elements prompted by the Russian government).

The success of the former methods and tactics is considered substantial, and a prime example of effective integration of psyops into operational strategy. Falling under the responsibility of the Centre Interarmée des Actions sur l’Environnement (CIAE), France’s psychological warfare doctrine follows closely from NATO regulations and instructions about psyops integration. Nevertheless, most actions after the conclusion of Operation Serval have not been considered particularly effective, and have rather been cited as the source of regional destabilisation in the Sahel. France ended up withdrawing its troops into Niger in August 2022.

United Kingdom and the United States

Another set of influential players in the domain of psychological warfare are the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US). Besides using various tactics and methods of psyops for the purposes of safeguarding domestic security and national interests, they also contribute significantly to the psyops strategy and capabilities within NATO. Falling under the organisation’s guidelines the chief focus of psyops as used by the two countries is on studying the target audience, various attributability categories and integration within operations in other domains.

In the UK, this is the task of the 77th Brigade - soldiers trained in special skills pertaining to information warfare, psyops, and influence operations. Furthermore, they are supported by the 15 Psychological Operations Group. These military units specialise in understanding the target audience, creating content for online distribution, as well as evaluating the success of previous operations by studying how particular content is received. Their work is evident in most operations in which UK troops are deployed, with some prominent ones involving operations in Iraq and other parts of the Middle East. They are also particularly used in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency action.

In the US, psychological operations involve additional layers of training, including cultural sensitivity, interpersonal skills, and foreign language abilities. Besides various forms of media, the focus is on establishing strong relationships with the target audience, which is essential for subsequent influence. As in the case of the UK, US psyops are regarded as part of wider military strategy and therefore used in many situations, including to build pro-US sentiments in countries like Russia, China, and Afghanistan. Furthermore, US strategy includes economic considerations, such as discrediting influential businesses.

Nevertheless, there is a concern about the effectiveness of psyops originating from democratic countries, including the ones mentioned. The need for transparency, accountability, and freedom of speech, on which much of democratic legitimacy is based, poses certain challenges to governments and militaries seeking to leverage public media platforms for the purposes of psyops. For instance, social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook have inadvertently identified and taken down US military-connected fake accounts whose purpose was to propagate psyops on these platforms, prompting an investigation by the Pentagon. At the same time, these same platforms can sometimes be cooperative in such efforts as well.

Countering psychological warfare

Despite the often adverse use of psychological warfare by various major geopolitical actors, there are a number of counter mechanisms available to those vulnerable to attack. The NATO psyops framework states: “Counter PSYOPS uses assets to analyse an adversary psychological activity and its effect on friendly populations, uncommitted audiences, and NATO forces.” Subsequently, counter-narratives and other methods are deployed to discredit psyops by an adversary and to provide accurate information. Methods include content analysis, evaluation of adversarial motives, cultural significance and audience analysis. At the same time, NATO’s counter-psyops can only be deployed in consultation with other units, such as those specialising in information warfare.

Outside of organisations specialising in issues of international security, supranational entities such as the EU have also explored the threats posed by psychological warfare and the potential means by which to leverage or counter its impact. Although there is no central doctrine on the role of psyops in the EU, it is closely modelled on NATO’s example, and its use has been explored in early crisis management missions. More recently, with the psychological warfare efforts of Russia in Ukraine and beyond, the EU has taken to more focused labelling and banning of disinformation sources. Understanding local culture and history is crucial in this process, since the values associated with these social aspects tend to be targeted. Without sufficient understanding, they would thus be impossible to identify and counter efficiently. Additionally, certain countries, such as the usually heavily-hit Estonia, have developed their own frameworks, centred around collecting detailed information about adversarial targets, strategy, and tactics. Countering psychological warfare therefore involves much of the same methods and skills as the offensive attack, the difference being the overall objective.

Conclusion

Psychological warfare is difficult to predict, plan, execute, and counter as it involves mental and emotional processes of which the intended victim might not be aware. Modern-day strategies and tactics incorporate psychological warfare, making use of all forms of traditional and social media platforms and sources. With the spread of information technologies and the multidimensional prospects of new ones, such as AI tools, the scope and reach of psychological operations may soon encompass unprecedented domains and uses. Both state and non-state entities must thus work towards incorporating such hybrid threats into their organisational frameworks and ensure a full understanding of their potential consequences. Countering the threat of psychological warfare in such an environment must furthermore take increasing priority, especially given its elusive nature, and these disproportionate consequences. Ensuring a thorough understanding of the target audience, methods, effects, and capabilities of adversaries, and countering them using these same methods should not, however, come at the expense of democratic values and citizens’ rights. As such, democratic states have a particularly fine line to tread.

London Politica 4/11/23 London Politica 4/11/23

Hybrid Threats 101 - Conceptual and Historical Context

Hybrid threats collectively constitute a relatively new concept, their practice, however, is not so recent. At the same time, their definition, categorisation, and historical context remain relatively elusive, even as their use, and therefore the necessity of countering them effectively, increases. In this introductory article to the series ‘Hybrid Threats in the 21st Century’, we aim to set the foundation by tackling these exact questions.

The Concept of Hybrid Threats

Hybrid warfare was defined by Hoffman for the first time as a method of conflict that combines both traditional and non-traditional tactics, including irregular formations, terrorism, and criminal activity, used by both state and non-state actors to achieve political goals. The primary objective is to disrupt the target nation through a blend of tactics, rather than to progress through traditional phases of warfare. Hybrid warfare presents a complex challenge for defence planning in the modern era, as it challenges conventional notions of warfighting, by erasing the boundaries between what is war and what is not. Ambiguous and unpredictable in nature, it securitizes every aspect of politics and society as everything is susceptible to becoming a threat to states.

Definitions by different international organisations

NATO defines hybrid threats as a combination of “military and non-military as well as covert and overt means, including disinformation, cyberattacks, economic pressure, deployment of irregular armed groups, and use of regular forces.” According to the Alliance, “hybrid methods are used to blur the lines between war and peace, and attempt to sow doubt in the minds of target populations.” The EU recognises the diversity of definitions of hybrid threats as well as the evolving nature of these threats and defines the concept in a similar fashion as NATO, as “the mixture of coercive and subversive activity, conventional and unconventional methods (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, technological), which can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific objectives while remaining below the threshold of formally declared warfare.”

As encompassing as the concept of hybrid threats is, the UN does not have a formal definition of the concept due to the differing views of all Member States, which poses a problem in building consensus around the term and the steps that need to be taken to combat these threats. Similarly, the OSCE does not have a formal definition as such, but its Member States have discussed the issue in several meetings with the Secretariat, showing a common concern to counter them.

Types and categories

Hybrid threats take many forms, and the types and categories delineated below form a list that is by no means exhaustive. Their irregular and blurry nature, in fact, may contribute to the notion that even categorisation as such can remain elusive. Nevertheless, we attempt to describe and briefly evaluate some of the more common ones below.

Grey zones

Grey zones are operations between war and peace; in some circles, “military operations other than war”. These may range from election interference to the use of ambiguous forces. The broad scope of action that can be considered as a part of grey zone operations poses a two-fold problem: (1) there is difficulty in determining which operations are taking place in the grey zone, i.e. the definition problem; and (2) another difficulty lies in establishing criteria of prioritisation for countering threats in the grey zone.

Due to their shadow nature, the principal use of grey zone operations tends to be attributed to non-democratic states such as China and Russia, although, with the diffusion of digital technology, these tactics are available to any state and non-state actor. Nevertheless, democratic states are generally considered at greater risk due to their open and transparent system of governance. This furthermore extends to businesses based in democratic states, who may be the direct target through economic pressure, or be indirectly affected by quasi-military activities or fluctuating and polarised public opinion. At the same time, freedom of speech and cooperation can be leveraged as key tools for exposing threats from grey zone activities.

Economic pressure

Economic coercion and pressure are threats targeting the economic and business activities of a state, including tactics such as debt dependency, intellectual property theft, forced technology transfers and punitive trade disruption. As a result of unfair trade practices by China, for example, and the narrowing of the global free trade space, countries like the United States have increasingly resorted to retaliation measures in the form of sanctions and tariff imposition.

Although it is unclear to what extent economic coercion helps states achieve their geopolitical goals or greater influence, it is clear that economic issues are increasingly understood as political and security issues as well. The implications for states and businesses alike need to be taken seriously. For all the dismissal of sanctions as ineffective, economic coercive measures and counter-measures are evolving towards more specific targeting, putting the pressure directly on businesses, their representatives, and individuals connected to the state rather than states as a whole. Furthermore, with a globalised and interconnected economy, the potential for secondary and tertiary impact remains high.

Cybersecurity

Cybersecurity is the practice of safeguarding computer systems, networks, and sensitive information from unauthorised access, theft, damage, or disruption. Governing cybersecurity is challenging due to the constantly evolving nature of cyber threats, the difficulty in attributing attacks to specific actors, and the absence of international norms and agreements on cyber warfare.

Cyberspace operates differently from the physical world due to the lack of physical boundaries. In cyberspace, information can be copied and disseminated instantly, and digital assets can be accessed and transferred without the need for physical presence or travel. This opens the door to attacks from anywhere in the world, with a lack of transparency and accountability. Cyberspace is also a relatively new domain of governance, and the existing legal frameworks, such as the Tallinn Manual, need to be updated accordingly. This legal uncertainty creates gaps and inconsistencies in the regulation of cyberspace and its treatment as a security issue.

Cybersecurity is an essential and cross-cutting component of hybrid warfare, as cyber-attacks can disrupt communications, steal sensitive information, and cause physical damage to infrastructure. This is directly linked to other hybrid threats such as critical infrastructure protection, management of dual-use technologies for Artificial Intelligence (AI) or strategies against disinformation: they require an adequate cybersecurity framework.

Disinformation and election interference

Disinformation, which can be defined as the deliberate dissemination of false or misleading information to deceive people, is a major security threat because it can manipulate public opinion, destabilise governments, undermine trust in international norms, and institutions, and incite violence. It can be used to interfere in elections and justify acts of aggression and even war crimes. Disinformation can achieve strategic objectives without resorting to direct military action, making it a cost-effective and low-risk tool for state and non-state actors.

The subjective nature of information and perception, along with the horizontal and democratised nature of social media makes disinformation a risky matter to address. While censorship may appear to some as the easiest way to counter disinformation, it highly undermines the legitimacy of a state, as it raises complex ethical questions and debates, such as the lack of freedom of expression or media plurality, and the respect for civil rights and freedoms.

Psychological warfare

Psychological warfare is by no means a new tactic, however, its use as a hybrid threat has greatly evolved since its employment in historical conflicts such as WWII. In theory, psychological warfare constitutes operations targeting morale, exploiting the fears, dispositions and emotions of enemy troops and the wider population. In practice, however, the lines are blurred between what constitutes psychological warfare, information operations, or foreign influence operations more broadly. The uniqueness of psychological warfare is that it is designed to target deeper feelings and processes outside of perception, many of which are difficult, if not impossible to control. Its use is not restricted to a time of war, however, and psychological operations can be used to intimidate adversaries and delay or deter military action. Modern-day use of technology, and especially the psychological impact of social media algorithms, has also expanded its potential reach beyond its traditional boundaries.

Energy

Using energy as a coercive measure is often construed as a subset practice of economic coercion, however, as recent events in Europe have demonstrated, the manipulation of energy resources has the potential to cause damage in more than one way. The reliance of a number of basic human needs on energy is only increasing, making energy a potent instrument of war and peace. Furthermore, the scarcity of resources has been discussed as a security issue long before energy specifically emerged as their frontrunner. Another challenge facing the reality of scarce energy resources is the exacerbation of such needs by climate change.

At the same time, energy as a hybrid threat faces serious shortcomings, namely traditional supply and demand calculations, sourcing of secondary material, and crucially, the availability of energy transport infrastructure. Confronting these aspects is thus a key stepping stone for states, businesses, and other non-state actors to guard against energy exploitation. In other words, with the right tools and policies, the cause of mitigating this hybrid threat remains at least partially hopeful.

Transport and supply chains

Supply chains are key to the functioning of economies and national security, as the US-China trade war currently demonstrates. Governments can leverage their control over supply chains to achieve objectives such as promoting domestic industries, protecting national security or exerting political influence through tactics such as export controls, investment restrictions or favouring domestic companies.

Supply chains are vulnerable to hybrid threats because they rely on the fragmentation of production and manufacturing processes across different states. The comparative gains from diversification and fragmentation of supply chains also open the door to dependency and vulnerability, as states and non-state actors often use supply chains and their facilities to disrupt other states, organisations and private entities.

Supply chain disruptions often target critical infrastructures, such as maritime trade routes, airports, air traffic, power plants, energy transmitters, and cyber infrastructures. Sustained supply shortages can have a significant impact on the economy and stability of states, leading to major disruptions in public security and a lack of long-term access to commodities, as seen in the crisis that erupted following the loss of agricultural exports since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Critical infrastructure

The term “critical infrastructure” refers to those assets, systems, and networks, physical or virtual, whose disruption or destruction would have an effect on security, economic security, public health or safety due to their vital contribution to peace, security and safety. Critical infrastructure enables the normal course of daily life. The term is all-encompassing and subjective in nature, as what is critical and what is not is left to the discretion of states. The US government has so far considered 16 sectors that could meet this definition: chemical, commercial facilities, communications, critical manufacturing assets, dams, defence industrial base, emergency services, energy and power plants, financial services, food and agriculture, government facilities, healthcare and public health, information technology (ICTs), transportation systems, water and wastewater systems, nuclear reactors, materials and waste.

Identifying and understanding the interdependencies between infrastructure elements and sectors is important for assessing risks and vulnerabilities and for determining measures to increase security and resilience. Damage, disruption or destruction of one infrastructure element can have cascading effects, affecting the continued operation of another. Depending on the degree of interconnection between infrastructures, the effects of disruption may be different. Therefore, if the exposure to risk is different from one infrastructure to another, the response must also be addressed in a distinct manner, complicating the management, governance and security of critical infrastructure.

Technology

States, state-sponsored groups, or self-funded terrorist groups, exploit many military technologies such as encrypted command systems, man-portable surface-to-air missiles, and other modern lethal systems. Nevertheless, technologies that had no original military use or purpose are now being transferred into the military domain: these are known as dual-use technologies and are key to understanding hybrid warfare and how traditional conflicts have changed.

Dual-use technologies have both civilian and military applications, blurring the line between the military and the non-military. They can be used for peaceful purposes such as transportation and communication or for military purposes such as weapon systems and intelligence gathering. Adversaries can misuse dual-use technologies in hybrid warfare. GPS technology, for instance, can guide missiles or drones to different targets, whether involved in a conflict or not, while social media platforms can spread propaganda or coordinate hybrid operations.

While the export of some dual-use technologies is not prohibited a priori, it is subject to restrictive controls, usually in the form of a licensing requirement. However, some countries are subject to import or export restrictions. For example, since 2018, the United States has imposed semiconductor export controls on China, targeting those that can be used for AI and military capabilities.

Migration

Migration is a constant reality of an interconnected world, and despite inflaming rhetoric has been pretty much stable over the past fifty years. Nevertheless, states are slowly coming to the realisation that the movement of large numbers of displaced people, forcibly or otherwise, can be used to pursue nefarious political and security objectives. The talk of ‘weaponising’ migration has entered geopolitical discourse very recently, yet states have been using migration policy in this way for much longer. The chief threat of weaponised migration lies in its socio-economic implications, but also increasingly in public polarisation and political destabilisation, especially when coupled with securitising rhetoric. The latter is often the primary goal, but other objectives may include punishment for what an adversary perceives to be a previous offence, or use as a bargaining chip at the negotiating table, whether in bilateral or multilateral relations.

However, one must also be careful of the use of terms such as ‘weaponising’ migrants, as it comes at the expense of their individual humanity. Not only can migration be used as a hybrid threat, but it can also incite discourses of dehumanisation, polarisation, and political violence, which themselves threaten stability in the long run.

Historical Context and Perspectives - Continuity and Change

Hybrid threats or hybrid warfare might appear relatively recent, decidedly twenty-first-century concepts, and the terminology is certainly quite new. This does not mean, however, that the characteristics and tactics of hybrid warfare are completely without precedent. In fact, warfare has been a complex phenomenon throughout history, whether labelled ‘hybrid’ or not. A number of tactics and events in history have thus retrospectively been likened to instances of hybrid warfare. These range from the Soviet partisan movement in the early 1940s, to the whole of the Cold War, to developments in Chinese military strategy at the end of the 1990s. Certain hybrid threat theorists posit that it is possible to go even further into history with examples such as the Peloponnesian War (431-405 BC) or the American Revolution (1875-1883), where tactics of psychological warfare, economic pressure, and the deployment of irregular forces were used.

Historically speaking, the purpose of hybrid threats as tactics of warfare has been to exploit the vulnerabilities of adversaries, or, where possible, even turn a formerly perceived advantage into a vulnerability by the employment of irregular means. They have thus been used principally by parties that would normally be perceived as being at a disadvantage in traditional settings. However, without the systematic and doctrinal foundations that present-day hybrid threats possess, the manners of addressing them varied greatly depending on the tactics used, and the circumstances adversarial parties found themselves in. The extent to which lines become blurred with the introduction of hybrid threats into traditional methods and tactics of warfare has certainly increased. A partial reason for this is the perceived hegemony of the United States that emerged at the end of the Cold War, which led challengers to the new status quo to pursue new and irregular approaches, incorporating them to fit their strategic, historical, geographical, and economic circumstances, while maintaining the corresponding difficulty of attribution characteristic of hybrid threats. These must therefore each be explored accordingly, in order to form a full and detailed picture of the use, impact and possible countering of hybrid threats in modern conflicts, by states and businesses alike.

Aims of ‘Hybrid Threats in the 21st Century’

Such exploration is, in a broad sense, the overall aim of this project. Due to the uncertain and broad nature of hybrid threats, and the fact that they can be difficult to define properly, it is also challenging to counter them effectively. A series of articles is to follow, which thus aims to highlight a variety of hybrid threats, as presented above, ranging from disinformation, disruption and attacks on critical infrastructure, to impacts on supply chains, energy security, economic pressures and cyber attacks, among others. Furthermore, we endeavour to highlight the current and likely impacts on business, non-profit organisations, and conflict more generally. Based on such analysis, tools and frameworks for countering hybrid threats will also be presented and evaluated.

London Politica 12/7/22 London Politica 12/7/22

Exploring Russian Private Military Contractors