Mapping Transnational Organised Crime
This special report with the Conflict and Security Watch examines the risks that stem from transnational organised crime activities. Taking a case study approach, we explore some of the most pervasive criminal markets including those of illicit drugs, arms, charcoal, timber, and most devastatingly, humans. From these analyses, we find that organised crime can create or compound several threats to operations including undermining human rights consideration, sustainability initiatives, and fuelling corruption and conflict.
Read the report HERE
Widespread political instability in Pakistan after the attempted assassination of Khan
On 3 November 2022, former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan was the victim of an assassination attempt while demonstrating against his removal from office in the Wazirabad district of Punjab province. Khan was on top of a container-mounted truck giving a speech to his supporters when he was attacked by what the state interior minister describes as a “religious extremist.” The attacker had been radicalised by religious extremists and had specifically attacked Khan for what he allegedly believed to be blasphemous remarks during speeches. The attacker confirmed that he acted alone. The attack took place as Khan was travelling in a large convoy of trucks and cars towards Islamabad, the state capital.
Pakistan has a long history of assassinations of its political leaders. The first Prime Minister to be assassinated was Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951. The late Benazir Bhutto was assassinated in December 2007 after escaping an assassination attempt in October 2007, while addressing a rally similar to Khan’s. Khan is the latest political leader in Pakistan to be the subject of an assassination attempt. He accused current Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, Interior Minister Rana Sanaullah, and a senior military official of orchestrating the attack on Khan’s convoy.
Khan has been protesting since he was removed as Prime Minister in April 2022 by a vote of no-confidence in Pakistan’s National Assembly. The attack raises new concerns about the growing instability in Pakistan, as Pakistani society has become increasingly polarised since Khan’s ouster. The former prime minister successfully mobilised mass rallies across the country by selling his supporters a narrative that he was ousted by a US-led “foreign conspiracy” in collaboration with the Pakistan Democratic Movement – Pakistan’s opposition parties to Khan’s Pakistan Movement for Justice (PTI) – as well as the powerful military.
The attack on Khan risks sparking violence across Pakistan and increasing political instability and insecurity in a country recovering from unprecedented floods that killed over 1600 people and displaced hundreds of thousands. Before leaving Lahore, Khan described his protest as a peaceful march. He said his political struggle against the government would continue until the Sharif administration accepts his demand for early elections or the army intervenes and uses its political power to demand early elections. The Sharif government has repeatedly stated that the next general election would be held as scheduled in August 2023.
Since the attack, state authorities have deployed additional security around Islamabad to deter any confrontation or violence. In the wake of the assassination attempt, Khan’s supporters began to “step-up protests with road blockages” across the country, and in towns and cities, protesters took to the streets in support of Khan. In Rawalpindi, a garrison city that houses the army’s headquarters, Khan’s supporters began shooting slogans and burning tyres. As a result, education authorities ordered the closure of schools and cancelled exams for two days on account of the “prevailing law and order situation” in the city. The decision to close schools was taken after school vans, ambulances and the general public were stranded at different places during protests. Khan’s political party called on its supporters to “protest peacefully” until the three officials accused of orchestrating the attack on his life resign and early parliamentary elections are held. The protests escalated when the Punjab police appeared reluctant to prosecute an army officer whom Khan and his party accused of masterminding the attack, because of his senior position in Pakistan’s intelligence services. The Supreme Court issued an ultimatum to the Punjab police to prosecute the accused within 24 hours.
It is likely that the popularity of Khan and his political party will increase, and that dissent within Pakistani society will grow in the near future. The armed forces will be challenged by Khan’s popularity as it is widely believed in Pakistan that the military brought Khan to power due to its political influence within the state. Furthermore, when relations soured, senior military commanders became neutral in their political stance leading to Khan’s exit from power. Participation in the marches is expected to increase as Khan continues to target the armed forces and the “imported government” in his speeches. As Khan has completed his recovery and aims to return to the stage, we can expect tensions to escalate between the incumbent government and the PTI protesters. Based on previous attempts by the PTI to enter the capital, it would be fair to suggest that if demonstrators begin marching towards Islamabad there is a high probability of violence and clashes between protestors and law enforcement authorities securing the capital. The threat of violence is imminent in Pakistan’s political gatherings. There is also reason to believe that protesters have been armed whilst attending PTI rallies.
Historically, the Pakistani military has dominated the country's politics since the state gained independence. The military and the bureaucracy have been dominant institutions of the state and have remained so because the state has been unable to distance itself from its colonial legacy. The military has been involved in numerous military coups that have weakened the process of democratic consolidation within the state. Since President Musharraf’s ouster, the military has controlled Pakistani political affairs from the outside. The civilian government is typically composed of pre-partition classes that align themselves with the armed forces in order to preserve their elitist interests. The military opposes any questioning of national security and foreign policy issues, and jealously guards its institutional interests within the state. Given the critical role of the military in Pakistan, the retirement of the current Chief of Army Staff (COAS) will be a turning point for Khan and his party. Indeed, the incoming COAS, General Asim Munir, was chief of intelligence when Khan had come into power in 2018. Khan had replaced Munir with LT Faiz Hameed after Khan and Munir fell out. It can therefore be argued that Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif’s nomination of Munir could be politically motivated and threaten Khan’s chances of coming to power.
Following the no-confidence vote that removed Khan from office, he has repeatedly accused the military for playing a role in his removal. However, Khan’s accusations are not intended to displace the military’s hegemony within the state, but rather are a “tactic to mount pressure on the military to concede to his demands” to dismiss the coalition government and force early elections. As such, the potential of shifting away from Pakistan’s hybrid system of governance, which consists of a supreme army and subservient civilian government, is unlikely despite Khan’s strained relations with the armed forces. Whether or not Khan succeeds in securing early elections, Pakistan’s democratic backsliding will remain unaffected, as political leaders rely on the support of the armed forces. Pakistan’s President and founding member of the PTI, Arif Alvi, has decided to act according to the constitution and law by approving the nomination of General Asim Munir, irrespective of PTI’s strained relations with the army. This can also be interpreted as a peace offering from the PTI, which is seeking closer ties with senior army officers. IK also welcomed the new military chief and praised the military as a “professional force”, but added that they must obey the constitution. That said, the military has never been so criticised since Khan began protesting against his removal from office. Therefore, further governmental instability can be expected, as well as a relatively similar hybrid relationship between the civilian government and senior military commanders.
Khan recently attended his first rally since his assassination attempt. He decided not to pursue his original intention of marching to Islamabad and protest against the incumbent government, which he accused of conspiring with the US. This decision risked aggravating the political turmoil in the nuclear-armed country, which is in the throes of an economic crisis. Instead, Khan decided that his party would resign from state assemblies in a new bid to push for early elections. The PTI has already resigned from the federal parliament but remains in power in two provinces and two administrative units – Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Dissolution will create major chaos in the country leaving state officials no choice but to call for early elections. While Khan will not be marching to Islamabad, his ‘Haqeeqi March’ movement will continue protesting in cities across Pakistan, which could have an impact on daily life and business. More than ever, Pakistan faces the likelihood of governmental instability and political unrest.