London Politica 3/31/23 London Politica 3/31/23

How the Private Security Industry Is Shaping Conflicts Around the World in 2023

During the last 13 months, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has highlighted both the ubiquity and potency of private military contractors (PMCs) as several, led by the now infamous Wagner Group, have garnered international headlines. While Russian PMCs have become prominent, groups based out of other countries are increasingly influencing conflicts around the world. Indeed, the industry still seems to be broadly dominated by Western private security companies. One 2015 study suggested that 27 of the world’s 50 largest security providers originated from the USA, while another 12 operated from the UK and another one from Canada. Meanwhile, as the scope of China’s foreign policy widens, particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Beijing, too, is increasingly using private security firms.

There is a vast array of companies operating within the private security industry from security firms and PMCs to mercenaries, and it is important to distinguish between them. Part of the difficulty in defining PMCs lies in their versatility; they are involved in combat, supply lines, logistics and training, among other tasks. And every actor, from powerful states such as the US and Russia to developing states, non-governmental organisations, international organisations and multinational corporations seem to have engaged their services.

PMCs have steadily proliferated since the end of the Cold War, filling in a security gap and adapting to the changing nature of war in the pro-free market conditions of the 1990s and 2000s. Moreover, by their very nature, PMCs normally contain top military experts who exert a genuine influence on the outcome of conflicts.

But, as well as fighting in wars, PMCs can influence conflicts through covert operations, maritime security or by complementing a state’s foreign policy. Given the shadowy nature of the industry, it is difficult to find contemporary open-source intelligence for each individual example but, using recently reported events and openly available data, it is possible to pinpoint these areas as likely trends in the private security industry this year.

Military operations in wars

The roots of the 21st-century private military industry are situated in the American-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, launched in 2001 and 2003 respectively, partly because of public backlash to the deployment of troops. PMCs are still fighting in wars today, notably in Ukraine. As well as Russian PMCs, there are other private groups present in the conflict.

Former US Marine colonel Andrew Milburn founded the Mozart Group – its name a response to the Wagner Group – and was among the private contractors fighting in Ukraine until it imploded in February following infighting among its leadership and a series of allegations against Milburn that included making disparaging comments about Ukraine’s leaders. He and his staff, mostly former special operations soldiers, were involved in many different aspects of fighting from rescuing civilians to conducting frontline training and workshops on drone warfare. However, his group, though largely aligned with American foreign policy, seems independent from it. His biggest donors were hedge fund managers from New York and a humanitarian organisation specialising in evacuations.

The Mozart Group was just one of many Western-led volunteer groups operating in Ukraine where an estimated 1,000 to 3,000 foreign fighters are reported to be active. However, while the aims of these groups largely align with Western states, their methods can end up contradicting NATO and the Biden administration’s efforts to avoid direct involvement in the war.

Maritime security

Anti-piracy has become another central tenet of the private security industry with several companies highlighting their work in the Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean, Gulf of Guinea, Horn of Africa, and Somalia. These groups provide a wide range of services from training crews against piracy attacks to maintaining weapons systems and protecting ships. This has unequivocally succeeded in reducing piracy, but a growing reliance on private contractors has exposed the human rights violations perpetrated by these groups, UN experts said in November 2022. Its use of floating armouries has also intensified weapons proliferation at sea. Such issues are compounded by non-existent or weak regulatory frameworks far away from land-based law enforcement. But this side of the industry seems to be changing of late, due to its very success. Piracy is becoming less of a threat and bandits are increasingly targeting inland waterways instead, creating a different role for PMCs. Guaranteeing security in these situations is becoming hybrid, involving both state navy and PMCs, bound together by highly profitable contracts.

Complementing state foreign policy

The private security industry is also used to complement a state’s foreign policy, helping to protect strategic sites and people abroad in less secure countries.

With the growing footprint left by the BRI, it seems that there will be an increasing role for Chinese private security companies (PSCs), employed to protect strategic interests in other countries, such as mining facilities, ports, and infrastructure projects. Unlike their Western counterparts, however, these groups are closely controlled by the central government, limiting their operations. Once again, it is important to distinguish between PMCs and private security companies as China forbids PMCs but legalised PSCs in 2009. As such, these groups have largely fulfilled security functions rather than engaging in military operations. It seems likely that their role will increase following President Xi Jinping's remarks at the 20th Communist Party Congress in which he said: “We will strengthen our capacity to ensure overseas security and protect the lawful rights and interests of Chinese citizens and legal entities overseas.”

Several other states also use PMCs to augment their foreign policy. As of 2018, dozens of big private British security companies “are all either already involved across either sub-Saharan Africa or north Africa, where there are vast security issues,” John Hilary, executive director at War on Want, told Open Democracy. One British company alone, G4S, employs more than 500,000 people and is present in more than 90 countries, as of 2020. Its role includes providing event security, security systems and running prisons.

Covert operations

The more clandestine side of the private security industry also lends itself to covert operations, offering plausible deniability for those commissioning the work. In one instance, members from a PSC called CTU Security have recently been arrested for assassinating Haiti’s President Jovenel Moise in July 2021. This US-based company recruited 20 Colombians with military training to help storm the president’s home and assassinate him. During the subsequent investigation, CTU Security was also accused of hatching a plot to assassinate Bolivian President Luis Alberto Arce Catacore in October 2020. Representatives from the company reportedly travelled to the country and planned with the Bolivian defence minister Luis Fernandez López to assassinate the president, preventing him from taking power after an election.

Although this example is extreme, it illustrates the wide-ranging effects that PSCs can have on a country’s politics and security, intensifying a pre-existing conflict. The assassination, which prosecutors say was motivated by businessmen who hoped to secure lucrative contracts under a new administration, has plunged Haiti into violence, creating a power vacuum for gangs to fill.

PMCs seem to be involved in the assassinations of other political figures too. Four of the Saudis who participated in the 2018 assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi received paramilitary training in the USA from an Arkansas-based security firm Tier 1 Group in 2017. The company said that the training was defensive rather than offensive, but its links to the assassination still illustrate the impact of the private security industry on political assassinations such as this one.

The private security industry is a wide-ranging one, encompassing everything from providing security for multinational companies to mercenary armies. As such it is capable of influencing conflicts in 2023 in ways beyond simply fighting in wars as has been highlighted during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The industry has carved out an important role for itself in maritime security too, influencing the nature of and reducing the potency of piracy. Moreover, by operating in tandem with more powerful states’ foreign policies, such as China or the UK, the private security industry assists these countries in maintaining a greater global footprint. Finally, the industry’s entanglement with more covert activities plays a direct role in influencing the domestic politics of less stable states and, in the case of Haiti, in perpetuating internal conflict.

London Politica 1/27/23 London Politica 1/27/23

Two months after the ceasefire, how has the situation in Tigray changed?

For nearly two years, Ethiopia’s Tigray region has been plagued by a conflict that has claimed the lives of an estimated 600,000 people, according to Olusegun Obasanjo, the African Union’s chief mediator in the peace talks.

From 1991 to 2018, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) – Tigray’s main political party – dominated Ethiopian national politics despite representing an ethnic minority in the country. The TPLF’ power began to wane in 2018 after Abiy Ahmed Ali became prime minister. Initially heralded as a peacemaker who could transcend ethnic divisions within Ethiopia, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 for reaching a peace agreement with Eritrea. However, Abiy, while weakening the TPLF, began to consolidate his own power by delaying national elections and extending his first term as prime minister in June 2020. Three months later, the Tigray State Council defied federal orders and held parliamentary elections, raising concerns that it was preparing to become a breakaway state, thus increasing tensions between the region and the federal government. After the elections, Abiy accused Tigrayan troops of looting weapons from a federal military camp and began an offensive against regional troops in Tigray on 4 November 2020.

The war in Tigray is marked by its brutality. The UN Human Rights Council issued a report concluding that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the Ethiopian federal governmen and its allies have committed crimes against humanity in Tigray, pointing to the withdrawal of basic services from the region, striking a refugee camp with an armed drone, and perpetrating sexual violence against Tigrayan civilians. The commission added that it also has reasonable grounds to believe that Tigrayan forces have committed war crimes and human rights violations during the conflict.

The conflict escalated in August 2022, but on 2 November 2022, the Ethiopian government and Tigrayan rebels signed a peace agreement in the hope of ending the war. Brokered by the African Union, the November ceasefire goes further than any other settlement attempt, with the TPLF and the Ethiopian federal government agreeing to a disarmament plan and the restoration of essential services. Since then, the situation has changed somewhat, with humanitarian aid reaching some, but not all, of the region, basic services restored, and the military ceasefire largely respected.

The ceasefire has been greeted with cautious optimism as previous settlements had failed, and Eritrea – a party in the conflict – was not represented at the peace talks. The ceasefire makes little provision for the role of Eritrea, which is neither a party to the agreement nor mentioned by name in the text. Jeffrey Feltman, former US special envoy for the Horn of Africa, argues that the international community should monitor the withdrawal of Eritrean troops from Ethiopia, as Asmara views the TPLF as “an existential threat and may not be content with a peace deal that leaves the organization intact and its leaders alive.” The Embassy of Eritrea in the USA responded to Feltman in an open letter, saying that his “underlying and transparent intentions are to stoke a new and wider war in the region.”

There are conflicting reports as to whether all Eritrean troops are withdrawing from Tigray. According to Obasanjo, “ all Eritreans are at the border,” but not all troops have left the country. His words were contradicted by Getachew Reda, the advisor to the President of Tigray, who tweeted “No; Eritrean forces are digging in their heels big time. And the #AU-JVMC are nowhere near. Let them go there & do their job first before such remarks are made!” In early December 2022, Eritrean troops were reported seizing food, vehicles and gold from more than two dozen towns in northern Tigray despite the ceasefire. Nonetheless, on 30 December 2022, Eritrean soldiers, who fought in support of Ethiopia’s federal government, reportedly withdrew from two major towns and headed for the border. This is indicative of what appears to be a military de-escalation. Political leaders are also taking steps to signal it. On 26 December 2022, a delegation from the Ethiopian federal government, led by the speaker of the House of Representatives, Tagesse Chafo, travelled to the northern region of Tigray to oversee the implementation of the peace agreement. It was the first high-level federal delegation to visit the region in two years.

As a result of the ceasefire, Obasanjo estimates that “we have stopped 1,000 deaths every day,” although the media reported that civilians were still being killed in early December 2022, a month after the ceasefire.

Some Tigrayans, according to Foreign Policy, have expressed dissatisfaction that the agreement stipulates the disarmament of the TPLF without addressing the root causes of the war. In their view, this will only create a weak Tigray, with the causes of the war still present and latent. Moreover, while the TPLF claims to have withdrawn 65 percent of its forces from the front lines, Tadesse Wereda, the TPLF’s commander-in-chief said that the organisation was still maintaining fighters in some places “where there is a presence of anti-peace forces.” He did not name these locations. Nevertheless, Tigrayan forces began handing over their heavy weapons in mid-January, with Getachew Reda tweeting that the Tigray government “hope[s] & expect[s] this will go a long way in expediting the full implementation of the agreement.”

The war in Tigray has created a humanitarian catastrophe that leaves more than 13 million people in northern Ethiopia dependent on humanitarian aid, including more than 90 percent of Tigray’s 6 million inhabitants. When the peace deal was announced, the World Health Organization estimated that there were around 5.2 million people in need of humanitarian assistance in Tigray, of whom 3.8 million required healthcare. No humanitarian assistance had reached the region for two months. Following the peace agreement, the World Food Programme (WFP) delivered more than 2,400 tonnes of food – enough to feed about 170,000 people – as well as medical, nutritional and other essential supplies, while the UN Humanitarian Air Service is operating in the region for the first time, carrying passengers and humanitarian aid. However, according to the WFP, deliveries were still below requirements on 25 November 2022. As of mid-January, humanitarian access, “particularly in border areas, areas off the main roads and locations requiring cross-line movements, continues to be challenging,” according to Tghat, a data collecting body in Tigray.

Banking services were suspended in Tigray during the war, further cutting the region off from international aid. Following the ceasefire, limited banking services returned in some parts of the region, allowing people to deposit money and receive it from abroad. The Commercial Bank of Ethiopia plans to restore services in all its branches if the conditions permit. Tigray’s dire economic situation extends beyond the banks, as large parts of the region need to be completely rebuilt. According to some estimates, reconstruction over the next three years is expected to cost more than $20 billion.

For much of the war, Tigray experienced a communications blackout that resulted in the “world’s longest uninterrupted shutdown,” according to the Internet rights group Access Now. In early December, Ethiopia’s electricity provider announced that the regional capital, Mekele, had been reconnected to the national power grid after more than a year of power cuts. Phone lines are beginning to be restored in the region, although areas under the control of Tigrayan forces are still cut off, while commercial flights have resumed between the Ethiopian federal capital Addis Ababa and Mekele. With some communication channels restored, people outside the region are only now beginning to learn what happened to their relatives. Restoring the social links between Tigray and the rest of Ethiopia is indicative of the overall changes taking place as a result of the ceasefire.

The security situation seems to be evolving as soldiers are withdrawing and the TPLF is disarming. Humanitarian aid is re-entering the region and the political structures overseeing the ceasefire seem to be respecting it. Nevertheless, the situation remains fraught. A ceasefire agreed upon in March 2022 reduced violence and allowed humanitarian aid to reach Tigray for five months until hostilities resumed.

In August 2022, as the first ceasefire collapsed, the TPLF demanded that the federal government restore essential services in Tigray, allow complete humanitarian access, be held accountable for war crimes, the withdrawal of foreign forces and the return of Western Tigray, which was under Amhara control. Some of these conditions appear stable under the current ceasefire, suggesting that it will be more durable than the one reached in August, but points of tension remain. The territorial dispute over Western Tigray remains unresolved, conflicting reports concerning the withdrawal of Eritrean troops suggest some are still present in the region, and the question of how to administer justice for alleged war crimes remains unanswered. Each of these elements could constitute a potential flashpoint in the future.

London Politica 1/30/22 London Politica 1/30/22

Overlooked Political Risks for 2022: The Politicization of “Everything”