From Early Warning to Early Response in Conflict Prevention
The last decades have been marked by instability of the international scene due to the increasing number of inter- and intra-state conflicts. These conflicts are caused by violent extremism, climate change, the deterioration of a state's socio-economic situation, a shortage of resources and, last but not least, civilians' growing distrust of its institutions. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 56 States suffered armed conflict in 2022 in the Americas, Asia and Oceania, Europe, the Middle East, North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa, 10 more than in 2021.
The concept of conflict prevention was coined in the 1960s. It refers to diplomatic approaches through multiple activities and strategies aimed at anticipating conflict or neutralising violence before it escalates into conflict. It is a broad term that includes early warning and early response systems. The concept has grown in popularity to become a strategy within international organisations such as the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and within national governments. Early warning and response systems are subject to specific regulations and commitments by countries depending on the context and the circumstances. With multiple definitions depending on the type of crisis to be managed, this article focuses on the conceptualisation of systems aimed at avoiding armed conflict and on the observation that, despite this, conflicts continue to break out between different state and non-state actors, particularly in Africa.
The concept of early warning
Early warning consists of identifying factors that predict the onset of violence. It comprises five main mechanisms: data collection, data analysis, assessment of different scenarios, formulation of possible actions, and the transmission of recommendations to decision-makers. This comprehensive monitoring is carried out by internal and external analysts in the region concerned, who focus on political leaders, political groups, armed groups, and other relevant stakeholders likely to jeopardise order. The spectrum assessment areas is broad and can focus on economic, political, demographical, social, ethnic, environmental, health, or safety factors. In practical terms, intelligence gathering and analysis provide an in-depth understanding of the social dynamics of the area threatened by conflict and the interests of the involved actors involved. By identifying potential scenarios and presenting them to decision-makers, they can anticipate the deterioration of a situation and develop a coherent strategy and effective intervention.
To make the early warning system more effective, four considerations need to be taken into account in addition to the overall monitoring. Firstly, the political analysis should identify the parties involved in the conflict who are in favour of peace. This targeting would make it possible to establish a relationship of trust with actors who have the potential to promote non-violent solutions to the crisis. Secondly, analysts should keep observing the situation to foresee unexpected developments during and after the warning. In addition, analysing the behaviours of the stakeholders involved could help to understand the actions taken and the causes of the instability. Finally, when elaborating the strategy, it should be essential for analysts to determine the actors best qualified to lead the resolution of the conflict. These considerations would make early warning credible and help to understand if and how political actors can exacerbate a crisis, what actions can accelerate tensions, and what form a crisis might take if left unchecked.
As the early warning system only serves to alert and advise on a possible crisis, it is often combined with an early response system to make conflict prevention comprehensive and effective.
The concept of early response
Early response consists of proposing timely and appropriate initiatives to ease tensions or put an end to the outbreak of violence. It brings together available tools and instruments from government, regional, and international organisations. This system is classified into three levels of action:
Facilitative - high-level diplomacy, mediation, and confidence-building measures;
Coercive - diplomatic penalties, sanctions, threats of international justice, and the use of force in extreme cases; and
Incentive - financial aid, security guarantees, and institutional support.
The classification of responses allows decision-makers to react in the short and long term, which would define the outcome of the conflict. Short-term measures cover interventions during an election, within civil society groups or representative authorities, joint peace missions, military deployment, or the conduct of mediation and negotiation between conflicting parties. Long-term measures cover the management of interactive peace dialogues, the organisation of problem-solving workshops, or the sensitisation of policy-makers and civil parties to a potential danger. It is therefore the type of crisis that will determine the form of the response.
This system is complementary to the early warning system, which enables conflicts to be predicted and prevented. Following the early warning assessment, researchers, academics, and external organisations submit a range of responses that could be implemented by national government, local, regional and international organisations. This allows decision-makers to tackle the real sources of conflict and prevent them not only on the surface but also in depth. Responses elaborated tend to be more structural over time by targeting the key socio-economic, political, and institutional factors that can lead to a crisis such as addressing marginalisation and inequality, strengthening social cohesion and social capacities, promoting local development, ensuring legitimate and equitable justice, and building security institutions. Therefore, early response helps to persuade and encourage decision-makers to pursue actions aimed at avoiding or minimising violence and to propose solutions to contain it.
The effectiveness of these systems: a case study of the African Union’s early warning and response system and the Sudan conflict
As mentioned above, an early warning and early response system can also be implemented at regional level. This section focuses on these systems within the African Union and their effectiveness. The organisation establishes policies and provides political and financial instruments to prevent conflicts within the continent.
Africa has always been confronted with cycles of conflict, the origins and degree of violence of which vary from one region to another. In 2012, the African Union set up the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) to gather information, monitor situations and formulate responses for decision-makers. In 2017, institutional reforms were undertaken to make the system more effective and address financial dependence on international donors. The reform resulted in the creation of a new department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security, and a Situation Room supervising early warning and early response in Africa. It has strengthened cooperation and coordination between economic communities and Member States at regional level. However, despite the implementation of the CEWS, Africa recorded its highest number of conflicts on the continent in 2019. The Peace Research Institute Oslo counted 25 state conflicts including ethnic, religious, environmental, or societal issues. Consequently, it can be said that the new departments created do not fulfil their mandates. Instead of focusing on early warning and response, they are concentrating more on crisis management of ongoing conflicts, thus losing sight of their purpose.
Despite the existence of the CEWS, Sudan has been facing a violent conflict since April 2023. This conflict opposes General Dagalo, leader of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, and General al-Burhan, commander of the Sudan national military force, due to institutional disagreements, economic and security instability, humanitarian needs, and poverty following their military coup in October 2021. Nevertheless, Sudan is a member of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) which operates the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), an early warning system implemented in 2022. As part of this regional community, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda have promoted a system that seeks to collect information from religious and civil society leaders, youth, and women to avoid crises. This strategy allows a greater number of factors to be gathered and used, enabling analysts to decipher potential tensions. However, this mechanism operates under a strict mandate, including the prevention of pastoralist conflicts in which governments are not involved, and the non-management of civil conflict between government and rebel groups supported by neighbouring governments. Furthermore, within this mandate, CEWARN can only provide accurate and verified information to the states concerned in order to enable them to take appropriate measures to prevent conflict. Consequently, the most competent body that could have prevented the conflict in Sudan was limited in terms of action, geographical scope and conflicting interests.
Since the coup in October 2021, the international community has been striving to restore civil democracy. At that time, UN Special Envoy Volker Perthes warned of the possibility of a further fragmentation of Sudan if no inclusive dialogue was initiated. He also advised rebuilding trust with the Sudanese people and regaining economic, financial and political support from the international arena. A return to the path of democratic transition in Sudan would have reduced tensions and the risk of escalating violence, and enabled international donors to restore their financial support for development, which had a major impact on early warning and response monitoring. After alerting to the situation, Volker Perthes proposed short- and medium-term actions such as stopping arbitrary arrests, releasing political detainees, and guaranteeing civilians’ rights to protest and assemble. Despite these proposals for rapid intervention to prevent the escalation of violence, the conflict that broke out in April 2023 is still ongoing, with no end in sight. Regional early warning and response systems did not prevent the conflict from breaking out, despite the existence of obvious factors such as institutional instability following a coup d'état, the country's poor economic situation, deplorable health, climatic and living conditions, and security instability in various parts of the country.
What is making these systems uncertain?
Several factors can make early warning and response systems uncertain. Having or benefiting from such systems does not guarantee that the tensions observed will not turn into conflict. Three factors can be taken into consideration when a conflict emerges despite the presence of an early warning and response system:
human unpredictability,
the country’s socio-economic situation, and
the strengthening of the country's institutional capacities.
Firstly, the stress faced by decision-makers is an important factor that needs to be taken into consideration in conflict prevention. Stress can be seen as a response resulting in positive or negative outcomes, based on a cognitive interpretation of a situation. Lazarus and Folkmans introduced a strategy called “stress coping”, which can be associated with a possible outbreak of conflict. Depending on the situation, this involves adopting a problem-focused response, an emotion-focused response or a self-esteem-focused approach. Thanks to this analysis, in the case of a possible crisis and a stressful challenge, it is possible to identify three types of responses.
Acknowledgement of a lack of control over the situation, which may lead to a lack of appropriate decisions.
Emotional outburst, which can lead to subjective decisions.
Confidence that tensions can be managed using available means, which can lead to unmeasured decisions.
As a result, human and psychological factors in times of crisis make the early warning and response system unpredictable. The decisions of decision-makers are indirectly influenced by their beliefs, convictions, emotions, and their advisors, which can compromise the effectiveness and certainty of the early warning and response system.
Second, violent conflicts frequently erupt in states with fragile economies and social structures. National budgets are distributed differently across countries and, since the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015, the level of national budget execution is an indicator of the government's ability to deliver public services and achieve development goals. With the overriding objective of ending poverty, promoting prosperity for people, and supporting sustainable development, decision-makers are seeking to strengthen institutional and organisational capacities. Therefore, conflict prevention is becoming a secondary concern, particularly for developing countries. Even if conflict prevention is less costly than conflict management, decision-makers may remain reluctant to intervene before violence escalates, undermining the effectiveness of the early warning and response systems.
Last but not least, early warning and response systems can be uncertain due to a lack of efficient institutional capacity building. Institutions are key actors in conflict prevention because they collect and analyse relevant information, identify threats, and assess warnings and appropriate responses for decision-makers. The escalation of violence is mainly due to a lack of substantial information or the inability to deploy the necessary resources to prevent conflict from breaking out. Consequently, early warning and response systems are difficult to implement, both for the country concerned and for external actors involved in conflict prevention.
How to make early warning and early response systems more efficient?
The current operation of early warning and response systems has shortcomings and therefore needs to be adjusted and reinforced on an ad-hoc basis. Four recommendations can be made to make these systems more effective.
The first recommendation concerns strengthening cooperation between national governments and external stakeholders to promote conflict prevention. To be more effective, it is important to focus on the exchange of information, strategies and materials. This will help to create coordinated and rapid responses in the field of conflict prevention. In this way, early warning and response systems will be more comprehensive, targeted, and responsive.
The second recommendation is about the effectiveness of actions taken under the rapid reaction system. National governments are on the front line when domestic tensions escalate into violent conflict. Therefore, governments must have available and flexible emergency funds that can be deployed in the event of an imminent crisis. The availability of the fund allows the decision-maker to react quickly, without worrying about prioritising socio-economic issues. The flexibility of the fund means that responses can be tailored to specific situations. In this way, less developed countries will reduce their dependence on international partners.
The third recommendation concerns the inclusion of civil society in conflict prevention, particularly women and youth. Women have an important voice due to their involvement at community level, since they are involved at all levels of the local population, organising the community. Young people are seen as the future of the community because they are at the heart of public policy and the first to be sensitised to enable long-term action. Together, they have a strong voice, could be agents of change in conflict prevention, be a valuable source of information, make early warning analysis more accurate, and enable appropriate responses. Moreover, by increasing their visibility and influence in the decision-making process, national government and external actors could seize the opportunity to raise awareness and prevent tensions from flaring up again.
Combined with the previous point, the fourth and final recommendation highlights the importance of reintegrating communities into society. As institutions in fragile countries struggle to provide adequate services and maintain a growing economy, civilians tend to gravitate towards organisations capable of performing government functions. These organisations are sometimes illegal armed groups. This is a practical relationship in which communities give their loyalty to illegal groups in exchange for the provision of necessary resources and security. The challenge is to reintegrate civilians into society by re-establishing a relationship of trust with the government. This requires effective institutions, strong democratic governance and economic growth for civil society.
The European Defence Fund: Political Impact and Challenges
The European Defence Fund
The European Defence Fund (EDF) is an initiative launched by the European Commission in 2017 under the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). For the 2021-2027 MFF, the main objective is to promote defence cooperation between EU Member States through the coordination, complementarity and amplification of national defence investments, to encourage an innovative and competitive defence industry, to enhance cooperation between companies and stakeholder states, and to support research and development in defence technology. The EDF is divided into two windows. One part of the fund is allocated to collaborative defence research projects. The other part is to provide capability levels and incentives for companies and EU Member States to cooperate on joint defence projects. This fund enables multi-level cooperation in the security and defence sector and increases competitiveness with other military powers in a global dynamic where all nations are seeking to remilitarise their territory and strengthen their defence industry. As a matter of fact, since the end of the Cold War, global military spending has risen considerably due to the volatility of the international scene. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, global military expenditures for 2018 reached $1,82 billion or 2,6% more in real terms compared to the $1,73 billion spent in 2017. In the context of this fast-changing development, the European Union attempts to assert itself through the European Defence Fund and the biggest military spenders, namely the United States (US), China, and Russia.
A changing security landscape
In response to the international arms race, the EDF was initially allocated a budget of €13 billion for the period 2021-2027. In the meantime, European priorities and challenges have shifted towards public health, research, and on the fight against climate change. The budget allocated to the EDF was subsequently revised downwards. The EDF budget was fixed at €8 billion, including €2,7 billion for collaborative defence research and €5,3 billion to fund capability development projects.
However, since its adoption, threats have evolved, as have the challenges to European security. The use of conventional and unconventional means to jeopardise security stability has increased on the international scene, as have the actors who use them. In addition to existing threats in its neighbourhood, such as armed conflict sor civil wars, Europe faces a wide range of hybrid threats, including terrorist threats, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber-attacks, propaganda, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) attacks, and disinformation. Given the volatility of the international scene and the danger facing European territory, the mid-term review of the MFF on 20 June 2023 was an opportunity for the European Commission to propose a revision of the MFF. The strengthening of EU defence research and development through an increase in the budget was accepted following the review. An additional €1.5 billion will be allocated to the EDF, bringing the total to €9.5 billion. In a long-term financial plan, the review is an opportunity to reassess European needs regarding new and current security and defence issues and provide common responses to them. With the Russian invasion of Ukraine having an immediate impact on European countries' decisions on military spending, the European Union should allocate more defence funds to Member State industries to enable the pooling and harmonisation of the European defence industry, particularly in the field of research and technological innovation. This will enable Europe's small military powers to overcome their gap with the major military powers and give the strongest defence industries the means to go further in innovation and capability design. This would simultaneously strengthen Europe's strategic autonomy.
Reinforcing the status of the European Union on the international stage
The implementation of the EDF is closely linked to the strengthening of Europe's strategic autonomy, and consequently to the consolidation of the EU's position on the international stage. Adopted in June 2016, the EU’s Global Strategy introduces the concept of an EU autonomy strategy. It is rooted in the idea of making the EU capable of conducting operations and crisis management missions within the EU, in its neighbourhood and in other regions of the world, of being well equipped militarily and of operating independently of the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The fund, combined with the strategy, would enable the EU to assert itself politically on the international stage, where the preservation of stability and security is increasingly under threat. As the EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, has said, strategic autonomy is also a “process of political survival” for the EU. This process could have consequences at three levels.
It would allow the EU to protect itself from its volatile neighbourhood environment. Indeed, all the crises happening in the southern and eastern neighbourhoods of Europe are having a strong impact on the EU’s internal security due to ripple effects. This is the case of the security situation in Sahel, which has led the EU to notice terrorist threats growing on its territory and to set up training missions -such as EUCAP Sahel Niger or EUCAP Sahel Mali- to prevent the spread of terrorist groups within and outside the region.
It would enhance EU action for international crisis management, and give a new dynamic to the Schuman Declaration which stated that “world peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it.” The economic interdependence that used to be enough to guarantee peace is no longer sufficient. To avoid conflict, the EU must have the means to ensure its own protection, defend its territory, and deter the enemy from destabilising international security by adjusting its strategies.
Progressively, the European Union could become more competitive with powers such as the US, China, and Russia, which are constantly increasing their defence investment in terms of research, innovation and technology. Indeed, the US ranks first in the world in terms of military spending. Its defence expenditures reached $877 billion in 2022. This was an increase of 0,7% in real terms on the 2021 budget of $801 billion. As the world's second largest military spender, China has been increasing its defence budget for 28 consecutive years, allocating $292 billion in 2022 to its military budget. This is 4,2% more than in 2021, with an estimated budget of $279,74 billion. Russia is the world's third largest military power, with a budget of $86,4 billion in 2022. It is 9,2% more than the 2021 budget (estimated at $78,45 billion).
The increasing complexity of the world, the changing nature of internal and external threats, the emergence of transnationalism in international relations and growing interconnectivity have altered the international balance of power and had an impact on international stability. This adaptation has had an impact on the EU's internal policy. These impacts have challenged the unity of European Member States before bringing them together.
What the EDF has triggered in the EU
A two-speed Europe
The cut in the EDF budget by the European Commission has relegated the reinforcement of European security and defence capabilities to a secondary position, due to the remote idea of war reappearing on the European continent and the need to consolidate the different defence and security policy perspectives of the Member States of the European Union. This has also led to a diversification of opinion on the desire to strengthen European defence and security capacities independent of NATO and the US, and in the political project of developing a strategic autonomy for the European Union. This was demonstrated through the negotiation of the MFF during the Finnish presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2019 and the French presidency in 2021. Finland proposed to cut the EDF budget in half for 2021-2027 and allocate it an amount of €6 million. On the contrary, France proposed a budget of €924 million. As a result, the notion of a two-speed Europe in terms of security objectives and means was reinforced. On one hand, some Member States were reluctant to have a stronger military role for the EU in order to avoid the duplication of NATO’s role. They were confident about NATO and the US ensuring security over their countries. This was the case of the Baltic States constantly warning that they were under threat from Russia due to the sharing of borders and the Russian military district in the enclave of Kaliningrad. On the other hand, some EU governments, mainly the major military powers such as France or Germany, were pressing for increased national spending to guarantee Europe’s security and defence. There was a clear divergence of vision between European countries with fewer security and defence capabilities, relying on others to protect them, and those capable of securing their own territory and defending themselves.
The EU Battle Groups have demonstrated this lack of common vision within the EU. Created in 2007, the EU Battle Groups consist of troops made available by European Member States and deployable within 10 days. These groups are not controlled by a centralised authority and generate unequal expenditure between countries with the means to deploy equipped troops. The gap between military strategies and threats assessment have discouraged European countries from getting involved in deploying the Battle Groups. As a result, they have never been used but are still active with the aim of overcoming obstacles and being deployed. However, due to the increase in common threats, national foreign, security and defence policy strategies, which previously differed, are tending to coincide between European Member States and within the institutions of the European Union.
Improved interoperability
Two instruments have been created to reduce the aforementioned divergences and extend the scope of European foreign security and defence actions. In 2017, the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) was launched, allowing EU Member States to integrate their defence capabilities on a voluntary basis, and with legally binding commitment. While this means can accentuate the division between Member States, it can also enable integration and cooperation, and serves to demonstrate the benefits and effectiveness of European defence capabilities. PESCO is a crucial mechanism for achieving strategic autonomy through closer cooperation between EU Member States and political preparedness. To complement this momentum, the European Peace Facility (EPF) was launched in 2021. This new financing instrument has a budget of €5 billion for the periods 2021-2027. The EPF guarantees the supply of military equipment and humanitarian aid, increases EU military mobility, and supports increased defence spending by EU countries. In this way, the European Union gives its Member States the financial resources they need to strengthen security and defence cooperation and increase the EU's influence on the international stage. In the context of recent security events and the reassessment of threats facing the EU, a consensus has emerged on cooperation and coordination of actions. The European Defence Fund, the Permanent Structured Cooperation, and the European Peace Facility are part of a package of defence measures offering Member States complementarity in maintaining security.
A “de facto solidarity” - Robert Schuman
From Robert Schuman to Ursula Von der Leyen, the European project has always been synonymous with solidarity, cooperation and interoperability. Initially to consolidate peace, today to manage crises and maintain European and international stability, the European project is adjusted and consolidated through European unity. The new and multiple security challenges are too great for individual Member States to tackle alone. Over time, European Member States have increased their national security capabilities and strengthened their cooperation and coordination. The Baltic States' willingness to devote 3% of their GDP to defence spending and the EU's provision of arms and assistance to Ukraine through the European Peace Facility are just two examples. This demonstrates the willingness of EU Member States to work together to maintain safety and security. The EDF, initially relegated to the background due to the multiple crises the EU has gone through, is regaining its importance. The initial project of a united Europe is present. The project of an interoperable Europe is progressing. The implementation of the EDF has consolidated the idea of the European concept described by Robert Schuman: “Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.”
Four challenges facing the EDF
These concrete achievements linked to the EDF have raised a number of challenges that the European institutions and the EU Member States must address. Four of them, among many others, are highlighted here:
The first concern relates to the traceability of weapons manufactured as part of a common defence industry and their delivery in support of partners affected by conflict. In order to develop the European defence industry and prevent such a situation from recurring, a European body should develop a system of checks and balances, as well as a means of tracing weapons so that they can be easily found and tracked.
The second concern is the development of new technologies and critical weapons. Given that the fund will be allocated to defence industry stakeholders on a project basis, the innovation of new technological weapons should be monitored. The European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council of the EU have agreed in an inter-institutional agreement not to fund Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) to ensure that new technologies remain human-centred. This is why the European Commission must set up a control authority capable of supervising the projects it funds through a system of monitoring, control, and audit. This will also enable the money invested to be tracked and will emphasise transparency between the European institutions, private players and European citizens.
The aforementioned challenge is closely linked to the direct arms financing in EU legislation. As the Lisbon Treaty forbids “expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications”, the EU provides money to Member States through public funds such as the EDF, the Cohesion Fund or the Recovery Fund to finance their military and defence industries. By authorising the use of these funds for defence spending, the EU is indirectly helping to finance weapons and bring them into line with Community law. This subtlety caused concern among EU diplomats, who stated that “the treaty explicitly excludes funding for weaponry” and wondered whether this strategy would work. Thierry Breton, European Commissioner for Internal Market, insisted on the “drastically, dramatically changed” European security context to justify using EU money to finance arms directly or indirectly. As the Cohesion Fund and the Recovery Fund were set up to help EU countries recover from the avian flu pandemic, the European Union should clarify the use of these funds and consider a strict plan on how they can be spent.
Finally, the mid-term review of the EDF could potentially lead to a significant reduction in other areas of the EU's public fund, but this has yet to be confirmed as decisions on the increase in the fund have not yet been made public. Europe is facing an economic and environmental crisis and is trying to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic. If Russia's aggression against Ukraine has convinced European public opinion to strengthen the practical and financial means of European defence and security, the EU must be able to justify the origin of the funds injected and the priority given to this area over others. There is common agreement on the war on European citizens, but the fears and interests of different nationalities are not the same.
Conclusion
As the international security landscape continues to evolve and transform, governments must adapt to meet new threats and ensure their defence. Within the European Union, the creation of the European Defence Fund has helped to address these crucial new security issues. This has had an impact on the European Union by highlighting its potential. Weaknesses that suggested the EU would not work have now become a strength, bringing together ideas and actions to address the common interests of European security. Although these objectives have exacerbated the divergent visions of EU Member States, the threats at Europe's borders and the instability of the international scene have made it essential to find a consensus. Today, there is a political will, which exceeds the financial capacities of the Member States, to move forward and cooperate to maintain security and assert Europe's place in the international system. European institutions, the private sector and public opinion in Europe are currently facing a number of challenges. They concern priorities, vision and action in the field of security and defence. However, these challenges do not seem impossible to meet, since they are based on a common objective: to have a European Union that is secure and capable of protecting itself in a world where security is increasingly fragile.
The Sudanese Generals’ Conflict - Overview and Possible Outcomes
A violent conflict broke out in Sudan between the Sudanese regular army and a paramilitary force called the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on 15 April 2023. The clashes come at a time of economic and political fragility, as Sudan undergoes a democratic transformation. International and intergovernmental agencies had predicted the conflict after efforts to establish a civilian-led democratic government failed, but tensions have only increased.
Overview of the current situation
This conflict has its roots in the regime of former dictator Omar al-Bashir. In 2003, armed movements in Darfur resisted Bashir’s regime, leading him to create the RSF. This paramilitary was led by Lt. General Mohammad Dagalo. He coordinated military operations with the Sudanese regular armed forces led by Lt General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. The cooperation between the two generals was strengthened in 2019 when a civilian uprising broke out against al-Bashir. They agreed to overthrow the regime and form a military council to rule the country. After three decades of terror, al-Bashir was ousted from power and, at the same time, prosecuted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for genocide and other crimes committed in Darfur in the 2000s. To this day, the ICC is still trying to arrest al-Bashir by cooperating with other states to extradite him.
In opposition to the figures al-Bashir assigned to lead the new civilian government, Dagalo and Burhan staged a coup in 2021 to rule over Sudan. With the country facing a severe economic and security crisis and having failed to establish a democratic government, a military framework between Burhan's regular army, Dagalo's RSF and the pro-democracy group Forces for Freedom and Change was signed in December 2022. However, public disagreements and tensions over the terms of the agreement gradually emerged between the two generals, through indirect statements and sharp accusations. These tensions eventually escalated into today’s violent conflict. The military coup, the failure to establish a democratic civilian government, and the governance of the country by two heavily armed military groups made Sudan a fertile ground for the emergence of armed conflict. It is not clear who initiated the fight, but both armed forces were militarily prepared for a confrontation.
The Generals’ fight
Before the conflict, Sudan was politically and economically weakened. Dagalo and Burhan saw the alliance as an opportunity to rule the country, protect their interests, strengthen their forces, and develop political ambitions. However, the military framework failed to bring about a common agreement between the two most powerful actors. The agreement provided for a transfer of power to civilians, the integration of the RSF into the regular army, the release of their lucrative control over agriculture, trade and other sectors, and the return of military forces to their headquarters. But, the framework was an obstacle to the interests and ambitions of the generals. By complying with it, both parties would have lost power and leadership over the control of the army, weapons, and resources. In addition, the generals' vision differed. On one hand, Dagalo accuses Burhan of being a “radical Islamist” and does not want him to rule the country. On the other hand, Burhan is willing to stop clashes and give back power to civilians only if a government is elected.
The conflict in Sudan clearly illustrates how quickly political alliances change, especially in a period of democratic transition. It also demonstrates the danger of having two heavily armed groups ruling the country and the ease with which the eruption of violence began. Their attitudes prove that this conflict is about power politics. Both generals have the ambition to free Sudan from the other faction. Their personal and professional experiences have accustomed them to always being in control at the top of the hierarchy, to using deterrent and offensive approaches, and to giving orders that include the use of lethal weapons. This idiosyncratic analysis can shed light on how they make decisions and confirm that they are willing to fight, regardless of the safety of the Sudanese.
The consequences and impacts of the conflict in Sudan
The clashes first started in Khartoum and quickly spread to other parts of Sudan, such as the Darfur region, Kassala, Gedaref, Port Sudan, and Omdurman. The conflict will cause a humanitarian crisis if a cease-fire is not reached. Indeed, at least 427 civilian casualties have been reported since the conflict began. The hostilities are destroying public infrastructure and making it impossible to supply basic necessities. Some civilian houses have been requisitioned and transformed into military fortifications. There are also reports of armed men breaking into homes to rob, assault, rape, loot and kill. Sudanese, humanitarian aid and diplomats are targeted. Martin Griffiths, UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, confirmed the reports. This raises questions about the ability of the two generals to command and control their soldiers. The inability of the commanders to handle their fighters could prolong the violence and undermine the chances of stability, even if Burhan and Dagalo were willing to reach an agreement.
How would it affect the region?
The conflict in Sudan could spread instability to neighbouring countries through refugee flows and intensify the future humanitarian crisis in Sudan and the wider region. As a result, Chad and Egypt have closed their borders with Sudan, believing that the fight could quickly spread to their countries. However, this does not mean that Sudan will be abandoned. In fact, Sudan is important. Located in a geopolitically important region, it is the third largest country in Africa, sharing borders with seven countries, and has an opening to the Red Sea. Sudan is rich in natural resources - gold, oil, iron, and chromium ore, among others - and has access to the Nile River. All these characteristics make Sudan a strategic country in an optimal but unstable location. Therefore, the involvement of other countries in this conflict can be envisaged, especially if it is prolonged. Dagalo and al-Burhan may seek material assistance from their allies. At present, General Mohammad Dagalo has an alliance with the United Arab Emirates and has close ties with the Wagner Group. For his part, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has an alliance with Egypt. It is important, in the coming days, to pay attention to new or re-established alliances in the region. Without the prospect of peace, other neighbouring and non-neighbouring countries may be tempted to take an interest in Sudan and participate directly or indirectly in the war efforts.
The conflict in Sudan is still at its peak. A 72-hour ceasefire on April 21 2023 came into effect after the emergency session of the UNSC during which the evacuation of foreign citizens occurred. According to Volker Pethers -head of the UN mission in Sudan- the ceasefire was only partially respected and clashes around “strategic locations largely continued and sometimes even intensified.” General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and General Mohammad Dagalo are both convinced of their positions and show no willingness to end the clashes. The time elapsed since the 2021 putsch shows that the generals are not willing to give up their seat of power and any response to international or international interventions has been a formality to which they would respond according to their own goodwill and interests. So far, mediators from the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and Western and Gulf capitals failed to bring Burhan and Dagalo to the negotiation table. An emergency session of the UN Security Council (UNSC) was held on 25 April 2023. António Guterres urged for a respected ceasefire and to end hostilities in order to launch negotiations and bring humanitarian assistance to the Sudanese people.
Possible outcomes
As international and intergovernmental actors have failed to obtain a proper ceasefire and bring the two parties to the negotiation table, several hypotheses on the evolution of this conflict can be envisaged.
Firstly, one of the issues would be the interference by other countries or private actors in this conflict by sending military, financial or human capabilities. Dagalo has a close relationship with Wagner, mainly for the extraction of natural resources. In order to continue to profit from Sudan's natural resources, Wagner could become directly or indirectly involved in the conflict to enable Dagalo to maintain an advantage in the conflict and gain power in the long term. Burhan and al-Sissi are partners and Sudan and Egypt share a common border. To prevent the conflict from spreading beyond his borders, President Abdel Fattah al-Sissi could decide to intervene in the conflict to both protect his territory and support an ally.
Secondly, one of the fighting parties took control of a laboratory in Khartoum on 26 April and “kicked out all of the technicians”, which represents a biological risk. Dangerous biological samples, such as cholera and measles, are isolated in this laboratory. With power cuts in Khartoum, the WHO has expressed concern about “exposure to highly contagious pathogens.” The exposure could reinforce the upcoming humanitarian crisis caused by the conflict and worsens the economic and health conditions in Sudan. Indeed, the spread of these viruses would decimate the Sudanese population, which is already in a critical situation, and would make it even more difficult for international humanitarian aid to intervene in the long term.
Last but not least, if one of the two generals wins, it is possible that the winner will refuse the establishment of a civilian democratic government and impose a dictatorship in his image. The stalemate of the conflict and the non-respect of international laws make them liable to international sanctions and prosecution before the ICC. Al-Bashir, prosecuted by the ICC for war crimes, is an example the generals do not want to follow. The ICC is actively requiring states like Jordan, South Africa, Kenya, and Angola, among others, to arrest the former dictator. However, there is a lack of cooperation and countries refuse to comply. Indeed, a number of countries are either signatories of the Rome Statute but have not ratified it, or are not signatories or State Parties and therefore do not recognise the Court’s jurisdiction. The generals will avoid falling under international warrants. However, the establishment of a civilian government and the opening of the country to international authorities would make them punishable and isolated. In this context, rivalries between generals are likely to persist and the establishment of democracy unlikely for the time being.