Germany’s Defence Policy: Security Challenges and Adjusted Evolution
German defence policy has been in turmoil in recent weeks. On 16 January, Christine Lambrecht, then-Defence Minister, announced her resignation from Chancellor Olaf Scholz's cabinet, marking both the end of her controversial and much-criticised tenure and the start of a crucial week for the German government in terms of defence policies, particularly with regards to its military involvement in the war in Ukraine. Later, on 25 January, Scholz announced unexpected news to the public: Germany will supply Ukraine with 14 Leopard 2 battle tanks, after a long reluctance to do so.
Lambrecht, who had no previous experience in defence or international affairs, had held the post of defence minister since 8 December 2021, following the inauguration of Scholz’s administration. At the time, the official view and subsequent foreign policy priorities of the new government were those that ensured “continuity” with the compromises adopted by its predecessors, especially those of Angela Merkel; defence and military-related issues were no exception. Prior to Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, analysts suggested that Berlin would once again fail to meet the NATO target of spending at least 2% of GDP on defence.
Nonetheless, the emergence, escalation, and prolongation of the conflict on the Ukrainian territory led to some significant deviations from Scholz’s original plans. Only a few days after the Russian invasion, the chancellor announced his decision to spend €100 billion on military investments in 2022, roughly doubling the funds allocated to this purpose in 2021 (€47 billion), in order to meet NATO’s annual defence spending target. This decision is remarkably striking, considering that, according to a 2019 pledge by Merkel, German compliance with the latter could only be expected after 2030.
In February 2022, Scholz’s statements mentioned the need to “invest more in the security of our country to protect our freedom and democracy” and introduced a pledge to provide further assistance to Ukraine in terms of “anti-tank weapons, surface-to-air missiles, and ammunition” after the country’s reluctance to send weapons to conflict zones. Several articles referred to a “revolution” or “U-turn” in the country’s defence policy. At the time, the Chancellor himself introduced the German concept of Zeitenwende (a turning point) to describe what the Russian invasion of Ukraine meant for Europe.
In this context, several challenges emerged for the then-Minister of Defence, given the strategic, logistical, and operational aspects of the German government’s new defence policy and its commitments to support Ukraine’s war efforts. On several occasions, Lambrecht has been questioned on her role as minister after a series of “blunders” and “missteps.” The criticism mostly focused on her management of the Bundeswehr (German armed forces), especially on matters related to their modernisation. However, other scandals intensified public objections to her. Lambrecht reportedly used a military helicopter for a private trip with her 21-year-old son in mid-April 2022. She also recently posted a “tone-deaf” video on her social media in which she discussed the "war raging in the middle of Europe" as fireworks rang out behind her during New Year’s celebrations in Berlin.
For Chancellor Scholz, the timing of her resignation was critical: that same week, representatives and senior defence officials from 51 countries were due to meet at the U.S. Ramstein Air Base, in the German province of Rhineland-Palatinate, following an official visit to Berlin by U.S. Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin.
On 17 January, just one day after Lambrecht stepped down from her role as defence minister, Scholz disclosed his choice for her successor: Boris Pistorius, who had, until then, served as interior minister of Lower Saxony. Upon his nomination, the German head of government emphasised Pistorious’ “experience, competence, and assertiveness” in a statement posted on Twitter, eloquently expressing his confidence in him, as he had done with Lambrecht when she was in office. However, Pistorius has “no defense experience, has never held senior federal office, and is not well known outside Germany.”
Pistorius officially took office on 19 January, one day before the Ramstein conference, while facing mounting international pressure to end the country’s reluctance to provide Ukraine with German-made Leopard 2 tanks. Despite comments by a senior U.S. defence official indicating that Washington would press Germany on the issue, given the possibility of a Russian spring offensive, the Ramstein talks yielded no clear results.
Notably, the hopes of several Western allies for a policy shift after the arrival of a new minister were quickly shattered. It was Chancellor Scholz himself who had repeatedly refused to allow his country and others to export Leopard tanks to Ukraine. Among his arguments was the consideration that supplying arms could potentially draw NATO into a wider conflict with Moscow.
Nevertheless, expectations remained high. On the one hand, on 20 January the government had not yet ruled out supplying Ukraine with Leopard 2 tanks. On the other hand, the Scholz administration had signalled on 23 January that it would not block other countries’ efforts to deliver these tanks, following statements by Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock indicating that Germany would not “stand in the way” should Poland decide to supply Ukraine with its national fleet of Leopard 2s.
The commitment not to interfere with other countries’ willingness to assist Kyiv by supplying tanks not only meant a compromise with the allies who demanded greater German involvement on the matter, but it was also a first sign of a change in Berlin’s posture. Eventually, Scholz announced his decision to supply Ukraine with 14 Leopard 2 battle tanks on 25 January. He did so alongside Joe Biden, who in turn announced a donation of 31 Abrams tanks. With this announcement, both countries have significantly asserted their stance on the war, as the tanks represent the most powerful direct offensive weapon provided to Ukraine so far. Given the scope of this decision and the implications it could have for German national security, it could be said that Scholz took this step reluctantly and in response to the pressures he and his cabinet have been under from several NATO members in recent weeks. Conversely, Russian officials have announced that bilateral ties with Berlin have been irreparably damaged and that this move has changed the nature of the war.
All in all, since Scholz’s Zeitenwende speech, Germany has provided €2 billion in aid to Ukraine, including border protection vehicles, reconnaissance drones, ambulances, tents, clothing, meals, and mine clearing systems, among others. Moreover, the country is expected to supply a further €2.2 billion in 2023 for security capacity building. The 14 Leopard 2 tanks also contribute to this effort.
Nevertheless, Germany’s foreign and defence policy has many aspects of continuity, even after undertaking a “U-turn”. Scholz has balanced his approach with a strong commitment to maintaining other German traditions in these policy areas. These key elements are encapsulated in the post-Cold War efforts to support international cooperation, European integration, and a rules-based international order, while remaining deeply committed to international institutions such as the UN and even the North Atlantic Treaty.
In the words of U.S. scholar Hal Brands, the German approach has been “evolutionary rather than revolutionary.” The concept of the Zeitenwende, even after the recent decisions on battle tanks, might actually be better understood as a 'turning point' in the speed of decision-making in public policy, in this case defence and security, rather than as a complete and unambiguous revolution. In addition, further obstacles to major change are likely to emerge when it comes to modernising the German military. According to Judy Dempsey, a Carnegie Europe non-resident Senior Fellow, the Ministry of Defence is affected by “deep structural issues”, such as “its bureaucracy, lack of a strategic military doctrine, and reluctance to embrace modernization.”
Meanwhile, several issues that pertain to German national security remain unresolved. Some are closely linked to the war in Ukraine, such as the question of energy supply. Beyond the dependence on Russian gas, which has officially ended according to Finance Minister Christian Lindner, a deeper crisis affecting the whole region has fueled local demand for candles, coal, and wood. Other pressing issues relate to relations with China: China's ambassador to Germany, Wu Ken, recently expressed concerns that the emergence of a new “ideology-based” German strategy towards Beijing could hamper bilateral cooperation and strain diplomatic ties.
Besides some of the novelties that the German defence policy has displayed, the traditional channels and means of shaping its direction remain in place. The Scholz-Macron meeting on 21 January was a public display of the chancellor’s and its counterpart's commitment to European unity and cooperation. Such demonstrations might reassure those concerned about Germany’s geopolitical position in a post-Ukraine war scenario, and might even reassure domestic stakeholders about the future stability of a responsible and timely implementation of the €100 billion Zeitenwende pledge.